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Leslie M. Jenny

Office Managing Attorney

Co-Chair, Long-Term Care Liability Practice

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Portrait of Leslie M. Jenny

As a member of the Health Care Department, Leslie focuses her practice on the representation of medical professionals and providers, including physicians, hospitals and nursing home/extended care facilities. She serves as co-chair of the Long-Term Care Liability Practice, defending long-term care facilities and providers against personal injury claims. Leslie is an experienced litigator who has spent her 25-year legal career defending matters related to catastrophic medical malpractice, medical device and pharmaceutical liability, and long-term care. She has also handled veterinary negligence matters and matters before the Ohio Veterinary Medical Licensing Board.

Leslie is a Certified Professional in Healthcare Risk Management (CPHRM). In this role, she counsels and advises clients on the prevention, reduction and control of loss within their organizations. She works together with health care providers to assess, manage and update their risk management programs.

Leslie was recognized as the 2025 Cleveland "Lawyer of the Year" in the area of Litigation - Health Care by the Best Lawyers organization. She is a member of the Claims and Litigation Management Alliance, American Society for Healthcare Risk Management, DRI and several bar associations. She is a frequent speaker at events hosted by hospitals, nursing homes and professional organizations.

    • Cleveland State University College of Law (J.D., 1996)
    • Baldwin Wallace University (B.A., cum laude, 1993)
    • Ohio, 1996
    • U.S. District Court Northern District of Ohio, 2008
    • The Best Lawyers in America®, “Lawyer of the Year,” Cleveland, Litigation - Health Care (2025)
    • The Best Lawyers in America®, Litigation - Health Care; Medical Malpractice Law - Defendants (2022-2027)
    • Ohio Super Lawyer Rising Star (2011-2012)
    • American Society for Healthcare Risk Management
    • Claims & Litigation Management Alliance (CLM)
    • Cleveland Metropolitan Bar Association
    • Ohio State Bar Association
    • Hot Topics: Regulatory and Related Changes in Healthcare, PLUS Medical PL Symposium, Chicago, IL, March 14, 2017
    • Impact of Affordable Care Act on Future Damages, Health Care Law Seminar, Marshall Dennehey, November 9, 2016
    • Application of ACA to Reduce Future Damages, Medical Liability Insurance ExecuSummit, Uncasville, CT, September 14, 2016
    • The Affordable Care Act: Changing the Health Care System and Medical Malpractice, Health Care and Health Law Seminar, Marshall Dennehey, November 5, 2015
    • Review of Claims and Other Legal Actions Involving Unprofessional Behavior by Physicians and Staff, Risk Management/Patient Safety Seminars for 2012, Lexington Insurance Company/Chartis, 2012
    • "Admissibility of State Survey Results in Long-Term Care Litigation," Defense Digest, Vol 23, No. 4, December 2017
    • "Practical Defense Considerations: Building the Foundation to Apply the ACA to Reduce Future Damages," PLUS Journal, December 2016
    • "Court Ruling Demonstrates ACA's Power to Reduce Future Medical Expenses," Journal of Healthcare Risk Management, Volume 35, Number 4, April 2016
    • Obtained a defense verdict on behalf of a nursing home in Cuyahoga County. The case involved a 75-year-old resident who fell, fracturing his hip, and died. The medical examiner ruled that the death was accidental and due to the fall. The plaintiff claimed inadequate fall precautions and failure to assess appropriately after the fall against the skilled nursing facility, and requested punitive damages. The plaintiff’s Final Pretrial Statement demanded $7 million. After three days of trial, the judge granted a directed verdict for the defense.

Results

Thought Leadership

The Quarterly Dose

Defense Victory: Summary Judgment Granted for Corporate Nursing Home Defendants in Medical Negligence Case

May 1, 2025

Leslie M. Jenny and Gabriella M. Wittbrod, both of our Cleveland, OH office, were granted summary judgment on behalf of their corporate nursing home clients in this medical negligence case. Judge Phillip S. Naumoff of the Richland County Court of Common Pleas granted our request, finding that the plaintiff failed to establish liability, causation or viable claims against individual employees—rendering vicarious liability inapplicable under Ohio law. Sarah Miller, as the Personal Representative of the Estate of Mary Holt v. Lexington Court Care Center, et al., Richland County Court of Common Pleas, 24-CV-288N, Judge Phillip S. Naumoff, was originally filed on August 4, 2021, naming corporate nursing home defendants and John Does. The John Does were later dismissed due to the expiration of the statute of limitations. The court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on May 17, 2023, because the remaining defendants were corporations, thus, incapable of acting on their own behalf.  The plaintiff voluntarily dismissed her case and refiled on June 6, 2024. The court again dismissed the John Doe defendants for the same reason. The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment for the remaining corporate defendants. In his order, Judge Naumoff held that, pursuant to Clawson v. Heights Chiropractic Physicians, L.L.C., 170 Ohio St.3d 451, 214 N.E.3d 540, 2022-Ohio-4154, an employer cannot be held vicariously liable for an employee’s alleged negligence when all claims against the employee are non-viable or have been extinguished. Judge Naumoff noted: “While it is true, the Plaintiff can file a claim against either the principal of an agent, the plaintiff cannot recover against a principal if she cannot legally recover against an agent.” In her brief in opposition to the defendants’ motion for summary judgement, the plaintiff made several arguments that were rejected by the court. First, the plaintiff claimed this was a “medical claim,” not a medical malpractice claim; thus, Clawson does not apply. The court held that Ohio law and Ohio courts make no distinction between medical claims and medical malpractice. The plaintiff also claimed that Clawson does not apply to nursing home claims, to which the court responded that it apples to any employer/employee relationship.  Judge Naumoff criticized the plaintiff’s complaint for being vague, stating that it “contains ninety-five paragraphs of repetitive allegations that throw a few scant facts and a mass of legal standards and legal conclusions together in a hodge-podge.” Further, he reviewed the plaintiff’s expert report and found the physician who reviewed the case only mentioned the nursing home and its staff—there was no mention of any of the named corporate defendants. The court also found that the plaintiff’s expert report did not address causation whatsoever.  Judge Naumoff dismissed all non-negligence claims for failure to state a claim, and he granted our request for summary judgment in favor of all the defendants on the remaining claim of medical negligence because the plaintiff failed to establish a duty of the defendants and/or causation.    The Quarterly Dose – May 2025, has been prepared for our readers by Marshall Dennehey. It is solely intended to provide information on recent legal developments and is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We welcome the opportunity to provide such legal assistance as you require on this and other subjects. If you receive the alerts in error, please send a note to tamontemuro@mdwcg.com. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2025 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved.

Legal Updates for Long-Term Care Liability

Defense Victory: Summary Judgment Granted for Corporate Nursing Home Defendants in Medical Negligence Case

April 11, 2025

Leslie M. Jenny and Gabriella M. Wittbrod, both of our Cleveland, OH office, were granted summary judgment on behalf of their corporate nursing home clients in this medical negligence case. Judge Phillip S. Naumoff of the Richland County Court of Common Pleas granted our request, finding that the plaintiff failed to establish liability, causation, or viable claims against individual employees—rendering vicarious liability inapplicable under Ohio law. Sarah Miller, as the Personal Representative of the Estate of Mary Holt v. Lexington Court Care Center, et al., Richland County Court of Common Pleas, 24-CV-288N, Judge Phillip S. Naumoff, was originally filed on August 4, 2021, naming corporate nursing home defendants and John Does. The John Does were later dismissed due to the expiration of the statute of limitations, and the court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on May 17, 2023, because the remaining defendants were corporations, thus, incapable of acting on their own behalf.  The plaintiff voluntarily dismissed her case and refiled on June 6, 2024. The court again dismissed the John Doe defendants for the same reason. The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment for the remaining corporate defendants. In his order, Judge Naumoff held that, pursuant to Clawson v. Heights Chiropractic Physicians, L.L.C., 170 Ohio St.3d 451, 214 N.E.3d 540, 2022-Ohio-4154, an employer cannot be held vicariously liable for an employee’s alleged negligence when all claims against the employee are non-viable or have been extinguished. Judge Naumoff noted: “While it is true, the Plaintiff can file a claim against either the principal of an agent, the Plaintiff cannot recover against a principal if she cannot legally recover against an agent.” In her brief in opposition to the defendants’ motion for summary judgement, the plaintiff made several arguments that were rejected by the court. First, the plaintiff claimed this was a “medical claim,” not a medical malpractice claim and, thus, Clawson does not apply. The court held that Ohio law and Ohio courts make no distinction between medical claims and medical malpractice. The plaintiff also claimed that Clawson does not apply to nursing home claims, to which the court responded that Clawson apples to any employer/employee relationship.  Judge Naumoff criticized the plaintiff’s complaint for being vague, stating that it “contains ninety-five paragraphs of repetitive allegations that throw a few scant facts and a mass of legal standards and legal conclusions together in a hodge-podge.” Further, he reviewed the plaintiff’s expert report and found the physician who reviewed the case only mentioned the nursing home and its staff—there was no mention of any of the named corporate defendants. The court also found that the plaintiff’s expert report did not address causation whatsoever.  Judge Naumoff dismissed all non-negligence claims for failure to state a claim, and he granted our request for summary judgment in favor of all the defendants on the remaining claim of medical negligence because the plaintiff failed to establish a duty of the defendants and/or causation.    Legal Updates for Long-Term Care Liability – April 11, 2025, has been prepared for our readers by Marshall Dennehey. It is solely intended to provide information on recent legal developments and is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We welcome the opportunity to provide such legal assistance as you require on this and other subjects. If you receive the alerts in error, please send a note to tamontemuro@mdwcg.com. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2024 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Florida Supreme Court Rules Florida Statute §627.70152 Does not Apply Retroactively

In a decision that resolves years of appellate uncertainty and confirms that insurers and insureds alike can rely on the legal framework in place when a policy is issued, the Supreme Court of Florida last week found that Florida Statute §627.70152, which involves an insured’s requirement to provide an insurer with pre-suit notice before filing a suit, cannot be applied retroactively. In Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company v. Hughes, the Court was presented with the issue of whether the statutory pre-suit notice requirement applied retroactively and whether it would apply to a breach of contract of an insurance policy that was issued before the statute went into effect. Before the Court was an appeal from a homeowner, Ms. Hughes, who sued her insurance carrier, Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company (Universal) for breach of contract under an insurance policy that was in effect from April 24, 2019 through April 24, 2020. During the policy period, Ms. Hughes suffered a loss and, on May 29, 2019, made a claim for water damage. The carrier investigated the loss and issued payment; Ms. Hughes disputed the payment, finding the amount insufficient for repairs. On July 1, 2021, Florida Statute §627.70152 went into effect, which required insureds to provide notice of intent to initiate litigation against the carrier prior to filing a lawsuit; if an insured filed the lawsuit without complying with §627.70152, a court must dismiss the case without prejudice. On August 4, 2021, Ms. Hughes filed her lawsuit against Universal for breach of contract. Universal moved to dismiss based on her failure to comply with §627.70152. Ms. Hughes contended the notice requirement could not be applied retroactively. The trial court disagreed and dismissed the lawsuit without prejudice, and Ms. Hughes appealed. During the appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, in Cole v. Universal Property & Casualty, 363 So. 3d 1089 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023), ruled that Florida Statute §627.70152 did apply retroactively to policies issued before the effective date of §627.70152. However, the Sixth District Court agreed with Ms. Hughes and overturned the trial court’s ruling, finding the statute could not retroactively apply to policies issued prior to the statute effective date. Thereafter, the other district courts weighed in, with the Third District Court agreeing with the Fourth District Court, and the First, Second and Fifth District Courts agreeing with the Sixth District Court. In resolving the conflict amongst the district courts, the Supreme Court advised “as a general rule, ‘the statute in effect at the time an insurance contract is executed governs substantive issues arising in connection with that contract.’ Hassen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 674 So. 2d 106, 108 (Fla. 1996). The Court applied the two-step test when deciding whether a statute has retroactive application: “First, the Court must ascertain whether the Legislature intended for the statute to apply retroactively. Second, if such an intent is clearly expressed, the Court must determine whether retroactive application would violate any constitutional principles.” Menendez v. Progressive Exp. Ins. Co., 35 So. 3d 873, 877 (Fla. 2010). In analyzing the Legislature’s intent, the Court must determine whether the Legislature has manifested a clear command for retroactivity in the statutory text.  In review of the statutory text, the Court found nothing in the language of the statute to indicate that the phrase “all suits” was serving another purpose of expanding its reach to suits based on policies that both predate and postdate the enactment of the statute. Buis v. Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 394 So. 3d 738, 741 (Fla. 2d DCA 2024). Further, the Court noted the statute has an effective date, which has long been considered to be evidence against retroactive application of a statute. The Court concluded that, on its face, no provision of §627.70152 speaks to application of the statute to insurance policies issued before the statute’s effective date and therefore, the Legislature did not clearly command retroactivity of the statute to include insurance policies issued prior to the enactment of the statute. The Court briefly reviewed Universal’s argument that the presuit notice requirement was procedural, not substantive, and therefore should be applied retroactively; however, the Court agreed with the Sixth District Court’s finding that, in its entirety, §627.70152 transformed an insured’s ability to sue an insurance company under a property insurance policy and an insurer’s obligations to respond to and pay insurance claims, thus making the requirement a substantive change. The Court thereby upheld the decision of the Sixth District and disapproved the decision of the Fourth District in Cole.

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Act 111's IRE Provisions

In this case, the claimant sustained a work injury of January 6, 1994, which was acknowledged by Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP). After the claimant’s receipt of 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, the employer filed a Request for an Impairment Rating Examination (IRE). The IRE was performed in May 2023 and the IRE physician found that the claimant had a 5% whole person impairment, under the AMA Guides. The employer filed a Petition based on the IRE results, and the Petition was granted by the WCJ. During litigation, the claimant argued that the IRE provisions of Act 111 (Section 306(a.3) of the Act) were not applicable to her injury, since it predated June 24, 1996, the date Act 57 went into effect, and that the IRE provisions were unconstitutional. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ)) granted the Petition and the Board affirmed. On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the claimant argued that Act 111 violated the nondelegation doctrine and that its retroactive application to the claimant’s injury was unconstitutional. The court rejected the arguments on the basis that they had already found the same arguments without merit in multiple, prior cases. The court also addressed an argument made by the claimant that Act 111 was procedurally defective under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it was only considered on two days in each House after having undergone amendments and reassignments. The court noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires every bill to be considered on three different days in each House. The claimant maintained that, according to the legislative history, the bill did not receive three separate days of consideration from each House when it was assigned a new bill number. The court pointed out, however, that the bill number, H.B. 1840 remained constant and was considered on three occasions by the House. Further, the court concluded that minor amendments to the bill were germane to its original subject, which was to modify the Act’s IRE process, in accordance with Protz II.

Thought Leadership

WCJ Improperly Refused to Conduct C&R Hearing and Erroneously Required Settlement of All Pending Petitions

In this case, the claimant sustained injuries in the course and scope of her employment as a registered nurse. The employer acknowledged the injury by a Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP).  Subsequently, a Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ) expanded the description of injury. The employer then filed a Termination Petition, alleging the claimant was fully recovered from the injuries. Providers filed Utilization Review (UR) Petitions, challenging UR determinations finding their chiropractic treatment to be not reasonable and necessary. A settlement of the claim was eventually reached, and the employer filed a Petition to Seek Approval of a Compromise and Release (C&R) Agreement. The C&R outlined that the agreement fully resolved all future workers’ compensation claims except for the termination and UR Petitions. Briefs were filed and one day later, the WCJ issued an Interlocutory Order which stated if instructions were not followed regarding filing of a C&R, a settlement hearing date would not be given. The employer complied with the order, and filed the C&R. Subsequently, the WCJ notified the parties that the C&R must resolve all issues in the petitions, or would not be entertained. A settlement hearing was never held, and the WCJ then issued a decision, granting the Termination Petition and dismissing the UR Petitions. The WCJ also said that the Petition for Approval of a C&R was dismissed without prejudice, as the issues in the Termination and UR Petitions went to a decision. The claimant appealed to the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Board). The Board granted the claimant’s appeal, finding that the WCJ violated the requirement of Section 449 that an expedited hearing be held when a Petition for Approval of a C&R is filed.  The Board further held that it was legally incorrect for the WCJ to insist that the C&R resolve all issues raised by the pending Petitions. The Board remanded the case to a new WCJ, and Employer appealed to the Commonwealth Court. The court affirmed the Board and held that the WCJ erred, as a matter of law, by refusing to hold an expedited hearing within 30 days, once the Petition for Approval of a C&R was filed.  The court noted that the language of Section 449(b) is mandatory, and a settlement hearing is not discretionary or dependent on a party’s separate request for a stay, or whether the record has been closed. The court further rejected Employer’s argument that the case should not be remanded to a new WCJ for a new decision on the termination and and UR Petitions, as the Board passed no judgment on whether the C&R Agreement resolved the termination and UR Petitions, and left it for the WCJ to decide in connection with the Petition for Approval of a C&R.