.

Legal Updates for Insurance Services

Court Clarifies Efficient Proximate Cause Rule: Covered Peril Must Be the Dominant Cause

February 24, 2026

A scenario all too familiar in the world of property insurance claims arises when an insured seeks a full roof replacement after their roof is beyond its useful life. The roof is visibly deteriorated, and a minor wind event becomes the proverbial “straw that breaks the camel’s back.” This raises a central coverage question: was the loss caused by a covered peril—wind—mandating payment for a new roof? Or, was the loss caused by excluded conditions—deterioration and wear and tear—which insurance does not cover? The answer to this question often determines whether the insurer owes tens of thousands of dollars, or nothing at all.

Recently, in Stella Property Development and Event Production, LLC v. Auto-Owners Insurance Company, 2026 WL 221489 (W.D. Pa. 2026), the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania addressed three issues that are often central to these types of claims:  Pennsylvania’s “causation” analysis, the scope of ensuing loss clauses, and the evidentiary threshold for maintaining statutory bad faith claims.

Following a windstorm, Stella submitted an insurance claim, alleging extensive roof damage. Auto-Owners had issued Stella a commercial property policy, covering a historic building formerly used as a church. As typical, the policy insured against “direct physical loss or damage” to the structure subject to various exclusions.

After multiple inspections, Auto-Owners concluded that the roof had not been damaged by a single wind event, but rather, was in a deteriorated state due to age, decay, and wear and tear. Accordingly, Auto-Owners denied coverage pursuant to the policy’s wear and tear and maintenance exclusions. Stella filed suit, asserting claims for breach of contract and statutory bad faith. The parties ultimately filed cross-motions for summary judgment, prompting a 32-page Memorandum Opinion.

 

Causation

The “entire premise” of Stella’s argument was that, even if the roof manifested wear and tear, the cited exclusions did not bar coverage under Pennsylvania’s “efficient proximate cause” rule. However, Stella also invoked what other jurisdictions refer to as the “concurrent causation” doctrine. Accordingly, prior to addressing Stella’s argument, the District Court clarified the difference between these theories.

“Efficient proximate cause” is framed in causal sequence, and asks which peril was the “triggering” cause. It requires coverage where a covered cause of loss “sets into motion the chain of events” culminating in the loss, even if excluded causes contributed along the way.

“Concurrent causation” is applied where covered and excluded perils operate as independent, concurrent causes of the same loss. It permits coverage so long as the covered peril is a “concurrent proximate cause of the injuries.”

The District Court then explained, regardless of labels, “courts often collapse the analysis into a single inquiry focused on identifying the proximate or predominant cause of the loss.”

Looking to Trexler Lumber Co. v. Allemannia Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh for guidance, the District Court predicted that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would apply the efficient proximate cause doctrine in a predominant-cause sense. Under that framework, Stella’s claim was not defeated merely because excluded perils contributed to the loss, but Stella was required to adduce evidence that the covered peril was the “dominant and efficient” cause of the damage, as opposed to merely a remote or incidental cause.

 

Ensuing Loss Clauses

The policy’s wear and tear and maintenance exclusions each contained ensuing loss provisions, albeit with slightly different wording. Despite the differing language, the District Court’s interpretation was consistent: the ensuing loss clauses applied only where the excluded condition itself “results in” a new, distinct covered peril. While inadequate maintenance and/or wear and tear may affect how a roof performs during a windstorm, neither “results in” a windstorm.

Accordingly, the District Court made clear that ensuing loss clauses are to be strictly construed, and do not automatically trigger coverage when excluded conditions contribute to the loss. Rather, coverage is only restored when the excluded conditions actually give rise to a separate covered peril.

 

Bad Faith Claim

Finally, because Auto-Owners’ coverage determination was grounded in a thorough investigation and well-supported expert opinions, Stella’s bad faith claim failed as a matter of law, and was dismissed.

In coming to its coverage decision, Auto-Owners’ relied on detailed investigative materials, multiple inspections, and expert assessments. Those findings all attributed the roof damage to decay, wear and tear, and inadequate maintenance, thereby providing Auto-Owners with an objectively reasonable basis for concluding that a covered windstorm was not the dominant and efficient cause of the loss.

 

Takeaway

This decision provides helpful framework as to how Pennsylvania courts are likely to assess causation in these claims, regardless of labels. Insurers should take heed of this as they adjust claims that involve multiple perils.


Legal Updates for Insurance Services - February 24, 2026, has been prepared for our readers by Marshall Dennehey. It is solely intended to provide information on recent legal developments and is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We welcome the opportunity to provide such legal assistance as you require on this and other subjects. If you receive the alerts in error, please contact MeDeSatnick@MDWCG.com. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2026 Marshall Dennehey, P.C. All Rights Reserved.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

WCJ Improperly Refused to Conduct C&R Hearing and Erroneously Required Settlement of All Pending Petitions

In this case, the claimant sustained injuries in the course and scope of her employment as a registered nurse. The employer acknowledged the injury by a Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP).  Subsequently, a Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ) expanded the description of injury. The employer then filed a Termination Petition, alleging the claimant was fully recovered from the injuries. Providers filed Utilization Review (UR) Petitions, challenging UR determinations finding their chiropractic treatment to be not reasonable and necessary. A settlement of the claim was eventually reached, and the employer filed a Petition to Seek Approval of a Compromise and Release (C&R) Agreement. The C&R outlined that the agreement fully resolved all future workers’ compensation claims except for the termination and UR Petitions. Briefs were filed and one day later, the WCJ issued an Interlocutory Order which stated if instructions were not followed regarding filing of a C&R, a settlement hearing date would not be given. The employer complied with the order, and filed the C&R. Subsequently, the WCJ notified the parties that the C&R must resolve all issues in the petitions, or would not be entertained. A settlement hearing was never held, and the WCJ then issued a decision, granting the Termination Petition and dismissing the UR Petitions. The WCJ also said that the Petition for Approval of a C&R was dismissed without prejudice, as the issues in the Termination and UR Petitions went to a decision. The claimant appealed to the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Board). The Board granted the claimant’s appeal, finding that the WCJ violated the requirement of Section 449 that an expedited hearing be held when a Petition for Approval of a C&R is filed.  The Board further held that it was legally incorrect for the WCJ to insist that the C&R resolve all issues raised by the pending Petitions. The Board remanded the case to a new WCJ, and Employer appealed to the Commonwealth Court. The court affirmed the Board and held that the WCJ erred, as a matter of law, by refusing to hold an expedited hearing within 30 days, once the Petition for Approval of a C&R was filed.  The court noted that the language of Section 449(b) is mandatory, and a settlement hearing is not discretionary or dependent on a party’s separate request for a stay, or whether the record has been closed. The court further rejected Employer’s argument that the case should not be remanded to a new WCJ for a new decision on the termination and and UR Petitions, as the Board passed no judgment on whether the C&R Agreement resolved the termination and UR Petitions, and left it for the WCJ to decide in connection with the Petition for Approval of a C&R.

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Act 111's IRE Provisions

In this case, the claimant sustained a work injury of January 6, 1994, which was acknowledged by Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP). After the claimant’s receipt of 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, the employer filed a Request for an Impairment Rating Examination (IRE). The IRE was performed in May 2023 and the IRE physician found that the claimant had a 5% whole person impairment, under the AMA Guides. The employer filed a Petition based on the IRE results, and the Petition was granted by the WCJ. During litigation, the claimant argued that the IRE provisions of Act 111 (Section 306(a.3) of the Act) were not applicable to her injury, since it predated June 24, 1996, the date Act 57 went into effect, and that the IRE provisions were unconstitutional. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ)) granted the Petition and the Board affirmed. On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the claimant argued that Act 111 violated the nondelegation doctrine and that its retroactive application to the claimant’s injury was unconstitutional. The court rejected the arguments on the basis that they had already found the same arguments without merit in multiple, prior cases. The court also addressed an argument made by the claimant that Act 111 was procedurally defective under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it was only considered on two days in each House after having undergone amendments and reassignments. The court noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires every bill to be considered on three different days in each House. The claimant maintained that, according to the legislative history, the bill did not receive three separate days of consideration from each House when it was assigned a new bill number. The court pointed out, however, that the bill number, H.B. 1840 remained constant and was considered on three occasions by the House. Further, the court concluded that minor amendments to the bill were germane to its original subject, which was to modify the Act’s IRE process, in accordance with Protz II.

Thought Leadership

Appellate Division Reversed Trial Judge's Orders Granting a Plaintiff's Section 40 Summary Judgement Motion

In Haskins v. Casey, et al., the plaintiff Dane Haskins worked for defendant Ekornes, Inc. (Ekornes) as a material handler. In June 2021, he filed a workers’ compensation claim petition for benefits due to a left shoulder injury in December 2020. He then resolved his workers’ compensation claim in November 2022 under an Order Approving Settlement. In January 2023, he filed a lawsuit against Ekornes and later amended to add additional claims and name other defendants, including the Ekornes president, chief financial officer, and director of human resources. In May 2025, a second amended complaint alleged that after he filed the workers compensation claim, Ekornes placed him on leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), denied his request for a work accommodation, and ultimately terminated him from employment in December 2021. He pleaded several causes of action asserting violations of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD) as well as fraudulent concealment and wrongful discharge. The plaintiff then moved for partial summary judgment, seeking an order enforcing Section 40 of the Workers’ Compensation Act (WCA) as well as summary judgment on his FMLA claims. The defendants opposed the motions and cross-moved for summary judgment on the FMLA claims. After arguments, the court entered an order in December 2025, denying the FMLA motion and cross motion and granting the plaintiff’s Section 40 motion. In the order, the court permitted the plaintiff to pursue compensatory damages at trial in connection with the bodily injury claim. The court also allowed the plaintiff to present evidence of any workers’ compensation benefits to support his claim. The court then denied the defendant's subsequent reconsideration motion in February 2026. The defendants that appealed the Section 40 aspect of the orders. In reviewing the appeal de novo, the Appellate Division rejected the plaintiff's argument that the work-related injury arose out of his discrimination claims under the LAD. The plaintiff argued that he should be able to pursue a personal injury claim as a part of his LAD claim, noting that the employer’s compensation carrier would be able to assert a lien against any recovery against his LAD claims. In distinguishing between the Richter vs. Oakland Board of Education, 246 N.J. 507 (2021) case, in which the Court found that any recovery would be subject to a Section 40 lien as the allegation was that the defendants failed to accommodate her pre-existing diabetic condition, which resulted in bodily injury. In this case, the Appellate Division indicated that there was no bodily injury caused by Ekornes’ failure to accommodate a pre-existing disability. Rather, the shoulder injury was a result of a workers compensation claim, for which he received appropriate benefits previously. The Appellate Division noted that if the plaintiff was successful in proving his LAD claims, he would be entitled to damages caused by the discriminatory discriminatory conduct such as lost wages and emotional distress damages and that there will be no Section 40 lien. In addition, the Appellate Division disagreed that the petitioner could present evidence about and seek damages for his shoulder injury at trial. Although the petitioner argued that a defendant who retaliated against an employee for filing a workers’ compensation claim should not benefit from the exclusivity provision of the WCA, the Appellate Division noted that the Legislature did not include this type of scenario in the statue nor did any of the case law recognize this type of claim as a remedy. As such, the Appellate Division reversed the December 2025 order granting the the plaintiff’s Section 40 summary judgment motion as well as the February 2026 reconsideration motion order. The Appellate Division noted that they did not intend to limit the plaintiff in his pursuit of his other claims on under the LAD, FMLA, and workers’ compensation retaliation causes of action.