Connolly v. Progressive Northern Ins. Co., et al., No. 3:13-cv-2717 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 4, 2015)

Denied: insurer’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s claim for stacked UIM benefits and bad faith as there existed an issue of fact regarding whether plaintiff was entitled to such benefits

The Middle District Court considered the defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment in which it sought dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims for UIM benefits and bad faith. The defendants also sought the dismissal of Progressive Casualty Insurance Company and Progressive Northern Insurance Company on the grounds that neither was in privity of contract with the plaintiff. Following a motor vehicle accident, the plaintiff settled her bodily injury liability claim with the tortfeasor’s insurance carrier for policy limits of $250,000. The plaintiff then made a claim for UIM benefits under her parents’ Progressive Policy. The parties disagreed as to the severity of the plaintiff’s injuries, and this suit followed. The parties also disagreed as to whether the plaintiff was entitled to stacked UIM benefits since her parents had signed a rejection of stacking form at the policy’s inception. The plaintiff argued that the rejection was not dispositive because other policies written by Progressive that did not contain stacking rejections may have covered the plaintiff at the time of the accident. The plaintiff also argued that there was an ambiguity as to which policy controlled because the defendant never provided certified copies of the policies. The court held that the record was devoid of any evidence establishing a contract of insurance between the plaintiff and Progressive Casualty Insurance Company or Progressive Northern Insurance Company and, therefore, dismissed those parties. With respect to the stacking issue, the court considered that the parents had signed a rejection of stacking form at the inception of the policy. However, the court also considered that the core number of the policy was augmented at various points in time since its inception. Thus, the court could not conclude that stacking was unavailable since it was unclear whether the subject policy in effect at the time of the accident was identical to the policy in effect when stacking was rejected. The court also denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment with respect to the bad faith count since there was an issue of fact as to the reasonableness of the defendant’s conduct.

Case Law Alerts, 3rd Quarter, July 2015

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