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Taylor E. Kosko

Portrait of Taylor E. Kosko

Taylor is an associate in the Casualty Department at Marshall Dennehey, concentrating her practice in asbestos, mass, and toxic tort matters arising out of exposure to asbestos, silica, and benzine. In addition to her work in asbestos and toxic tort cases, Taylor also assists in the defense of general liability matters.  These include product liability, premises liability, automobile accidents, and dram shop/liquor liability cases. She participates in all phases of litigation throughout Western Pennsylvania including pleadings, discovery, motions practice, and trial preparation.  Prior to joining Marshall Dennehey, Taylor worked for a regional defense firm in Pittsburgh where she similarly practiced the defense of mass toxic tort matters.

In 2017, Taylor earned her juris doctor from Duquesne University School of Law. While in law school, she served as president of the Health Law Society from 2015-2017. She also studied international law in the nature of human rights, arbitration, and alternative dispute resolution in Belfast and Dublin, Ireland, and worked at a law firm in Frankfurt, Germany after completing her first year of law school.  Taylor held several internships throughout law school, and clerked at a boutique law firm during her final year where she handled plaintiff and defense work under the supervision of practicing attorneys.

Taylor graduated from Duquesne University in 2014 with a Bachelor of Arts after completing her undergraduate coursework in just three years. During that time, she was a member of the Duquesne University Division I Varsity Women's Lacrosse team.

Taylor is admitted to practice law in the state of Pennsylvania.

    • Thomas R. Kline School of Law of Duquesne University (J.D., 2017)
    • Duquesne University (B.A., 2014)
    • Pennsylvania, 2017
    • The Best Lawyers: Ones to Watch©, Mass Tort Litigation/Class Actions – Defendants; Personal Injury Litigation – Defendants (2024-2027)
    • Pennsylvania Super Lawyers Rising Star (2024-2027)
    • "Appellate Court Reverses $224 Million Verdict Against Johnson & Johnson", Marshall Dennehey Legal Update for Environmental Law, October 2023

Thought Leadership

Defense Digest

Even When You Think You Have The Perfect Jury, You Can Still Be Surprised

September 30, 2026

Key Points: • Jury selection matters, but it is not predictive. Even an attentive and seemingly favorable jury can return an unexpected or internally inconsistent verdict, particularly in complex cases. • Verdict slips deserve careful attention. The structure and wording of a verdict slip can significantly affect the outcome of a case. Clear verdict sheets can be just as important as the evidence presented at trial. • Expect the unexpected. Even the most carefully selected jury can return a surprising verdict. It is a reminder that while jury selection is essential, no panel is ever completely predictable. A recent Pittsburgh trial serves as a stark reminder that even when jury selection has resulted in a seemingly favorable panel, a jury can still deliver an unexpected result. While careful jury selection remains crucial to proper trial preparation, no amount of voir dire completely eliminates the possibility of inconsistent or unpredictable verdicts. In 2023, a lawsuit was filed by Michaeleen Lee in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County against numerous defendants, including Johnson & Johnson, alleging that she developed mesothelioma as a result of her exposure to talcum powder products. The case proceeded to trial in late 2025, continued by her estate after Ms. Lee passed away from her mesothelioma prior to trial. Following a one-and-a-half-month long trial, the jury rendered its verdict. The jury found Johnson & Johnson negligent, but did not find that Johnson & Johnson’s negligence was a factual cause of Ms. Lee’s diagnosis. The jury then shockingly attempted to award $22 million in punitive damages to Ms. Lee’s estate. How could a jury award millions of dollars in punitive damages against Johnson & Johnson despite failing to find causation? Looking back, the wording and format of the verdict slip laid the groundwork for juror confusion, and provides a cautionary example of why the selection of a favorable jury may not be enough to ensure success at trial. In its deliberation, the jury found Johnson & Johnson negligent, but did not find that the negligence caused Ms. Lee’s mesothelioma. Further, the jury found that Ms. Lee relied to her detriment upon statements of material fact made by Johnson & Johnson that allegedly concealed or omitted material information about the safety of the product at issue, but did not find that her reliance on those statements caused her mesothelioma. Finally, the jury found that Ms. Lee relied to her detriment on statements or conduct of material fact, intentionally or negligently made by Johnson & Johnson, which misrepresented the safety of the product at issue, but again did not find that her reliance on such statements or conduct of material fact caused her mesothelioma.  The verdict slip required the jurors to answer “yes” to having found that Johnson & Johnson’s negligence, statements of material fact, and/or misrepresentations were a factual cause of Ms. Lee’s mesothelioma diagnosis before they could award punitive damages. The jurors did not do so. Despite not finding causation, the jury still attempted to award Ms. Lee’s estate $22 million in punitive damages. Ultimately, the trial court molded the verdict, finding for Johnson & Johnson and awarding Ms. Lee’s estate no punitive damages.  The decision to mold the verdict found itself before the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, which just recently issued a non-precedential opinion, affirming the trial court's decision. Because the jury clearly found that Johnson & Johnson's conduct was not a factual cause of Ms. Lee's injuries, the punitive damages award could not stand as a matter of Pennsylvania law. Although the appellate decision focused on correcting a seemingly inconsistent verdict, the case offers a valuable lesson for trial lawyers. Jury selection is critical, but but relying upon the selection of a seemingly favorable jury is insufficient to guarantee success at trial. Even a carefully selected panel may struggle with complex verdict slips, nuanced legal standards such as causation, or the distinction between disapproving of a defendant's conduct and finding that conduct legally caused a plaintiff's injury. Cases involving multiple claims and multiple defendants only increase the likelihood that jurors may reach conclusions that appear difficult to reconcile. For trial counsel, this underscores the importance of not only selecting a thoughtful jury, but also presenting a clear narrative, simplifying complex legal concepts whenever possible, and paying close attention to the structure and wording of the verdict sheet. Taylor is an Associate in our Pittsburgh, PA office. She can be reached at 412-803-2440 or TEKosko@mdwcg.com.

Legal Updates for Asbestos and Mass Tort Litigation

Appellate Court Reverses $224 Million Verdict Against Johnson & Johnson

October 5, 2023

On October 4, 2023, a panel of three judges in the New Jersey Appellate Division reversed a $224 million verdict against Johnson & Johnson, awarded to a consolidated group of four plaintiffs who alleged their use of the company’s talcum powder products caused them to be diagnosed with cancer. The jury awarded the plaintiffs an aggregate compensatory damages award of $37.3 million and a punitive damages award totaling $186.5 million.  The basis of the reversal was that the trial court did not fulfill its role as a gatekeeper for permitting only reliable expert testimony to be presented to a jury by failing to conduct pre-trial hearings on the scientific methodology and the underlying data relied upon by the plaintiffs’ expert witnesses. In the opinion, the Appellate Division reinforced the proper role of the trial court as the gatekeeper of expert witness testimony. Further, the court instructed trial courts to assess both the methodology used by the expert to arrive at an opinion as well as the underlying data used in the formation of the opinion.  Overall, the Appellate Division found that the trial court failed to hold an evidentiary hearing as to the expert testimony, failed to make legal determinations of reliability as to the methodology, and permitted the jury to make credibility determinations as to the quality of the expert testimony instead of first determining whether the expert opinion was based on sound and adequately founded scientific methodology. These errors, the Appellate Division believed, were so “wide off the mark that a manifest denial of justice resulted.” This monumental opinion raises the bar for the standard that plaintiffs must meet in pursuing claims of talc powder exposure against companies such as Johnson & Johnson. Further, it provides an avenue for talc defendants to challenge expert witnesses offering testimony for plaintiffs in a talc case. For obvious reasons, we can expect this opinion to have more of an impact in talc litigation than in asbestos claims, where the scientific methodology of expert witnesses has been studied extensively over its longstanding history. As we are seeing an increasing number of talc cases being filed, the reversal of this $224 million verdict is a useful roadmap for proper expert witness practice as well as a reassuring development for industry clients.   Legal Update for Environmental Law - October 5, 2023, has been prepared for our readers by Marshall Dennehey. It is solely intended to provide information on recent legal developments and is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We welcome the opportunity to provide such legal assistance as you require on this and other subjects. If you receive the alerts in error, please send a note to tamontemuro@mdwcg.com. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2023 Marshall Dennehey Warner. All Rights Reserved.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.

Thought Leadership

Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.