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Asbestos & Mass Tort Litigation

Since the inception of toxic tort litigation, Marshall Dennehey has been heavily involved in a wide variety of such matters, with a particular focus on the defense of asbestos claims and suits. Beginning in the mid-1970s, we represented Johns Manville Corporation, the largest manufacturer of asbestos products in North America, in all asbestos litigation in eastern Pennsylvania and southern New Jersey. When the Manville Personal Injury Settlement Trust was established in the late 1980s, we served as Northeast Region Consulting Counsel for the Trust.

The attorneys in our asbestos litigation practice, residing in Pennsylvania, New Jersey and Delaware, have defended a significant number of manufacturers, distributors, contractors and premises owners in thousands of asbestos personal injury claims brought against them. The majority of our attorneys who work in this practice group have in excess of 20 years of experience in toxic tort and mass tort litigation. Our trial team has tried hundreds of these claims to verdict and is the most experienced team in Philadelphia. This extensive trial experience has enabled our clients to secure outstanding results through both trials and settlements.

The attorneys in our New York office represent clients in the New York courts, as well as numerous other jurisdictions throughout the country. Several of the newest members of this practice group serve as national counsel for their clients, serve on the New York Supreme Court's Asbestos Litigation Case Management Committee, and were founding members of the Joint Medical Defense Group, a cooperative group that shares responsibility for preparing medical defenses on common cases. Also, several of these attorneys act as liaison counsel in many of the New York City extremis clusters and are called upon by the court and Special Master to resolve disputes and to enable the extremis cases, which are prepared on a very short schedule, to proceed to trial as efficiently as possible.

An understandable concern of every client in significant environmental and toxic tort cases is the extent of legal fees and costs. Our firm began as an insurance defense firm and, although we have expanded our practice areas considerably, we have never lost our sensitivity to our clients' desire to control legal expenses. This is especially true in the environmental and toxic tort areas where multi-party, complex cases make control of expenses all the more important. We always handle cases with a practical, result-oriented approach, balancing strong representation of our clients with realistic cost containment. In addition to our fees being very competitive, we work with our clients to develop innovative, alternative approaches to normal file handling that result in considerable savings to our clients without sacrificing quality legal representation.

Results

Summary Judgment Granted in Asbestos Case

We were granted summary judgment on behalf of a national truck manufacturer in an asbestos case where the plaintiff claimed his mesothelioma diagnosis was the result of his work on his employer’s trucks. The plaintiff claimed he developed mesothelioma as a result of his alleged exposure to asbestos while working on the trucks and products manufactured by the other defendants. The plaintiff had worked and resided the majority of his life in Mississippi; therefore, Mississippi law was applicable. In granting summary judgment, the court found that any alleged exposure to the manufacturer’s products was de minimis in relation to his other alleged asbestos exposures. The court also found that under the “bare metal” defense, the manufacturer was not liable for third-party manufacturers’ parts, which they did not manufacture or supply, used in conjunction with their trucks.

After Nine-Week Trial, Unanimous Defense Verdict in Asbestos Case Where $40 Million in Damages Had Been Sought

We obtained a unanimous defense verdict after a nine-week trial in Suffolk County, New York, where the plaintiff’s counsel requested that the jury award $40 million in damages. The plaintiff was 51 years old when she was diagnosed with peritoneal mesothelioma, allegedly as a result of being exposed to asbestos-containing joint compound manufactured and sold by our client. The plaintiff, who was 56 at the time of trial, testified that she had little or no knowledge of ever being exposed to asbestos. However, her older sister, who served as the only product identification witness at trial, testified that she recalled that their father used asbestos-containing joint compound on two occasions, approximately 50 years ago, when he repaired their home after a fire in 1970 and when he built a home in Florida around 1975. The plaintiff was five years old during the alleged exposures, and her sister was seven years older. The plaintiff’s sister testified that she had a vivid memory of her father using six different joint compounds during the two projects, including our client’s product. She also testified that the plaintiff was present hundreds of times when their father mixed, applied and sanded the joint compound. At trial, we called an industrial hygienist, a toxicologist and an epidemiologist, who testified that the type of asbestos fiber used in our client’s joint compound did not cause or contribute to her mesothelioma because the fibers are too short and do not cause disease. Our epidemiologist testified that the plaintiff’s mesothelioma developed spontaneously and was not the result of asbestos exposure. We also called a construction expert, who testified that the sister’s testimony regarding the amount of joint compound used and the time the sister was exposed were excessive. The jury deliberated an hour before returning the verdict. Post-trial comments from jurors indicated they did not find the sister to be credible.

Thought Leadership

Defense Digest

Delaware Supreme Court’s Reversal of Trial Court Decision on Zantac Expert Testimony May Carve a Path for Heightened Scrutiny of Experts in Asbestos Litigation

December 1, 2025

Key Points:  Supreme Court held that trial court misinterpreted the plaintiffs’ burden by stating Delaware Rule of Evidcen 702 should be applied with a liberal thrust favoring admission. Supreme Court ruled that the plaintiffs failed to show by preponderance of the evidence that their experts’ opinions were reliable. Court emphasized that “an expert offering an opinion regarding general causation for a product must opine as to the product itself,” not the toxicity of some individual component. Court observed that there is no consensus in Delaware law as to “threshold dose.” As of September 2022, there were approximately 75,000 pending Zantac (ranitidine) cases in Delaware, coming from more than a dozen national plaintiffs’ firms and with three Delaware firms acting as local counsel. These cases were filed in the Superior Court of Delaware. The plaintiffs in In re: Zantac (Ranitidine) Litig., 2025 WL 1903760 (Del. 2025) alleged that their ingestion of the molecule ranitidine—marketed under the brand name Zantac, in which N-Nitrosodimethylamine (NDMA), an alleged carcinogen, may be found—caused the cancer with which they were diagnosed. In November 2023, the defendants moved to exclude the plaintiffs’ general causation experts under Delaware Rule of Evidence 702 (DRE 702), which is modeled after Federal Rule of Evidence 702 (FRE 702), and the principles set forth in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), which determine whether expert testimony is admissible. Daubert reiterates the requirements of FRE 702 by stating that expert opinions must be the product of a reliable process measured by things like peer review and general acceptance in the scientific community. Daubert also states that judges should act as gatekeepers to ensure that potential expert opinions are both reliable and relevant before they can be heard by a jury.  The defendants’ principal arguments were that (1) the original lab study was an outlier, conducted under unrealistic conditions, and the results were never duplicated; (2) the plaintiffs’ experts failed to offer threshold-dose opinions; and (3) the plaintiffs’ experts inappropriately focused on toxicity of NDMA itself as opposed to causation associated with ranitidine use. The trial court denied the defendants’ Rule 702 motion, finding that (1) the studies focused on NDMA toxicity were sufficient to establish general causation—ignoring the defendants’ argument that no studies show a connection between ranitidine use and cancer; (2) Delaware law does not “recognize a threshold-dose requirement as part of the general causation analysis”; and (3) Delaware law requires a trial court to apply a “liberal thrust” favoring admissibility of expert testimony. Consistent with this liberal-thrust standard, the court dismissed each of the defendants’ critiques of the plaintiffs’ experts, stating that they went to weight rather than admissibility and, therefore, were jury questions.  The defendants requested that the Superior Court certify its order for an interlocutory appeal. The Superior Court denied certification. However, the Supreme Court of The State of Delaware reviewed and granted the request.  The Supreme Court acknowledged that evidentiary rulings are rarely appropriate for interlocutory review, but it noted that the trial court’s decision raised substantial issues regarding the Daubert standard and mass tort litigation specifically. Further, recognizing the significance of the issues, the Supreme Court elected to hear the case en banc. The appellants raised three claims on appeal:  (1)    The Superior Court applied an unduly lenient standard and wrongly held that all methodological critiques went to weight, not admissibility. Specifically, the appellants argued that an analysis under DRE 702 should not be conducted with a “liberal thrust favoring admission” and that it is a trial court’s duty to ensure that an expert applies his or her methodology reliably; (2)    The Superior Court erred in focusing its general causation analysis on NDMA, rather than ranitidine; and  (3)    The Superior Court erred in holding that the plaintiffs’ experts did not need to identify the threshold dose required to cause the cancers at issue. On July 10, 2025, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s ruling on several grounds.  First, the court held that the trial court misinterpreted the plaintiffs’ burden by stating DRE 702 should be applied with a liberal thrust favoring admission. The court stressed that Daubert never created a presumption of admissibility. Instead, they opined that “the proponent of an expert opinion must prove its admissibility by a preponderance of the evidence” with no presumption toward admissibility.  After clarifying the burden of proof, the Supreme Court took a deep dive into the underlying studies. The court noted several instances where the plaintiffs’ experts ignored—without explanation—major peer-reviewed epidemiology studies in favor of lower-quality and less-relevant publications. In doing so, the court affirmatively ruled that the plaintiffs failed to show by preponderance of the evidence that their experts’ opinions were reliable.  The Supreme Court also found that the trial court erred by framing the general-causation question on the alleged carcinogenic agent—NDMA—rather than the actual product at issue—ranitidine. The court emphasized that “an expert offering an opinion regarding general causation for a product must opine as to the product itself,” not the toxicity of some individual component. Having held that the plaintiffs’ experts’ opinions were deficient, the court determined that it did not need to reach the separate “threshold dose” question the defendants raised on appeal, but it observed that “there is no consensus in Delaware law as to ‘threshold dose.’” There are several takeaways from the Supreme Court’s ruling that may be relevant to asbestos litigation.  First, with the Delaware Supreme Court clarifying a preponderance-of-the evidence standard (with no presumption of admissibility) over the previously understood “liberal thrust favoring admission,” plaintiffs’ and defense experts are likely to face heightened scrutiny.  Further, it now appears that experts offering causation opinions “must opine as to the product itself,” as opposed to asbestos toxicity generally. Plaintiffs may likely be required to show that exposure to a specific product has a higher rate of developing asbestos disease. This may pose a potentially significant obstacle for plaintiffs when asbestos fibers are encapsulated within a product.  Defense Digest, Vol. 31, No. 4, December 2025, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2025 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Defense Digest

Asbestosis Takes the Stand: Raising Awareness of an Abnormally High Verdict for a Typically Low Value Case

June 1, 2024

Key Points: Asbestosis claims are usually considered to be on the lower end of settlements for asbestos law cases.  A verdict of $25 million was returned by a jury in Philadelphia, where the last asbestosis case verdict was $957,000.  Plaintiff’s oxygen dependence likely factored into verdict amount—a factor that should be weighed in future asbestosis claims.  It’s not a secret that many cases don’t go to trial. We have reached an era of practicing law where it’s easier to settle, to negotiate, to compromise, rather than go to trial. Pre-trial settlements and dismissals make life easier on both plaintiff and defense counsel, especially in the world of asbestos, where there can be dozens of defendants.  There are some asbestos cases that go to trial, but those are few and far between, especially in Pennsylvania. While trial dates and conciliations are scheduled, the majority of asbestos cases simply resolve, with all defendants either being dismissed or paying a settlement. (For frame of reference, there have been two asbestos trials in Allegheny County and three asbestos trials in Philadelphia County within the last five years).  Determining the value of a case depends on the disease process itself. For those not involved in asbestos law, there are three main diseases that usually crop up—mesothelioma, lung cancer, and asbestosis. The mesothelioma claims are valued the highest, then lung cancer, and then asbestosis cases. Whether someone was a heavy smoker or not can influence the value of a lung cancer claim. Obviously, there are nuances with every case. Some of these nuances for asbestos cases include the type of job the plaintiff performed, other comorbidities he or she may have had, age, and how long he or she worked at a facility. However, the important context to take away from this scale is that asbestosis claims are near the lower end of the settlement hierarchy.  With that in mind, we turn to the case of Richard Daciw. Mr. Daciw filed suit in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas on May 2, 2019. Fifty-five entities were sued in the initial complaint, with an additional defendant added in an amended complaint. Mr. Daciw was 76 years old. He alleged asbestos exposure from serving in the Navy as a fireman and shipfitter from 1965 to 1969; as a maintenance mechanic at Jeffries Processors in Philadelphia from 1969 to 1972; as a pipefitter and welder for Domino Sugar in Philadelphia from 1972 to 1983; as a welder at Allied Chemical for several months in 1983; and, in various maintenance roles at Smith Kline from 1983 to 2004.  Mr. Daciw was diagnosed with asbestosis by a treating pulmonologist in January of 2019. He had shortness of breath and difficulty breathing with activity. He also had chronic obstructive pulmonary disease and diabetes. An important medical note for Mr. Daciw was that he had become oxygen dependent due to his breathing troubles.  Mr. Daciw was deposed for several days and provided lengthy testimony about the products he worked with over his career. He identified various brands of gaskets, packing, pumps, valves, turbines, boilers, and cement as the products and equipment that allegedly exposed him to asbestos. Based upon Mr. Daciw’s deposition testimony and his identification of these products, the case proceeded in the usual fashion—dismissals and settlements. However, not all defendants reached one of those resolutions.  John Crane, Inc., was the lone defendant in this instance who took this case to trial. As an asbestosis case, it was a likely thought that the risk should have been minimal. However, the results of trial would prove that the risk was anything but minimal.  Trial began on December 12, 2022, before Judge Ann Butchart. It would end on December 22, 2022, when the jury handed down a $25 million verdict. Richard Daciw, et al. v. John Crane Inc., et al., 2022 WL 18232642 (C.P. Phila. Dec. 19, 2022). Richard Daciw was awarded $15 million in damages, and his wife, Winifred Daciw, was awarded $10 million in a loss of consortium claim. While John Crane, Inc., was the sole defendant trying the case, there were an additional 19 defendants on the verdict sheet. Twelve of these non-party entities were found to have no liability for Mr. Daciw’s disease. John Crane, Inc., was found to be liable for asbestos exposure to Mr. Daciw and his subsequent asbestosis. Seven non-party entities were also found to be liable. The verdict sheet did not include how the $25 million would be apportioned.  The last asbestosis case that went to trial in Philadelphia County had a verdict of $957,000. In fact, the last mesothelioma case that went to trial there had a verdict of about $3.8 million. That is a difference of $21 million for a disease process that is considered by most asbestos attorneys to create higher-value settlements for plaintiffs. While it’s impossible to know the full thought process, it is extremely likely that Mr. Daciw’s physical state—oxygen dependence—induced sympathy from the jury.  With this most recent verdict, the usual approach to asbestosis cases needs to be taken with a grain of salt in Pennsylvania. While yes, the majority of asbestosis cases will probably continue to settle within usual ranges, attorneys and carriers alike need to be aware of the possibility that a push to trial could create a huge payday for a plaintiff, especially one with a health situation similar to Richard Daciw. A complete approach overhaul isn’t necessary, but a little awareness will go a long way when it comes to asbestosis cases.  *Renee works in our Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, office.    Defense Digest, Vol. 30, No. 2, June 2024, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2024 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

U.S. Supreme Court Decides Key Issue Regarding Interstate Freight Broker Liability

Freight brokers are intermediaries.  They connect shippers of goods with trucking companies that transport those goods.  Freight brokers match a load of freight with a trucking company and oversee the logistics of the transportation. For a number of years there has been a division among the Federal Circuits regarding the potential liability of freight brokers when the trucking companies that they retain for interstate loads are involved in accidents.  At the center of this division was the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAAA).  Some Federal Circuit Courts have held that state law negligent hiring claims against freight brokers were preempted by the FAAAA .  Other Federal Circuits Courts have held that even if preemption applied, the “safety exception” in the FAAAA saved state law negligent hiring claims from federal preemption.  On May 14, 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the conflict in Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC, et al, No24-1238. In that case freight broker C.H. Robinson selected Caribe Transport to haul an interstate load. The commercial truck driver employed by Caribe Transport allegedly caused an accident and the plaintiff, Montgomery, was seriously injured. Montgomery brought an action against the driver, Caribe Transport and C.H. Robinson. The allegation against C.H. Robinson was that it negligently retained Caribe Transport when it knew, or should have known, that it was an unsafe company. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that Montgomery’s claims against C.H. Robinson were preempted by the FAAAA. The plaintiff appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.  The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision focused primarily on the safety exception in the FAAAA.  That provision provides that the FAAAA preemption “…shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles.” C.H. Robinson argued, as freight brokers historically have, that their function was not “with respect to motor vehicles” because they do not own trucks or employ drivers. They are merely intermediaries, connecting entities who need freight moved with entities who can do that job. Therefore, C.H. Robinson argued that preemption applied, not the safety exception. The U.S. Supreme Court did not accept that argument. The Court focused on the meaning of the phrase “with respect to” in the safety exception. The Court held that it means “referring to”, “concerning” or “regarding”. Therefore, writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Barrett concluded that “[r]equiring C.H. Robinson to exercise ordinary care in selecting a carrier therefore “concerns” motor vehicles—most obviously, the trucks that will transport the goods. So, Montgomery’s negligent-hiring claim falls within the FAAAA’s safety exception, which saves it from preemption.” Justice Kavanaugh, in his concurring opinion, noted the effect this ruling may have on freight brokers and their insurers throughout the country: Importantly, the Court's decision today should not be read to mean that brokers will routinely be subject to state tort liability in the wake of truck accidents. As even plaintiff's counsel stressed, brokers should be able to successfully defend against state tort suits if the brokers have acted reasonably and arranged transportation with reputable trucking companies. Tr. of Oral Arg. 27-29. In plaintiff's counsel's words, the brokers "just have to hire carriers that actually have a reasonable policy," and "the broker is not going to have a problem if it's asking the hard questions of the carrier." Id., at 42, 45. In addition, the proximate-cause requirement in typical state tort law should help protect brokers from excessive liability. Id., at 25. That said, the brokers rightly caution against naivete. In the real world, as the brokers forcefully respond, state tort law can be unpredictable, and the costs to brokers of litigation and insurance may be significant even when brokers prevail in lawsuits. Moreover, the costs of litigation and insurance, as well as the costs of brokers' conducting more substantial inquiries into trucking companies, will cascade through the economy and be paid in part by American consumers in the form of higher prices. The concerns expressed by the brokers are legitimate and weighty. The key point here is that freight brokers can no longer claim they are protected from negligent retention claims by the FAAAA (in cases involving interstate transportation). The challenge will be to determine what is considered ”reasonable efforts” used by brokers when retaining transportation companies. 

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

PA Middle District Dismisses Claims Against School District and its Superintendent, Principal, Special Education Director, and Classroom Teacher

A five-year-old special education student was enrolled in the Wyoming Valley West School District and attended the State Street Elementary School during the 2024-2025 school year. The student refused to clean up classroom toys at dismissal. When his teacher allegedly grabbed him by the wrist to walk him back to his seat, the student dropped to the floor and began crying. The teacher then allegedly grabbed the student by the ankle and dragged him across the floor. Following an investigation, criminal charges were not advanced by the county DA, and the school permitted the teacher to return to the classroom. The student’s parents sued, lodging thirteen legal counts under both state and federal law, which sought monetary damages from the teacher, the school district, the superintendent, the principal, and the director of special education. The plaintiff’s 42 USC 1983 claims were dismissed as to the school district for failure to allege a policy or custom violation, and the failure to alleged deliberate indifference in the failure-to-train context. As to the superintendent, building principal, and special education director, the Section 1983 claims were also dismissed for failure to allege personal involvement on the part of the individuals. Regarding an equal protection claim asserted against all defendants, the motion to dismiss was also granted for a failure to advance a plausible equal protection claim, holding that “plaintiffs' single-act allegations do not include a factual basis to even infer that the act was motivated by discriminatory animus rather than some other non-discriminatory impulse.” The court further dismissed the plaintiff’s negligence-based claims including negligence against the teacher and district administrators, NIED, and vicarious liability under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (PSTCA). The federal claims under the IDEA, Section 504, and the ADA were also dismissed in various respects. The IDEA claim was dismissed against all defendants with prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Section 504 claims against the individual defendants were also dismissed with prejudice, as districts, not individuals, are the recipients of federal funds under Section 504. However, the Section 504 and ADA claims were dismissed without prejudice as to defendant Wyoming Valley West, and the plaintiff was permitted leave to amend.