.

Since joining our firm, Paul has worked on many diverse types of cases, including professional liability matters involving attorneys, accountants, real estate and insurance agents; products liability cases; civil rights claims; insurance coverage issues; and general liability matters. He presently focuses his practice on personal injury matters in transportation/trucking liability, premises liability, motor vehicle and municipal liability, and he defends all asbestos matters for the firm in the state of New Jersey.

Paul has handled close to a thousand asbestos matters and has represented plumbing, electrical, building and auto supply companies, as well as industrial boiler manufacturers and drywall product manufacturers in asbestos matters. In his career, he has represented a variety of small and large trucking companies in motor vehicle accidents and had the opportunity to handle many municipality matters throughout central and southern New Jersey on a variety of casualty claims.

Paul graduated, magna cum laude, from the University of Scranton with a Bachelors of Science degree in Psychology and a minor in Philosophy, in 1987. Following his graduation, Paul worked as a legal assistant in his father's law office before entering law school. Paul graduated from Villanova University School of Law in 1991.

After completing law school, Paul held a judicial clerkship in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division in Ocean County, New Jersey. He had the opportunity to work with four different judges in this vicinage through a rotating clerkship program. Paul clerked for the Honorable James D. Clyne, the Honorable Peter J. Giovine, the Honorable Francis D. Piscal, and the Honorable Rosalie B. Cooper.

Following the one-year clerkship, in the fall of 1992, Paul worked for the Legal Aid Society of Mercer County in Trenton, New Jersey, becoming the managing attorney for the housing unit in 1994.

    • Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law (J.D., 1991)
    • University of Scranton (B.S., magna cum laude, 1987)
    • New Jersey, 1991
    • U.S. District Court District of New Jersey, 1991
    • U.S. Court of Appeals 3rd Circuit, 1991
    • AV® Preeminent™ by Martindale-Hubbell®
      The Martindale Hubbell rated attorney list is issued by Internet Brands, Inc. A description of the selection methodology can be found here. No aspect of this advertisement has been approved by the Supreme Court of New Jersey.
    • American Bar Association
    • Mercer County Bar Association
    • New Jersey Recent Court Rulings Affecting the Asbestos Litigation: Proving Cross-Claims, Forum Non Conveniens, Bankruptcy Trusts, Bare Metal, etc., HarrisMartin's New Jersey Asbestos Litigation Conference, February 13, 2019
    • Employment Law, Liability Risks and Ethics
    • Employment Law Overview of Federal and New Jersey Statutes and Case Law
    • Claims Against Public Entities - New Jersey Tort Claims Act
    • Update on Tort Reform Issues in New Jersey and Effect on Transportation Cases
    • "Appellate Court Reverses $224 Million Verdict Against Johnson & Johnson", Marshall Dennehey Legal Update for Environmental Law, October 2023
    • "NJ Supreme Court Further Erodes Bare Metal Defense", Marshall Dennehey Legal Updates for Toxic Tort Litigation, June 8, 2020
    • "New Jersey Asbestos Case Review 2018", Marshall Dennehey Legal Updates for Toxic Tort Litigation, February 5, 2019
    • "'Bare-Ly' There – Third Circuit Strips Down Bare Metal Defense in Maritime Law," Defense Digest, Vol. 24, No. 1, March 2018
    • "Cosmetic Manufacturers' Talc Did Not Cause Asbestos Disease, NJ Jury Finds", Marshall Dennehey Legal Updates for Toxic Tort Litigation, December 2, 2015
    • "New Jersey Jury Awards $1.5 Million to 83-Year-Old Plumber for Mesothelioma", Marshall Dennehey Legal Updates for Toxic Tort Litigation, April 20, 2015
    • "NJ Supreme Court Asked to Consider Bare Metal Defense", Marshall Dennehey Legal Updates for Toxic Tort Litigation, August 1, 2014
    • "Pushing the Tort Claims Act Threshold," Defense Digest, Vol. 11, No. 3, September 2005
    • "Moving the Goalposts -Expansion of the Tort Claims Act Threshold," Defense Digest, Vol. 10, No. 1, March 2004
    • "UM/UIM 'Step Down' May Step Up to the New Jersey Supreme Court," Defense Digest, Vol. 9, No. 4, December 2003
    • "'Show Me The Money' Not Always Required by the NJ Charitable Immunity Act," Redwoods Group Articles of Interest Series, November 2003
    • "Employer Liability under the FMLA," Defense Digest, Vol. 9, No. 3, September 2003
    • "'Show Me The Money' Not Always Required by the NJ Charitable Immunity Act," Defense Digest, Vol. 9, No. 2, June 2003
    • "Employment Law -Liability, Risks and Ethics," Insurance Society of Philadelphia, October 2002
    • "Beware of Freudian Slips -Psychologist/Patient Privilege in New Jersey," Defense Digest, Vol. 8, No. 3, September 2002
    • Obtained Summary Judgment for a contractor that retained a trucking company to deliver fuel products where the settlement demand had been $3 million.
    • Obtained defense verdict at trial in a negligent maintenance claim against a forklift repair company where settlement demand was $250,000.
    • Successfully obtained summary judgment for auto parts supplier in asbestos case where the settlement demand had been $350,000.
    • Compelled defense and indemnification from a transportation carrier on behalf of a warehouse facility in a claim alleging negligent loading of the tractor trailer arguing New Jersey's loading and unloading exclusions.
    • Successfully extended the scope of the Tort Claims Act threshold in a precedent setting case so that it did not automatically exclude all injuries where temporary hardware, such as pins or rods, had been temporarily used to facilitate healing of a fracture.
    • Obtained a defense verdict in a forklift accident case through the use at trial of an engineering expert and an orthopedic medical expert.
    • Through the use of an accident reconstructionist, a biomechanical expert, orthopedic, neurological, and neuropsychiatric experts, resolved a trucking case for significantly less than the over $1 million demand.
    • Gaskill v. Mount Holly Township

Thought Leadership

Legal Updates for Asbestos and Mass Tort Litigation

Appellate Court Reverses $224 Million Verdict Against Johnson & Johnson

October 5, 2023

On October 4, 2023, a panel of three judges in the New Jersey Appellate Division reversed a $224 million verdict against Johnson & Johnson, awarded to a consolidated group of four plaintiffs who alleged their use of the company’s talcum powder products caused them to be diagnosed with cancer. The jury awarded the plaintiffs an aggregate compensatory damages award of $37.3 million and a punitive damages award totaling $186.5 million.  The basis of the reversal was that the trial court did not fulfill its role as a gatekeeper for permitting only reliable expert testimony to be presented to a jury by failing to conduct pre-trial hearings on the scientific methodology and the underlying data relied upon by the plaintiffs’ expert witnesses. In the opinion, the Appellate Division reinforced the proper role of the trial court as the gatekeeper of expert witness testimony. Further, the court instructed trial courts to assess both the methodology used by the expert to arrive at an opinion as well as the underlying data used in the formation of the opinion.  Overall, the Appellate Division found that the trial court failed to hold an evidentiary hearing as to the expert testimony, failed to make legal determinations of reliability as to the methodology, and permitted the jury to make credibility determinations as to the quality of the expert testimony instead of first determining whether the expert opinion was based on sound and adequately founded scientific methodology. These errors, the Appellate Division believed, were so “wide off the mark that a manifest denial of justice resulted.” This monumental opinion raises the bar for the standard that plaintiffs must meet in pursuing claims of talc powder exposure against companies such as Johnson & Johnson. Further, it provides an avenue for talc defendants to challenge expert witnesses offering testimony for plaintiffs in a talc case. For obvious reasons, we can expect this opinion to have more of an impact in talc litigation than in asbestos claims, where the scientific methodology of expert witnesses has been studied extensively over its longstanding history. As we are seeing an increasing number of talc cases being filed, the reversal of this $224 million verdict is a useful roadmap for proper expert witness practice as well as a reassuring development for industry clients.   Legal Update for Environmental Law - October 5, 2023, has been prepared for our readers by Marshall Dennehey. It is solely intended to provide information on recent legal developments and is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We welcome the opportunity to provide such legal assistance as you require on this and other subjects. If you receive the alerts in error, please send a note to tamontemuro@mdwcg.com. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2023 Marshall Dennehey Warner. All Rights Reserved.

Legal Updates for Asbestos and Mass Tort Litigation

New Jersey Appellate Division Strikes Down $117M Verdict in Talc/Asbestos Case Because Trial Court Did Not Properly Assess Plaintiffs’ Expert Opinions

April 30, 2021

In April 2018, a Middlesex County jury returned a verdict against Johnson & Johnson Consumer, Inc. and Imerys Talc America, Inc., finding that the plaintiff, Stephen Lanzo, was exposed to asbestos from Johnson’s baby powder and Shower to Shower powder and that this exposure caused his mesothelioma. The jury awarded $30 million in compensatory damages to Stephen Lanzo, $7 million to Kendra Lanzo for loss of consortium, and subsequently entered punitive damages awards of $55 million against Johnson & Johnson and $25 million against Imerys, for a total verdict of $117 million. Both defendants appealed, arguing that the trial judge erred by admitting unreliable expert testimony. Johnson & Johnson also appealed the trial court’s denial of their motion to sever the plaintiffs’ claims against them from the claims against Imerys based on an adverse inference jury charge against Imerys. The Appellate Division agreed with the defendants, reversing the trial court judgment and remanding the matter to the Law Division for a new trial. On the adverse inference issue, the Appellate Division held that the new trials should be conducted separately in order to avoid any potential prejudice to Johnson & Johnson caused by the adverse inference charge against Imerys. Expert – Gatekeeper Role Both defendants challenged the expert opinions expressed by two of the plaintiffs’ expert witnesses, Dr. Jacqueline Moline and Dr. James Webber, that non-asbestiform cleavage fragments from certain minerals could cause mesothelioma. The trial judge denied the defendants’ request for a Rule 104 hearing. The defendants contended that by permitting these experts to testify, the trial judge misapplied the well-established gatekeeping procedures required to be handled by the trial court and as required by In re Accutane Litigation (Accutane), 234 N.J. 340, 388 (2018). The Appellate Division noted that the Supreme Court decision in Accutane essentially reconciled New Jersey Rules of Evidence with the longstanding Federal evidence standard expressed in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). An expert’s opinion on causation may be admitted when it is “based on sound, adequately founded scientific methodology involving data and information of the type reasonably relied on by experts in the scientific field.” Accutane, at 349-350. The trial court is required to assess the soundness of the preferred methodology and the underlying data used to formulate the opinion in evaluating the qualifications of the expert and the conclusions. When a proponent fails to demonstrate “the soundness of a methodology, both in terms of its approach to reasoning and to its use of data, from the perspective of others within the relevant scientific community, the gatekeeper should exclude the proposed expert testimony on the basis that it is unreliable.” Lanzo v. Johnson & Johnson, (slip op. p. 34-35). Here, both Drs. Moline and Webber testified that non-asbestiform cleavage fragments can cause mesothelioma. The trial judge only noted that “the issue of cleavage fragments was an area that’s highly contested between plaintiff’s experts and defense experts,” but the judge did not evaluate the issues in context. Lanzo, (slip op. p. 41). The trial judge also denied the defendants’ motion for a Rule 104 hearing on the experts’ opinions on this issue. The Appellate Division found that the trial court did not assess the methodology or the underlying data used by these experts, noting that Dr. Webber had not conducted any studies and was not aware of any studies showing that non-asbestiform cleavage fragments could cause mesothelioma. Dr. Moline had previously testified that non-asbestiform cleavage fragments could not cause mesothelioma. At trial in this case, she testified that she had changed her opinion on this issue over time. However, she did not express any scientific basis for the change in her opinion. The Appellate Division determined that the trial judge did not perform the required gatekeeping function by failing to evaluate the methodology or the data and information that formed the basis for the expert conclusions put forth by Drs. Webber and Moline. The Appellate Division also determined that those errors were clearly capable of producing an unjust result, which required a new trial. Adverse Inference In their discovery responses, Imerys certified that it did not have and was not aware of any historical talc samples or testing documents. At trial, however, Imerys’ representative confirmed that Imerys had, at one time, been in possession of historical talc samples and testing documents, but they had discarded the talc samples and documents. The trial court determined that discarding these items was not intentional, however, recognized that spoliation does not require intent. The court noted that the purpose of an adverse inference charge is to level the playing field where evidence has been hidden or destroyed. To accomplish this levelling, the trial court included a jury charge that stated, “You may infer that the missing evidence may have been helpful to the plaintiffs’ case to the detriment of defendant Imerys.” The trial court also specifically charged that Johnson & Johnson was not involved in the spoliation conduct and that the adverse inference should not be drawn as to any other defendant in the case. The Appellate Division noted that New Jersey court rules permit separate trials in order to prevent prejudice. R. 4:29-2 & R. 4:38-2(a). Severance may be appropriate “where a significant portion of the evidence to be adduced at trial is admissible only as to one defendant thereby causing prejudice to other defendants.” State v. Mance, 300 N.J. Super. 37, 53 (App. Div. 1997). The Appellate Division found that, once the jury was permitted to draw an adverse inference that Imerys’ talc was contaminated with asbestos, it would likely be impossible for the jury to make a different finding as to Johnson & Johnson. The Appellate Division held that the trial court erred in failing to sever the claims against Imerys from the claims against Johnson & Johnson and remanded the matter to the trial court for separate trials against each defendant.     Legal Updates for Asbestos & Mass Tort Litigation – April 30, 2021, has been prepared for our readers by Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin. It is solely intended to provide information on recent legal developments, and is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We welcome the opportunity to provide such legal assistance as you require on this and other subjects. If you receive the alerts in error, please send a note to tdrau@mdwcg.com. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2021 Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin. All Rights Reserved.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.

Thought Leadership

Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.