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Michael L. Turner

Co-Chair, Asbestos Litigation Practice

MLTurner@mdwcg.com

Portrait of Michael L. Turner

A senior attorney with 40 years of litigation experience, Mike has tried in excess of 200 jury trials to verdict in the state and federal courts of Pennsylvania, as well as other jurisdictions throughout the United States.

Mike is a former member of the firm's Board of Directors, and as a highly experienced litigator and trial attorney, he represents and defends clients in mass torts cases and complex general liability matters.

Mike began his law career in the Philadelphia District Attorney's office where he served as an assistant district attorney for five years. He then joined the civil litigation firm of Krusen, Evans and Byrne in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. After trying numerous asbestos-related cases, he co­founded the firm of Kelley, Jasons, McGuire & Spinelli in Philadelphia where he focused on the preparation and trial of complex personal injury, products liability, and criminal cases.

    • University of Virginia School of Law (J.D., 1981)
    • Virginia State University (B.A., magna cum laude, 1978)
    • Pennsylvania, 1982
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 1982
    • U.S. Court of Appeals 4th Circuit, 1993
    • American College of Trial Lawyers, Fellow, 2019
    • AV® Preeminent™ by Martindale-Hubbell®
    • The Best Lawyers in America®, Mass Tort Litigation/Class Actions – Defendants (2023-2027)
    • The Best Lawyers in America®, Criminal Defense: White-Collar (2024-2027)
    • The Best Lawyers in America©, Commercial Litigation (2026-2027)
    • International Academy of Trial Lawyers, 2023
    • Pennsylvania Super Lawyers (2019-2027)
    • American Bar Association
    • American College of Trial Lawyers
    • National Bar Association
    • Pennsylvania Bar Association
    • Pennsylvania Defense Institute
    • Philadelphia Association of Defense Counsel
    • Moderator, In-House Perspective 2021: Managing Relationships & New Technology From the Inside, Perrin Conference, February, 2021
    • Panelist, Insights on Diversity in the Legal Community, Perrin Conference, November 2016
    • Panelist, Legal Issues Arising in Trial Practice, Lawyers Club Philadelphia, May, 2016
    • How to Retain and Prepare Expert Witnesses, Philadelaphia Bar Institute CLE, March 2015
    • Moderator, Alternatives to Mock Trial: What You Can Learn With Less Cost, Breakout Session, DRI Asbestos Medicine Seminar, November, 2013
    • Panelist, Today's Jury Pool - The Impact of Generation "Y" and the Social Media  Revolution, American Bar Association Litigation Section's Corporate Counsel CLE Seminar, February, 2013
    • How To Conduct Effective Opening And Closing Statements, American Bar Association Section of Litigation, National Conference for the Minority Lawyer, 1999 
    • Seminar, Direct and Cross Examination, Pennsylvania Bar Institute, 1989 
    • Director, Univest Bank 
    • Past President, Germantown Branch Board of Settlement Music School 
    • Past President, Center City Crime Victim Services Board 
    • Defended a local corporation in a case where plaintiff, a carpenter, was electrocuted while setting up scaffolding around defendant's electrical generators. Plaintiff, who was 33 at the time of his injury, suffered closed head injuries and was unable to return to work. Plaintiff's medical bills totaled $750,000. His past and future lost wages were in the millions, and his settlement demand was in excess of $3.5 million. After a six-week jury trial in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas, the jury awarded plaintiff $750,000 in damages. 
    • Defended a local insurance agency in a case where plaintiff, an automobile repair shop owner, alleged our client negligently failed to provide him with the proper mix of insurance coverages, including underinsurance coverage. Plaintiff was seriously injured in an automobile accident caused by an individual who had minimal insurance coverage. Plaintiff's medical bills exceeded six figures and his alleged economic losses exceeded seven figures. After a six day trial in the Court of Common Pleas in Philadelphia, the jury found that the Plaintiff was contributorily negligent.
    • Defendant's Motion for Directed Verdict was granted after a three-week jury trial in federal court in Philadelphia. Represented a corporation that at one time manufactured and sold bathtub inserts to hotels throughout the United States. Plaintiff alleged he pulled the grab bar on a bathroom insert which broke, causing him to fall out of the tub, injuring his back, hips, shoulders, and legs and permanently disabling him. Plaintiff's defective design and manufacture claim was dismissed as to the defendant as a result of successor liability arguments. 
    • Defended a national fast food retailer in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia. Plaintiff alleged negligent hiring, negligent retention, and failure to properly supervise. The co-defendant employee falsified his employment application and failed to disclose that he had been convicted of armed robbery. He thereafter allegedly told one of his supervisors at the fast food establishment that he had a criminal record. Months later, co­defendant employee brought a gun to work and showed it to several of his co-workers during their shift. At the end of his shift, co-defendant employee shot and wounded two of his co-workers and killed two other co-workers in a field about 300 yards from defendant's retail establishment. This case settled for a confidential amount on the day of jury selection. 
    • Tried to verdict a one-week reverse bifurcated jury trial in Delaware County, Pennsylvania, where seven mesothelioma cases were consolidated for trial. Two of the plaintiffs were living and five were deceased. Defendants did not contest the diagnoses of mesothelioma or that exposure to asbestos caused the mesotheliomas. Defendants also did not present any medical evidence in the damage phase of the trial. In five of these cases, the jury returned verdicts in the low five figures. In the other two cases, the jury returned verdicts in the low six figures. Defendant was able to settle all of these cases based on the low Phase I verdicts and avoid a Phase II liability trial. 
    • Tried a group of 26 asbestos cases to verdict before a jury in an eight-week trial in state court, Baltimore, Maryland. The plaintiffs' diseases included lung cancer, asbestosis, mesothelioma, colon cancer, and kidney cancer. In all of these cases, plaintiffs presented medical evidence that their injuries were caused by occupational exposure to asbestos. Defendant presented evidence that the plaintiffs' diseases were not caused by asbestos but other causes, including smoking. Defendants received outright defense verdicts in 14 of these cases and minimal verdicts in nearly all of the remaining cases. 
    • Represented a contractor that allegedly installed asbestos-containing pipe covering. Plaintiff alleged his mesothelioma was caused by exposure to the asbestos-containing products of various defendants. This was an all issues trial where plaintiff presented state-of-the-art and failure to warn evidence, as well as evidence on causation. On the eve of trial, all co-defendants settled, leaving contractor alone in the courtroom to defend this matter. Although the jury rendered a verdict for Plaintiff, after setoffs and credits, our client paid zero dollars. 
    • Tried a consolidated group of three asbestos lung cancers cases to verdict before a jury in state court in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. These cases were reverse bifurcated with damages being tried first. Plaintiffs alleged their lung cancers were caused solely by occupational exposure to asbestos. Defendants alleged Plaintiffs' lung cancers were caused solely by their smoking histories. Our client received outright defense verdicts in two of the three cases and a verdict of $190,000 in the third case. During the liability phase of this third case, Plaintiff alleged his injuries were caused solely by exposure to our client's asbestos product. The jury disagreed and found that our client was liable for only $20,000 of this verdict and that other Defendants were liable for varying amounts. 

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Event

CLM 2026 Focus Conference

Allison joins three insurance industry leaders to discuss how cyber coverage disputes, the growing impact of social inflation on bodily injury claim valuation, and the use of artificial intelligence are reshaping the bad faith landscape. The panel will examine emerging sources of extra-contractual exposure, including evolving cyber insurance coverage issues and the challenges of accurately valuing bodily injury claims. Practical approaches to claim evaluation using AI, along with defense strategies designed to help prevent or successfully defend against bad faith litigation, will also be addressed. 

Marshall Dennehey Welcomes Special Counsel David Farkouh and Michele P. Rannie to New York City Office

News

Marshall Dennehey Welcomes Special Counsel David Farkouh and Michele P. Rannie to New York City Office

Defense Victory Obtained in Workers’ Compensation Case

Result

Defense Victory Obtained in Workers’ Compensation Case

Thought Leadership

Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.

Four Marshall Dennehey Attorneys Selected 2026 “Top Lawyers” by Delaware Today Magazine

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Four Marshall Dennehey Attorneys Selected 2026 “Top Lawyers” by Delaware Today Magazine

Thought Leadership

The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.

business meeting photo

Result

Summary Judgment Obtained in Insurance Coverage Case

MD Selected a 2027 Best Law Firm in Multiple Practice Areas by Best Lawyers

News

Marshall Dennehey Named a 2027 Best Law Firm in Multiple Practice Areas by Best Lawyers®

Complete Victory Obtained in a Workers’ Compensation Matter

Result

Complete Victory Obtained in a Workers’ Compensation Matter