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Joshua concentrates his practice on the defense of claims made and suits brought against companies involving toxic tort litigation. Joshua also handles litigation involving premises liability, construction defects and automobile liability. Additionally, he has represented housing complexes in personal injury claims involving mold exposure.

In 1998, Joshua graduated from Drew University with a Bachelor of Arts in Psychobiology, a dual major. After graduating from Drew, Joshua worked for several years as a mental health counselor and case manager in child protective services before entering law school in 2003.

Joshua attended the Rutgers School of Law - Camden, New Jersey, earning his juris doctor in 2006. During this period, Joshua served as an articles editor for the Rutgers Law Journal. As well, he participated in the externship program during his third year of law school, where he externed for The Honorable John S. Holston, Jr. in the New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division and helped to author a precedential opinion in the field of insurance coverage.

Prior to joining the firm, Joshua worked as an associate at a civil litigation law firm in Philadelphia where he concentrated his practice in the fields of toxic torts, warranty litigation and product liability.

Soon after joining Marshall Dennehey, Joshua acted as the firm's lead attorney in assisting clients nationwide to navigate the onerous MDL- Asbestos docket when it roared back to life in 2008 until its virtual closure in 2015. In 2016, Joshua took the Delaware bar and, following admission into Delaware, moved to the Wilmington office where he focuses on handling a variety of casualty cases. Joshua is active in his local community where he coaches youth sports and serves on the executive boards of different youth sports organizations.
    • Rutgers Law School (J.D., 2006)
    • Drew University (B.A., 1998)
    • Pennsylvania, 2006
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 2009
    • Delaware, 2016
    • U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware, 2017
    • The Best Lawyers in America®, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants (2023-2025)
    • “Bare with Me: The Effect of Tincher v. Omega Flex, Inc. on Equipment Defendants in Asbestos Litigation in Pennsylvania,” Defense Digest, Vol. 21, No. 1, March 2015

Thought Leadership

Defense Digest

A Double Take: Workers’ Compensation Liens Render UIM Non-Duplication Clauses Unenforceable

March 1, 2025

Key Points: Delaware Superior Court permits injured plaintiffs-employees to board medical bills and lost wages already paid by the workers’ compensation carrier in subsequent UIM claim related to the same incident, despite a non-duplication clause in UIM policy.  In John Henry, et al. v. The Cincinnati Ins. Co., C.A. No. N18C-03-092 (December 23, 2024) (Brennan, J.), the court resolved seeming conflict of public policies between those underlying subrogation rights under the Workers’ Compensation Act and those behind the Uninsured Motorist Statute. In a departure from historical precedent, the Delaware Superior Court permits injured plaintiffs-employees to board medical bills and lost wages that were already paid by the workers’ compensation carrier in a subsequent underinsured motorist (UIM) claim related to the same incident, despite the inclusion of a non-duplication clause in the UIM policy. John Henry, et al. v. The Cincinnati Ins. Co., C.A. No. N18C-03-092 (December 23, 2024) (Brennan, J.) (Henry III). In so doing, the court resolves the seeming conflict of public policies between those underlying subrogation rights under the Workers’ Compensation Act (the Act) and those behind the Uninsured Motorist Statute.  Even though it may appear there is a duplicate recovery by the plaintiff-employee recovering these damages in a workers’ compensation claim and then boarding them in a subsequent UIM claim, functionally there is no duplication of damages since the recovery in the UIM context is now subject to a statutory right to subrogation of those recovered amounts by the workers’ compensation carrier/employer. The new paradigm created is best described as one in which the injured plaintiff-employee is permitted access to an advanced payment by the tortfeasor, but through the workers’ compensation carrier, with the ability to put on a full damages case against the employer’s UIM carrier where the third-party tortfeasor’s coverage in insufficient. Under the court’s rationale, by permitting this new category of damages in the UIM claim, Delaware law puts the workers’ compensation carrier or the employer as whole as reasonably can be accomplished while still fully compensating the injured plaintiff-employee. The Henry III case involves an employee who was seriously injured in an automobile crash and then collected significant workers’ compensation benefits. The plaintiff-employee then filed third-party claims against the tortfeasors and collected the relatively modest policy limits and reimbursed the workers’ compensation carrier with a portion of those proceeds. The employee next filed a claim with his employer’s UIM carrier. The UIM carrier attempted to have the UIM claim dismissed pursuant to the workers’ compensation exclusivity provision. The Delaware Supreme Court held that the UIM carrier itself was not an employer under the Act and, instead, stepped into the shoes of the tortfeasor, thus, eliminating the exclusivity bar under the Act. Henry v. Cincinnati Ins. Co. & Fritz v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 212 A.3d 285 (Del. 2019) (consolidated appeal) (Henry I).  In the wake of Henry I, and following a robust procedural history, the workers’ compensation carrier eventually filed an action seeking declaratory judgment, which was dismissed and appealed, and then ultimately led to the Supreme Court’s holding, for the first time, that the Act “expressly allows the employer and its workers’ compensation carrier to assert a subrogation lien against benefits paid to the employee under the employer’s uninsured motorist policy.” Horizon Servs., Inc. v. Henry, 304 A.3d 552, 555 (Del. 2023) (Henry II). The Supreme Court then remanded the case to the trial court to develop the facts and determine the impact of the UIM non-duplication clauses.  Back to Henry III, the Superior Court was faced with reconciling the statutory right of a workers’ compensation carrier/employer to subrogation with the contractual language of the non-duplication clause in a UIM policy. The controversy implicated competing public policies between the right to subrogation under the Act and the policy behind mandating UIM coverage through. Faced with resolving this question, Judge Brennan reasoned, given the statutory right to subrogation announced in Henry II combined with the fact that the workers’ compensation carrier was not a party to the contract with the non-duplication clause, the non-duplication clause could not be upheld. Henry III, at 12. The court noted that the way to resolve this supposed clash of public policies was to “harmonize the statutes” in a way to give both public policies meaning and effect. The simplest way to do this, the court reasoned, was to allow the plaintiff “to bring an action for all damages with the workers’ compensation lien against any damage award.” Id. at 15. In this context, there is no double recovery or duplication of indemnity since the monies paid in the UIM claim were subject to the subrogation rights of the workers’ compensation carrier/employer.  As of this writing, Henry III is the law of Delaware and necessitates a modification of the handling of UIM claims in this and similar situations. At the very least, it requires a careful review of release language in order to ensure a resolution of all claims and liens moving forward.  *Joshua works in our Wilmington, Delaware, office and is a member of our Casualty Department.  Defense Digest, Vol. 31, No. 1, March 2025, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2025 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Unanimous New Jersey Supreme Court Holds That Personal Emails of Public Employees and Officials are Subject to OPRA

In Rosetti v. Ramapo-Indian Hills Regional High School Board of Education, the New Jersey Supreme Court unanimously held that government-related emails, which are contained within personal email accounts, are government records under the Open Public Records Act (OPRA), and a log of those emails must be produced when requested. In reaching this decision, the court conducted an analysis of the OPRA and cited previous cases that held that emails do in fact fall within OPRA’s definition of a record and must be produced when requested pursuant to the Act. The court in Rosetti then had to answer the question as to whether public officials’ personal email accounts that are used for government purposes are subject to OPRA, and found that they are. Rosetti made an OPRA request to the Board of Education seeking email logs from Board members’ personal email accounts. The Board refused to produce the logs and indicated that it was not under any obligation to produce personal email account logs, only from government-related email accounts. The issue was whether a log had to be produced for Board members’ personal email accounts, which they used to conduct Board business. The Board argued that while it was possible to create a log for government-related email accounts through its IT Department, it was not possible to do so for personal email accounts. The court rejected this argument and ruled that Board members are required to search their personal email accounts and create a log of government-related emails housed in those accounts. Once completed, each Board member then must submit a certification detailing the searches that were conducted. The court went one step further with a suggestion to government employees and officials, stating, “[g]overnment agencies should strongly advise their employees, elected officials, and others engaged in government-related business to refrain from using their personal email accounts when conducting government-related business.”  Please do not hesitate to contact me with any questions regarding this case and others pertaining to the OPRA. 

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

News

Marshall Dennehey’s John J. Hare Brings Home Attorney of the Year Honors; Firm Named Litigation Department of the Year in Two Categories

Marshall Dennehey took home top honors in three categories at the The Legal Intelligencer’s 2026 Pennsylvania Legal Awards, held June 11 in Philadelphia. The first place awards include: Attorney of the Year: John J. Hare, Chair of the firm’s Appellate Advocacy & Post-Trial Practice Group and Executive Committee member, together with Charles “Chip” Becker of Kline & Specter Litigation Department of the Year, Appellate – Third Win in a Row! Litigation Department of the Year, Product Liability/Mass Torts “There is no one more deserving of Attorney of the Year honors than John. This award is a testament to his exceptional skill, dedication, and leadership—qualities that truly exemplify the very best of our firm,” said G. Mark Thompson, Marshall Dennehey’s President & CEO. “These honors also reflect the strength and depth of our product liability, mass torts, and appellate practices across Pennsylvania and beyond, underscoring our ongoing commitment to delivering outstanding results for our clients.” Attorney of the Year – John J. Hare, Marshall Dennehey, together with Charles “Chip” Becker, Kline & Specter Over the past year, John and Charles were opposing counsel in many of the highest-profile civil appeals in Pennsylvania. John is renowned as a preeminent appellate lawyer on the defense side, and Chip on the plaintiff's side. They have opposed each other repeatedly, exhibiting peerless professionalism and exceptional civility, while zealously litigating under the unremitting pressure of high-profile litigation and record-setting verdicts totaling more than $3.5 billion. They have also collaborated, outside of litigation, on many commissions, committees, and projects of importance to the Pennsylvania judiciary and legal community. Litigation Department of the Year – Appellate Law, Winner (previous winner, 2025 and 2024) 2025 was another standout year for the firm’s Appellate Advocacy & Post‑Trial Practice Group, led by John J. Hare, which was retained to challenge many of Pennsylvania’s “nuclear” verdicts—awards exceeding $10 million. Notably, the department persuaded the Pennsylvania Superior Court to reverse a Philadelphia judgment of $1.09 billion, the largest judgment ever overturned by a Pennsylvania appellate court. The group’s 11 full‑time Pennsylvania‑based appellate lawyers are at the center of Pennsylvania’s most high-profile matters, bringing more than 150 years of combined appellate experience. They routinely handle post‑trial and appellate matters and are frequently engaged to participate in and monitor trials in high‑exposure cases to ensure that critical legal issues are properly raised and preserved for appeal. Litigation Department of the Year – Product Liability/Mass Torts, Winner This marks the first win for the firm’s Pennsylvania Product Liability and Mass Torts practices, which operate within our Casualty Department, managed by Matthew Schorr and Jeff Rapattoni. For almost five decades, Fortune 500 product manufacturers/distributors and their insurers have turned to these groups to defend their litigation. Led by Bradley D. Remick and Vlada Tasich, our Product Liability group’s success can be attributed to its commitment to keeping abreast of ever-changing legal theories, judicial viewpoints, and evolving technology impacting the product liability landscape. Our attorneys have successfully handled thousands of product liability matters in all jurisdictions across the state. Likewise, our mass tort litigation practice – divided into Asbestos & Mass Tort, and Environmental & Toxic Tort Litigation –  has defended manufacturers, distributors, contractors, and premises owners in thousands of personal injury and other claims. Led by Kevin E. Hexstall and Patrick T. Reilly, most attorneys in these groups have more than 20 years of experience, and our seasoned trial team has tried hundreds of cases to verdict, consistently achieving strong results through both trials and settlements. In addition to these awards, Marshall Dennehey was a Litigation Department of the Year finalist for Professional Liability.

Thought Leadership

Coverage Determined, Judgment Paid, Bad Faith Survives: Fourth DCA’s Opinion Highlights the Distinction Between Contractual and Extra-Contractual Damages

In Healthy Food Experts, LLC v. Amguard Ins. Co., No. 4D2025-0181 (4th DCA June 10, 2026), the Fourth District Court of Appeal explained that an insurer’s payment of a judgment in a breach of contract case does not automatically eliminate a later bad faith claim seeking extra-contractual damages. The decision provides guidance on when a first-party bad faith claim may still proceed after a coverage dispute has already been resolved by a judgment. Healthy Food Experts, LLC involved a dispute related to a property damage claim submitted under a commercial insurance policy issued by the insurer following a ceiling collapse at the insured’s restaurant. The insurer denied coverage for the insured’s losses for business personal property and business income, but extended coverage for the food spoilage losses. As a result, the insured filed a breach of contract action and ultimately obtained a jury verdict. The insurer appealed the verdict and, while the appeal was pending, the insured filed a Civil Remedy Notice (CRN) seeking payment for the judgment plus interest. The insurer failed to cure the CRN within the statutory sixty-day cure period, but paid the judgement in full with accrued interest following the appeals court’s per curiam affirmance. Nevertheless, the insured filed a first party bad faith lawsuit claiming to have suffered extra-contractual damages. In response to the bad faith suit, the insurer filed a Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, relying on Fridman v. Safeco Insurance Co. of Illinois, 185 So. 3d 1214 (Fla. 2016) stating that damages were fixed by judgment of the breach of contract suit and the insured could not recover additional damages beyond those already awarded. The insurer also argued that the judgment did not exceed the insured’s policy limits, which was a required element of a first party bad faith claim. The trial court dismissed the bad faith action based on Fridman, concluding the insured could not seek any additional damages.  The insured appealed the court’s ruling to the Fourth DCA arguing the trial court’s order conflicts with Florida law and misapplies Fridman, as a contractual damage determination in the underlying suit establishes the “condition precedent to prosecute a first party bad faith action.” Cingari v. First Protective Ins. Co., 377 So. 3d 1169, 1174 (Fla. 4th DCA 2024). Further, the insured argued that the only purpose to the binding language in Fridman is to prevent the re-litigating of the same damages, which in this case are the contractual damages. The insured asserted the damages were not the “same” as they were seeking consequential damages from the insurer’s alleged bad faith. The Fourth District emphasized in its ruling that a first party bad faith claim is not ripe for litigation until there has been the following: a determination of the insurer’s liability for coverage; a determination of the extent of the insured’s contractual damages, and the required civil remedy notice is filed pursuant to §624.155(3)(a).  Demase v. State Farm Fla. Ins. Co., 239 So. 3d 218, 221 (Fla. 5th DCA 2018) The court concluded that the necessary conditions were satisfied as the jury verdict determined both coverage and the extent of the insured’s contractual damages, and the insured properly filed a civil remedy notice, so the bad faith claim was ripe for litigation. The Fourth DCA further explained the insured could not seek contractual damages in its bad faith action, which was previously litigated in its breach of contract suit. However, the court determined the insured could seek “extra-contractual damages,” which were not recoverable in the insured’s breach of contract suit, which may include interest, court cost, and reasonable attorney’s fees incurred by the insured. Further, the court held excess judgment is not essential in a first party bad faith claim and the insurer’s late payment of the judgment did not preclude the insured’s bad faith action. As a result, the Fourth District Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s final dismissal order of the bad faith action. This opinion highlights the distinction between contractual and extra-contractual damages. Moreover, this case demonstrates that a judgment does not necessarily end the dispute in a first party property claim as it is could also serve as a prerequisite of a bad faith action. The decision serves as a reminder that insurers may face bad faith exposure notwithstanding the payment of a judgment in an underlying breach of contract action.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court Holds Self-Referral Prohibition Does Not Cover Prescriptions Written by Physicians with Ownership Interests in Dispensing Pharmacies

700 Pharmacy v. Bureau of Workers’ Compensation Fee Review Hearing Office (State Workers’ Insurance Fund); Nos. 97, 98, 99, 100, 101 MAP 2024; decided June 16, 2026; by Justice Mundy.   In this case, Drs. Miteswar Purewal and Shailen Jalali, treating physicians for workers’ compensation claimants, wrote prescriptions for various medications that were filled by 700 Pharmacy. The worker’s compensation insurer refused to pay for the prescriptions on the basis that they were illegal self-referrals under the Act. 700 Pharmacy subsequently filed fee review applications with The Bureau of Workers’ Compensation Medical Fee Review Office. At a fee review hearing, both physicians stipulated they had a financial interest in the pharmacy.  The physicians argued that the Anti-Referral Provision of the Act does not bar self-referrals on prescription drugs and pharmaceutical services, since the provision does not specifically identify prescription drugs. The Fee Review Hearing Officer rejected this argument and found that prescriptions for medications are prohibited under the “goods or services” language included in the provision. 700 Pharmacy appealed to the Commonwealth Court, and the court affirmed, agreeing with the Hearing Officer’s interpretation of “goods and services” as encompassing prescriptions. 700 Pharmacy appealed to the Supreme Court.  The Supreme Court reversed the decisions of the Hearing Officer and the Commonwealth Court, holding that the term “goods and services” in the Anti-Referral Provision of the Act did not include prescriptions. According to the Court, “goods and services” was not a catch-all, but simply explanatory as to the eight enumerated categories in the provision. The provision (Section 306(f.1)(3)(iii)) reads, in pertinent part: Notwithstanding any other provision of law, it is unlawful for a provider to refer a person for laboratory, physical therapy, rehabilitation, chiropractic, radiation oncology, psychometric, home infusion therapy  or diagnostic imaging, goods or services pursuant to this section if the provider has a financial interest with the person or in the entity that receives the referral. The Court said that if the General Assembly wanted to specifically include prescription drugs and pharmaceutical services in the Anti-Referral Provision, they would have done so. They pointed out that prescription drugs and pharmaceutical services were included by the legislature in Section 306 (f.1)(3)(vi) of the Act as to reimbursement, and claimed that their omission from the Anti-Referral Provision supports the conclusion that those services are not included in the Anti-Referral Provision’s self-referral prohibition.