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Daniel J. Ryan Jr.

Co-Chair, Environmental & Toxic Tort Practice

Portrait of Daniel J. Ryan Jr.

Dan is chair of the Environmental & Toxic Tort Practice and is responsible for the oversight of a group of attorneys who focus on toxic tort litigation. He also supervises the representation of many defendants in asbestos litigation throughout Pennsylvania. Dan also concentrates a portion of his practice to defending insurers in bad faith litigation.

In addition to close to 30 years of trial experience in toxic tort litigation on behalf of asbestos manufacturers, Dan has also developed an extensive involvement in lead paint litigation on behalf of building owners and has also tried auto, premises, exercise equipment and various other product liability claims, representing manufacturers and insurers. As an alternative to litigating matters, Dan has extensive participation in various types of mediation and alternative dispute resolution.

Adding to his law practice, Dan has given lectures and seminars concerning the defense in mass tort litigation with particular emphasis on alternative, cost effective ways for processing large volumes of cases. He has also lectured on the defense of bad faith cases for the Insurance Society of Philadelphia's Continuing Legal Education program as well as to the staffs of insurers. 

    • Mitchell Hamline School of Law (J.D., 1977)
    • Villanova University (B.S., 1974)
    • Pennsylvania, 1978
    • AV® Preeminent™ by Martindale-Hubbell®
    • The Best Lawyers in America®, Philadelphia, "Lawyer of the Year" - Personal Injury Litigation – Defendants (2021)
    • The Best Lawyers in America®, Personal Injury Litigation – Defendants (2009-2027)
    • Pennsylvania Super Lawyers (2006, 2009-2026)
    • American Board of Trial Advocates, Philadelphia Chapter
    • Defense Research Institute
    • Federation of Defense and Corporate Counsel
    • Hearing Committee Member, Serving the Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, July 2005
    • Pennsylvania Bar Association
    • Philadelphia Bar Association
    • Handling UM/UIM Cases in Pennsylvania, Marshall Dennehey Client Webinar, May, 2021
    • Annual presentations to various clients groups regarding the status of asbestos litigation in Pennsylvania involving strategies for defending various types of products such as brakes, tile, caulk, joint compound, boilers, wire, pumps and packing. 
    • Presented several in-house presentations to various insurers as to how to avoid bad faith litigation in Pennsylvania while handling first party claims. 
    • "What’s New In 2017? Filing Trends and Developments In Asbestos Litigation," Mealey's Litigation Reports, August 16, 2017
    • "Sunlight is the Best Disinfectant; Solutions to the Concealment of Asbestos Trust Filings in Tort Litigation," For the Defense, April 2016
    • "Uncloaking Bankruptcy Trust Filings In Asbestos Litigation: Refuting the Myths About Transparency," Mealey's Asbestos Bankruptcy Report and Mealey's Litigation Report Asbestos, April 2016
    • "Uncloaking Bankruptcy Trust Filings In Asbestos Litigation: A Survey Of Solutions To The Types Of Conduct Exposed In Garlock's Bankruptcy," Mealey's Asbestos Bankrupcty Report, August 28, 2015
    • "Is Mold The Next Gold For The Plaintiffs' Bar?," Defense Digest, Vol. 8, No. 1, March 2002
    • "'Market-Share' Liability Is Rejected In Lead Paint Case in Pennsylvania," Defense Digest, Vol. 2, No. 1, January 1996
    • "Applying Lessons Learned From the Asbestos Litigation to the Next Mass Tort (Repetitive Stress)," Defense Digest, January 1995 
    • "Pennsylvania Superior Court Finally Clarifies What is Bad Faith Conduct Under Section 8371," Defense Digest, Winter 1994 
    • Received a defense verdict in an asbestos product liability suit by a mesothelioma victim for a wire manufacturer in Northampton County, Pennsylvania, in a two-and-a-half-week trial. 
    • Succeeded in precluding plaintiff's toxicologist following a Frye hearing in a chemical sensitivity case which resulted in a non suit victory for a builder. 
    • Tried and won one of the original first party bad faith cases in Pennsylvania, which is one of the most often cited decisions in the field of first party bad faith litigation. Terletsky v. Prudential, 649 A2d 680 [Pa Super 1994] 
    • Received a defense verdict in a first party bad faith case tried in Philadelphia following the preclusion of plaintiff's bad faith expert, which was upheld on appeal. Bergman v. USAA, 742 A2d 1101 [ Pa Super 1999] 
    • Received a defense verdict in a bad faith trial in the federal court from a jury wherein the demand was $1 million against the top plaintiff bad faith litigator in Pennsylvania, which was upheld on appeal to the Third Circuit. Dinner v. USAA, no. 01-1299, February 2002. 
    • Successfully defended numerous asbestos manufacturers and suppliers and received several low verdicts as well as many very reasonable settlements during trial. 
    • Has tried many UM/UIM Arbitration cases. 
    • Successfully engineered many victories for clients in asbestos litigation through summary judgment where many of these decisions have been upheld on appeal. 
    • Handled a class action involving claims of bad faith regarding a coverage position taken by an insurer, which was dismissed after discovery was completed. 

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

The Tolling Trap: Filing Alone Will Not Toll the Statute Without Good-Faith Service

The Eastern District of Pennsylvania recently reinforced a critical limitation on bad faith claims, holding that a timely filing alone will not preserve a cause of action absent a good-faith effort to serve the original process. The plaintiff had presented a claim for underinsured motorist benefits to his auto insurer. The insurer evaluated the claim and determined that the plaintiff’s accident-related damages did not exceed the bodily injury liability insurance limits of the at-fault driver and denied his claim. Among other claims, the plaintiff sought to present a claim for insurance bad faith under 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8371, to which a two year statute of limitation applies. He first filed a praecipe for writ of summons before the expiration of the statute of limitation. However, the plaintiff did not attempt to serve the praecipe or writ until after the statute of limitations had expired. Additionally, the service failed as the plaintiff had mailed the original process to an incorrect address. Despite receipt of the Postal Service’s failure to deliver the original process, the plaintiff did not attempt to re-serve the writ. Two months later, the plaintiff filed a complaint and then successfully served that complaint. The insurer sought to dismiss the plaintiff’s bad faith claim as time-barred by the statute of limitations. The district court agreed. Though the plaintiff had filed a praecipe for a writ of summons prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations, the statute is only tolled if there is a good faith effort to serve that original process. In this case, the court determined that the plaintiff had failed to perform a “good faith effort to serve the original process”. Additionally, though the filing and service of a complaint can serve as alternative original process when the lawsuit is commenced by the filing of a praecipe for a writ of summons, the plaintiff filed his complaint after the statute of limitations had expired. The plaintiff’s bad faith claim was therefore determined to be barred by the statute of limitations and dismissed by the court, with prejudice. A key takeaway for the defense is not to assume that the statute of limitations has been successfully tolled by a plaintiff merely because a praecipe for a writ of summons or complaint has been filed prior to the expiration of the statute. A filed complaint or writ is only part of the equation. The defense should carefully review the docket and filings to confirm that the plaintiff also performed the requisite good faith effort to serve that original process. A thorough review of the docket may reveal that the plaintiff failed to make the good-faith service efforts necessary to toll the statute of limitations.

Thought Leadership

Florida Supreme Court Rules Florida Statute §627.70152 Does not Apply Retroactively

In a decision that resolves years of appellate uncertainty and confirms that insurers and insureds alike can rely on the legal framework in place when a policy is issued, the Supreme Court of Florida last week found that Florida Statute §627.70152, which involves an insured’s requirement to provide an insurer with pre-suit notice before filing a suit, cannot be applied retroactively. In Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company v. Hughes, the Court was presented with the issue of whether the statutory pre-suit notice requirement applied retroactively and whether it would apply to a breach of contract of an insurance policy that was issued before the statute went into effect. Before the Court was an appeal from a homeowner, Ms. Hughes, who sued her insurance carrier, Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company (Universal) for breach of contract under an insurance policy that was in effect from April 24, 2019 through April 24, 2020. During the policy period, Ms. Hughes suffered a loss and, on May 29, 2019, made a claim for water damage. The carrier investigated the loss and issued payment; Ms. Hughes disputed the payment, finding the amount insufficient for repairs. On July 1, 2021, Florida Statute §627.70152 went into effect, which required insureds to provide notice of intent to initiate litigation against the carrier prior to filing a lawsuit; if an insured filed the lawsuit without complying with §627.70152, a court must dismiss the case without prejudice. On August 4, 2021, Ms. Hughes filed her lawsuit against Universal for breach of contract. Universal moved to dismiss based on her failure to comply with §627.70152. Ms. Hughes contended the notice requirement could not be applied retroactively. The trial court disagreed and dismissed the lawsuit without prejudice, and Ms. Hughes appealed. During the appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, in Cole v. Universal Property & Casualty, 363 So. 3d 1089 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023), ruled that Florida Statute §627.70152 did apply retroactively to policies issued before the effective date of §627.70152. However, the Sixth District Court agreed with Ms. Hughes and overturned the trial court’s ruling, finding the statute could not retroactively apply to policies issued prior to the statute effective date. Thereafter, the other district courts weighed in, with the Third District Court agreeing with the Fourth District Court, and the First, Second and Fifth District Courts agreeing with the Sixth District Court. In resolving the conflict amongst the district courts, the Supreme Court advised “as a general rule, ‘the statute in effect at the time an insurance contract is executed governs substantive issues arising in connection with that contract.’ Hassen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 674 So. 2d 106, 108 (Fla. 1996). The Court applied the two-step test when deciding whether a statute has retroactive application: “First, the Court must ascertain whether the Legislature intended for the statute to apply retroactively. Second, if such an intent is clearly expressed, the Court must determine whether retroactive application would violate any constitutional principles.” Menendez v. Progressive Exp. Ins. Co., 35 So. 3d 873, 877 (Fla. 2010). In analyzing the Legislature’s intent, the Court must determine whether the Legislature has manifested a clear command for retroactivity in the statutory text.  In review of the statutory text, the Court found nothing in the language of the statute to indicate that the phrase “all suits” was serving another purpose of expanding its reach to suits based on policies that both predate and postdate the enactment of the statute. Buis v. Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 394 So. 3d 738, 741 (Fla. 2d DCA 2024). Further, the Court noted the statute has an effective date, which has long been considered to be evidence against retroactive application of a statute. The Court concluded that, on its face, no provision of §627.70152 speaks to application of the statute to insurance policies issued before the statute’s effective date and therefore, the Legislature did not clearly command retroactivity of the statute to include insurance policies issued prior to the enactment of the statute. The Court briefly reviewed Universal’s argument that the presuit notice requirement was procedural, not substantive, and therefore should be applied retroactively; however, the Court agreed with the Sixth District Court’s finding that, in its entirety, §627.70152 transformed an insured’s ability to sue an insurance company under a property insurance policy and an insurer’s obligations to respond to and pay insurance claims, thus making the requirement a substantive change. The Court thereby upheld the decision of the Sixth District and disapproved the decision of the Fourth District in Cole.

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Act 111's IRE Provisions

In this case, the claimant sustained a work injury of January 6, 1994, which was acknowledged by Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP). After the claimant’s receipt of 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, the employer filed a Request for an Impairment Rating Examination (IRE). The IRE was performed in May 2023 and the IRE physician found that the claimant had a 5% whole person impairment, under the AMA Guides. The employer filed a Petition based on the IRE results, and the Petition was granted by the WCJ. During litigation, the claimant argued that the IRE provisions of Act 111 (Section 306(a.3) of the Act) were not applicable to her injury, since it predated June 24, 1996, the date Act 57 went into effect, and that the IRE provisions were unconstitutional. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ)) granted the Petition and the Board affirmed. On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the claimant argued that Act 111 violated the nondelegation doctrine and that its retroactive application to the claimant’s injury was unconstitutional. The court rejected the arguments on the basis that they had already found the same arguments without merit in multiple, prior cases. The court also addressed an argument made by the claimant that Act 111 was procedurally defective under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it was only considered on two days in each House after having undergone amendments and reassignments. The court noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires every bill to be considered on three different days in each House. The claimant maintained that, according to the legislative history, the bill did not receive three separate days of consideration from each House when it was assigned a new bill number. The court pointed out, however, that the bill number, H.B. 1840 remained constant and was considered on three occasions by the House. Further, the court concluded that minor amendments to the bill were germane to its original subject, which was to modify the Act’s IRE process, in accordance with Protz II.