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Daniel J. Ryan Jr.

Co-Chair, Environmental & Toxic Tort Practice

Portrait of Daniel J. Ryan Jr.

Dan is chair of the Environmental & Toxic Tort Practice and is responsible for the oversight of a group of attorneys who focus on toxic tort litigation. He also supervises the representation of many defendants in asbestos litigation throughout Pennsylvania. Dan also concentrates a portion of his practice to defending insurers in bad faith litigation.

In addition to close to 30 years of trial experience in toxic tort litigation on behalf of asbestos manufacturers, Dan has also developed an extensive involvement in lead paint litigation on behalf of building owners and has also tried auto, premises, exercise equipment and various other product liability claims, representing manufacturers and insurers. As an alternative to litigating matters, Dan has extensive participation in various types of mediation and alternative dispute resolution.

Adding to his law practice, Dan has given lectures and seminars concerning the defense in mass tort litigation with particular emphasis on alternative, cost effective ways for processing large volumes of cases. He has also lectured on the defense of bad faith cases for the Insurance Society of Philadelphia's Continuing Legal Education program as well as to the staffs of insurers. 

    • Mitchell Hamline School of Law (J.D., 1977)
    • Villanova University (B.S., 1974)
    • Pennsylvania, 1978
    • AV® Preeminent™ by Martindale-Hubbell®
    • The Best Lawyers in America®, Philadelphia, "Lawyer of the Year" - Personal Injury Litigation – Defendants (2021)
    • The Best Lawyers in America®, Personal Injury Litigation – Defendants (2009-2026)
    • Pennsylvania Super Lawyers (2006, 2009-2026)
    • American Board of Trial Advocates, Philadelphia Chapter
    • Defense Research Institute
    • Federation of Defense and Corporate Counsel
    • Hearing Committee Member, Serving the Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, July 2005
    • Pennsylvania Bar Association
    • Philadelphia Bar Association
    • Handling UM/UIM Cases in Pennsylvania, Marshall Dennehey Client Webinar, May, 2021
    • Annual presentations to various clients groups regarding the status of asbestos litigation in Pennsylvania involving strategies for defending various types of products such as brakes, tile, caulk, joint compound, boilers, wire, pumps and packing. 
    • Presented several in-house presentations to various insurers as to how to avoid bad faith litigation in Pennsylvania while handling first party claims. 
    • "What’s New In 2017? Filing Trends and Developments In Asbestos Litigation," Mealey's Litigation Reports, August 16, 2017
    • "Sunlight is the Best Disinfectant; Solutions to the Concealment of Asbestos Trust Filings in Tort Litigation," For the Defense, April 2016
    • "Uncloaking Bankruptcy Trust Filings In Asbestos Litigation: Refuting the Myths About Transparency," Mealey's Asbestos Bankruptcy Report and Mealey's Litigation Report Asbestos, April 2016
    • "Uncloaking Bankruptcy Trust Filings In Asbestos Litigation: A Survey Of Solutions To The Types Of Conduct Exposed In Garlock's Bankruptcy," Mealey's Asbestos Bankrupcty Report, August 28, 2015
    • "Is Mold The Next Gold For The Plaintiffs' Bar?," Defense Digest, Vol. 8, No. 1, March 2002
    • "'Market-Share' Liability Is Rejected In Lead Paint Case in Pennsylvania," Defense Digest, Vol. 2, No. 1, January 1996
    • "Applying Lessons Learned From the Asbestos Litigation to the Next Mass Tort (Repetitive Stress)," Defense Digest, January 1995 
    • "Pennsylvania Superior Court Finally Clarifies What is Bad Faith Conduct Under Section 8371," Defense Digest, Winter 1994 
    • Received a defense verdict in an asbestos product liability suit by a mesothelioma victim for a wire manufacturer in Northampton County, Pennsylvania, in a two-and-a-half-week trial. 
    • Succeeded in precluding plaintiff's toxicologist following a Frye hearing in a chemical sensitivity case which resulted in a non suit victory for a builder. 
    • Tried and won one of the original first party bad faith cases in Pennsylvania, which is one of the most often cited decisions in the field of first party bad faith litigation. Terletsky v. Prudential, 649 A2d 680 [Pa Super 1994] 
    • Received a defense verdict in a first party bad faith case tried in Philadelphia following the preclusion of plaintiff's bad faith expert, which was upheld on appeal. Bergman v. USAA, 742 A2d 1101 [ Pa Super 1999] 
    • Received a defense verdict in a bad faith trial in the federal court from a jury wherein the demand was $1 million against the top plaintiff bad faith litigator in Pennsylvania, which was upheld on appeal to the Third Circuit. Dinner v. USAA, no. 01-1299, February 2002. 
    • Successfully defended numerous asbestos manufacturers and suppliers and received several low verdicts as well as many very reasonable settlements during trial. 
    • Has tried many UM/UIM Arbitration cases. 
    • Successfully engineered many victories for clients in asbestos litigation through summary judgment where many of these decisions have been upheld on appeal. 
    • Handled a class action involving claims of bad faith regarding a coverage position taken by an insurer, which was dismissed after discovery was completed. 

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Delaware Superior Court Clarifies Pleading Standard for Legal Malpractice Claims

In the matter of Edelstein v. Kirschner, No. N25C-09-018 FJJ, 2026 Del. Super. LEXIS 45, at *1 (Super. Ct. Jan. 29, 2026), the plaintiff law firm sued its former client for unpaid legal fees in the amount of $4,399.35. The former client asserted a counterclaim alleging legal malpractice. More, specifically, the former client claimed that his lawyer committed malpractice be recommending that he settle an underlying lawsuit by entering into a stipulated judgment for an excessive amount with interest that was accruing at “an outlandish” interest rate. The law firm moved to dismiss the counterclaim on the basis that its former client had not alleged facts reflecting that he could prove the case within the case. That is, facts reflecting that his attorneys caused him to lose the underlying case. The Superior Court held that while a legal malpractice plaintiff in cases arising from underlying litigation must prove the case within the case to survive a summary judgment motion, he does not need to plead facts reflecting as much in order to survive a motion to dismiss. While this case addresses the pleading requirements of a legal malpractice case in Delaware, it also serves as reminder that chasing unpaid legal fees from a former client can often give rise to a legal malpractice counterclaim. Attorneys seeking to collect unpaid legal fees should ensure that the fees they seek are for a significant amount, which would be recoverable if a judgment is obtained. Otherwise, the effort could backfire.

Thought Leadership

Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court Takes Up the Gist of the Action Doctrine

The gist of the action doctrine has been a hot topic in legal malpractice cases in Pennsylvania over the last several years.  Beginning in 2014, the Pennsylvania courts applied the gist of the action doctrine to professional liability actions, following the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s opinion in Bruno v. Erie Ins. Co., 106 A.3d 48 (Pa. 2014).  In Bruno, the court applied the gist of the action doctrine to a professional negligence claim, and found that a negligence claim was not barred simply because the parties were in a contractual relationship where the gist of the claim sounded in negligence. Thereafter, courts in Pennsylvania applied the gist of the action doctrine to breach of contract claims as well, finding that where the allegations sounded in negligence, a plaintiff could not recast a negligence claim as one for breach of contract. This was important because of the distinction between statutes of limitations: negligence claims must be brought within two (2) years, while breach of contract claims can be brought within four (4) years.  Then, last year, the Pennsylvania Superior Court held that the gist of the action doctrine does not apply to breach of contract claims as seen through two opinions. These opinions were Swatt v. Nottingham Village, 342 A.3d 23 (Pa. Super. 2025) and Poteat v. Asteak, et al., 350 A.3d 198 (Pa. Super. 2025). That is, the gist of the action doctrine can bar a negligence claim but it cannot bar a breach of contract claim.  This month, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted the petition for allowance of appeal in Poteat.  The Supreme Court phrased the issue for consideration as follows: Whether the Superior Court majority’s holding conflicts with this Court’s holding in Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co., 160 A.3d 48 (Pa. 2014), as well as Superior Court opinions that applied Bruno, and departs from almost 200 years of controlling precedent that distinguishes between causes of action in contract and tort based upon the nature of the duty that was allegedly breached? Attorneys on both sides of legal malpractice matters no doubt look forward to clarification on these issues from our Supreme Court.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict.