The Architectural, Engineering and Construction Defect Litigation Practice Group of Marshall Dennehey clearly understands the relationship between construction professionals and their respective responsibilities. Our practice group has a considerable number of years of experience in defending construction industry cases. The practice includes representation of owners, developers, general contractors, construction managers, subcontractors and design professionals. This group quickly develops an understanding of the project and contract documents in order to identify key issues early, then proceeds to develop those issues into sound defense strategies. Our practice group's litigation experience includes initial negotiations, construction claims, arbitration proceedings and jury trials involving all phases of construction litigation.
Our defense approach is aimed at the early identification of key issues and is predicated on developing the earliest possible defense strategies tailored to the individual case and client. The application of this strategy is carried out by a team approach consisting of experienced partners, associates and paralegals capable of handling the basic, as well as the highly sophisticated and complex, construction litigation matters.
The Architectural, Engineering and Construction Defect Litigation Practice Group of Marshall Dennehey consists of a diverse group of professionals with considerable experience handling matters throughout Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Delaware, Ohio, West Virginia, Florida, New York and Connecticut. The group prides itself on its multi-jurisdictional range of experience and substantial number of cases handled.
We look forward to your inquiries and remain at your disposal for presentations or seminars which your company may desire.
Results
Multimillion Dollar Default Judgment Successfully Struck Down by Appellate Court
We succeeded in striking a $4.1 million default judgment entered in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas by a plaintiff who alleged defective residential construction. We convinced the court that Pennsylvania Prothonotaries and Clerks of Court lack authority to accept a praecipe to enter a default judgment in a specified amount unless the amount is approved by a judge or is a sum certain, meaning that the amount is ascertainable from a confessed judgment or a contract that specifies the amount due. The default judgment had spawned significant coverage litigation by and against the defendant’s insurer.
Summary Judgment Secured in a Design Defect Case
We won summary judgment on behalf of a company that provided software for the overall design of roof trusses in a design defect case. The plaintiff owned the apartment complex being built and hired Turnbull Wahlert to construct the building. 84 Lumber was subcontracted by Turnbull to build and install the roof trusses. 84 Lumber contracted with our client to use its software for the design of the roof trusses and to provide truss connect plate hangers. The building experienced severe water damage allegedly because the roof trusses were not sloped properly and the HVAC units were misplaced on the roof. Damages were estimated at over $1.2 million. 84 Lumber demanded that our client defend and indemnify it against Turnbull’s allegations. The court granted our motion for summary judgment.
Thought Leadership
Case Law Alerts
Florida Appellate Court Holds Right to Arbitrate Did Not Apply Within Lien Transfer Bond
April 1, 2026
A trial court’s order granting a motion to compel arbitration was recently overturned after the Fourth District Court of Appeals determined that no enforceable arbitration agreement existed between the parties. The plaintiff, Andersen Service Company, entered into a subcontract with Marco Contractors, Inc. for construction work, which included a dispute resolution clause enabling only Marco to select arbitration or litigation. If Marco elected arbitration, that proceeding would have to take place in Allegheny County, Pennsylvania. Subsequently, Andersen filed a construction lien for unpaid work. That lien was transferred to a lien transfer bond, issued by the defendant, Old Republic Surety Company. Notably, the transfer did not incorporate the subcontract and its arbitration clause, but rather indicated it was issued pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 713.24. Thereafter, Andersen filed suit in Broward County where the bond was recorded, and Old Republic Surety sought to compel arbitration. The trial court granted Old Republic’s Motion, and proceedings were subsequently stayed. On appeal, Florida’s Fourth District Court of Appeal noted that the trial court granted the motion in error, as there was no binding contract compelling the arbitration between Andersen and Old Republic. Only Marco Contractors and Andersen were parties to the contract, not Old Republic. The court held that sureties cannot exercise the contractual election right when that right is saved for the principal to the contract. Marco Construction exclusively retained the right to elect arbitration, and the bond transfer did not enable Old Republic to do so. As a result, the Fourth DCA remanded to the trial court for further proceedings pursuant to its ruling.
Case Law Alerts
Appellate Division Clarifies Scope of Indemnification Clauses in Construction Injury Litigation
April 1, 2026
This case involves a fall at a construction site in which a jury found the defendant, a general contractor, partially liable for the plaintiff’s injuries, awarding him and his wife damages. The defendant appealed the lower court’s determination that it was not entitled to contractual indemnification from the co-defendants, a steel company, for sums it was required to pay for not accepting plaintiffs’ offer of judgment. The general contractor subcontracted with the steel company to install steel rebar for the project. That agreement contained an indemnification provision. Upon initiation of the plaintiff’s lawsuit, the general contractor demanded that the steel company assume its defense, which they declined. Thereafter, the lower court ruled that the defendant general contractor was not entitled to indemnification. On appeal, they argued that the judge erred when he concluded it was not entitled to indemnification by the defendant steel company, arguing that the provision’s language required indemnification for “any and all…fines…penalties,…damages, liability, losses, costs and expenses, including…attorney’s fees,” which would include the offer of judgment penalties. The Appellate Court concluded that the lower court judge’s interpretation of the indemnification agreement as either not contemplating an offer of judgment or requiring the parties to draft a specific provision relating to the consequences of not accepting an offer of judgment, was in error. The court reversed that portion of the court’s April 5, 2024, order and remanded for entry of an order requiring the defendant steel company to indemnify the general contractor for the consequences of not accepting plaintiffs’ offer of judgment.
