.

Tyler is a member of the Health Care Department concentrating his practice on the defense of health care practitioners and providers, as well as physicians’ offices, hospitals and health systems in various litigation matters. He works closely with clients to defend against claims and preserve their interests throughout all stages of the litigation process. In addition to representing clients in complex medical malpractice matters, Tyler also commits himself to defending corporations in the general casualty, product liability, construction injury and premises liability fields.

Prior to joining Marshall Dennehey, Tyler worked as a Nationally Registered Paramedic in both Montgomery County and Bucks County. Drawing from his professional health care experience, Tyler understands the nature and complexity of each client’s interests and manages each case with a multidisciplinary approach. When clients are confronted with legal obstacles, they can rely on Tyler to appreciate and maintain their interests from the foundational issues through the complex issues that may arise in each matter. 

Tyler earned his juris doctor from Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law, where he served as Vice Chairperson of the Moot Court Board. He received his undergraduate degree in Emergency Medicine from the University of Pittsburgh.

    • Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law (J.D., 2022)
    • University of Pittsburgh (B.S., 2013)
    • Pennsylvania, 2022
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 2023
    • U.S. District Court Middle District of Pennsylvania, 2023
    • Lehigh County Bar Association
    • Pennsylvania Bar Association

Thought Leadership

The Quarterly Dose

From Bedside to Bar

June 11, 2026

Tyler R. Price, Esquire Former Nationally Registered Paramedic Working in emergency medicine demanded sharp critical thinking — recognizing life-threatening conditions, delivering timely interventions, uncovering relevant medical history, and shaping a treatment plan that aligned with a patient’s ultimate needs. I was taught to always “bring a shovel” to every encounter, because careful digging almost always revealed the details that mattered most. As an attorney, I still bring that shovel. Thorough investigation and deliberate “digging” into the facts of each case are essential to understanding potential theories of liability, assessing exposure, and evaluating every viable defense. Examining a case from multiple angles and points in the timeline allows me to appreciate how each fact fits into the broader strategy. Although I’m no longer making split second medical decisions, the same disciplined approach guides my litigation work. Every detail counts. For every client, in every matter, my goal is to identify the key facts that allow us to build the strongest possible defense. My training in emergency medicine gave me the tools, mindset, and discipline that now make me an effective litigator. Megan J. Nelson, Esquire Registered Nurse My nursing career has been a significant asset to my work as a medical malpractice defense attorney. A Registered Nurse since 2010, I have extensive, hands-on clinical experience across high-acuity settings. My background in neonatal and pediatric critical care (including work in the NICU, PICU, pediatric cardiac ICU, and pediatric emergency department) and experience managing critically ill patients (including those requiring ECMO and cardiac bypass) gives me a practical understanding of complex medical care, clinical decision-making, and the realities of fast-paced health care settings often central to malpractice claims. This firsthand knowledge allows me to analyze medical records with precision, communicate effectively with experts and providers, and identify nuances that may be overlooked by those without clinical training. In my current work on Rule 5.900 petitions for expedited judicial intervention regarding medical treatments, this clinical foundation is especially critical, as I am often tasked with effectively “educating” the court during emergency hearings—translating complex medical conditions, interventions, and risks into understandable terms for the judge. I am also able to prepare providers for testimony in a way that ensures clarity and accuracy under pressure. Ultimately, my clinical foundation enables me to bridge the gap between medicine and law, strengthening my ability to build compelling defenses grounded in real-world health care practice.

The Quarterly Dose

LEGAL ROUNDUP – Pennsylvania

November 1, 2025

Pennsylvania Superior Court Enforces Venue Selection Clause in Surgical Consent Form Somerlot v. Jung, 2025 Pa. Super. 166 (July 30, 2025) The Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the order of the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, sustaining preliminary objections of the defendant-physician and defendant-facility as to venue, and transferred the case to the Bucks County Court of Common Pleas based upon the venue selection clause in the surgical consent form. This opinion emphasizes a party’s right to contract for a proper venue prior to initiating litigation. Notably, to form a contract, there must be an offer, acceptance and consideration. The Superior Court held that the plaintiff was free to reject the contract entirely or propose a counteroffer, reject the venue clause, prior to consenting to surgery, but she failed to do so. Because the plaintiff was afforded a meaningful choice when she signed the consent-to operate contract, the contract was valid, and the venue-selection provision was enforced. Venue was appropriately transferred to the Bucks County Court of Common Pleas.    A Jury Does Not Need to Make an Express Finding of Liability as to Each Defendant to Establish a Hospital’s Vicarious Liability for a Child’s Brain Injury Hagans v. Hospital of the University of Pennsylvania, 2025 Pa. Super. 142 (July 10, 2025) The Superior Court affirmed the order of the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas denying the defendant’s motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, new trial and remitter. The court also entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant. On appeal, the defendant argued that the verdict must be vacated because the plaintiff failed to ask the jury to determine the liability of any agent or employee as a necessary predicate to a finding of vicarious liability. The Superior Court was not persuaded. According to the Superior Court, the trial court had found that, through expert testimony and other evidence presented at trial, the plaintiff sufficiently established the defendant’s agents acted negligently. Also, the jury did not need to make an express finding as to each individual defendant. The plaintiff was required to establish the liability of the defendant’s employees to determine if the defendant was vicariously liable, which the plaintiff did. Thus, the defendant’s liability was based on the actions of its employees.  The Quarterly Dose – November 2025, has been prepared for our readers by Marshall Dennehey. It is solely intended to provide information on recent legal developments and is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We welcome the opportunity to provide such legal assistance as you require on this and other subjects. If you receive the alerts in error, please send a note to tamontemuro@mdwcg.com. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2025 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Featured Conversations... Key Takeaways from A.M. Best’s Webinar on the Misuse Defense in Product Liability Claims, Featuring Michael Salvati

Michael Salvati, shareholder in our Philadelphia office, was a panelist for the April A.M. Best webinar, “The Misuse Defense: Strategic Approaches to Defending Product Liability Claims for Insurers.” During the program, Michael and his fellow panelists offered practical, jurisdiction‑specific guidance on how misuse and failure‑to‑warn theories intersect in modern product liability litigation. Michael emphasized the unique challenges these claims present—particularly in states like Pennsylvania, where evidentiary rules diverge sharply from those applied in many other jurisdictions. Failure to Warn as the “Flip Side” of Misuse Salvati explained that failure‑to‑warn allegations often arise as a direct counter to a misuse defense. As he noted, “If our misuse defense is that the plaintiff didn't use a product properly or safely, then the failure to warn claim is that we didn't tell them how to use it properly.” He emphasized that these claims can stem from either the absence of warnings or criticisms of existing warnings, such as insufficient specificity or lack of clarity about risks. Pennsylvania’s Unique Evidentiary Landscape One of Salvati’s most notable points was the stark difference in how Pennsylvania treats evidence of compliance with industry standards. He highlighted that Pennsylvania is “one of the only states…where that evidence is not admissible” in strict liability cases. Manufacturers cannot rely on compliance with ANSI, UL, ISO, or even federal safety standards to defend the product against a strict liability claim—because the focus is solely on the product itself, not the manufacturer’s conduct. Salvati acknowledged the challenge this creates for defense counsel and clients who expect such compliance to carry weight. Understanding the Three Defect Theories Salvati also walked through the three primary defect theories recognized in many jurisdictions: - Design defect – a flaw in the product’s intended design - Manufacturing defect – a deviation affecting a specific unit - Failure to warn – inadequate instructions or warnings He noted that warnings claims are increasingly significant and sometimes stand alone when design or manufacturing theories are weak. As he put it, plaintiffs often default to warnings claims because “the default position seems to be, ‘If I got hurt, there must be something wrong.’” Warranties and State‑by‑State Variations Salvati addressed how breach‑of‑warranty claims fit into the broader framework, explaining that implied warranties—such as merchantability—often overlap with strict liability in Pennsylvania. He emphasized the importance of understanding local nuances, as warranty law and admissibility rules vary widely across states. Looking Ahead: The Growing Importance of Warnings In his closing remarks, Salvati stressed that warnings should never be treated as an afterthought in product liability defense. He observed that warnings‑only claims are becoming more common and urged manufacturers and insurers to continually evaluate the clarity and completeness of their instructions and warnings. His takeaway: “We should always be talking about what are the instructions that come with our products…to bolster a misuse defense.” Listen to the complete webinar here: https://www3.ambest.com/conferences/events/eventregister.aspx?event_id=WEB1074.

Thought Leadership

The Enforceability of Online Arbitration Agreements Remains Unresolved in Pennsylvania, But the Pennsylvania Superior Court has Provided Substantive Guidance on the Issue

Key Points: The Pennsylvania Supreme Court confirms that an order compelling arbitration is not immediately appealable as collateral orders. The outcome of Chilutti II has generally left the substantive enforceability issues with browsewrap agreements unresolved in Pennsylvania. Until this issue is resolved by the Pennsylvania courts, companies operating in the Commonwealth should strive to ensure that their registration websites and/or application screens conspicuously present arbitration agreements in manners which ensure their users and consumers assent to the terms of the agreements by following the standards set forth in Chilutti I. Browsewrap agreements have been defined as agreements “‘in which a website offers terms that are disclosed only through a hyperlink and the user supposedly manifests assent to those terms simply by continuing to use the website,’ and typically do not require an electronic signature.” See, Cobb v. Tesla, Inc., 2026 WL 458470, at *1 n. 2 (Pa. Super. Feb. 18, 2026) (citation omitted). They are largely regarded as the “if you keep using this, you agree to everything buried in this link” terms embedded into almost every online agreement consumers and users sign before proceeding with purchases of goods and/or services. While consumers are generally aware of them, many almost never click on the link, nor read them in their entirety. This leaves many consumers and users ignorant of the terms and impact of such agreements. However, one’s ignorance of the otherwise neatly-tucked-away terms rarely renders them unenforceable. The issue of the enforceability of browsewrap agreements has been up for debate for some time in many jurisdictions, including Pennsylvania. Indeed, Pennsylvania had a brief grip on this issue for a period in time. Specifically, in 2023, an en banc Superior Court set forth heightened standards for companies to meet in order to secure assent and enforce browsewrap arbitration agreements. See Chilutti v. Uber Techs., Inc., 300 A.3d 430 (Pa.Super. 2023) (en banc) (“Chilutti I”) Chilutti I involved a husband and wife who sued Uber and its subsidiaries after the wife, a wheelchair bound passenger using Uber’s rideshare service, fell, struck her head, and lost consciousness due to her uber driver failing to provide a seatbelt and making an aggressive turn during the trip. The Chilutti’s filed a negligence lawsuit against Uber and its subsidiaries. In response, the defendants moved to compel arbitration, arguing that “the couple’s conduct on the company’s website and application — when they registered for the ridesharing service — signified that they agreed to be bound by the mandatory arbitration provision found in the hyperlinked terms and conditions.” The trial court granted the defendants’ petition and stayed the proceedings pending the results of arbitration, and the Chilutti’s appealed. On appeal, the Superior Court addressed two issues. First, it addressed the issue of whether it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal. A divided Superior Court determined that it did, with its basis for the holding being that the order from which the Chilutti’s appealed was a collateral order. Next, the Superior Court set out to address the merits of the Chilutti’s substantive claim. The Superior Court concluded that the parties lacked a valid agreement to arbitrate. Its rationale was that Uber’s website and application did not provide reasonably conspicuous notice of the terms to the Chiluttis. In reaching this decision, the en banc Superior Court held that browsewrap arbitration agreements are enforceable in Pennsylvania only if the registration website and application screens explicitly inform consumers that they are waiving the right to a jury trial, the registration process cannot be completed until the consumer is fully informed of this waiver, and, when the agreement is available via hyperlink, the waiver appears at the top of the first page of the terms in bold, capitalized text. Since the ruling, Pennsylvania courts have applied Chilutti I to determine if browsewrap agreements are enforceable.  For instance, the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas invoked Chilutti I to reject an agreement that lacked an express jury-trial waiver on the assent screen.  See Miller v. Festival Fun Parks, LLC, 92 WDA 2025 (C.P. Alleg. Cnty. Mar. 24, 2025). Similarly, the Superior Court has held that notice which failed to explicitly state the consumer was waiving a jury-trial right did not “me[e]t the strict burden set forth by our en banc Court in Chilutti I.” Pierce v. FloatMe Corp., 348 A.3d 1077, 1088 (Pa. Super. 2025). While the issue of enforceability of browsewrap agreements appeared to have been resolved by Chilutti I, Pennsylvania courts’ grip on this issue has been slackened by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s January 21, 2026, opinion in Chilutti II. See Chilutti v. Uber Techs., Inc., 349 A.3d 826 (Pa. 2026) (“Chilutti II”). Therein, the Supreme Court did not address the merits of the Chiluttis’ substantive claim, but rather the issue of whether the Superior Court had appellate jurisdiction to immediately review the orders staying litigation pending arbitration. The Court ultimately vacated the en banc opinion on jurisdictional grounds, holding that the Superior Court did not have appellate jurisdiction because the trial court’s order from which the Chiluttis appealed did not qualify as a collateral order and, thus, the Superior Court erred in holding to the contrary and lacked jurisdiction to entertain the merits” of the Chiluttis’ substantive claim. As such, Chilutti II has rendered Chilutti I nonbinding, and the issue of enforceability of online arbitration agreements remains unresolved. However, in light of the fact the Supreme Court did not address or comment on the merits of the Chiluttis’ appeal, Chilutti I is still meaningful. Specifically, it provides guidance as to the standards a company should strive to meet to ensure they have obtained users’ assent so that they are able to enforce online arbitration agreements. Additionally, it may serve as persuasive authority in judges’ evaluations of petitions and/or motions to compel browsewrap arbitration agreements until this particular issue is properly put before our appellate courts. Keanna works in our Pittsburgh, PA office. She can be reached at (412) 803-1174 or KASeabrooks@MDWCG.com.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict.