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Seth J. Schwartz

Chair, Construction Injury Practice

Portrait of Seth J. Schwartz

A shareholder in the firm’s Casualty Department and recipient of Martindale-Hubbell’s highest AV® Preeminent™ rating, Seth represents construction companies and contractors, trucking companies, bars, commercial property owners and managers, and amusement parks and insurers throughout Pennsylvania. His practice focuses on high-exposure matters involving catastrophic injury or death in the areas of construction accidents and defects, trucking, liquor liability, premises liability, and sports and amusement. An accomplished trial lawyer, Seth has tried numerous jury cases in Philadelphia and across eastern Pennsylvania, securing multiple defense verdicts.

Prior to joining Marshall Dennehey, Seth was a staff trial attorney for seven years at Nationwide Insurance. He handled general defense litigation including automobile liability, construction matters, and premises liability. Before joining Nationwide Insurance, Seth entered private practice at a small civil litigation firm in Philadelphia, where he handled a range of civil litigation from premises liability to complex product liability matters.

Seth was appointed to judge pro tem for the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas and to the Investigative Division of the Philadelphia Bar Association's Commission on Judicial Selection and Retention.

Seth graduated from Temple University School of Law in 1992. He attended college at The American University where he graduated in 1988 with honors.

    • Temple University Beasley School of Law (J.D., 1992)
    • American University (B.S.B.A., cum laude, 1988)
    • Pennsylvania, 1992
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 1994
    • AV® Preeminent™ by Martindale-Hubbell®
    • BTI Client Service All-Star (2024)
    • Pennsylvania Bar Association
    • An Overview of Construction Defect Litigation in Pennsylvania, Nationwide Insurance Company, December 16, 2014
    • Commercial Defense Practice in New York, New Jersey & Pennsylvania, Nationwide Insurance Company, December 5, 2014
    • Commercial Defense Practice in New Jersey and Pennsylvania, Nationwide Insurance Company, December 2013
    • Brief Overview of Pennsylvania Contractual Indemnity and Additional Insured Issues, Nationwide insurance Company, April 2012
    • Numerous presentations to property managers and insurance companies regarding effective claims handling and tender issues 
    • Pennsylvania Amusement Park Association Annual Conference, 2007
    • Defense jury verdict in premises liability matter.  Seth was the only defense attorney and Plaintiff had two lawyers during trial.  Plaintiff argued spoliation of evidence, had back surgery and "boarded" over seven figures in damages.  Seth developed inconsistencies during the cross examination of Plaintiff's witnesses, and argued that Plaintiff failed to meet his burden of proof.
    • Defense jury verdict in premises liability matter.  Seth again was the only defense attorney and Plaintiff had two lawyers during trial.  Plaintiff  argued that the defendant failed to preserve evidence.  It is also noted that the defendant had witness issues with a former employee.  Plaintiff was a grandfatherly gentlemen claiming a serious a  hip injury.  Seth introduced evidence that there were gaps in Plaintiff's story, and during Seth's cross examination of Plaintiff's liability expert, the expert admitted that he did not have his entire file, although he initially told the jury he did; and, he acknowledged that the Defendant was compliant with a different set of industry regulations which he omitted to discuss during direct examination.
    • Defense jury verdict in automobile rear-end collision with negligence stipulation involving surgery and significant wage loss claim. Negligence was admitted to the jury. Significant credibility issues developed during the case, including Plaintiff's vocational expert admitting in front of the jury of failing to produce all discoverable documents. After hearing the evidence, jury returned a defense verdict, although negligence was admitted. 
    • Defense jury verdict in rear-end motor vehicle accident case. Negligence was admitted. Plaintiff alleged surgery and a significant vocational claim. Numerous inconsistencies were developed during trial involving the Plaintiff's reporting of the incident to the doctor. After deliberation, jury awarded a defense verdict. 
    • Defense jury verdict in rear-end collision with negligence stipulation involving two personal injury claims of multiple herniations and permanency. During trial, evidence was developed which revealed that Plaintiffs provided varying medical histories to different doctors. After hearing the evidence, jury returned a defense verdict. 
    • Defense jury verdict in premises liability case whereby the plaintiff, a pizza delivery person, allegedly fell on ice while delivering a pizza. During trial Plaintiff admitted on cross examination to observing alternative pathways and that he did not maintain a vigilant look out. The jury returned a defense verdict in favor of the homeowners. 
    • Christian Legal Clinics of Philadelphia

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Defense Digest

On the Pulse…Construction Injury Litigation Practice Group

December 1, 2023

Recent data released from the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics reveals that construction laborers accounted for 11.9% of all reported fatal falls, slips, or trips in 2020 across all occupations. Sixty percent of all construction laborers perform their work near or around moving mechanical parts or in close proximity to large moving objects. Fifty percent of these workers reportedly make use of PPE. Construction sites are among the most dangerous places to work in the United States. Indeed, in 2020 alone, construction laborers accounted for 8.9% of all workplace deaths due to exposure to harmful substances or environments. With millions of accidents reported each year, injuries to construction workers are often serious or even catastrophic.  This type of litigation is fraught with difficulty since it tends to involve sophisticated legal issues, multiple parties, multiple causes of action, complex relationships, and problematic factual situations. The law in this area continues to evolve as existing rules and precedent are continually challenged, overturned, replaced, or modified.  Marshall Dennehey’s Construction Injury Litigation Practice Group understands these complex relationships and issues. Our firm has a significant presence in the construction industry in the representation of construction companies/prime contractors, commercial property owners/ managers, developers, design professionals, and demolition, electrical, roofing, and various other trade subcontractors in a wide array of serious loss cases where there is often catastrophic injury or death. With decades of experience, our diverse team of attorneys regularly defends our clients in a multitude of personal injury matters arising out of the construction process. We handle everything from catastrophic injury or death due to contact with objects or equipment, fatal or catastrophic transportation incidents, roofing incidents, and scaffolding/ladder incidents, to the more routine worksite slip and fall incidents.  Our defense approach is aimed at the early identification of key issues and is predicated on developing the earliest possible defense strategies tailored to the individual case and client. Our involvement often begins with pre-litigation accident investigation, claims analysis, best practices related to client document and evidence retention, and early assessment of risk/liability transfer opportunities to shift liability and exposure under the terms of a construction contract, including indemnification and additional insured coverage issues. Our diverse team of trial attorneys have significant experience in handling some of the most high-profile and complex construction litigation matters taking place across the United States, and we have proven time and again, that we are ready and able to try even the most challenging construction injury matters to verdict with the skills needed to prevail.  The depth of our experience is the key to our legal defense in construction injury matters. Our professionals have considerable breadth of experience in this domain. They understand the evolving and complex laws surrounding this volatile area of practice, including issues relating to insurance coverage and claims disputes, additional insured coverage, product liability, workers’ compensation, the statutory employer doctrine, contractor licensing issues, Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) compliance and workplace safety issues, and the peculiar risk doctrine. Through the use of cutting-edge technology and aggressive claim investigation, we are able to assess liability exposure and potential damages issues early on in a case so, together with the client and insurer, we can effectively resolve the case. Our unique strategy and team approach consists of experienced partners, associates, and paralegals capable of handling the basic, as well as the highly-sophisticated and complex, construction injury litigation matters throughout Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Delaware, Ohio, Florida, New York, and Connecticut.  We look forward to your inquiries and remain at your disposal for presentations or seminars your company may desire.     Defense Digest, Vol. 29, No. 4, December 2023, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2023 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com. 

Firm Highlights

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Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.

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Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.

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The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.