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Scott R. Eberle

Portrait of Scott R. Eberle

Scott is a shareholder in the Professional Liability Department with over 20 years of experience defending professionals against malpractice and other professional liability claims. He often defends lawyers against claims of malpractice and malicious prosecution. Scott also has extensive experience counseling lawyers on professional ethics and professional responsibility matters, including those facing disciplinary charges before the Office of Disciplinary Counsel as well as matters before the Pennsylvania Lawyers Fund for Client Security, the Pennsylvania Judicial Board and the Pennsylvania State Ethics Commission. While his practice is largely focused on defending lawyers and law firms, he also frequently defends accountants, engineers, real estate agents, insurance agents and design professionals in a variety of professional liability lawsuits.  

Scott is well known within the Pennsylvania legal community and is a frequent speaker at industry events. Among his many professional memberships, he is a member of the House of Delegates of the Pennsylvania Bar Association and Co-Vice Chair of its Professional Liability Committee. He is also active in the Allegheny County Bar Association where he is a member of the Ethics and Lawyer Professional Liability Committee. Additionally, he is a member of the Professional Liability Defense Federation. 

Prior to joining Marshall Dennehey, Scott chaired the Ethics & Legal Malpractice Team at a Pittsburgh-based firm.  A graduate of Duquesne University School of Law and DePauw University, he is admitted to practice in Pennsylvania, the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit and the United States Court of Federal Claims.
 

    • Thomas R. Kline School of Law of Duquesne University (J.D., 2002)
    • DePauw University (B.A., 1999)
    • Pennsylvania
    • U.S. District Court Western District of Pennsylvania
    • U.S. Court of Appeals 3rd Circuit
    • U.S. Court of Federal Claims
    • Pennsylvania Super Lawyer Rising Star (2010, 2013, 2015-2017)
    • Allegheny County Bar Association, Member of Ethics & Lawyer Professional Liability Committee
    • Pennsylvania Bar Association, Member of House of Delegates & Co-Vice Chair of Professional Liability Commitee
    • Professional Liability Defense Federation, Member
    • “Avoiding Legal Malpractice,” Butler County Bar Association, September 2025
    • “Ethically Terminating the Attorney-Client Relationship,” Allegheny County Bar Association (Sorg Forum), May 2025
    • “Ethics Considerations,” Pennsylvania Bar Institute Auto Law Update, October 2024
    • “Avoiding Legal Malpractice,” Beaver County Bar Association, November 2023 
    • "Ethics Considerations," Pennsylvania Bar Institute Auto Law Update, October 2023
    • “Avoiding Legal Malpractice,” Butler County Bar Association, August 2023 
    • “Avoiding Legal Malpractice,” Westmoreland County Bar Association, June 2023
    • "Avoiding Legal Malpractice," Pennsylvania Bar Association, June 2023
    • “Ethics Considerations,” Pennsylvania Bar Institute Auto Law Update, October 2022
    • “Avoiding Legal Malpractice,” Butler County Bar Association, September 2022
    • “Avoiding Legal Malpractice,” Clearfield County Bar Association, September 2022
    • “Risk Management for Pennsylvania Attorneys,” INtegrity First Corporation, September 2022
    • “The Ethics of Representing Entities and Their Employees,” panelist, Allegheny County Bar Association, May 2022
    • “Ethically Responding to Negative Online Reviews and Lawyer Blogging,” Allegheny County Bar Association, February 2022
    • “Avoiding Legal Malpractice – How to Get Sued in 10 Easy Steps,” Erie County Bar Association, December 2021
    • “Ethics Considerations – Responding to Negative Online Reviews,” Pennsylvania Bar Institute Auto Law Update, October 2021
    • “Ethics Refresher for Paralegals,” Pittsburgh Paralegal Association, August 2021
    • “Ethically Terminating the Lawyer-Client Relationship,” Panelist, PBI Family Law Institute, April 2021
    • “Ethics of Medical Marijuana,” panelist, Allegheny County Bar Association, April 2021
    • “Ethics Considerations,” Pennsylvania Bar Institute Criminal Law Update, December 2020
    • “Ethics Considerations,” Pennsylvania Bar Institute Auto Law Update, October 2020
    • “Ethics and Social Media,” Pennsylvania Bar Institute, October 2019
    • “Avoiding Ethical Jams, Documenting the Representation,” Erie County Bar Association, May 2019
    • “Who Exactly is Your Client?” Pennsylvania Bar Institute, March 2019
    • “Cyber Liability and Duties of a Lawyer in the Event of a Data Breach,” Allegheny County Bar Association, December 2018

Thought Leadership

Legal Updates for Lawyers' Professional Liability

Pennsylvania Bar Association Formal Opinion 2025-100 Reinforces Written Fee Agreements as Essential for Compliance and Risk Management

January 1, 2026

In Formal Opinion 2025-100, the Pennsylvania Bar Association Committee on Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility emphasizes the importance of written fee arrangements. The recent Opinion clarifies the minimum requirements of Rule 1.5 (Fees) and discusses recommended best practices to reduce disciplinary and malpractice risk. Rule 1.5(b) requires that when a lawyer has not regularly represented a client, the basis or rate of the fee must be communicated to the client in writing before or within a reasonable time after commencement of the representation. A written communication of fees is mandatory in nearly all engagements. The only exception applies when a lawyer has regularly represented the client. Although the Rules of Professional Conduct do not define “regularly,” comment [1] to the Rule explains that the exception applies where the client has an evolved understanding of the fees to be charged. The Opinion underscores that contingent fee arrangements are treated differently. Under Rule 1.5(c), a written fee agreement is always required for a contingent fee, regardless of the lawyer’s prior relationship with the client. The written contingent fee agreement must specify how the fee and expenses will be calculated. Additionally, at the conclusion of a contingent fee matter, a written closing statement showing the outcome of the matter, the remittance to the client, and the method of the determination of the fee is also required. Although the Rules of Professional Conduct only require a written statement of the basis or rate of the fee, the Committee strongly recommends a more comprehensive written fee agreement, countersigned by the client, as a best practice to avoid malpractice claims and disciplinary complaints. Fee agreements that go beyond the minimum requirements of Rule 1.5 protect the rights and interests of both the lawyer and the client, prevent misunderstandings, and ensure the lawyer’s compliance with their communication obligations under Rule 1.4. The Committee suggests that a written fee agreement can be used to clarify, among other things, the identity of the client, the scope of the representation, and the expectations and obligations of both lawyer and client. The Opinion also reminds lawyers that the writing required by Rule 1.5 must be retained for at least five years after termination of the attorney-client relationship pursuant to Rule 1.15(c). Formal Opinion 2025-100 ultimately reinforces that written fee communications protect both clients and lawyers and are an essential part the lawyer-client relationship. Legal Update for Lawyers’ Professional Liability – January 2026 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2026 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact MEDeSatnick@MDWCG.com. 

Legal Updates for Lawyers' Professional Liability

Legal Updates for Lawyers’ Professional Liability - CASE LAW UPDATE

September 1, 2025

District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania Upholds Agreement to Arbitrate Fee Dispute in Attorney Retainer Agreement PeriRx, LLC v. Harras, Boom & Archer, LLP, Civil No. 24-2601, 2025 WL 2447788 (E.D. of Pa. August 25, 2025) (non-precedential) The plaintiff filed a legal malpractice action against its attorneys arising out of the attorneys’ representation in a patent dispute. One of the plaintiff’s claims alleged that the attorneys misappropriated $490,000 of their funds that were in an escrow account.  The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the conversion claim, alleging the claim was covered by the arbitration provision in the parties’ retainer agreement attached as an exhibit to the plaintiff’s complaint.  The District Court construed the attorneys’ motion as a motion to compel arbitration, which they granted, finding there was a valid agreement to arbitrate fee disputes in section 4 of the retention agreement to which both parties agreed and affixed signatures.  The court further found that the plaintiff’s allegation that the attorney used funds in the escrow account to compensate herself and her firm without sufficient explanation to the plaintiff about what work those funds supposedly covered fell within the scope of the agreed upon arbitration provision. Additionally, the court compelled arbitration of a portion of the plaintiff’s negligence claim which focused on the same fee-dispute matter.    Legal Updates for Lawyers’ Professional Liability – September 2025 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2025 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

SIU Gets a Boost: NJ Supreme Court Affirms Insurers' Right to Litigate, Not Arbitrate, Fraud Claims

In a significant win for insurers' Special Investigation Units, the New Jersey Supreme Court clarified that statutory insurance fraud and racketeering claims may proceed in court rather than through PIP arbitration. At issue was whether insurance fraud claims brought under New Jersey's Insurance Fraud Prevention Act (IFPA) and the state's Anti-Racketeering Act (NJ RICO) are subject to mandatory arbitration under the Automobile Insurance Cost Reduction Act’s (AICRA) PIP dispute-resolution framework. Allstate had sued a network of medical practices, physicians, and related corporate entities, alleging a scheme to extract more than $1.7 million in PIP benefits through fraudulent and misleading billing. The trial court dismissed Allstate's complaint and compelled arbitration, reading AICRA's arbitration clause — which covers "any dispute regarding the recovery of... benefits" under PIP coverage, N.J.S.A. 39:6A-5.1(a) — as sweeping in fraud and racketeering claims along with routine benefit disputes. The Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Division's reversal, adopting Judge Gilson's opinion below (480 N.J. Super. 566 (App. Div. 2025)) as its own reasoning. The Court held that IFPA and RICO claims fall outside the scope of AICRA's PIP arbitration mechanism because that "streamlined and specialized" process cannot grant the relief those statutes contemplate — treble damages, injunctive relief, broad discovery, and joinder of third parties — and because arbitrators lack authority to award compensatory or treble damages to an insurer. The Court also rejected the argument that Allstate's own Decision Point Review Plans independently compel arbitration, finding those plan provisions no broader than AICRA's own arbitration clause. Notably, the Court expressly disagreed with the Third Circuit's contrary holding in GEICO v. Mt. Prospect Chiropractic Center, 98 F.4th 463 (3d Cir. 2024), concluding it is not bound by that federal interpretation of New Jersey law. Insurers retain the right to pursue IFPA and RICO claims in the Law Division, with a jury trial. For SIU units and NJ insurance carriers, this decision is a significant win: it forecloses defense clinics' primary procedural tool for shunting fraud investigations into limited-scope PIP arbitration, where treble damages, RICO relief, and meaningful discovery were never realistically available. Carriers building cases against fraudulently structured clinics, straw-owned practices, or coordinated billing networks can now proceed with confidence that a well-pleaded IFPA/RICO complaint stays in the Law Division rather than being diverted to arbitration on a motion to compel. Practically, this strengthens SIU's leverage in settlement negotiations, preserves civil discovery tools (subpoenas, depositions, joinder of related corporate entities) critical to unwinding complex ownership and referral schemes, and resolves the split with the Third Circuit in favor of NJ insurers — at least as a matter of state law. Expect increased reliance on IFPA civil actions, rather than PIP arbitration demands, as SIU's primary enforcement vehicle going forward.

Thought Leadership

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania Holds That Public Policy Does Not Prevent Insurance Coverage for Sex Trafficking Claims

On July 21, 2026, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania issued an opinion emphasizing the limited circumstances in which courts may invoke public policy to bar insurance coverage, holding in Samsung Fire & Marine Insurance Co., Ltd. (U.S. Branch) v. RI Settlement Trust that Pennsylvania public policy does not preclude coverage for claims alleging that insureds enabled or profited from human sex trafficking. The decision rejects a line of federal district court decisions predicting otherwise and reinforces that Pennsylvania courts will invoke the public policy doctrine only in the clearest of circumstances. RI Settlement is particularly significant because it arose on certified questions from the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, giving the Supreme Court the opportunity to resolve an issue on which federal courts had predicted Pennsylvania law differently. RI Settlement arose out of four separate civil complaints in which the underlying plaintiffs alleged that, as minors, they were the victims of human sex trafficking at various hotels in Philadelphia. The plaintiffs claimed that the hotel owners were negligent in failing to stop the sex trafficking from happening at their hotels. After the filing of the lawsuits, the hotel owners sought coverage under their Commercial General Liability policies. The insurers initially defended the hotels under Reservation of Rights letters, though the carriers later filed Declaratory Judgment actions seeking declarations that they did not owe a duty to defend or indemnify. In short, the insurers argued in the alternative that they did not owe any obligation to provide coverage based upon Pennsylvania public policy (because the claims violated the Human Trafficking Law – 18 Pa.C.S. § 3011) and the terms and conditions of the policy. On motions for judgment on the pleadings, the District Court found for the insurers on the basis of public policy: There is no duty to defend or indemnify against actions arising out of an insured's criminal conduct related to the sex trafficking of minors. The Court appreciates that it may make public policy the basis of a judicial decision only in “the clearest of cases.” See Minnesota Fire & Cas. Co. v. Greenfield, 589 A.2d 854, 868 (Pa. 2004) (quoting Hall v. Amica Mut. Ins. Co., 648 A.2d 755, 760 (Pa. 1994)). Yet, the Court strains to imagine a clearer case than the one presented here in which the facts alleged indicate that Policyholders engaged in criminal conduct in violation of Pennsylvania's Human Trafficking Law. The hotel owners appealed the matter to the Third Circuit, which petitioned the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania to grant review of two certified questions of law: (1) whether Pennsylvania law had an “overriding public policy” against sex trafficking, such that an insurer’s duty to defend and/or indemnify is abrogated when an insured is alleged to have enabled or profited from such trafficking; and (2) if yes, is that duty abrogated whenever the insured’s alleged conduct would constitute a violation of the Pennsylvania Human Trafficking statute. Importantly, the certified questions did not ask the Supreme Court to determine whether the policies afforded coverage under their terms. Rather, the court was asked only whether Pennsylvania public policy independently barred coverage. As a result, the court assumed for purposes of answering the certified questions that the insurers otherwise owed a duty to defend and addressed only the public policy issue, leaving all policy-based coverage defenses for further proceedings. Because the court concluded that the answer to the first certified question was “no”, it did not reach the second issue. In reaching its determination that Pennsylvania public policy does not prohibit insurance coverage for sex trafficking claims, the court limited the impact of its decision in Minnesota Fire & Cas. Co. v. Greenfield, 855 A. 2d 854, 855 (Pa. 2004), which the RI Settlement opinion emphasized as having been an “Opinion Announcing Judgment of the Court” – or a plurality opinion. In Greenfield, the insured homeowner was sued by the estate of his houseguest who overdosed from heroin that he sold to her. The matter wound its way to the Supreme Court, which determined that the insurer did not owe a duty to defend or indemnify based upon Pennsylvania public policy, which criminalized the sale and use of heroin as a Schedule I narcotic. In RI Settlement, the court “decline[d] the invitation” to extend the rationale of the three-justice plurality in Greenfield beyond cases involving Schedule I controlled substances. In so holding, the justices in RI Settlement refused to “divine an overriding public policy pronouncement by the General Assembly by virtue of its enactment of the Human Trafficking Law.” The opinion further states that it is not “within the purview of this Court to rank the magnitude of the public policy underlying the various crimes defined in the Crimes Code. It is sufficient for the work of the courts to know that the General Assembly has identified conduct it deems harmful and dangerous to the maintenance of an orderly society and criminalized it.” While the court declined to declare that Pennsylvania public policy prohibits coverage for sex trafficking claims, the opinion in RI Settlement expressly states that insurers are free to include appropriate exclusionary language for such causes of actions in their policies if they desire to do so. It will certainly be interesting to see whether the insurance industry accepts the court’s invitation, or perhaps whether the Pennsylvania legislature steps in to clarify that sex trafficking claims are indeed of the type or magnitude that they should not be covered by insurance. In any event, we will, of course, continue to monitor this and other insurance coverage issues that arise before courts in Pennsylvania, New Jersey and throughout our firm’s geographic footprint and around the country.

Thought Leadership

New Jersey Expands Family Leave Protections Effective July 17, 2026

On January 17, 2026, Governor Murphy signed into law legislation expanding the New Jersey Family Leave Act (NJFLA). Beginning July 17, 2026, significant amendments to the NJFLA will expand job-protected family leave to smaller businesses and more employees across the state. The new law broadens coverage by lowering the threshold for private employers from 30 employees to 15 employees, meaning many smaller businesses will now be subject to the NJFLA. Employees of state and local government agencies will continue to be covered regardless of the size of the employer. The amendments also make it easier for employees to qualify for leave. Under the revised law, an employee will be eligible after three months of employment and at least 250 hours worked during the preceding 12 months, replacing the previous requirement of 12 months of employment and 1,000 hours worked. Currently, New Jersey's Temporary Disability Insurance (TDI) and Family Leave Insurance (FLI) programs provide eligible employees with wage replacement while they are on leave but do not independently guarantee job protection. The recent amendments to the New Jersey Family Leave Act (NJFLA) expand these protections by extending job-protected leave to additional employees. Under the amended law, employees receiving TDI or FLI benefits may be entitled to return to the same position they held before taking leave, or to an equivalent position with the same seniority, status, pay, and benefits. Although the legislation also states that it does not expand or modify an employee's reinstatement rights under the NJFLA, the amendments appear to provide job protection to eligible employees receiving TDI or FLI benefits without requiring them to separately satisfy the eligibility requirements of the NJFLA or the federal Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). As a result, some employees may be entitled to longer periods of job-protected leave than were previously available under existing law. With these amendments, New Jersey continues to strengthen workplace protections by expanding access to job-protected family leave for eligible employees. These changes significantly expand access to job-protected family leave and may require employers to update their leave policies, employee handbooks, and HR practices. Notably, employers who were previously not required to administer NJFLA may need to amend their policies and/or create new protocols to come into compliance with the NJFLA. Failure to do so would prove costly, as the penalties for non-compliance are significant.