.

M. Scott Gemberling

Portrait of M. Scott Gemberling

For over 40 years, Scott has focused a significant portion of his practice on the defense of liquor liability, professional liability (legal, accounting, employment, D&O, non-profit, HOA) and significant exposure excess insurance claims. Scott has tried over 100 jury cases to verdict, many involving dram shop, medical and dental malpractice and product liability matters.

In addition to his law practice, Scott has lectured extensively to various claims and trial lawyer associations concerning liquor liability, early mediation and/or settlement negotiations and trial tactics. He serves as the National Litigation Coordinator for high-exposure liquor liability, professional liability and excess claims cases for a number of national insurance companies. Scott has actively defended liquor liability, casualty and professional liability claims in a variety of jurisdictions including Florida, New York, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Oklahoma, Michigan, Minnesota, Georgia, South Carolina, North Carolina, New Jersey, Connecticut, California, Washington, Arizona, Kentucky, Tennessee, Texas and Colorado. 

Scott previously served on the faculty of the Pennsylvania Bar Institute for its annual Tort Law Update Program lecturing attorneys on subjects including dram shop liability and the admission of evidence of alcohol in civil cases. He has served as a judge pro tem in Delaware County (1997-2002), co-chairman of the Delaware County Civil Trial Practice Committee (1998-2002) and a member of the Delaware County Judicial Advisory Committee. 

Scott graduated from Clarion University of Pennsylvania in 1974 and completed master's credits toward a Master of Psychosocial Science at the Pennsylvania State University from 1976 through 1978. He concluded his legal education at Widener University School of Law in 1981. Scott began his career with Marshall Dennehey as a law clerk in 1979 and continued employment with the firm following his admission to the Pennsylvania Bar in 1981.
 

    • Widener University Delaware Law School (J.D., 1981)
    • Pennsylvania Western University, Clarion (B.A., 1974)
    • The Pennsylvania State University
      • M.Pssc. [course credits completed for Master in Psycho Social Science], 1976-1978
    • Pennsylvania, 1981
    • AV® Preeminent™ by Martindale-Hubbell®
    • Litigation Counsel of America Fellows
    • Pennsylvania Super Lawyers (2005-2021)
    • American Board of Trial Advocates, Eastern Pennsylvania Chapter
    • Delaware County Bar Association
    • Delaware County Judge Pro Tem (1997 – 2002)
    • Delaware County, Judicial Advisory Committee (1998-2002); Co-Chairman, Civil Trial Practices Committee (1998 ¬- 2002)
    • Pennsylvania Bar Association
    • Pennsylvania Defense Institute
    • Philadelphia Association of Defense Counsel
    • Philadelphia Bar Association
    • Dram Shop, The Toxicology and the Law, National Academy of Continuing Legal Education, August 1, 2024
    • Dram Shop,The Toxicology and The Law, National Academy of Continuing Legal Education, December, 2020
    • The New Fair Share Act and Dram Shop Liquor Liability, Markel Insurance Co. and Markel International Insurance, August 2011
    • Recent Developments in Dram Shop Litigation, Pennsylvania Association for Justice, April 2010
    • Mealey's Retail Hospitality Liability Conference, Las Vegas, Nevada, October 2005
    • Annual Symposium on Alcoholic Beverage Law, National Alcohol Beverage Control Association, Inc., Arlington, Virginia, March 2004
    • Dram Shop Liability, Insurance Society of Philadelphia, December 2003
    • Tort Law Update, Pennsylvania Bar Institute, August 2008
    • Liquor Liability, Philadelphia Trial Lawyers Association, November 1999
    • Liquor Liability Seminar, Pennsylvania Bar Institute (Pittsburgh, Mechanicsburg and Philadelphia), 1999-Present
    • Tort Law Update (Evidence and Expert Witnesses), Pennsylvania Bar Institute, 1995-Present
    • Evidence of Intoxication, Philadelphia Bar Education Foundation, December 1995
    • Defending Liquor Liability Cases, Philadelphia Trial Lawyers Association, June 1992
    • Dram Shop Liability, Pennsylvania Trial Lawyers Association, Winter 1991
    • American College of Forensic Psychiatrists, 1992, 1994, 1996, 1999
    • "Dram Shop Cases Are Perfectly Suited For Early Mediation," The Legal Intelligencer, Liquor Law Supplement (page 6), February 22, 2019
    • “Appellate Bailout in Pennsylvania Dram Shop Case,” Defense Digest, Vol. 18, No. 1, March 2012
    • "Recent Dram Shop Developments," The Pennsylvania Bar Association Quarterly, Vol. 70, No. 3, July, 1999
    • "Direct vs. Circumstantial Evidence of Visible Intoxication in Dram Shop Case - Kelly Hotel Continues The Trend," Defense Digest, Vol. 5, No. 3, 1999
    • "Direct vs. Circumstantial Evidence of Visible Intoxication in Dram Shop Case - Kelly Hotel Continues The Trend," Pennsylvania Law Weekly, July 19, 1999
    • "Defense of Contributory Negligence In A Dram Shop Case Involving An Adult Consumer of Alcohol," Defense Digest, Vol. 5, No. 2, 1999
    • "Defense of Contributory Negligence In A Dram Shop Case Involving An Adult Consumer of Alcohol," The Legal Intelligencer, June 14, 1999
    • "Dram Shop Liability," Pennsylvania Bar Institute No. 1999-2074
    • "'After Hours' Service of Alcohol Not A Basis For Liability Under PA Dram Shop Act," Defense Digest, October 1995
    • "Estate of Boudwin v. Dino's Lounge, et al.: A Dram Shop Act Case," (Co-Author), American Journal of Forensic Psychiatry, Vol. 15, No. 3, 1994
    • "No Social Host Liability for 'Minors'," Defense Digest, Summer 1992
    • "The Dram Shop Act in Pennsylvania: Strategies for the Defense," (Co-Author), American Journal of Forensic Psychiatry, Vol. 13, No. 3, 1992
    • Advisory Board of the Nerney Leadership Institute at Cabrini College, Advisory Board, 2014-2016
    • National Advisory Board, United States Liability Insurance Group
    • In Hiles v. The Brandywine Club, 443 Pa. Super. 462; 662 A.2d 16 (1995), Scott represented the co-defendant liquor licensee, The Brandywine Club, in the wrongful death/survival claim of a husband whose wife was killed by the co­defendant drunk driver, William Diviney, as she was driving to work at 6:30 a.m. on November 30, 1985.  Following trial in Chester County, Pennsylvania, the jury rendered a verdict finding Diviney 100% liable and awarded Hiles $925,000.00 with The Brandywine Club avoiding payment of the entire verdict under joint and several liability for any percent of negligence.  The Hiles case has since provided the defining standard in Pennsylvania for licensee liability involving off-premises accidents caused by intoxicated adult patrons.
    • In Pulliam v. Bakerstown Hotel, 2004 Pa. Super. 116 (2004), the plaintiff was rendered quadriplegic as a result of a one-vehicle accident following his consumption of alcoholic beverages at the defendant bar.  During jury trial in Butler County, Pennsylvania in 2002, the Court admitted evidence of plaintiff's juvenile drug rehabilitation records, prior DUI convictions and evidence that plaintiff's urine tested positive for marijuana and cocaine following the accident as "highly probative" of the plaintiff's life expectancy and tolerance to intoxicants.  Plaintiff's Petition for Allowance of Appeal was denied by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in July 2005 and the case has since provided the standard by which evidence of plaintiff's prior drug and alcohol history may be admitted at trial.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.

Thought Leadership

Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.

Thought Leadership

The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.