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With more than 25 years of legal experience, Judd has secured successful results for clients in Northampton, Lehigh, Berks, Schuylkill, Monroe and Carbon counties including school districts, intermediate units, nursing homes, assisted living facilities, large retailers, manufacturers, construction companies, and various other employers. He has also defended coal mine operations throughout the eastern part of Pennsylvania in Federal Black Lung claims. A native of Allentown, Judd has spent his legal career defending clients in the Lehigh Valley region against workers' compensation claims.

Judd has significant experience litigating cases before Workers’ Compensation Judges throughout the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and before the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board. He has successfully defeated numerous claim petitions by presenting medical and factual evidence showing that the claimants did not sustain work-related injuries and/or corresponding disabilities. Judd utilizes innovative legal strategies and develops unique solutions to help clients achieve their litigation goals. He places a high value on communication and works closely with each client from case inception to completion.

Judd is also skilled in counseling clients on effective management of workers' compensation plans and development and implementation of innovative return-to-work programs. He also provides risk management services, which can help reduce litigation costs.

In 2026, Judd was inducted into the College of Workers' Compensation Lawyers, joining a select group of attorneys from across the country who have distinguished themselves in the practice of workers' compensation law.

Judd is a graduate of Ursinus College in Collegeville, Pennsylvania. He received his juris doctor in from Widener University School of Law in Wilmington, Delaware, graduating cum laude. He is admitted to practice in Pennsylvania and before the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.

    • Widener University Delaware Law School (J.D., cum laude, 1995)
    • Ursinus College (B.A., 1992)
    • Pennsylvania, 1995
    • U.S. Court of Appeals 3rd Circuit
    • The Best Lawyers in America®, Workers’ Compensation Law - Employers (2025-2027)
    • Top Lawyers of the Lehigh Valley, Workers' Compensation (2025)
    • Bar Association of Lehigh County, Workers' Compensation Committee
    • Claims & Litigation Management Alliance
    • College of Workers' Compensation Lawyers
    • Pennsylvania Bar Association
    • Older, Wiser, But Costlier to Heal: What an Aging Workforce Means for Employers and for the Industry, National Comp, Las Vegas, NV, September 29, 2026
    • We See You: How Employee Engagement Enhances Work Comp Outcomes, CLM Work Comp Conference, Nashville, TN, May 20, 2026
    • A State-By-State Guide to Avoiding Attorneys' Fees and Sanctions, Marshall Dennehey Workers' Compensation Seminar, October 27, 2022
    • Civil Litigation Updates in COVID-19 Litigation – Where Do We Stand One Year Later?, Marshall Dennehey Webinar, May 2021
    • IREs and WC Case Law Update, client webinar, May 19, 2021
    • Are You Coming or Going – Do You Know Your Course and Scope?, Marshall Dennehey webinar, October 26, 2020
    • Mitigating the Risk of Workplace Bullying, Marshall Dennehey Workers' Compensation Seminar, October 24, 2019
    • Return to Work: Perfecting Job Offers and the Revival of the Labor Market Survey, Marshall Dennehey Workers' Compensation Seminar, October 18 and 25, 2018
    • Ingredients for Successfully Defending Claims for Work Injuries at Home, Marshall Dennehey Workers' Compensation Seminar, October 19, 2017
    • Course and Scope, Marshall Dennehey Workers' Compensation Seminars, October 19 and 27, 2016
    • Cover Your Bases: A WCAIS Update, Marshall Dennehey Workers' Compensation Seminar, October 22, 2015
    • The Basics of WCAIS, client seminar, Parsippany, New Jersey, November 21, 2014
    • Social Media Update, Marshall Dennehey Workers' Compensation Seminar, November 6, 2014
    • Workers' Compensation: What's the Best Case, The Seltzer Group Workers' Compensation Seminar, Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, December 6, 2012
    • How To Control Your Claim, The Seltzer Group Workers' Compensation Seminar, Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, December 7, 2011
    • Workers' Compensation Hearings: Techniques & Strategies for Success, National Business Institute, Allentown, Pennsylvania, October 22, 2008 
    • Advanced Workers' Compensation in Pennsylvania, National Business Institute, Allentown, Pennsylvania, 2003, 2004 (speaker and course planner) 
    • Pennsylvania Workers' Compensation Law Seminar, Top 20 Cases of 2001 & 2002, Professional Education Systems Institute, Pittsburgh, 2002 
    • Workers' Compensation Update Lecture, Institute of Management Accountants, Lehigh Valley Chapter, Holiday Inn Bethlehem, 1998 
    • "Goodbye 'Yellow Freight' Road?," The Legal Intelligencer, November 15, 2024
    • “Protz – One Year Later,” Defense Digest, Vol. 24, No. 2, June 2018
    • "It "Payes" to Be Abnormal - Is The Law Really Changing for Mental/Mental Claims in PA Workers’ Comp?," Defense Digest, Vol. 20, No. 3, September 2014
    • "That 70's Show: Obamacare Takes Federal Black Lung Claims Back in Time," Carrier Management, December 2013 and Defense Digest, Vol. 20, No. 1, March 2014
    • Successfully defended against a Petition for Joinder of Additional Defendant that sought to place liability on our client as a statutory employer under the Act.  The judge found that the original defendants had failed to join the proper party, had failed to prove that our client was a statutory employer, and had failed to prove facts sufficient to pierce the corporate veil. Our client was dismissed from the claim.
    • Defeated a claim where the claimant was alleging that his degenerative disc disease in his cervical and lumbar spine was caused by his years of employment as a lineman for a cable services company. 
    • Prevailed in several cases for a meat packing company by proving that the claimants' alleged repetitive stress injuries to the upper extremities (shoulder injuries, carpal tunnel, etc.) were not caused by their employment. 
    • Successfully defended numerous federal black lung claims filed by miners, even when the miner was able to prove an extensive coal mine employment history and significant exposure to coal dust, and widows' claims when the miners had been awarded lifetime benefits, but the widows were unable to prove that coal workers' pneumoconiosis caused or significantly contributed to the miners' death.
    • Successfully defended a claim in which claimant was seriously injured in an automobile accident on her way to work by convincing the judge and Appeal Board that the facts of the case did not meet the criteria for exclusion from the coming and going rule. 
    • Successfully defended multiple claims where claimant was working under restrictions but was fired by the employer. Successfully argued to several Workers' Compensation Judges that the claimant was fired for cause and for reasons unrelated to the work injury and that benefits should not be awarded or reinstated.

Results

Successfully Represented an Insurance Company in a Workers’ Compensation Appellate Matter

We successfully represented an insurance company before the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania. The court agreed with our argument that the claimant needed to provide notice of his work-related injury to the defendant insurance company within 120 days of the occurrence of the injury due to his combined status as sole proprietor/owner and also the employee in this matter. The judges distinguished the facts of the case due to the fact that the claimant was a sole proprietor, owner and the only employee of his own business. The court agreed that allowing the claimant to pursue a claim, by claiming that he provided notice to himself immediately when the accident occurred, but did not bother to report the injury to the insurance company for over a year thereafter, would result in an absurdity and put the insurance company at a disadvantage in the investigation of the claim. The court also noted that the definition of “employer” in certain portions of the Act includes not only the actual employer as a business itself, but also the employer’s duly authorized agent or its insurer, if such insurer has assumed the employer’s liability. Since the claimant failed to provide notice to the insurance company within 120 days of his injury, the court held that the Claim Petition was barred. The Claim Petition was dismissed, and the claimant was not entitled to any benefits at all.

Establishing Failure to Well-Plead Secures a Win for the Defense

In our successful appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the workers’ compensation judge had awarded a closed period of benefits and then terminated all benefits, despite the employer’s late answer. The judge found that the description of injury was not well-pled and, therefore, not deemed admitted. The Appeal Board reversed the judge on the full termination of benefits, saying that, since our IME physician did not acknowledge a work-related psychiatric injury, his testimony was in conflict with the admitted injury due to the late answer. They reversed the judge and ordered reinstatement of temporary total disability benefits. The Commonwealth Court found in our favor and reversed. The court held that the judge was correct that the injury was not well-pled and that we were not deemed to have admitted a psychiatric injury. Therefore, they reinstated the judge’s decision which terminated benefits.

Thought Leadership

What's Hot in Workers' Comp

Pennsylvania Bureau of Workers' Compensation Payment Authorization Form

January 14, 2025

On October 29, 2024, Pennsylvania Governor Josh Shapiro signed into law Senate Bill 1232, which amended the Pennsylvania Workers’ Compensation Act to require that employers and insurers offer claimants the option to receive their workers’ compensation wage loss payments by direct deposit. The Direct Deposit law took effect December 28, 2024. Pursuant to the law, direct deposit must be offered to all claimants as an option for payment of indemnity benefits on or before December 28, 2025.  Employers and carriers can start offering direct deposit immediately. The Bureau recently issued a form (LIBC-215) that employers and carriers can send to claimants to authorize direct deposit. A copy of the form can be found at this link:  Payment Authorization Form LIBC-215  Please note that claimants are not required to use direct deposit, but the law requires that it be offered as an option. Please contact any of our Pennsylvania Workers’ Compensation attorneys if you have any questions regarding this new requirement.    What’s Hot in Workers’ Comp – Special PA Alert – January 14, 2025, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2025 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Goodbye ‘Yellow Freight’ Road?

November 15, 2024

Pursuant to Yellow Freight System v. Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board (Madara), 423 A.2d 1125 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1981), an employer’s answer to a claim petition that is filed more than 20 days after the assignment of the claim petition to a workers’ compensation judge (WCJ) is deemed to be a “late answer” and the employer is deemed to have admitted all well pleaded facts alleged in the claim petition. While not a complete default judgment, the granting of a Yellow Freight motion by a WCJ will often mean that a claim is found compensable and benefits are payable with the burden of proof shifting to the employer to prove that benefits should be modified, suspended or terminated.

Events

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

First DCA Reverses Excessive Jury Award Unsupported by the Evidence

In December 2019, the plaintiffs filed a claim with Universal for damages caused by a water and sewage back up through the plumbing system and existing through multiple fixtures including the washing machine drain, kitchen sink, dishwasher, bathtub and toilet. Universal investigated the claim, issued payment for resulting water damage totaling $7,000.00 in actual cash value ($12,000.00 in replacement cost value). The plaintiffs sought additional benefits for work needed to access the below-slab cast iron plumbing system due to the failure of the system from rust, deterioration, corrosion and breaks in the line. Universal denied any additional benefits for access. In 2021, the plaintiffs filed suit. During litigation, Universal sent a plumber to inspect the home and the plumber concluded the pipes were clogged but could be cleaned. The plaintiffs’ plumber testified that the plumbing system needed to be replaced due to holes and openings in the pipes. The plaintiffs introduced two estimates prepared by Triad Restoration services totaling $79,680.22 in replacement cost value and $50,219.97 in actual cash value and an executed contract with another company for repairs with the amounts of repair redacted. Since the insurance policy did not provide coverage for repair or replacement of the plumbing system, the jury only had to decide whether the plumbing system needed to be replaced, and if it did, Universal would owe for the access costs; the jury verdict form required the jury to determine both the replacement cost value and actual cash value amounts. The jury asked if it had to rely on the Triad estimates for their amounts. The trial court advised the amount awarded had to be based on the evidence presented at trial and the law given by the trial court. The jury awarded $335,000.00 in replacement cost value or $305,000.00 in actual cash value. Universal motioned for a new trial arguing the amount awarded was unsupported by the evidence and then moved for remittitur. The trial court denied both motions and this appeal followed. The court found that while a jury’s verdict should only be disturbed with caution and discretion, the trial court must give the properly challenged award close scrutiny and determine whether it bears a reasonable relation to the damaged provided, is supported by the evidence, and could have been reached in a logical manner by reasonable means §768.74(3), (5)(d)-(e), Fla. Stat. The court found the trial court did consider the statutory requirements at the hearing on Universal’s remittitur motion and was concerned about a reasonable relation to the amount of damages proved and injury suffered and whether the award was supported by the evidence, but ultimately denied the motion, reasoning that the jury had been properly instructed to fairly and adequately compensate the plaintiffs. The court noted the only evidence providing the basis for the jury verdict was Triad’s estimates and those valued the plaintiffs' claimed loss at $79,680.22 in replacement cost value and $50,219.97 in actual cash value; no valuation evidence reasonably supported the jury verdict. The plaintiffs argued that the jury was entitled to consider more than the estimates, but the court conveyed the evidence provided did not give the jury a way to reach the amounts they awarded. The court was also not swayed by the plaintiffs’ argument regarding inflation and later price increases, but the court noted that no evidence via the contract, nor testimony regarding increase in labor, material, fuel or construction costs were entered into the record.  The court concluded the jury may draw reasonable inferences from the evidence, but it may not supply a damages number by speculation. The court did not find any of the plaintiffs’ remaining argument persuasive either. The court reversed the denial of Universal’s remittitur motion and motion for new trial as to damaged and remanded the case. The court ended its opinion with advising the trial court must determine whether replacement cost value or actual cash value is the property measure of damages under the policy and order remittitur in an amount consistent with that determination and the evidence.

Thought Leadership

United State District Court for the Middle District of Florida finds Evidence of Replacement Cost Value is Admissible and Recoverable Even When Repairs Have Not Been Made

The plaintiff filed a claim for damage as a result of Hurricane Ian. It claimed damages were over $24 million, but the carrier accepted partial coverage and paid $8,307.49 for secondary components. The carrier found hurricane damage to the building, but it was below the insurance policy’s $3.6 million deductible. The plaintiff sued for breach of the insurance policy. The carrier argued in a motion for summary judgment that plaintiff could not recover replacement cost value (RCV) because the property repairs had not been effectuated. The policy provided for RCV, but only after the repairs were completed. The carrier argued that because the repairs were not completed, the plaintiff was not entitled to RCV damages. The plaintiff argued the carrier could not withhold the actual cost value (ACV) due, which was the main allegation of the lawsuit, then fault it for not making the repairs to unlock the RCV. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida rejected the carrier’s argument, finding that when an insurer allegedly breached the policy by withholding coverage, it could not hide behind a repair-contingent provision to block the insured from RCV damages at trial. The court found the issue to be whether the contractual language designed to preclude certain coverage until after repairs are completed barred an insured from seeking those damages at trial when repairs were not complete. The court noted the Eleventh Circuit had not resolved this issue and neither side pointed to a definitive answer from the Florida Supreme Court. The court reasoned that it must look to the Sixth District Court of Appeal (6th DCA), which is the court which would have heard this case if it was in state court. The court noted the 6th DCA recently addressed this issue in Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Rodriguez, 427 So. 3d 676 (Fla. 6th DCA 2026). The Rodriguez Court found that a breach of contract action is designed to adjudicate not only whether the contract was breached, but also evaluate the damages incurred had the breach not occurred, which the Rodriguez court found to be recovery of the RCV. This court also noted basic Florida contract principles compelled the same result, as a material breach frees the nonbreaching party to suspend its own performance and can demand the full benefit of its bargain, including RCV damages. Finally, the court found the distinction between a full denial and partial denial did not compel a different result. It found the policy required the carrier to acknowledge coverage and pay ACV for all covered damages, and the failure to do that is a material breach, entitling the insured to all of the damages available under the contract, which included the RCV.

Thought Leadership

Appeals Court Reverses Trial Court Order Awarding Attorney’s Fees Due to Lack of Evidence to Support Fee Awarded

The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s order awarding appellate fees to People’s Trust Insurance Company based upon a lack of evidence to support the attorney’s fee award in RM & Assocs. Consulting, Inc. v. People's Trust Ins. Co., 2026 Fla. App. LEXIS 4654 (Fla. 4th DCA 2026). People’s Trust was the insurer of a residential property that had sustained water damage. RM & Associates Consulting was hired by the homeowner to perform mitigation services at the property. The homeowner assigned post-loss benefits to RM and RM subsequently filed suit against People’s Trust alleging that it had not been paid the money it was owed for the mitigation services. People’s Trust defended the lawsuit on the ground that the policy required the insured to notify the insurer before authorizing repairs so People's Trust could elect to use its preferred contractor. Because the owner did not comply with that provision, People's Trust asserted its liability was limited to the amount that its preferred contractor would have charged for the work, which People's Trust contended was $2,000. People's Trust paid that amount to RM before RM filed suit. People’s Trust filed a motion for summary judgment which was granted. RM appealed the summary judgment ruling and the ruling was upheld by the Fourth District Court of Appeal. The appellate court also granted People’s Trust’s entitlement to appellate attorney’s fees, subject to the trial court’s determination of the amount of fees, based upon an offer of judgment made by People's Trust. On remand, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing to determine the amount of attorney’s fees People’s Trust was entitled to. At the hearing, People’s Trust presented testimony from it’s fee expert, supervising trial counsel and appellate counsel. People’s Trust sought recovery of $24,866.17 for work performed by appellate counsel. The request primarily consisted of work performed in preparation of the answer brief. The fee expert testified that more than ninety hours spent preparing the answer brief was reasonable given the complexity and significance of the underlying issue. The appellate court found that the fee expert’s testimony fell short of meeting the necessary standard of demonstrating that the hours expended were necessary. The appellate court found that the billing records did not serve to cure the deficient testimony, as the billing records did not contain adequate details regarding the specific tasks performed. Rather the records contained entries such as “answer brief” which the appellate court found to be insufficient. The appellate court noted that neither the fee expert or counsel addressed how the prior research and briefing in the parallel litigation informed the work in the instant matter. The appellate court noted this was significant in that a court's attorney's fees award must exclude excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary hours, citing Florida Patient's Compensation Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 1985). Based upon the record failing to support the finding of the trial court, the 4th DCA remanded the case to the trial court for a reconsideration and redetermination of reasonable appellate attorney’s fees supported by competent substantial evidence. The 4th DCA reiterated that the fee expert’s focus on the quality of the work and the importance of the work to People’s Trust did not make up for the perceived deficiencies in the position that spending over ninety hours on a single answer brief was reasonable. Whether moving for attorney’s fees or challenging the amount of fees being sought by an opposing party, practitioners should be mindful of the evidence being used to support the claims being made. Parties should pay close attention to whether the hours being sought may be impacted by prior litigation either party may have engaged in. A party must be prepared to address how prior litigation efforts did or did not impact the amount of hours being claimed in current litigation. Lastly, billing records must be sufficiently detailed so as to support any potential future fee claim.