Josh J.T. Byrne is Co-Chair of the firm's Disciplinary Board Representation Practice and concentrates his practice on representing and defending professionals in a variety of professional liability matters. Josh regularly represents attorneys in legal malpractice, wrongful use of civil proceedings and disciplinary matters. He also represents many other types of professionals, including those in the health care field, in the federal and state courts in Pennsylvania and New Jersey and before disciplinary boards.
Josh has devoted his legal career to the protection of professionals and is highly regarded in this arena throughout the state. He is the former Chair of the Pennsylvania Bar Association’s Professional Liability Committee; Co-Chair of the Amicus Curiae Brief Committee; and an active member of the Ethics Committee. He is also Co-Chair of the Philadelphia Bar Association’s Professional Responsibility Committee, the former Co-Chair of the Philadelphia Bar Association’s Professional Guidance Committee and is a former Hearing Committee Member serving the Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. He serves as a Zone One delegate to the Pennsylvania Bar Association’s House of Delegates and as a Judge Pro Temp for the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas.
A prolific writer, Josh publishes extensively on malpractice avoidance and authors a recurring column in The Legal Intelligencer on professional liability topics. Josh frequently presents to legal and business organizations throughout Pennsylvania on professional liability themes.
Josh graduated with a dual major in Political Science and Japanese Studies From Earlham College in Richmond, Indiana. After college, he worked for two years as a coordinator for international relations in Chiba, Japan. He then obtained his juris doctor from Rutgers University School of Law. He is rated AV-Preeminent by Martindale-Hubbell, the highest rating for professional competence.
Results
Civil Rights Claims Dismissed Against Attorney Client in Federal Court
Obtained dismissal of claims in a civil rights action brought against their attorney client in the Middle District of Pennsylvania. The plaintiff brought claims for Deprivation of Rights (42 U.S.C. § 1983), Conspiracy Against Rights (42 U.S.C. § 1985), and Civil Conspiracy against their client. Jake and Josh filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to F.R.C.P. 12(b)(6), arguing that the plaintiff had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The Magistrate Judge agreed, issuing a report and recommendation for the claims to be dismissed, which the District Judge then adopted as the Court’s decision. No timely appeal was taken.
Unanimous Decision Received from the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
We received a unanimous decision from the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. This decision both limits the use of offensive collateral estoppel in disciplinary matters and establishes that the standard of proof for disciplinary matters in Pennsylvania is clear and convincing evidence. The Office of Disciplinary Counsel had sought to utilize non-mutual offensive collateral estoppel to preclude the respondent from disputing fact determinations by a bankruptcy judge when she sanctioned the respondent and his client. The Supreme Court determined that the burden of proof for the judge in issuing sanctions was something less than clear and convincing evidence and, therefore, collateral estoppel did not apply. In making its decision, the Supreme Court noted that the previously expressed standard of “preponderance of clear and satisfactory evidence” was confusing and archaic but is the functional equivalent of “clear and convincing.”
Thought Leadership
The Legal Intelligencer
What’s the Gist of the Gist of the Action in Pennsylvania?
May 14, 2026
The question of when and how the gist of the action doctrine applies to professional liability claims in Pennsylvania, and whether a breach of contract claim may be asserted in any legal malpractice action where there is a contract, remains open.
The Legal Intelligencer
The Distinction Between Abuse of Process and Wrongful Use of Civil Proceedings
March 16, 2026
Attorneys and Pennsylvania courts have often conflated actions for abuse of process and wrongful use of civil proceedings (the Dragonetti Act). The two torts are very different claims, with different requirements, and should be considered separately. Some recent opinions have highlighted one of the key differences between the two types of claims, the distinction between a “proceeding” and “process.”
