.

John L. Slimm

Senior Counsel

JLSlimm@mdwcg.com

Portrait of John L. Slimm

Jack is a member of the Professional Liability Department where he concentrates his practice in complex litigation, with emphasis on the defense of professionals, including lawyers, accountants, architects and engineers, insurance brokers, real estate professionals, and directors and officers in matters pertaining to malpractice, negligence, fraud, and defamation.  He is also a fellow in the American College of Trial Lawyers, and has tried over 150 cases and argued scores of appeals. 

Jack is admitted to practice in New Jersey, the District of New Jersey, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, and the United States Supreme Court. He has also been admitted to try cases in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, the Eastern District of New York, and the Southern District of New York, as well as the Supreme Court of the State of New York.

A graduate of the University of Notre Dame Law School, Jack subsequently served as Law Secretary for the Honorable Thomas F. Dalton, J.S.C., Superior Court of New Jersey.

Jack is a frequent speaker for the New Jersey Institute for Continuing Legal Education and the American College of Trial Lawyers on legal malpractice matters.

In 2025, Jack was recognized by the New Jersey Judiciary for his exemplary pro bono work and unwavering commitment to serving the public.

    • Notre Dame Law School (J.D., 1970)
    • La Salle University (B.A., 1967)
    • New Jersey, 1970
    • AV® Preeminent™ by Martindale-Hubbell®
      The Martindale-Hubbell rated attorney list is issued by Internet Brands, Inc. A description of the selection methodology can be found here. No aspect of this advertisement has been approved by the Supreme Court of New Jersey.
    • The Best Lawyers in America®, Legal Malpractice Law - Defendants; Professional Malpractice Law – Defendants; Philadelphia "Lawyer of the Year" Legal Malpractice Law - Defendants, 2015 (2010-2026)
      The Best Lawyers list is issued by Woodward & White. A description of the selection methodology can be found here. No aspect of this advertisement has been approved by the Supreme Court of New Jersey.
    • New Jersey Super Lawyer List (2005-2009, 2011-2021)
      The Super Lawyers list is issued by Thomson Reuters. A description of the selection methodology can be found here. No aspect of this advertisement has been approved by the Supreme Court of New Jersey.
    • American Bar Association
    • American College of Trial Lawyers
    • Burlington County Bar Association, Co-Chairman of Civil Practice Committee
    • Camden County Bar Association, Civil Practice Committee
    • New Jersey State Bar Association
    • Legal Malpractice Update, NJICLE Seminar, June 14, 2024
    • The Defense of Appellate Counsel in Legal Malpractice Actions, Client Webinar, June 4, 2024
    • NJ Business Rule and Its Application to Lost Profits, NJICLE Business Litigation Year in Review Seminar, November 1, 2023
    • Strategic Approaches to Handling Lost Profit Claims Under New Jersey's New Business Rule, Client Webinar, September 7, 2023
    • Mediation Process & Techniques in Civil & Chancery Disputes: Producing the Best Results for Your Client, Camden County Bar Association’s Civil Practice Update, June 5, 2023 
    • Criminal Defense Bar and Their Exposure to Legal Malpractice & Cross-Examining an Expert in a Legal Malpractice Case, NJICLE 2023 Legal Malpractice Update, March 25, 2023 
    • Virtual Jury Trials in New Jersey: The Good, The Bad and The Ugly, Client Webinar, March 25, 2022
    • NJICLE Annual Legal Malpractice Conference, March 27, 2021
    • De Bene Esse Depositions, NJICLE Deposition College Seminar, March 26, 2021
    • What Can Go Wrong At Trial?, New Jersey Institute for Continuing Legal Education, April 2014
    • Where Has All the Privity Gone?, New Jersey Institute for Continuing Legal Education, March 2013
    • Legal Malpractice, New Jersey Law Journal Continuing Legal Education Series, December 2012
    • Examining Non-Traditional Claims Against Lawyers, The Hartford, May 2012
    • Non-Traditional, Complex Professional Liability Claims, PLUS, April 2012
    • New Jersey's Litigation Privilege, How It Applies and Can Be Used In Defense of Attorneys in Actions Filed in Both State and Federal Courts in New Jersey, New Jersey Institute of Continuing Legal Education, April 2012
    • Civil Practice, Camden County Bar Association, November 2011
    • Legal Malpractice, Mercer County Bar Association, November 2011
    • False Arrest and Malicious Prosecution, CNA Insurance Company, October 2011
    • 2010 Review of the New Jersey Environmental Law Seminar: Issues of Legal Malpractice and Ethics Arising Out of the Handling of Transactions in Which Environmental Issues are Involved, New Jersey Institute for Continuing Legal Education, March 2010
    • Defense Perspective of Civil Practice Under the Rules of Court, Camden County Bar Association Civil Practice Committee, November 2009
    • Legal Malpractice Seminar, Burlington County Bar Association, November 2009
    • Civil Practice, Camden County Bar Association, February 2009
    • "Strategic Defenses to Appellate Malpractice Claims," PLUS Blog, April 19, 2024
    • "Strategy is Key for Opening Statements and Closing Arguments," New Jersey Lawyer, June 2021
    • "The Liability of Trial Counsel for Strategic and Tactical Judgments Made During Trial,"New Jersey Law Journal Professional Malpractice Supplement (page 6), January 13, 2020
    • "How to Avoid Liability For Your Clients' Representations,"New Jersey Law Journal, Professional Malpractice Supplement, January 9, 2019
    • "The Immunity of Attorneys for the Occasional Bad Result,"New Jersey Law Journal, Professional Malpractice Supplement, January 15, 2018
    • "When Attorney Fees Can Be Awarded in Legal Mal Actions Brought by Non-Clients," New Jersey Law Journal, January 24, 2017
    • "Disgruntled Beneficiaries and Claims Against Estate Planning Attorneys," New Jersey Law Journal, January 18, 2016
    • “New Jersey's Litigation Privilege Does Not Bar a Claim By a Client for Legal Malpractice Against Defense Attorneys,” Defense Digest, Vol. 19, No. 1, March 2013
    • “The Litigation Privilege In Claims Against Attorneys,” New Jersey Law Journal, Vol. 203, No. 11, March 14, 2011
    • "New Jersey Holds Comparative Negligence Defense Unavailable in Broker Malpractice Actions," Defense Digest, Volume 7, No. 6, December, 2001 
    • "Hashing Out the Broker -Dealers Duty of Disclosure," Pennsylvania Law Weekly, September 27, 2001
    • "Discharge of At-Will Employees in New Jersey," Defense Digest, Volume 7, No. 4, August 2001 
    • "The Architect's Conditional Privilege to Interfere with the Construction Contract of its Principal," Defense Digest, Volume 7, No. 4, August 2001 
    • "New Jersey Appellate Division Concludes that the Manifest Trigger Applies for Only First-Party Property Damage Coverage Involved," Defense Digest, Volume 6, No. 5, October 2000 
    • "New Jersey Limits Accountants Liability in Securities Fraud Actions," Defense Digest, Vol. 6, No. 4, June 2000
    • "New Jersey Rejects Claims for Bad Faith Settlement of Asbestos-Related Personal Injury Claims," Defense Digest, Vol. 6, No. 4, June 2000 
    • "Federal Court, Under Judicial Estoppel Theory, Rejects Plaintiff's Claims For Disability Under the ADA and NJLAD," Defense Digest, Vol. 6, No. 2, April 2000 
    • "New Jersey Limits Accountant's Liability in Review Engagements," Defense Digest, Volume 6, No. 1, February 2000 
    • "Proving the Empty Chair Defense In New Jersey Product Liability Actions," Defense Digest, Vol. 5, No. 2, 1999 
    • "New Jersey Accounting Malpractice Update," Defense Digest, Vol. 5, No. 3, 1999 
    • "New Jersey Supreme Court Rejects Learned Intermediary Doctrine," Defense Digest, Oct. Vol. 5, No. 5, 1999
    • Successfully defended an action in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Monmouth County, and obtained dismissal of a legal malpractice action involving $12 million in liquidated damages arising out of two underlying Law Division actions, two bankruptcy matters, a Federal District Court action, an Appeal to the Third Circuit, underlying foreclosure and Note actions, and an appeal to the Appellate Division. Jack represented a well-known bankruptcy practitioner in connection with claims made by the plaintiff borrower against the lender bank, its officers, and counsel.
    • Obtained a defense verdict in an action recently tried in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Monmouth County, in which Jack represented a boutique New York firm in connection with their representation of a money manager in a construction defect case involving millions of dollars in damages.  Jack, during trial, was successful in getting the malpractice claims dismissed.  Jack then proceeded to argue the insured’s Counterclaim for fees due and owing.  The jury found in our favor, and entered a Judgement against the plaintiff on our Counterclaim in the approximate amount of $250,000.00.  Then, the Court awarded contractual interest (which is discretionary), taking the total award in favor of our client against the plaintiff to almost $500,000.00.
    • Obtained a defense verdict in a matter tried in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Burlington County, involving a New York firm who was sued in connection with the failure to properly prosecute a Title 7 retaliation case.  Jack tried the case-within-a-case Title 7 case, and the jury found that there was no causation for the legal malpractice action because the plaintiff’s employer rightfully terminated the plaintiff, and that there was no retaliation by the employer.
    • Obtained a defense verdict in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Gloucester County in favor of a land use planning attorney arising out of claims of negligent land use planning and land development, which arose out of the faulty design of a drainage system for a new development.
    • Successfully defended in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Hunterdon County, an architect in connection with claims asserted by homeowners for water infiltration, mold growth, personal injuries, and permanency in a multi-defendant action against builders, developers, architects, and engineers relative to the design of a solar panel system.
    • Successful at trial in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Middlesex County in the defense of manufacturers of keyboards, and in defense of claims for orthopedic injuries against the manufacturers of keyboards.  This was the first test case tried in New Jersey. Jack tried this case for weeks, resulting in a defense verdict for the computer keyboard industry.
    • Successful at trial in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Cape May County, in a complex legal malpractice action where the Court entered a direct verdict after a trial lasting months involving claims by a developer against the lending bank and bank counsel for lender liability and fraud.
    • Successfully obtained a dismissal in a Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Monmouth County, case on behalf of a County Utilities Authority in an action by a developer against Municipalities, the Utilities Authorities, the Freeholders, and the Counties arising out of the developer’s claim, in an affordable housing development, that the Municipalities refused to provide consent to permit water service for the property, and failed to facilitate the development of affordable housing.
    • Successful at trial in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Ocean County, in a complex legal malpractice action arising out of a claim that the real estate/business law firm failed to properly document a multi-million dollar transaction, failed to properly ascertain the true owner of the property, and failed to properly investigate the Title to the property and undertake a Title search. Jack successfully argued at trial that the real estate attorney had a limited scope of engagement, and was only required to draft transaction documents based upon information provided by the clients.
    • Cureton Clark, P.C. v. William H. Lewis, Individually and as Administrator of the Estate of Irma B. Lewis, Superior Court of New Jersey, Burlington County, Chancery Division – Probate Part, Docket No:  2008-0644. In this case, Jack defended the Counterclaim filed by the Administrator of an Estate against the attorneys who handled the probate litigation. The attorneys were retained to defend the probate case which involved the challenge of gifts. Following the resolution of that litigation, the attorneys filed an action against the Estate for non-payment of fees.  The Estate filed a Counterclaim and a Third Party Complaint against the attorneys, alleging legal malpractice, fraud, and misrepresentation in connection with the attorney's handling of the underlying probate case and their billings. The Complaint and Counterclaim were tried in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Burlington County, Chancery Division – Probate Part. Jack defended the Counterclaim and Third Party Complaint. After a trial spanning several weeks, the Court issued its opinion on October 18, 2013 dismissing all claims in the Counterclaim and Third Party Complaint, and also awarding fees to our clients. The Court found that the services performed by our clients were not performed in bad faith or for the purpose to gain fees in the underlying case. The Court found that there was no dishonesty, fraud or deceit on the part of the attorneys in their billings. The Court did not find any deceit, fraud, or dishonesty by the attorneys. Also, the Court agreed with our position, pursuant to Camden Iron v. Klehr, 384 N.J. Super. 172 (App. Div. 2006), that there is no independent cause of action in New Jersey based upon the Rules of Professional Conduct. The Court also found that there was no showing by clear and convincing evidence of any material misrepresentations by the attorneys.
    • Johnson v. McClellan, 468 N.J. Super. 562 (App. Div.), cert. denied, 249 N.J. 76 (2021). Jack was retained by a prominent law school to represent on appeal one of its professors who had been charged with the unauthorized practice of law, which resulted in the Trial Court entering a Judgment against the professor for hundreds of thousands of dollars, including treble damages and attorneys’ fees because of his acceptance of a referral fee in a malpractice case.  The plaintiff argued, and the trial Judge found, that the professor violated New Jersey’s Criminal Statute for the unauthorized practice of law.  Jack was retained to brief and argue the appeal.  The Appellate Court reversed the Trial Court, reversed the finding that the professor engaged in the unauthorized practice of law, and reversed the Trial Court’s Judgment which had been entered against the professor for treble damages and fees.  The Supreme Court denied plaintiff’s Petition for Certification.  This decision could spare others from criminal prosecution under New Jersey’s Criminal Statute related to the unauthorized practice of law.
    • Schwartz v. Cooper Levenson, 251 N.J. 556 (2022).  Jack argued before the New Jersey Supreme Court in this precedent-setting case in connection with whether the New Business Rule constitutes a per se bar on all lost profits claimed by new businesses.  This opinion applies in any type of case in which a new business is making a claim for lost profits.  The Supreme Court agreed with Jack’s argument that if the Court intended to amend the rule, then they should follow the New York and Illinois rule, which provides that such claims must be proven by reasonable certainty.  Jack convinced the Supreme Court to apply New York and Illinois law to find that, with regard to a new business, the reasonable certainty standard applies to claims for lost profits.  This decision will apply to all cases in which a new business is making a claim for lost profits.  The Supreme Court ruled, pursuant to Jack’s argument, that Trial Courts must now “carefully scrutinize” a new business’  lost profits claim, and should bar that claim unless it can be proven with reasonable certainty.  
    • Mystic Isle Development Corp. v. Perskie & Nehmad, 142 N.J. 310 (1995). This case is a precedent-setting case in New Jersey juris prudence. Jack successfully argued before the New Jersey Supreme Court that the Entire Controversy Doctrine applied to attorneys and law firms. This case is regularly cited in opinions by the Appellate Division and the New Jersey Supreme Court regarding the application of the Entire Controversy Doctrine.
    • Lynch v. NJ Education Association, 161 N.J. 152 (1999). Jack successfully argued in the New Jersey Supreme Court on behalf of an editor, in a public figure defamation case, that the plaintiff, a State Senator, was a public official and public figure. The plaintiff argued that the campaign literature was defamatory, including an article entitled “Boss of Bosses,” which was published in a local newspaper.  The Senator alleged that the advertisement described him not merely as associated with organized crime, but as its top official.  The Supreme Court held that the statement in the newspaper was not defamatory.  The Supreme Court also held that the facts in the newspaper advertisement that the Senator had been a partner and an officer in three mob-owned companies, and had mobsters as business partners and clients, did not support the assertion that the Senator was the boss of bosses of the mafia.  The Court found that readers of the newspaper articles would understand the statements to be hyperbole and name-calling, emanating from a rough-and-tumble political campaign.  The Court found that the Senator’s proofs did not demonstrate that a jury could find by clear and convincing evidence that the editor published the statements with actual malice.
    • 2820 Mt. Ephraim Ave. v. Brown, A-2694-19/A-2699-19 (App. Div. July 13, 2021).  Jack successfully argued pre-trial Motions for Summary Judgment in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Camden County, in a $10,000,000 tortious interference and defamation case filed on behalf of investors against an attorney and bank counsel arising out of a multi-million dollar loan for a commercial land transaction. The allegations against the attorney included claims of slander for allegedly calling the plaintiff a “wannabe gangster” in front of a potential investor, as well as a claim for tortious interference with prospective economic advantage for a contract that plaintiff entered into with the investor.  The Trial Court granted the Motions, and found that calling plaintiff a “wannabe gangster” was name-calling, and not actual defamation.  On appeal, the Appellate Division affirmed the Trial Court’s holding, and held that the statement “wannabe gangster” does not constitute slander per se because it did not impute a criminal offense, and did not necessarily assign the plaintiff a characteristic that was incompatible with his business or trade as an attorney and accountant. The Appellate Division agreed with the Trial Court that the statement fell within the litigation privilege.  The Appellate Division affirmed the Trial Court’s Order which granted the attorneys’ Motion for Summary Judgment because the defamation claim was barred by the litigation privilege.
    • Camden Iron & Metal, Inc. v. Klehr Harrison, 384 N.J. Super. 172 (App. Div., certif. denied), 187 N.J. 83 (2006). This is a seminal case in New Jersey in which Jack successfully appealed the decision of the trial court. The Appellate Division ruled that New Jersey courts do not have the authority to regulate attorney conduct in Pennsylvania simply because the attorneys are admitted in New Jersey and have offices in New Jersey. Also, the court ruled that forum non conveniens Motions for Disqualification must be filed in the jurisdiction where the underlying litigation is pending. The court also ruled that the Rules for Professional Conduct do not provide a basis for a legal malpractice action. The New Jersey Supreme Court denied plaintiff's petition for certification. 
    • Morris Properties, Inc. v. Jonathan Wheeler, et al., A-2653-20 (App. Div. February 28, 2023). Jack successfully argued on appeal, in a legal malpractice action arising out of an underlying complex insurance coverage litigation in the United States District Court, that in legal malpractice actions, proximate cause requires an initial determination of cause in fact, which requires proof that the result complained of probably would not have occurred but for the negligent conduct of the defendant.  Also, Jack made the point that a plaintiff must then present evidence to support a finding that the defendant’s negligent conduct was a substantial factor in bringing about plaintiff’s injury, even though there may be other concurrent causes of the harm.  In addition, Jack successfully argued that a plaintiff must show what injuries were suffered as a proximate consequence of the attorney’s breach of duty, ordinarily measured by the amount that a client would have received but for the attorney’s negligence.  Also, the client must have sustained actual damage that is real, not merely speculative.  It is the plaintiff’s burden to show what injuries were suffered as a proximate consequence of the attorney’s breach of duty.  In Morris Properties, at the trial level, Jack argued that plaintiffs did not present expert testimony to demonstrate that the plaintiff would have prevailed in its coverage case against the carrier, or would have received a greater settlement had the attorneys met the standard of care.  The Appellate Division agreed that plaintiffs failed to establish proximate cause as a matter of law, and that expert testimony was necessary to prove proximate causation and damages. Plaintiffs did submit an expert report.  
    • Borough Construction, Inc. v. Lenape Reg. High School Dist. Bd. of Ed. v. DiGeronimo/Mikula Assoc., 445 Fed. Appx. 498 (3d Cir. 2011). Jack Slimm and Dante Rohr had the privilege of representing the nationally recognized expert in the design of running tracks in an action in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey.  Our client developed the standards used in the industry for running tracks, including those at the Olympic level where he has designed running tracks.  In the litigation, the school district brought suit against numerous contractors, designers, etc. for defects in the high school.  The co-defendants settled at mediation leaving in the case the general contractor for his retainage, and our client, who designed the running track.  The school district alleged, through their expert, that the running track was not properly certified, was not properly built, and was not certifiable.  Therefore, the school district had a new track installed at considerable expense.  This track was a "double bend" or "broken-back" configuration.  (You might recall seeing that design when you watched the Olympics on television).  In any event, the case involved some courtroom drama because the school district took the risk of re-calling their expert engineer on rebuttal.  When he was re-called, he changed his opinion.  When asked by the Federal judge why he changed his testimony, the plaintiff's expert testified, "I was confused by Mr. Slimm's cross-examination."  That cross-examination came through the geometric calculations which were done at counsel table by New Jersey's resident electrical engineer, Dante Rohr, who gave Jack the numbers on the fly so that Jack could cross-examine plaintiff's expert.  It worked, and the expert was discredited.  The court, after findings of fact and conclusions of law, rejected the opinions of plaintiff's expert, and entered Judgment in favor of our client dismissing all claims.
    • Shapiro v. Rinaldi, A-1753-14T4 (App. Div. March 18, 2016). Jack successfully argued at the Trial Court and on appeal that the law firm had no liability for the actions of the non-lawyer assistant to advise clients with respect to their legal rights, including advising clients of deadlines to file a claim. Jack was successful in arguing that the plaintiff’s expert’s reliance on the Rules of Professional Conduct was not sufficient to make out a cause of action for legal malpractice. Also, this opinion is significant because, in the same, the Appellate Division held that, with solo practitioners, the attorney took responsibility to ensure that his secretary/paralegal complied with his professional obligations. In addition, the Appellate Division rejected the plaintiff’s claim that the attorney should be held vicariously liable for his secretary’s oversight. Significantly, the Court held that the attorney’s secretary was not an attorney, and owed no duty to the plaintiff.
    • Broadway Family Practice v. Willitts (Successful defense of appeal in App. Div. under Docket No: A-3700-04T1) (App. Div. 2005). In this Appellate Decision argued by Jack, the court held that the Entire Controversy Doctrine does apply to bar legal malpractice if the attorney commits malpractice in the course of handling a case and the client becomes aware of the facts supporting the potential claim while the case is still pending. The malpractice action against the attorney must be joined with the underlying lawsuit, or it will be barred by the Entire Controversy Doctrine. The Entire Controversy Doctrine applied in that case because in April of 1997, when the underlying Chancery Division action was pending, the law was such in New Jersey that the attorney could have and should have been joined as a defendant pursuant to Mystic Isle Development Corp. v. Perskie & Nehmad, 142 N.J. 310 (1995), a case which Jack successfully argued in the New Jersey Supreme Court. 
    • Shamrock Lacrosse, Inc. v. Klehr, Harrison, Harvey, Branzburg & Ellers, LLP, 416 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 2010). Jack successfully argued in the Appellate Division in a complex legal malpractice action arising out of the allegedly negligent omissions made by a patent attorney who had worked, in succession, at two law firms.  The Complaint alleged that the attorney failed to assure that certain renewal fees necessary to maintain plaintiff’s patent were paid to the United States Patent & Trademark Office (the “USPTO”).  Consequently, the patent expired, and plaintiff was unable to get it reinstated.  As a result, plaintiff claimed that it suffered economic harm.  In this precedent-setting case, the Appellate Division held that under New Jersey’s Affidavit of Merit Statue, N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-26 to -29, law firms are “licensed persons” for which an Affidavit of Merit is required under the Statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-27.  The Court held that it would be anomalous to allow a plaintiff to evade the Affidavit of Merit requirement by suing only the professional entities (here the law firms), and not the principals, partners, shareholders, and employees of those firms who actually provided the professional services in question.  In addition, the Court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the Complaint fell, at least in part, outside the scope of N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-27 because it substantively asserted various other causes of action in additional legal malpractice.  The Court found that the other claims were “simply labels for a cause of action, the essence of which is one sounding in legal malpractice.  Accordingly, the Affidavit of Merit obligation applied to the entire Complaint.
    • Soult v. Mattioni, Ltd., A-A-2619-07T2 (App. Div. February 20, 2009), Jack successfully argued at the trial level, and then on appeal, that attorneys handling toxic tort cases do not have an obligation to shop for a new expert when they receive an unfavorable opinion. In this key case, the Appellate Division held that there is nothing to support a plaintiff’s claim and a plaintiff’s expert opinion that it is the standard to continue to shop for a favorable expert once unfavorable reports are rendered. The Court made the point that without liability, damages are pointless. This is the only Appellate Division case on this issue. Attorneys are not required to shop around for a better or different expert in order to prove liability. Once the attorney receives an opinion from a competent expert (whether on the defense side of the plaintiff side), there is no continued duty to shop for a favorable expert in an attempt to get a better or different opinion.
    • Merrick Wilson; Presidential Hill, LLC;  and Pennington Hills, LLC v. Robert A. Gladstone, Esq. and Charles J. Casale, Jr., Esq., A-1774-11T1 (App. Div. May 17, 2013). In this case, Jack successfully argued at trial, and on appeal, in this multi-million dollar land use planning matter, where plaintiffs brought a legal malpractice claim against the defendant zoning counsel, who was retained to challenge Hopewell Township’s Zoning Ordinance. In the case, the plaintiff/developer argued that the attorney failed to Subpoena NJDEP personnel to testify at trial that the Town used improper methodology to support its conclusions as to the availability of water for residential development on the property. The Appellate Division held that it was speculative for plaintiffs to argue that the DEP would have provided a letter opinion or testified at the trial. It was purely speculative as to what the DEP engineer would have testified to at trial, and whether it would have been favorable to the plaintiffs’ position.
    • Twp. of Gloucester v. Maryland Casualty, 702 F. Supp. 1126 (D. N.J. 1987). Jack was lead counsel in this environmental coverage case. This was the first case in New Jersey to establish the doctrine of known risk in Law Division cases. The case involved $100 million in damages to the township property. 
    • Monsanto v. Lacy's Express, 5 F.3d 1490 (3d Cir. 1993). Jack argued as lead counsel and was successful in obtaining a dismissal based upon New Jersey's entire controversy doctrine. 
    • Trivedi v. Martin-Simmonds, A-3166-05T5 (App. Div., May 14, 2007). The Appellate Division affirmed an order for Summary Judgment obtained by Jack in a legal malpractice action against Allstate's defense counsel, where there was an underlying excess verdict. Jack successfully argued that the opinions of plaintiffs' experts were net opinions. The Appellate Division found that expert testimony is necessary in professional malpractice cases in order to establish both the applicable standard of care and whether damages were proximately caused by the alleged negligence of the attorney. This case is significant because in it the Appellate Division affirmed the order for Summary Judgment granted by the trial court in favor of the defense attorneys appointed by All State to defend their insured in the underlying litigation. Unfortunately, there was an excess verdict, which resulted in a legal malpractice action. Nevertheless, Jack was successful and the Appellate Division ruled that plaintiffs' experts referenced no judicial or statutory authority establishing the existence of a standard of care for defense attorneys when the client's monetary exposure over the policy limits places the client in jeopardy of substantial excess verdict. 
    • Torban v. Obermayer Rebmann Maxwell & Hippel, LLP, A-3660-05T3 (App. Div., June 27, 2007). Jack obtained a dismissal at trial, which was affirmed on appeal, on behalf of the law firm in connection with duty of attorneys regarding post-mortem tax planning. The case was decided pursuant to the Estate of Fitzgerald v. Linnus, A-6626-98T3 (App. Div. Jan. 22, 2001). This matter was affirmed on appeal. Jack was successful in arguing that the attorneys had no duty to the testator's son for post-mortem tax planning. The Court found that the estate plan drafted by the attorneys would have been affected had the testators followed the attorney's instructions regarding retitling certain assets. This case holds that attorneys retained to counsel an executor during administration of an estate are under no duty to advise regarding post-mortem estate planning options. 
    • Liberty Travel v. Friedman & Siegelbaum, A-4136-07T1 (App. Div. July 14, 2010).  In Liberty Travel, the legal malpractice action arose from a class action suit filed in Pennsylvania, arising out of claims for retaliatory termination, and violation of the Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act.  In the malpractice action, Liberty claimed that the attorneys failed to obtain an extension of time to Answer the employee's Complaint, and that a default was entered and not vacated, resulting in a Judgment of $1,406,117.58 against Liberty.  The Court held that under the case-within-a-case Doctrine, Liberty was legally liable in the class action suit.  Although there were deviations from the standard of care, nevertheless there was no causal connection under Froom v. Perel, 377 N.J. Super. 298 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 185 N.J. 267 (2005).
    • Chulsky v. Hudson Law Offices, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29781 (D.N.J. March 22, 2011).  In this case of first impression, the Court granted the Motion to Dismiss with respect to the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act and the Truth In Consumer Contract Warranty & Notice Act claims brought by a debtor against a collection attorney arising out of the attorney's purchase of and attempts to collect a consumer debt.  The Court held that the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act does not reach the debt collection activities of a debt buyer of defaulted credit card debt.  It found that a debt buyer, while subject to regulation under the FDCPA and, perhaps, New Jersey's Collection Act or Criminal Statutes, is not a "seller" whose subsequent performance falls within the ambit of the NJCFA.
    • Morse v. Kaplan, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61201 (D.N.J. June 8, 2011).  In this Fair Debt Collection Practices Act claim against a collection attorney, the Court granted Summary Judgment when suit was brought stemming from two debt collection letters written by the attorney to the debtor.  
    • ACBB-BITS v. Clancey v. Lombardo, A-2734-09T1 (App. Div. November 21, 2011). Jack successfully defended an appeal in a complex economic dispute between a property owner, a commercial landlord, a real estate broker, and the attorney who represented the plaintiff-owner in Lease negotiations for an office building in New Jersey. In the Law Division, Jack was successful in obtaining an Order for Summary Judgment.  After the other defendants obtained dismissals, the matter was appealed. The Appellate Division agreed with Jack's argument that the Third Party Complaint filed by the real estate broker against the attorney did not state a claim because the broker and the attorney could never be deemed joint tortfeasors under New Jersey's Joint Tortfeasors Contribution Law.  Their alleged torts were separate in nature and time. The broker could not claim that he relied upon any representations of the attorney for the owner, nor that his firm represented them. New Jersey law does not provide a cause of action under these circumstances which the broker could pursue. Therefore, although the case was remanded in connection with the owner's claims against the broker for tort, breach of contract, and consumer fraud, the Appellate Division affirmed the Judgment.
    • 2025 New Jersey Judiciary Pro Bono Award Recipient

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Successful Defense of High‑Profile Condo Board Election Challenge as Court Dismisses Claims With Prejudice

Dismissal Obtained in a Complex Legal Malpractice Case

After four hearings, we obtained the dismissal of a complex legal malpractice action arising out of litigation in the U.S. District Court over the failed purchase of a Kia dealership in New Jersey. The plaintiff’s claims against our client, a well-known transactional lawyer with one of the largest firms in the United States, involved hundreds of thousands of dollars in fees and losses related to the investment in the dealership. Following the hearings, and a re-hearing, we obtained the dismissal because the plaintiff’s expert failed to tie in the damages to the alleged deviations in connection with the handling of the underlying transaction. Following the hearings, the court rejected the expert’s opinion on damages and then granted our application for a dismissal of the entire case.   

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Legal Updates for Lawyers' Professional Liability

New Jersey Appellate Division Affirms Exclusion of Legal Malpractice Expert as Impermissible Net Opinion

July 23, 2026

Jack Slimm and Jeremy Zacharias obtained a favorable decision on behalf of their client in a case centering on the admissibility of expert testimony in legal malpractice actions. In Martin v. Loury, the New Jersey Appellate Division affirmed the exclusion of a plaintiff's legal malpractice expert, holding that the expert's opinions on causation and damages were too speculative to support the malpractice claim. The legal malpractice action arose from an underlying employment dispute involving claims for damages stemming from the breach of an employment agreement. The plaintiff alleged that defense counsel committed malpractice during a second trial by failing to recall the plaintiff as a rebuttal witness after the employer's CEO testified. According to the plaintiff's expert, additional rebuttal testimony would have bolstered the plaintiff's damages claims and led to a more favorable result. Both the trial court and the Appellate Division rejected that theory. The courts found that the expert could not explain how the proposed rebuttal testimony would have altered the outcome of the underlying case or resulted in any additional recoverable damages. Notably, the trial judge in the underlying employment matter had already rejected the CEO's testimony as not credible and had accepted the damages analysis advanced by the plaintiff. The court had also determined that the amount of damages was not genuinely disputed. As a result, the expert's opinion that additional rebuttal testimony would have produced a better outcome was unsupported by the record and based on speculation rather than evidence. The Appellate Division agreed that neither the plaintiff nor the expert could identify any actual damages attributable to the alleged malpractice or demonstrate the required element of proximate causation. The court further upheld the trial court's application of New Jersey's net opinion doctrine, finding that the expert failed to provide the necessary "why and wherefore" supporting his conclusion that the attorney's conduct caused a compensable loss. Because the opinions rested on unquantified possibilities rather than demonstrable facts, they were inadmissible. Key Takeaway for Legal Malpractice Defendants For attorneys and firms defending legal malpractice claims, Martin v. Loury underscores the importance of closely scrutinizing an opponent's expert report on the critical elements of proximate causation and damages. The decision demonstrates that a malpractice claim cannot survive where an expert merely speculates that different litigation tactics might have produced a better result. Instead, the plaintiff must present admissible expert testimony grounded in the record that explains how the alleged attorney error probably changed the outcome of the underlying matter and resulted in measurable damages.

New Jersey Appellate Division Clarifies Limits of Transactional Attorneys’ Duties and Proof of Damages in Legal Malpractice Claims

April 21, 2026

On April 15, 2026, the New Jersey Appellate Division issued an important decision in Gonzalez v. DiBello, et al., A‑2334‑24 (App. Div. Apr. 15, 2026), affirming summary judgment in favor of a transactional attorney accused of legal malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty. Marshall Dennehey’s Jack Slimm and Jeremy Zacharias successfully represented the attorney‑defendant. The decision provides significant guidance to both the malpractice defense bar and transactional practitioners, particularly regarding the scope of an attorney’s duty of care, the role of expert testimony, and the proof required to establish causation and damages. The malpractice action stemmed from an underlying federal lawsuit arising out of a failed transaction to purchase a Kia dealership. An investor alleged that the purchasers and their counsel engaged in a fraudulent scheme, asserting claims including fraud, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, aiding and abetting, and conspiracy. Although the federal complaint named the transactional attorney, the claims against her were dismissed, and she was never found liable. The attorney neither represented the investor nor provided him with legal advice and was unaware that he was the ultimate source of investment funds. Her role was limited to preparing transaction documents required by the manufacturer to reflect a transfer of ownership interests. Following dismissal of the federal action, purchaser Christopher Gonzalez filed a legal malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty action against the attorney. Gonzalez relied on expert reports asserting that the attorney had a duty to investigate the source of funds, determine whether her client was financially capable of consummating the transaction, and uncover any disqualifying relationships among investors. The trial court rejected those opinions, holding that New Jersey law does not impose upon transactional attorneys a duty to investigate the origins of funds passing through a trust account or to assess a client’s financial capacity absent specific circumstances. The Appellate Division affirmed, reiterating that an attorney’s duty in a transaction is “to exercise that degree of reasonable knowledge and skill that lawyers of ordinary ability and skill possess and exercise,” and that alleged violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct do not, standing alone, create a cause of action. The Appellate Division also affirmed dismissal based on the plaintiff’s failure to establish damages and causation through competent expert testimony. Gonzalez sought, among other things, to recover all legal fees incurred defending the federal action and alleged loss of investment. However, his expert offered what the courts deemed a classic “net opinion,” failing to analyze the reasonableness of the fees, allocate which fees were allegedly caused by the claimed malpractice, or quantify any lost benefit of the bargain. The court emphasized that when damages are an essential element of a legal malpractice claim, expert testimony must do more than assert conclusions—it must explain how and why specific damages were proximately caused by the attorney’s conduct. Absent such an analysis, allowing a jury to award all defense fees would impermissibly convert compensatory damages into speculative or liquidated damages. Finally, the Appellate Division rejected Gonzalez’s attempt to salvage his claims through a “suit‑within‑a‑suit” theory or a parallel breach of fiduciary duty claim. Citing Morris Properties, Inc. v. Wheeler, the court reaffirmed that plaintiffs cannot avoid their prima facie proof requirements by invoking trial methodologies, and that expert testimony remains necessary in esoteric malpractice cases. The court further held that Gonzalez could not show he would have recovered in the underlying federal action, particularly where he and the attorney were dismissed from that case. The fiduciary duty claim was properly dismissed as duplicative of the malpractice claim and failed for the same lack of proof on causation and damages. This decision is a significant reaffirmation of rigorous proof standards in transactional malpractice cases and provides meaningful protection against expansive and speculative damages theories.

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Supreme Court of Pennsylvania Holds That Public Policy Does Not Prevent Insurance Coverage for Sex Trafficking Claims

On July 21, 2026, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania issued an opinion emphasizing the limited circumstances in which courts may invoke public policy to bar insurance coverage, holding in Samsung Fire & Marine Insurance Co., Ltd. (U.S. Branch) v. RI Settlement Trust that Pennsylvania public policy does not preclude coverage for claims alleging that insureds enabled or profited from human sex trafficking. The decision rejects a line of federal district court decisions predicting otherwise and reinforces that Pennsylvania courts will invoke the public policy doctrine only in the clearest of circumstances. RI Settlement is particularly significant because it arose on certified questions from the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, giving the Supreme Court the opportunity to resolve an issue on which federal courts had predicted Pennsylvania law differently. RI Settlement arose out of four separate civil complaints in which the underlying plaintiffs alleged that, as minors, they were the victims of human sex trafficking at various hotels in Philadelphia. The plaintiffs claimed that the hotel owners were negligent in failing to stop the sex trafficking from happening at their hotels. After the filing of the lawsuits, the hotel owners sought coverage under their Commercial General Liability policies. The insurers initially defended the hotels under Reservation of Rights letters, though the carriers later filed Declaratory Judgment actions seeking declarations that they did not owe a duty to defend or indemnify. In short, the insurers argued in the alternative that they did not owe any obligation to provide coverage based upon Pennsylvania public policy (because the claims violated the Human Trafficking Law – 18 Pa.C.S. § 3011) and the terms and conditions of the policy. On motions for judgment on the pleadings, the District Court found for the insurers on the basis of public policy: There is no duty to defend or indemnify against actions arising out of an insured's criminal conduct related to the sex trafficking of minors. The Court appreciates that it may make public policy the basis of a judicial decision only in “the clearest of cases.” See Minnesota Fire & Cas. Co. v. Greenfield, 589 A.2d 854, 868 (Pa. 2004) (quoting Hall v. Amica Mut. Ins. Co., 648 A.2d 755, 760 (Pa. 1994)). Yet, the Court strains to imagine a clearer case than the one presented here in which the facts alleged indicate that Policyholders engaged in criminal conduct in violation of Pennsylvania's Human Trafficking Law. The hotel owners appealed the matter to the Third Circuit, which petitioned the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania to grant review of two certified questions of law: (1) whether Pennsylvania law had an “overriding public policy” against sex trafficking, such that an insurer’s duty to defend and/or indemnify is abrogated when an insured is alleged to have enabled or profited from such trafficking; and (2) if yes, is that duty abrogated whenever the insured’s alleged conduct would constitute a violation of the Pennsylvania Human Trafficking statute. Importantly, the certified questions did not ask the Supreme Court to determine whether the policies afforded coverage under their terms. Rather, the court was asked only whether Pennsylvania public policy independently barred coverage. As a result, the court assumed for purposes of answering the certified questions that the insurers otherwise owed a duty to defend and addressed only the public policy issue, leaving all policy-based coverage defenses for further proceedings. Because the court concluded that the answer to the first certified question was “no”, it did not reach the second issue. In reaching its determination that Pennsylvania public policy does not prohibit insurance coverage for sex trafficking claims, the court limited the impact of its decision in Minnesota Fire & Cas. Co. v. Greenfield, 855 A. 2d 854, 855 (Pa. 2004), which the RI Settlement opinion emphasized as having been an “Opinion Announcing Judgment of the Court” – or a plurality opinion. In Greenfield, the insured homeowner was sued by the estate of his houseguest who overdosed from heroin that he sold to her. The matter wound its way to the Supreme Court, which determined that the insurer did not owe a duty to defend or indemnify based upon Pennsylvania public policy, which criminalized the sale and use of heroin as a Schedule I narcotic. In RI Settlement, the court “decline[d] the invitation” to extend the rationale of the three-justice plurality in Greenfield beyond cases involving Schedule I controlled substances. In so holding, the justices in RI Settlement refused to “divine an overriding public policy pronouncement by the General Assembly by virtue of its enactment of the Human Trafficking Law.” The opinion further states that it is not “within the purview of this Court to rank the magnitude of the public policy underlying the various crimes defined in the Crimes Code. It is sufficient for the work of the courts to know that the General Assembly has identified conduct it deems harmful and dangerous to the maintenance of an orderly society and criminalized it.” While the court declined to declare that Pennsylvania public policy prohibits coverage for sex trafficking claims, the opinion in RI Settlement expressly states that insurers are free to include appropriate exclusionary language for such causes of actions in their policies if they desire to do so. It will certainly be interesting to see whether the insurance industry accepts the court’s invitation, or perhaps whether the Pennsylvania legislature steps in to clarify that sex trafficking claims are indeed of the type or magnitude that they should not be covered by insurance. In any event, we will, of course, continue to monitor this and other insurance coverage issues that arise before courts in Pennsylvania, New Jersey and throughout our firm’s geographic footprint and around the country.

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Ray Freudiger and Michael A. Roberts (both of Cincinnati) successfully obtained summary judgment on behalf of their client in a coverage dispute arising from a May 19, 2022, motor vehicle accident. A permissive driver operated a box truck for an interstate trucking company and caused severe injuries to two tort victims. Prior to the accident, the insured had procured a commercial auto policy for the trucking company with stated limits of $1,000,000. Following the accident, the insurer initiated a declaratory judgment action asserting that only reduced bodily injury limits of $25,000/$50,000 applied and later counterclaimed, alleging it would not have insured the driver had he been properly submitted for approval under the policy. After extensive discovery, briefing, and oral argument, the court rejected the insurer’s attempt to shift responsibility for the $750,000 in coverage it was legally required to provide for permissive drivers under Ohio law, granting summary judgment in favor of the insured and preserving $750,000 in liability exposure.

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We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

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Portrait of Carolyn Schweizer, with text below: Philadelphia Office Managing Attorney

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New Jersey Appellate Division Affirms Exclusion of Legal Malpractice Expert as Impermissible Net Opinion

Jack Slimm and Jeremy Zacharias obtained a favorable decision on behalf of their client in a case centering on the admissibility of expert testimony in legal malpractice actions. In Martin v. Loury, the New Jersey Appellate Division affirmed the exclusion of a plaintiff's legal malpractice expert, holding that the expert's opinions on causation and damages were too speculative to support the malpractice claim. The legal malpractice action arose from an underlying employment dispute involving claims for damages stemming from the breach of an employment agreement. The plaintiff alleged that defense counsel committed malpractice during a second trial by failing to recall the plaintiff as a rebuttal witness after the employer's CEO testified. According to the plaintiff's expert, additional rebuttal testimony would have bolstered the plaintiff's damages claims and led to a more favorable result. Both the trial court and the Appellate Division rejected that theory. The courts found that the expert could not explain how the proposed rebuttal testimony would have altered the outcome of the underlying case or resulted in any additional recoverable damages. Notably, the trial judge in the underlying employment matter had already rejected the CEO's testimony as not credible and had accepted the damages analysis advanced by the plaintiff. The court had also determined that the amount of damages was not genuinely disputed. As a result, the expert's opinion that additional rebuttal testimony would have produced a better outcome was unsupported by the record and based on speculation rather than evidence. The Appellate Division agreed that neither the plaintiff nor the expert could identify any actual damages attributable to the alleged malpractice or demonstrate the required element of proximate causation. The court further upheld the trial court's application of New Jersey's net opinion doctrine, finding that the expert failed to provide the necessary "why and wherefore" supporting his conclusion that the attorney's conduct caused a compensable loss. Because the opinions rested on unquantified possibilities rather than demonstrable facts, they were inadmissible. Key Takeaway for Legal Malpractice Defendants For attorneys and firms defending legal malpractice claims, Martin v. Loury underscores the importance of closely scrutinizing an opponent's expert report on the critical elements of proximate causation and damages. The decision demonstrates that a malpractice claim cannot survive where an expert merely speculates that different litigation tactics might have produced a better result. Instead, the plaintiff must present admissible expert testimony grounded in the record that explains how the alleged attorney error probably changed the outcome of the underlying matter and resulted in measurable damages.