.

Jay S. Rothman

General Counsel

Chair, Commercial Litigation Practice Group

Portrait of Jay S. Rothman

Jay Rothman serves as the general counsel for Marshall Dennehey. He brings a unique understanding of business issues to his duties as general counsel as well as to his law practice, where he concentrates largely on commercial litigation matters in the defense of virtually all non-medical professionals. Jay's clients include accountants, appraisers, abstractors, consultants, mortgage brokers, real estate professionals and lawyers. Jay also defends director and officer claims, FDCPA/FCRA claims, class actions, defamation/disparagement and RICO actions. 

Jay is a frequent lecturer in the fields of professional liability and risk management. As well, he is actively involved in designing and implementing internal risk management protocols for client implementation. 

Since 1987 Jay has practiced at Marshall Dennehey, when he began his legal career.  He was elected as a shareholder in 1994, served as the vice chair of the firm's Transactional Litigation Practice Group within the Professional Liability Department, and in 2009 was appointed as general counsel.

In 1984 Jay graduated from the University of Michigan where he received his bachelor of arts degree. He is a 1987 graduate of Washington College of Law at American University where he earned his juris doctor degree. While in law school, Jay served as a legal intern at the Securities and Exchange Commission's Enforcement Division. 

    • American University Washington College of Law (J.D., 1987)
    • University of Michigan (B.A., 1984)
    • Pennsylvania, 1987
    • U.S. Court of Appeals 3rd Circuit, 1987
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 1987
    • AV® Preeminent™ by Martindale-Hubbell®
    • Pennsylvania Super Lawyer (2011-2012)
    • Philadelphia Bar Association
    • Professional Liability Underwriters Society (PLUS)
    • Understanding the Subprime Credit and Housing Crisis, Insurance Society of Philadelphia, June 2008 
    • Analyzing the Corporate Structure and Its Implications with Respect to Liability and Damages, Insurance Society of Philadelphia, June 2008 
    • Risk Management Techniques and Ethical Obligations In Litigating Eminent Domain Proceedings, National Conference of Eminent Domain, November 21, 2002 
    • Malpractice Avoidance for Lawyers, Pennsylvania Bar Association, April 16, 2002 
    • The Legal Malpractice Explosion - Risk Management Techniques, Delaware County Bar Association Sponsored by The Young Lawyers Division, May 11, 2001 
    • Risk Management Techniques for Realtors, National Association of Realtors Annual Conference, Spring, 2000 
    • Discharging Your Ethical Obligations to Communicate with Your Client, Pennsylvania Continuing Legal Education, January 26, 1999 
    • Risk Management Techniques for Accountants, PICPA Annual Accounting and Auditing Conference, December, 1998 
    • Private Securities Litigation Reform Act - New Developments
    • In-House Seminars for Various Insurance Companies - Risk Associated with Claims in the Real Estate Profession
    • In-House Seminars for Various Accounting Firms - Risk Management Techniques
    • In-House Seminars for Various Insurance Companies - Developing Case Law in the Legal Malpractice Arena
    • "Liability Survival Is in the Limits," Pennsylvania CPA Journal, Volume 77, No. 4, Winter 2006 
    • "Client Referrals Are Not Without Risk," Pennsylvania CPA Journal, Volume 77, No. 1, Spring 2006 
    • "Subpoenaed? Call Your Attorney," Pennsylvania CPA Journal, Volume 76, No. 3, Fall 2005 
    • "Consider Protective Clauses," Pennsylvania CPA Journal, Volume 76, No. 1, Spring 2005 
    • "Engagement Creep," Pennsylvania CPA Journal, Volume 75, No. 3, Fall 2004 
    • "Envisioning Real Estate Practice without Boundaries," Real Estate: A Supplement to the Legal Intelligencer and Pennsylvania Law Weekly, July 2004 
    • "Tort v. Contract Claims in the Defense of Professionals - What's In a Name The Pennsylvania Superior Court Affirms Application of the Contributory Negligence Doctrine," Defense Digest, Vol. 10, No. 1, March 2004 
    • "The Pariah Cometh - Take a Look at Your Accountant," PLUS Journal, April 2002 
    • "Pantuso Motors v. CoreStates Bank: Lenders Beware," Defense Digest, Vol. 8, No. 4, December 2002 
    • "Law Safeguards Parties against Bad Inspections," Lawyers Journal and the Philadelphia Legal Intelligencer, Real Estate Quarterly, March 9, 2001 
    • "Reliance on Home Inspection May Eliminate Liability of Seller," Defense Digest, Vol. 7, No. 2, April 2001 
    • "Professionals Beware: Further Relaxation of the Privity Requirement Under Pennsylvania Law," Defense Digest, Vol. 6, No. 4, July 2000 
    • "The Y2K Act: Defining the Coverage Battleground," Defense Digest, Vol. 5, No. 5, 1999
    • "Litigation without Damages: A New Twist to the Damage Element of Tort Actions," Defense Digest, Vol. 2, No. 5, 1996
    • "Third Party Subpoena of Accountants - Your Right to Your Work Papers," The Asset Column, Practical Protection Tips for Accountants, Vol. 6, No. 3 

Thought Leadership

Defense Digest

On the Pulse…Our Real Estate E&O Liability Practice Group

December 1, 2022

Our Real Estate E&O Liability Practice Group has a long history of representing real estate professionals. We have defended real estate brokers and agents, title agents and abstractors, appraisers, surveyors, home inspectors, mortgage companies, property management companies and condominium associations, on all types of claims brought in state and federal court and regulatory forums throughout all jurisdictions in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, New York, Florida, Delaware, Ohio and Connecticut. These claims manifest themselves in a variety of ways, with most arising from commercial and residential real estate transactions. They involve disputes surrounding disclosures, financing, valuation, liens, zoning, property management, conditions, construction, and a variety of other items that arise from the property acquisition and transfer process. The claims range from contract to tort, to those raising statutory violations. Many present equitable issues involving easements, deed restrictions and title. Apart from these standard E&O claims, the Group also represents and defends condominium associations and boards in disputes arising with and between unit owners and third parties. These claims may involve property damage, construction, water, fire and mold disputes. They can also include a variety of other issues, including those specific to particular jurisdictions, like mold, sinkholes and storm-related claims. We also handle disputes surrounding the legal interpretation and application of association governance documents, such as declarations and by-laws in declaratory judgment actions. In the regulatory forum, our lawyers regularly defend real estate professionals against customer complaints resulting from the delivery of services. They often implicate violations of state and administrative law concerning the delivery of professional services. We defend real estate agents, appraisers, title agents and a variety of other professionals from these complaints, starting with the customer complaint or initial inquiry received through the administrative hearing process. Our practice group is composed of seasoned, creative and highly regarded lawyers who have litigated many complex disputes. They include shareholders: Jay Rothman, Jeffrey Chomko and Dana Gittleman in Philadelphia; Christopher Conrad in our Harrisburg office; Jonathan Kanov in Fort Lauderdale, Florida; Christopher Block in our Roseland, New Jersey, office; and Aaron Moore in our Wilmington, Delaware, office. We also have a team of associates and paralegals who work with them in preparing and defending all aspects of these cases. We pride ourselves on our strong reputation, earned over the last 60 years through the successful defense of the most complex and difficult matters. Our philosophy is simple: to quickly evaluate and strive to efficiently resolve these matters at an early stage, if possible, in order to avoid costly, unpredictable litigation. Nevertheless, if necessary, we are prepared to take to trial those cases that cannot be resolved. We also present seminars and training sessions to clients and insureds that address legal issues that arise in the particular jurisdictions we service. We discuss best practices for real estate agents, home inspectors and other professionals. We welcome you to look at the bios of our attorneys in the group and reach out to us with any questions.   Defense Digest, Vol. 28, No. 12, December 2022, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2022 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.

Thought Leadership

Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.