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Francis X. Wickersham

Portrait of Francis X. Wickersham

Frank provides seasoned defense counsel to employers, insurance carriers and third-party administrators across the full spectrum of workers’ compensation matters. His practice blends deep legal knowledge with a solutions oriented approach that supports clients both inside and outside the courtroom. In addition to his litigation work, Frank regularly advises on risk management practices designed to prevent claims before they arise.

Clients value Frank’s ability to pair innovative legal strategy with real‑world practicality, achieving favorable outcomes while reducing exposure and controlling costs.

An accomplished writer, Frank’s articles on trending issues impacting workers' compensation have appeared in various publications. He also provides monthly Pennsylvania case law updates for the firm's What's Hot In Workers' Comp newsletter. In addition, Frank is a frequent speaker for local and national employer and insurance industry groups. He is an active member of the Montgomery County Bar Association, the Claims & Litigation Management Alliance, and the RIMS Delaware Valley Chapter.

Frank received his undergraduate degree from Villanova University and his juris doctor from the Widener University School of Law.

    • Widener University Delaware Law School (J.D., 1989)
    • Villanova University (B.A., 1986)
    • Pennsylvania, 1989
    • The Best Lawyers in America®, Workers' Compensation Law - Employers (2023-2027)
    • Claims & Litigation Management Alliance (CLM)
    • Montgomery County Bar Association
    • RIMS - Delaware Valley Chapter
    • School District of Philadelphia v. WCAB (Hennegan), 751 A.2d 729 (Pa. Cmmwlth. 2000) 
    • McKinney v. WCAB (Decision Data), 752 A.2d 928 (Pa. Cmmwlth. 2000) (rev. per cuiam, 770 A.2d 326 (Pa. 2001)) 
    • Reefer Madness: Medical Marijuana & Workers’ Compensation in 2026, RIMS National Conference, Philadelphia, PA, May 6, 2026
    • One Less Workers' Compensation Zombie in the Apocalypse, CLM Work Comp, Casualty & Risk Management Conference, Chicago, IL, May 18, 2023
    • State of the Union - Medical Marijuana, Workers' Compensation Insurance ExecuSummit, Uncasville, Connecticut, January 24-25, 2023
    • Protecting Against Unreasonable Medical Expenses and Fee Reviews, Marshall Dennehey Workers' Compensation Seminar, October 27, 2022
    • Unique Workers' Compensation Aspects of Independent Contractors and Traveling Employees, Lorman Education Services webinar, December 16, 2021
    • The URO Challenge and the Impact of Medical Marijuana, Marshall Dennehey webinar, October 29, 2020
    • Mitigating the Risk of Workplace Bullying, Marshall Dennehey Workers' Compensation Seminar, October 24, 2019
    • Pot For Pain, Marshall Dennehey Workers' Compensation Seminar, October 25, 2018
    • In a Pickle: The Implications of Protz, Marshall Dennehey Workers' Compensation Seminar, October 19, 2017
    • Defense Counsel Wish List, Marshall Dennehey Workers' Compensation Seminar, October 19, 2016
    • Aging Gracefully? The Senior Workforce and Impacts on Workers' Compensation, CLM Atlanta, Atlanta, Georgia, May 2016
    • Doped Up: Implications of Compound Medications, Generic Drugs and Medical Marijuana, Marshall Dennehey Workers' Compensation Seminar, October 22, 2015
    • Marijuana in Workers' Compensation - Medical and Legal Challenges, CLM 2015 Medical Legal Summit, Chicago, Illinois, June 3, 2015
    • Medicare Liens and Set-Asides and Workers' Compensation Liens, Philadelphia Bar Association's Bench-Bar & Annual Conference, October 18, 2014
    • Behind the Robe: An Interview With the Judges, Roadmap to Success - Understanding Workers' Compensation, Marshall Dennehey seminar, October 24, 2013
    • Career Day, Upper Merion Middle School, 2011
    • Case Law Update, Broadspire and Glaxosmithkline, 2010
    • Navigating the Workers' Compensation Court Room, Berkley Midatlantic Group, 2010
    • How to Distinguish Between ADA, FMLA and Workers' Compensation Actions, Wegmans, 2009
    • Record Retention and E-Discovery, The Addis Group, 2009
    • Legal Updates: A Survival Guide, Pennsylvania Self-Insurers Association Annual Meeting, 2008
    • Impact of New Vocational Regulations on Pennsylvania Workers' Compensation Claims Handling, Sedgwick Claims Management Services, 2007
    • Impact of New Vocational Regulations on Pennsylvania Workers' Compensation Claims Handling, Cambridge Integrated Services, 2007
    • The Do's and Don'ts of Utilization Reviews, Montgomery Bar Association, 2007
    • Career Day, Upper Merion Middle School, 2005
    • Law Day, Caley Elementary School, 2002
    • Law Day, Caley Elementary School, 2001
    • Ethical Considerations in Workers' Compensation, Montgomery Bar Association, 2000 
    • Interplay Between Workers' Compensation and Liability, Insurance Society of Philadelphia, 1999 
    • Act 57 and its Impact On Workers' Compensation Litigation, Pottstown Hospital, February 1998 
    • "Back to the Future: A Post-'Protz' Primer on Pre-'Protz' Law," Pennsylvania Law Weekly, August 11, 2022
    • "Blurred Lines: A Breakdown of Conventional Workplace Boundaries During the Pandemic,"Pennsylvania Law Weekly, August 5, 2021
    • "Medical Marijuana: Reasonable and Necessary Medical Care for Injured Workers?"The Legal Intelligencer's Cannabis Law Supplement, May 27, 2020
    • "Workers' Compensation Fraud Case Against Pharmacies & Physicians Dismissed by Court," What's Hot in Workers' Comp--Special PA Alert, September 18, 2019
    • "Pot for Pain: A Cannabis Conundrum in the Courts," CLM Magazine, September 2018
    • "Much Anticipated Protz Decision Comes Down," Philadelphia Bar Reporter, September 2017
    • "Protz: Problems for Practitioners and Politicians," Pennsylvania Law Weekly, August 22, 2017
    • "State of Confusion: Duffey v. WCAB and Pennsylvania’s Impaired Impairment Rating System," Defense Digest, Vol. 23, No. 2, June 2017
    • "Aging Gracefully? The Impact of a Senior Workforce on Workers' Compensation," Workers' Compensation, page 28. August/September 2016
    • "Supreme Court of Pennsylvania Carves Out Exception to Exclude Remedy Provisions of the Pennsylvania Workers' Compensation Act For Late Manifesting Occupational Disease Claims," ABA TIPS Workers’ Compensation And Employers’ Liability Law Committee Newsletter, Winter 2014
    • Case Law Alerts, regular contributor, 2010-present
    • "Legal Updates," Pennsylvania Self-Insurers Association Newsletter, 2009-present
    • "Ask an Expert," Pennsylvania Self-Insurers Association Newsletter, January 2009
    • Digest of Insurance Law, Pennsylvania Workers' Compensation, Best's Directory of Recommended Insurance Attorneys, 2007-present
    • Special Pennsylvania Workers' Compensation Law Alerts, 2006-present
    • Critical Case Summaries, Pennsylvania Self-Insurers Association Newsletter, 2006-2008
    • What's Hot in Workers' Comp, Marshall Dennehey Workers' Compensation Department newsletter, 2002-present
    • "Decisions Impact Workers' Comp Benefits: Court Focuses on Release Agreement, Length of Employment," The Legal Intelligencer, March 2001 
    • "Independent Contractor or Employee: Supreme Court Rolls Over Controversial Commonwealth Court Decision Holding That Federal and State Motor Carrier Regulations Require Finding of Employment," Defense Digest, Vol. 7, No. 2, April 2001 
    • "Lykins: The Supreme Court Eliminates Unemployment Compensation Credit for pre-Act 44 Injuries," Counterpoint, January 1999 
    • "Act 44 and Pre-Amendment Injuries: Banic Breaks the Mold," PSIA Workers' Compensation Newsletter, March 1996 
    • "Pennsylvania Workers' Compensation Update," Counterpoint, newsletter of the PA Defense Institute, June 2002-present

Results

The defense successfully proves flaw in claimant’s expert testimony

We successfully defended a Claim Petition on behalf of a national trucking company where the claimant alleged a disabling aggravation of a pre-existing cervical condition from a fall at work. Our thorough review of the medical records and the presentation of the evidence convinced the judge that the claimant did not meet his burden of proof on causation. While providing the requisite direct testimony, on cross examination, the claimant’s expert admitted when he first saw the claimant one month after the work incident, the claimant had a head droop from cervical fusion surgery five months before the date of injury, and said that surgery “unrelated” to the work injury would be needed to correct it. This was inconsistent with the expert’s direct examination testimony, which was that the work incident had caused the head droop. Further, with the employer’s expert, who reviewed the testimony of the claimant’s expert and reviewed all medical records pre- and post-incident, we were able to establish that the opinion of the claimant’s expert was flawed, pointing out that the claimant’s expert failed to perform a side-by-side comparison of pre-injury diagnostic studies to post-injury studies, which would indicate whether the head droop was a slow progression from the prior surgery or due to a traumatic incident. The Judge found that the claimant’s expert failed to adequately explain what he saw in the studies completed after the work incident that supported his theory on causation.

Successfully Defended a Claim Petition on Behalf of a National Trucking Company

We successfully defended a claim on behalf of our client where the answer was late without a reasonable excuse. However, we persuaded the workers’ compensation judge that the claim petition was not well-pled as to the main allegation. We further convinced the judge that the claimant did not meet his burden of proof on causation.

Thought Leadership

What's Hot in Workers' Comp

Commonwealth Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Act 111's IRE Provisions

October 20, 2026

In this case, the claimant sustained a work injury of January 6, 1994, which was acknowledged by Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP). After the claimant’s receipt of 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, the employer filed a Request for an Impairment Rating Examination (IRE). The IRE was performed in May 2023 and the IRE physician found that the claimant had a 5% whole person impairment, under the AMA Guides. The employer filed a Petition based on the IRE results, and the Petition was granted by the WCJ. During litigation, the claimant argued that the IRE provisions of Act 111 (Section 306(a.3) of the Act) were not applicable to her injury, since it predated June 24, 1996, the date Act 57 went into effect, and that the IRE provisions were unconstitutional. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ)) granted the Petition and the Board affirmed. On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the claimant argued that Act 111 violated the nondelegation doctrine and that its retroactive application to the claimant’s injury was unconstitutional. The court rejected the arguments on the basis that they had already found the same arguments without merit in multiple, prior cases. The court also addressed an argument made by the claimant that Act 111 was procedurally defective under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it was only considered on two days in each House after having undergone amendments and reassignments. The court noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires every bill to be considered on three different days in each House. The claimant maintained that, according to the legislative history, the bill did not receive three separate days of consideration from each House when it was assigned a new bill number. The court pointed out, however, that the bill number, H.B. 1840 remained constant and was considered on three occasions by the House. Further, the court concluded that minor amendments to the bill were germane to its original subject, which was to modify the Act’s IRE process, in accordance with Protz II.

What's Hot in Workers' Comp

WCJ Improperly Refused to Conduct C&R Hearing and Erroneously Required Settlement of All Pending Petitions

October 20, 2026

In this case, the claimant sustained injuries in the course and scope of her employment as a registered nurse. The employer acknowledged the injury by a Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP).  Subsequently, a Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ) expanded the description of injury. The employer then filed a Termination Petition, alleging the claimant was fully recovered from the injuries. Providers filed Utilization Review (UR) Petitions, challenging UR determinations finding their chiropractic treatment to be not reasonable and necessary. A settlement of the claim was eventually reached, and the employer filed a Petition to Seek Approval of a Compromise and Release (C&R) Agreement. The C&R outlined that the agreement fully resolved all future workers’ compensation claims except for the termination and UR Petitions. Briefs were filed and one day later, the WCJ issued an Interlocutory Order which stated if instructions were not followed regarding filing of a C&R, a settlement hearing date would not be given. The employer complied with the order, and filed the C&R. Subsequently, the WCJ notified the parties that the C&R must resolve all issues in the petitions, or would not be entertained. A settlement hearing was never held, and the WCJ then issued a decision, granting the Termination Petition and dismissing the UR Petitions. The WCJ also said that the Petition for Approval of a C&R was dismissed without prejudice, as the issues in the Termination and UR Petitions went to a decision. The claimant appealed to the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Board). The Board granted the claimant’s appeal, finding that the WCJ violated the requirement of Section 449 that an expedited hearing be held when a Petition for Approval of a C&R is filed.  The Board further held that it was legally incorrect for the WCJ to insist that the C&R resolve all issues raised by the pending Petitions. The Board remanded the case to a new WCJ, and Employer appealed to the Commonwealth Court. The court affirmed the Board and held that the WCJ erred, as a matter of law, by refusing to hold an expedited hearing within 30 days, once the Petition for Approval of a C&R was filed.  The court noted that the language of Section 449(b) is mandatory, and a settlement hearing is not discretionary or dependent on a party’s separate request for a stay, or whether the record has been closed. The court further rejected Employer’s argument that the case should not be remanded to a new WCJ for a new decision on the termination and and UR Petitions, as the Board passed no judgment on whether the C&R Agreement resolved the termination and UR Petitions, and left it for the WCJ to decide in connection with the Petition for Approval of a C&R.

Events

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.

Thought Leadership

The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.