.

Ashley is an associate in the Casualty Department, handling matters involving Special Investigations (SIU), New York Labor Law, and General Liability matters.

As part of the Special Investigation practice group, Ashley’s experience is in defending cases where we assert allegations of fraud and exaggerated injuries against Plaintiffs. These fact-intensive cases involve fraud rings, staged accidents and exaggerated injuries, in addition to improper and fraudulent medical provider billing and reporting.

As part of the New York Labor Law practice group, Ashley handles complex construction site accident cases throughout the state. These include claims involving the use of scaffold systems, demolition and heavy machinery in industrial, commercial and residential projects

Ashley handles a variety of General Liability matters involving claims of personal injury and property damage. Specifically, defending clients in matter of premises liability (residential, commercial, restaurant, and retail) and motor vehicle torts, including for claims of wrongful death and punitive damages.

Ashley is admitted to practice in New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and New York. Outside of her work at Marshall Dennehey, she stays active through hiking, running, working out, and traveling.

    • Widener University Delaware Law School (J.D., 2023)
    • Kutztown University of Pennsylvania (B.A., 2018)
    • Kutztown University of Pennsylvania (Paralegal Certificate, 2018)
    • New Jersey, 2024
    • Pennsylvania, 2024
    • U.S. District Court District of New Jersey, 2024
    • Maryland, 2025
    • New York, 2025
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of New York, 2025
  • Obtained summary judgment in a construction site accident matter in which the plaintiff alleged he was injured after lifting a cover and falling into a hole at an active worksite. Our client was the owner of the building under construction at the time of the accident. Based on the contractual agreements and testimony of the parties involved, we successfully argued that the subcontractors and the plaintiff’s employer were solely responsible for worker safety, supervision, and site conditions. We further argued that our client could not be held liable for the alleged negligence of independent contractors. The court agreed, finding that our client owed no duty to the plaintiff, and dismissed all claims against our client.

    Obtained summary judgment in a breach of contract matter involving 41 separate small claims actions filed against our client arising from travel protection policies. The court consolidated the actions into a single matter. The plaintiff, acting by assignment from insureds, sought recovery under the policies’ rental car damage provisions for alleged vehicle damages incurred by his rental car company. We successfully argued that the majority of the assignments were invalid, depriving the plaintiff of standing to sue. We further argued that, even if the assignments were deemed valid, the plaintiff failed to comply with the policies’ terms, conditions, and claim submission requirements, including conditions precedent to coverage. The court agreed and dismissed all claims against our client.

    Successfully obtained summary judgment in a slip-and-fall matter in which the plaintiff alleged she slipped and fell on snow and ice in a parking lot while entering her vehicle. Our client owned property adjacent to that of a co-defendant, and based on the accident report, plaintiff’s testimony, and expert findings, we successfully argued that the incident did not occur on our client’s property and that our client therefore owed no duty to the plaintiff. The court agreed and dismissed all claims against our client.

    Successfully obtained summary judgment in a breach of contract claim against our client in the Eastern District of New York. The case involved a rental car company attempting to recover from a credit card company based on credit cardholders’ assignment of Collision Damage Waiver benefits to the plaintiff. We argued that there were no contracts between the credit cardholders and our client, but that the contracts were between the cardholders and the non-party banks. The Court dismissed the case in its entirety.

    Successfully won a dismissal of a New York Labor Law case before the Supreme Court, New York County. ​Plaintiff's counsel withdrew from this case after potential fraud issues were raised by the defense. The plaintiff proceeded pro se and then did not appear at further court conferences. The judge later dismissed the case entirely. 

    • “Enforceability of Choice-of-Law Provisions in Maritime Contracts,” Defense Digest, Vol. 30, No. 4, December 2024

Results

Thought Leadership

Defense Digest

Enforceability of Choice-of-Law Provisions in Maritime Contracts

December 1, 2024

Key Points:  Choice-of-law provisions in maritime contracts are enforceable. The U.S. Supreme Court decision in Great Lakes Ins. SE v. Raiders Retreat Realty Co., LLC helps with the uniformity of federal maritime law. This decision helps save on costs and time if there is a future dispute to the contract. General Overview A choice-of-law provision is a contractual provision that would be used to specify what law will govern the contract should a future dispute arise. Choice-of-law provisions have been known to be an issue when it comes to insurance contracts. A dispute arises when there are two different states’ laws that may be applicable to a contract and the parties do not agree on which one should be applied. If the parties do not agree and cannot decide which state’s law to apply, the court must then decide. These issues ultimately arise when the parties to the contract are in different jurisdictions. In many maritime contracts, the parties are from different jurisdictions, so this issue is one that comes up frequently. Enforceability of a choice-of-law provision is governed by federal maritime law.  The Supreme Court of the United States recently applied federal maritime law in Great Lakes Ins. SE v. Raiders Retreat Realty Co., LLC, 144 S. Ct. 637, 642 (2024). Their decision has streamlined this issue by holding, when there is a choice-of-law provision in a maritime contract, the court must enforce it, except if one of the two exceptions applies. Further, the Supreme Court stated that a “[l]ongstanding precedent establishes a federal maritime rule: Choice-of-law provisions in maritime contracts are presumptively enforceable.” Before this case, the Court had not addressed this issue, but other lower courts had.  Rule on Choice-of-Law Provisions  In its unanimous decision, the Supreme Court determined that choice-of-law clauses in maritime contracts are presumptively enforceable under federal maritime law, subject to two narrow exceptions: (1) when the chosen law would contravene a controlling federal statute or an established federal maritime policy; or (2) when the contracting parties cannot show any reasonable basis for the chosen jurisdiction. With regard to the second exception, the court must apply “substantial deference to the contracting parties.”  Advantages of Rule on Choice-of-Law Provision  The Supreme Court stated: “By identifying the governing law in advance, choice-of-law provisions allow parties to avoid later disputes—as well as ensuing litigation and its attendant costs.” Great Lakes Ins. SE v. Raiders Retreat Realty Co., LLC, 144 S. Ct. 637, 644 (2024). Further, by allowing a choice-of-law provision to be enforceable in a contract, it will save time and money that would be expended on motions and hearings to determine which state’s law should apply to the dispute. If a maritime contract has a provision with the choice-of-law already agreed upon, there would be no dispute as to what law the court would apply to the case. Moreover, determining the choice-of-law in advance helps maritime shippers to decide on the front end “what precautions to take” on their ships (American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 454 (1994)) and enable[s] marine insurers to better assess risk (see Brief for American Institute of Marine Underwriters et al. as Amici Curiae, at pp. 12–13). Choice-of-law provisions, therefore, can lower the price and expand the availability of marine insurance. Should a dispute between parties arise, the court would then turn to the choice-of-law provision in the contract as the law to be applied, unless the contract falls within one of the two exceptions listed above.  The Future The Supreme Court did not discuss the “issue of federalism in admiralty and the scope of application of state law in maritime cases...” Great Lakes Ins. SE, 144 S. Ct. at 642 (quoting 1 T. Schoenbaum, Admiralty and Maritime Law § 4:4, p. 268 (6th ed. 2018). As stated above, this rule on choice-of-law provisions applies to federal maritime law. However, if a state court is hearing a maritime case, it can apply its state laws, as long as they do not conflict with the federal maritime law. Conclusion This decision is favorable for insurers as these provisions will generally be upheld in future contracts. Also, by having these provisions in maritime contracts going forward, insurers will be saving time and costs on disputing these issues pre-trial. Lastly, knowing what law will apply to the contract gives the contracting parties the advance opportunity to determine what protections/precautions they should take. *Ashley is an associate in our Casualty Department and works in our Mount Laurel, New Jersey, office.    Defense Digest, Vol. 30, No. 4, December 2024, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2024 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Florida Supreme Court Rules Florida Statute §627.70152 Does not Apply Retroactively

In a decision that resolves years of appellate uncertainty and confirms that insurers and insureds alike can rely on the legal framework in place when a policy is issued, the Supreme Court of Florida last week found that Florida Statute §627.70152, which involves an insured’s requirement to provide an insurer with pre-suit notice before filing a suit, cannot be applied retroactively. In Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company v. Hughes, the Court was presented with the issue of whether the statutory pre-suit notice requirement applied retroactively and whether it would apply to a breach of contract of an insurance policy that was issued before the statute went into effect. Before the Court was an appeal from a homeowner, Ms. Hughes, who sued her insurance carrier, Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company (Universal) for breach of contract under an insurance policy that was in effect from April 24, 2019 through April 24, 2020. During the policy period, Ms. Hughes suffered a loss and, on May 29, 2019, made a claim for water damage. The carrier investigated the loss and issued payment; Ms. Hughes disputed the payment, finding the amount insufficient for repairs. On July 1, 2021, Florida Statute §627.70152 went into effect, which required insureds to provide notice of intent to initiate litigation against the carrier prior to filing a lawsuit; if an insured filed the lawsuit without complying with §627.70152, a court must dismiss the case without prejudice. On August 4, 2021, Ms. Hughes filed her lawsuit against Universal for breach of contract. Universal moved to dismiss based on her failure to comply with §627.70152. Ms. Hughes contended the notice requirement could not be applied retroactively. The trial court disagreed and dismissed the lawsuit without prejudice, and Ms. Hughes appealed. During the appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, in Cole v. Universal Property & Casualty, 363 So. 3d 1089 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023), ruled that Florida Statute §627.70152 did apply retroactively to policies issued before the effective date of §627.70152. However, the Sixth District Court agreed with Ms. Hughes and overturned the trial court’s ruling, finding the statute could not retroactively apply to policies issued prior to the statute effective date. Thereafter, the other district courts weighed in, with the Third District Court agreeing with the Fourth District Court, and the First, Second and Fifth District Courts agreeing with the Sixth District Court. In resolving the conflict amongst the district courts, the Supreme Court advised “as a general rule, ‘the statute in effect at the time an insurance contract is executed governs substantive issues arising in connection with that contract.’ Hassen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 674 So. 2d 106, 108 (Fla. 1996). The Court applied the two-step test when deciding whether a statute has retroactive application: “First, the Court must ascertain whether the Legislature intended for the statute to apply retroactively. Second, if such an intent is clearly expressed, the Court must determine whether retroactive application would violate any constitutional principles.” Menendez v. Progressive Exp. Ins. Co., 35 So. 3d 873, 877 (Fla. 2010). In analyzing the Legislature’s intent, the Court must determine whether the Legislature has manifested a clear command for retroactivity in the statutory text.  In review of the statutory text, the Court found nothing in the language of the statute to indicate that the phrase “all suits” was serving another purpose of expanding its reach to suits based on policies that both predate and postdate the enactment of the statute. Buis v. Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 394 So. 3d 738, 741 (Fla. 2d DCA 2024). Further, the Court noted the statute has an effective date, which has long been considered to be evidence against retroactive application of a statute. The Court concluded that, on its face, no provision of §627.70152 speaks to application of the statute to insurance policies issued before the statute’s effective date and therefore, the Legislature did not clearly command retroactivity of the statute to include insurance policies issued prior to the enactment of the statute. The Court briefly reviewed Universal’s argument that the presuit notice requirement was procedural, not substantive, and therefore should be applied retroactively; however, the Court agreed with the Sixth District Court’s finding that, in its entirety, §627.70152 transformed an insured’s ability to sue an insurance company under a property insurance policy and an insurer’s obligations to respond to and pay insurance claims, thus making the requirement a substantive change. The Court thereby upheld the decision of the Sixth District and disapproved the decision of the Fourth District in Cole.

Thought Leadership

New Jersey Appellate Division Affirms Recreational Immunity for County Under Landowners' Liability Act

In a recent unpublished decision in Matthew Kuzma, etc. v. Middlesex County Parks Department, et al., the New Jersey Appellate Division affirmed summary judgment in favor of Middlesex County Parks Department, holding that the county was immune from liability under New Jersey's Landowners' Liability Act (LLA), notwithstanding its failure to plead the immunity as an affirmative defense in its answer to the Complaint. The case arose from injuries sustained by fourteen-year-old plaintiff, Matthew Kuzma, while playing basketball at Spring Lake Park in South Plainfield on August 23, 2019. The plaintiff observed a crack in the basketball court before beginning to play but did not consider it dangerous. During the game, his foot became caught in the crack, causing him to fall and suffer a significant ankle injury. The plaintiff alleged that the injury resulted in ongoing physical limitations and deprived him of the opportunity to play collegiate basketball. The plaintiff filed suit alleging that the defendants negligently maintained the basketball court. Although the county did not assert LLA immunity as an affirmative defense in its answers, it later moved for summary judgment on that basis. The plaintiff opposed the motion, arguing that the county had waived the defense by failing to plead it. The county maintained that the plaintiff had received sufficient notice of its intent to rely on the LLA through discovery and therefore suffered no unfair surprise or prejudice. The trial court agreed and granted summary judgment, concluding that the county should be permitted to invoke statutory immunity notwithstanding its failure to formally plead the defense. Relying heavily on the New Jersey Supreme Court's guidance in Arias v. Cnty. of Bergen, holding a county park was subject to the immunity of the LLA, the Appellate Division affirmed, holding that the county's failure to plead LLA immunity did not preclude reliance on the defense under the circumstances presented. The court determined that the plaintiff had received adequate notice of the immunity claim through discovery and that permitting the defense furthered the public-policy objectives embodied in the LLA. In affirming dismissal, the Appellate Division acknowledged the seriousness of the plaintiff's injury and the general societal interest in maintaining parks and recreational facilities in a safe condition. However, the court emphasized that both the legislature and the New Jersey Supreme Court have expressed a clear policy choice to limit liability for public and private landowners who make recreational property available for public use. The decision reinforces the courts' continuing adherence to the Landowners' Liability Act and the principle that recreational lands and facilities should be broadly protected from liability exposure, even in cases involving significant personal injuries.

Thought Leadership

The Tolling Trap: Filing Alone Will Not Toll the Statute Without Good-Faith Service

The Eastern District of Pennsylvania recently reinforced a critical limitation on bad faith claims, holding that a timely filing alone will not preserve a cause of action absent a good-faith effort to serve the original process. The plaintiff had presented a claim for underinsured motorist benefits to his auto insurer. The insurer evaluated the claim and determined that the plaintiff’s accident-related damages did not exceed the bodily injury liability insurance limits of the at-fault driver and denied his claim. Among other claims, the plaintiff sought to present a claim for insurance bad faith under 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8371, to which a two year statute of limitation applies. He first filed a praecipe for writ of summons before the expiration of the statute of limitation. However, the plaintiff did not attempt to serve the praecipe or writ until after the statute of limitations had expired. Additionally, the service failed as the plaintiff had mailed the original process to an incorrect address. Despite receipt of the Postal Service’s failure to deliver the original process, the plaintiff did not attempt to re-serve the writ. Two months later, the plaintiff filed a complaint and then successfully served that complaint. The insurer sought to dismiss the plaintiff’s bad faith claim as time-barred by the statute of limitations. The district court agreed. Though the plaintiff had filed a praecipe for a writ of summons prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations, the statute is only tolled if there is a good faith effort to serve that original process. In this case, the court determined that the plaintiff had failed to perform a “good faith effort to serve the original process”. Additionally, though the filing and service of a complaint can serve as alternative original process when the lawsuit is commenced by the filing of a praecipe for a writ of summons, the plaintiff filed his complaint after the statute of limitations had expired. The plaintiff’s bad faith claim was therefore determined to be barred by the statute of limitations and dismissed by the court, with prejudice. A key takeaway for the defense is not to assume that the statute of limitations has been successfully tolled by a plaintiff merely because a praecipe for a writ of summons or complaint has been filed prior to the expiration of the statute. A filed complaint or writ is only part of the equation. The defense should carefully review the docket and filings to confirm that the plaintiff also performed the requisite good faith effort to serve that original process. A thorough review of the docket may reveal that the plaintiff failed to make the good-faith service efforts necessary to toll the statute of limitations.