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Amara Benitez Rodriguez

Portrait of Amara Benitez Rodriguez

Amara is an associate in the Casualty Department where she represents defendants in third-party insurance defense matters concerning negligence, automobile liability, premises liability, construction defect, personal injury and defamation/ libel. Additionally, she has experience handling litigation involving insurance fraud and Special Investigation Unit (SIU) with particular emphasis on large loss fraud and medical provider fraud.  Amara has practiced before both federal and state court judges.

Amara received her juris doctor, cum laude, with a concentration in advocacy from Stetson University College of Law. While in law school, Amara was a member of the nation’s top ranked advocacy program as a member of the Trial Team. During her two years on the team, Amara learned the fundamental skills for advocating in a jury trial and is proud to be a two-time regional champion of the American Association for Justice’s Mock Trial Competition. Her exceptional skills in oral advocacy earned her the invitation for induction into The Order of the Barristers in 2018. Amara was also a member of the Student Bar Association, where she served as vice-president, and Phi Delta Phi.

During law school, Amara worked as a summer associate for the Department of the Navy’s Office of the General Counsel’s Naval Litigation Office. In this role, Amara worked out of the Pentagon and Washington DC Naval Yard defending the United States Navy and Marine Corp in matters concerning breach of military contracts, employment law and environmental law. Amara also interned at the Department of Veterans Affairs Office of General Counsel and the Veterans Law Institute at Stetson. Amara was selected to contribute to an Amicus Brief on Veterans’ Due Process rights to the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims due to her dedication to Veterans’ Advocacy.

Prior to law school, Amara attended the University of South Florida, where she earned a B.S. in Health Sciences with concentrations in Biological Health and Mental and Behavioral Health.

Amara is admitted to practice in the State of Florida and Middle District of Florida.

    • Stetson University College of Law (J.D., cum laude, 2018)
    • University of South Florida (B.S., 2014)
    • Florida, 2018
    • U.S. District Court Middle District of Florida, 2019
    • Florida Super Lawyers, Rising Stars (2024-2026)
    • A Proposal for Settlement for All Seasons: Effective Use of the PFS in Florida’s New Legal Landscape, Florida Liability Claims Conference, Lake Buena Visit, FL, June 18, 2025
    • Successfully argued a Motion to Dismiss; a client was accused of negligently supervising an employee, resulting in molestation of a minor. We settled the federal defamation/ libel matter for $11,500 when Plaintiff was demanding $250,000.

Thought Leadership

Defense Digest

Plaintiff Does Not Have to Pay for It and Neither Should You: Preventing Plaintiff’s Introduction of Past Medical Expenses that Have Been Adjusted and/or Written Off by Collateral Source Payments

June 1, 2023

Key Points: Evidence of past medical bill charges that have been paid, adjusted, or written off are not relevant.  Florida case law establishes that Medicare/Medicaid recipients are precluded from showing evidence of medical damages above the Medicare/Medicaid subrogation/lien amount. The principles for limiting evidence of medical damages that have been paid, adjusted, or written off should apply regardless of the source of payment. It is the eve of trial, and evidentiary issues are being evaluated. For attorneys trying personal injury cases, one issue that must be evaluated involves the damages that the plaintiff will be able to present to the jury. Plaintiff’s counsel will inevitably try to present every single last penny charged by medical providers, irrespective of any payments, adjustments, or write-offs. On the other hand, defense counsel is undoubtedly crunching the numbers, trying to determine what bills should be excluded. Everyone knows that the decisions on this issue will have a significant impact on the verdict. Everyone understands what is on the line.  Until recently, Florida plaintiffs essentially had free reign to present to the jury medical bills and charges that were already paid, already adjusted, or even written off. In such a scenario, a jury would award a verdict based on numbers that were more than the amount paid by the insurer, Medicare/Medicaid, or any collateral source, and the verdict amount would be set-off after the fact. However, in 2022, the Florida Supreme Court’s decision in Dial v. Calusa Palms Master Ass’n, Inc., 337 So. 3d 1229, 1232 (Fla. 2022) changed the playing field. The court established that it is proper to prevent the plaintiff from presenting the full charges for past medical expenses that Medicare already paid or were adjusted or written off based on a Medicare/Medicaid payment.  The holding in Dial is founded upon the principle that:  [T]he touchstone for admissibility of medical bills under Florida law is an individual’s obligation to pay them… [w]here a Plaintiff is not obligated to pay the full amount of the medical bills, the full amount of the medical bills becomes irrelevant and should be excluded.  Sensini v. MTD Sw. Inc., 2019 WL 2015957, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Jan 7, 2019). The court explained that Florida Statute 768.76 prohibits any set-off of Medicare/Medicaid benefits and, therefore, a post-verdict set-off for Medicare/Medicaid recipients is not an option.  And so, when a plaintiff is a Medicare/Medicaid recipient, defense attorneys can now successfully argue: The medical providers are prohibited by federal and/or state statute from seeking additional payment after accepting payment from Medicare/Medicaid.  The plaintiff will only ever be liable for the Medicare/Medicaid subrogation/lien amount that corresponds to the payments actually made to the medical providers. The difference between the initial gross charge and the payment amount is not relevant to any issue because the plaintiff will never have to pay that difference and the provider cannot seek payment of that difference from any person or entity.  The plaintiff should be precluded from presenting any evidence of the full charges submitted by providers and should only be allowed to present evidence of the amount Medicare has paid and which the plaintiff may ultimately be responsible for paying. Defense counsel should not be timid in their quest to push for additional limitations on evidence of payments, adjustments, and write-offs that medical providers accept from other collateral sources. Florida policy is clear that “a Plaintiff… is not entitled to recover compensatory damages in excess of the amount which represents the loss actually inflicted by the action of the Defendant.” Dial, 337 So. 3d at 1232. This is a fundamental principle for the recovery of compensatory damages and should apply regardless of the source of the payment.  For cases filed after March 24, 2023, defense counsel will rely on House Bill 837, “Civil Remedies,” which establishes that the evidence offered to prove the amount of damages for past medical bills that have already been satisfied is limited to the evidence of the amount actually paid, regardless of the source of payment. However, for all those very-many cases filed before this monumental tort reform, defense counsel should consider the following: To be admissible, evidence must be relevant; it must tend to prove or disprove a material fact. Charles W. Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence § 402.1, at 222 (2021 ed.).  The inflated gross amount of a charge is irrelevant as a proper measure of compensatory damages because it was subsequently paid by the plaintiff’s collateral source or adjusted and/or written off.  The original charge does not tend to prove or disprove that the claimant has suffered any loss by reason of the charge. Dial, 337 So. 3d at 1232 (citing Thyssenkrupp Elevator Corp. v. Lasky, 868 So. 2d 547, 551 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)).  Therefore, the plaintiff should be limited to presenting evidence of the amount actually paid.  Whether Florida’s courts will take up the issue of limiting evidence of past medical bills, regardless of the source of payment, for cases filed before House Bill 837 is unknown…after all, the days of it being an issue appear to be numbered. But, Florida courts are inundated with cases that are not subject to House Bill 837, and defense attorneys need to gear up with every tool available to advocate for their clients and prevent excessive awards. *Amara is an associate in our Tampa, Florida, office. She can be reached at 813.898.1820 AXRodriguez@mdwcg.com.       Defense Digest, Vol. 29, No. 2, June 2023, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2023 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

The Tolling Trap: Filing Alone Will Not Toll the Statute Without Good-Faith Service

The Eastern District of Pennsylvania recently reinforced a critical limitation on bad faith claims, holding that a timely filing alone will not preserve a cause of action absent a good-faith effort to serve the original process. The plaintiff had presented a claim for underinsured motorist benefits to his auto insurer. The insurer evaluated the claim and determined that the plaintiff’s accident-related damages did not exceed the bodily injury liability insurance limits of the at-fault driver and denied his claim. Among other claims, the plaintiff sought to present a claim for insurance bad faith under 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8371, to which a two year statute of limitation applies. He first filed a praecipe for writ of summons before the expiration of the statute of limitation. However, the plaintiff did not attempt to serve the praecipe or writ until after the statute of limitations had expired. Additionally, the service failed as the plaintiff had mailed the original process to an incorrect address. Despite receipt of the Postal Service’s failure to deliver the original process, the plaintiff did not attempt to re-serve the writ. Two months later, the plaintiff filed a complaint and then successfully served that complaint. The insurer sought to dismiss the plaintiff’s bad faith claim as time-barred by the statute of limitations. The district court agreed. Though the plaintiff had filed a praecipe for a writ of summons prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations, the statute is only tolled if there is a good faith effort to serve that original process. In this case, the court determined that the plaintiff had failed to perform a “good faith effort to serve the original process”. Additionally, though the filing and service of a complaint can serve as alternative original process when the lawsuit is commenced by the filing of a praecipe for a writ of summons, the plaintiff filed his complaint after the statute of limitations had expired. The plaintiff’s bad faith claim was therefore determined to be barred by the statute of limitations and dismissed by the court, with prejudice. A key takeaway for the defense is not to assume that the statute of limitations has been successfully tolled by a plaintiff merely because a praecipe for a writ of summons or complaint has been filed prior to the expiration of the statute. A filed complaint or writ is only part of the equation. The defense should carefully review the docket and filings to confirm that the plaintiff also performed the requisite good faith effort to serve that original process. A thorough review of the docket may reveal that the plaintiff failed to make the good-faith service efforts necessary to toll the statute of limitations.

Thought Leadership

Florida Supreme Court Rules Florida Statute §627.70152 Does not Apply Retroactively

In a decision that resolves years of appellate uncertainty and confirms that insurers and insureds alike can rely on the legal framework in place when a policy is issued, the Supreme Court of Florida last week found that Florida Statute §627.70152, which involves an insured’s requirement to provide an insurer with pre-suit notice before filing a suit, cannot be applied retroactively. In Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company v. Hughes, the Court was presented with the issue of whether the statutory pre-suit notice requirement applied retroactively and whether it would apply to a breach of contract of an insurance policy that was issued before the statute went into effect. Before the Court was an appeal from a homeowner, Ms. Hughes, who sued her insurance carrier, Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company (Universal) for breach of contract under an insurance policy that was in effect from April 24, 2019 through April 24, 2020. During the policy period, Ms. Hughes suffered a loss and, on May 29, 2019, made a claim for water damage. The carrier investigated the loss and issued payment; Ms. Hughes disputed the payment, finding the amount insufficient for repairs. On July 1, 2021, Florida Statute §627.70152 went into effect, which required insureds to provide notice of intent to initiate litigation against the carrier prior to filing a lawsuit; if an insured filed the lawsuit without complying with §627.70152, a court must dismiss the case without prejudice. On August 4, 2021, Ms. Hughes filed her lawsuit against Universal for breach of contract. Universal moved to dismiss based on her failure to comply with §627.70152. Ms. Hughes contended the notice requirement could not be applied retroactively. The trial court disagreed and dismissed the lawsuit without prejudice, and Ms. Hughes appealed. During the appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, in Cole v. Universal Property & Casualty, 363 So. 3d 1089 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023), ruled that Florida Statute §627.70152 did apply retroactively to policies issued before the effective date of §627.70152. However, the Sixth District Court agreed with Ms. Hughes and overturned the trial court’s ruling, finding the statute could not retroactively apply to policies issued prior to the statute effective date. Thereafter, the other district courts weighed in, with the Third District Court agreeing with the Fourth District Court, and the First, Second and Fifth District Courts agreeing with the Sixth District Court. In resolving the conflict amongst the district courts, the Supreme Court advised “as a general rule, ‘the statute in effect at the time an insurance contract is executed governs substantive issues arising in connection with that contract.’ Hassen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 674 So. 2d 106, 108 (Fla. 1996). The Court applied the two-step test when deciding whether a statute has retroactive application: “First, the Court must ascertain whether the Legislature intended for the statute to apply retroactively. Second, if such an intent is clearly expressed, the Court must determine whether retroactive application would violate any constitutional principles.” Menendez v. Progressive Exp. Ins. Co., 35 So. 3d 873, 877 (Fla. 2010). In analyzing the Legislature’s intent, the Court must determine whether the Legislature has manifested a clear command for retroactivity in the statutory text.  In review of the statutory text, the Court found nothing in the language of the statute to indicate that the phrase “all suits” was serving another purpose of expanding its reach to suits based on policies that both predate and postdate the enactment of the statute. Buis v. Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 394 So. 3d 738, 741 (Fla. 2d DCA 2024). Further, the Court noted the statute has an effective date, which has long been considered to be evidence against retroactive application of a statute. The Court concluded that, on its face, no provision of §627.70152 speaks to application of the statute to insurance policies issued before the statute’s effective date and therefore, the Legislature did not clearly command retroactivity of the statute to include insurance policies issued prior to the enactment of the statute. The Court briefly reviewed Universal’s argument that the presuit notice requirement was procedural, not substantive, and therefore should be applied retroactively; however, the Court agreed with the Sixth District Court’s finding that, in its entirety, §627.70152 transformed an insured’s ability to sue an insurance company under a property insurance policy and an insurer’s obligations to respond to and pay insurance claims, thus making the requirement a substantive change. The Court thereby upheld the decision of the Sixth District and disapproved the decision of the Fourth District in Cole.

Thought Leadership

New Jersey Appellate Division Affirms Recreational Immunity for County Under Landowners' Liability Act

In a recent unpublished decision in Matthew Kuzma, etc. v. Middlesex County Parks Department, et al., the New Jersey Appellate Division affirmed summary judgment in favor of Middlesex County Parks Department, holding that the county was immune from liability under New Jersey's Landowners' Liability Act (LLA), notwithstanding its failure to plead the immunity as an affirmative defense in its answer to the Complaint. The case arose from injuries sustained by fourteen-year-old plaintiff, Matthew Kuzma, while playing basketball at Spring Lake Park in South Plainfield on August 23, 2019. The plaintiff observed a crack in the basketball court before beginning to play but did not consider it dangerous. During the game, his foot became caught in the crack, causing him to fall and suffer a significant ankle injury. The plaintiff alleged that the injury resulted in ongoing physical limitations and deprived him of the opportunity to play collegiate basketball. The plaintiff filed suit alleging that the defendants negligently maintained the basketball court. Although the county did not assert LLA immunity as an affirmative defense in its answers, it later moved for summary judgment on that basis. The plaintiff opposed the motion, arguing that the county had waived the defense by failing to plead it. The county maintained that the plaintiff had received sufficient notice of its intent to rely on the LLA through discovery and therefore suffered no unfair surprise or prejudice. The trial court agreed and granted summary judgment, concluding that the county should be permitted to invoke statutory immunity notwithstanding its failure to formally plead the defense. Relying heavily on the New Jersey Supreme Court's guidance in Arias v. Cnty. of Bergen, holding a county park was subject to the immunity of the LLA, the Appellate Division affirmed, holding that the county's failure to plead LLA immunity did not preclude reliance on the defense under the circumstances presented. The court determined that the plaintiff had received adequate notice of the immunity claim through discovery and that permitting the defense furthered the public-policy objectives embodied in the LLA. In affirming dismissal, the Appellate Division acknowledged the seriousness of the plaintiff's injury and the general societal interest in maintaining parks and recreational facilities in a safe condition. However, the court emphasized that both the legislature and the New Jersey Supreme Court have expressed a clear policy choice to limit liability for public and private landowners who make recreational property available for public use. The decision reinforces the courts' continuing adherence to the Landowners' Liability Act and the principle that recreational lands and facilities should be broadly protected from liability exposure, even in cases involving significant personal injuries.