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Legal Updates for Insurance Agents & Brokers

Pennsylvania Superior Court Finds Appellants’ Position Unreasonable

Legal Update for Insurance Agents & Brokers – June 2025

June 1, 2025

by Dana A. Gittleman

In Hespen v. Erie Insurance Company, Levy Insurance Company, LLC and Thomas Levy, 332 A.3d 1229 (Pa. Super. 2024), the Pennsylvania Superior Court rejected the appellants’ assertion of the applicability of the doctrine of reasonable expectations. 

The appellants entered into a stipulated judgment with the company of a tortfeasor driver who injured Mr. Hespen, accepting an assignment of rights of the company, Karalis Mechanical Services, LLC, against its insurer, Erie, and insurance agency, Levy Insurance Agency, LLC, and insurance agent Thomas Levy. Karalis Mechanical had a commercial general liability policy procured by Levy and underwritten by Erie and had obtained an umbrella business catastrophe policy (BCL) with Erie after the subject automobile accident occurred. Karalis Mechanical had a separate commercial automobile policy with State Farm at the time. 

Erie denied coverage for the accident under the CGL policy, which excluded automobile liability, and under the BCL policy, which was not in effect on the date of loss, and the coverage only applied to automobiles insured by Erie. The trial court granted Erie’s and Levy’s motions for summary judgment, and the appellants appealed on the basis of the reasonable expectations doctrine. That is, whether the trial court had erred in refusing to consider the expectations of the insured, Karalis Mechanical, and in finding that Karalis Mechanical did not have an expectation of coverage as a matter of law.

In evaluating this claim, the Pennsylvania Superior Court considered the plain language of Erie’s policies themselves, as well as Mr. Levy’s conduct regarding insurance procurement. Approximately one year prior to the accident, Mr. Levy provided an Erie Business Auto Policy quote, which would have covered the vehicle involved in the accident. Karalis Mechanical opted to continue its auto insurance coverage with State Farm based on price and emailed Mr. Levy with this decision and rationale.

The doctrine of reasonable expectations is designed to protect “a non-commercial insured from policy terms which are not readily apparent, and to protect non-commercial insureds from deception by insurance agents.” Hespen, 332 A.3d at *4 (citing Matcon Diamond, Inc. v. Penn Nat. Ins. Co., 815 A.2d 1109, 1114 (Pa. Super. 2003)). Here, Karalis Mechanical was a commercial insured, and there was no deception. Indeed, the terms of the Erie policies were unambiguous: Mr. Levy provided a BCL quote as requested; Mr. Karalis never responded to the quote until after the accident occurred; and even if the BCL policy had been in effect, Erie would not have covered the loss as Mr. Karalis had rejected Erie’s auto quote (and, thus, the auto involved in the accident was not insured by Erie). Moreover, the court was unconvinced by Mr. Levy’s note in his computer system about “adding auto” to the commercial policy.

Given the court’s rejection of the doctrine of reasonable expectations, the appellant’s claims against Erie, Levy Agency and Mr. Levy lacked support, and the court affirmed the trial court’s summary judgment rulings.

With respect to the claims against Mr. Levy specifically, this case is a reminder of the oft-cited best practice to contemporaneously memorialize customer interactions and communications. Here, Mr. Levy offered auto insurance for Karalis Mechanical with Erie, which was rejected, and the offer to procure BCL coverage was not accepted until after the accident, despite repeated follow-up by Mr. Levy. These communications evidenced Mr. Karalis’ intentions regarding auto insurance and did not support a finding of deception. 

This case also bolsters the existing case law governing the application of the doctrine of reasonable expectations, reiterating the criteria articulated in Matcon, supra: “This Court has noted that, generally, courts cannot invoke the reasonable expectation doctrine to create an ambiguity where the policy itself is unambiguous. Our Supreme Court has identified only two limited exceptions to this principle: (1) protecting non-commercial insureds from policy terms which are not readily apparent; and (2) protecting non-commercial insureds from deception by insurance agents.”

Insurance agents should be cognizant of their insurance customer audience and provide clear communication and access to information to mitigate against potential claims of deception under the doctrine of reasonable expectations. When this doctrine is invoked, liability may attach for the insurance agent. 


 

Legal Update for Insurance Agents & Brokers- June 2025, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2025 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

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Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.

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Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.

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The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.