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William J. McPartland

Co-Chair, Special Education Law Practice Group

Portrait of William J. McPartland

Will is a member of the Professional Liability Department and handles matters on behalf of both insured and self-insured clients. He concentrates his practice in areas involving special education due process, civil rights, employment matters and claims involving the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act.  Will represents both government and private employers in state and federal court in ADEA, ADA, Title VII, FMLA and PA Veterans Preference Act claims.  He also handles general liability matters involving automobile accidents, premises liability claims and special investigations matters, which often involve claims of suspected arson and insurance fraud.

Prior to joining Marshall Dennehey, Will worked for defense firms in Pittsburgh and Philadelphia. He also served as a law clerk to the Honorable Ralph L. DeLuccia, Jr. in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Trial Division, in Passaic County.

Will earned his Bachelor of Arts degree from the University of Miami in environmental planning, an interdisciplinary degree with an emphasis on science and civil engineering. While at Miami, he was the starting fullback for the Hurricanes and received All Big East Football Academic Honors. He later attended the University of Pittsburgh School of Law, earning his juris doctor in 2004.

    • University of Pittsburgh School of Law (J.D., 2004)
    • University of Miami (B.S., 2000)
    • New Jersey, 2004
    • Pennsylvania, 2004
    • U.S. District Court District of New Jersey, 2005
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 2005
    • New York, 2006
    • U.S. District Court Western District of Pennsylvania, 2006
    • U.S. District Court Middle District of Pennsylvania, 2010
    • U.S. Court of Appeals 3rd Circuit, 2011
    • U.S. District Court Northern District of New York, 2014
    • U.S. District Court Western District of New York, 2014
    • U.S. District Court Southern District of New York, 2016
    • The Best Lawyers in America®, Insurance Law (2023-2027)
    • Successfully defended a school district at a Special Education Due Process Hearing where plaintiffs claimed that the district failed to provide the student with a Free Appropriate Public Education pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act related to a request for assistive technology.
    • Successfully defended a school district in the first trial in Pennsylvania challenging a student drug testing policy under Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.
    • Obtained a defense verdict in a slip and fall case before the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County brought by a tenant alleging she fell on ice caused by the paint used on the stairs as well as a leaking gutter.
    • Obtained a defense award for school district at Special Education Due Process Hearing regarding a disciplinary matter and the district's manifestation determination hearing.
    • Obtained dismissal of a claim against a school district alleging failure to protect a student from abuse by a third party.
    • Obtained dismissal of claims of trespass and negligence against a landowner related to the use of an easement which was adjacent to his property.
    • Obtained dismissal of a 14th Amendment state created danger claim against a school district arising out of a fight between two students.
    • Obtained dismissal of a plaintiff's challenge to a sale of land by a school district under the Donated and Dedicated Property Act and the Public Trust Doctrine.

Results

Thought Leadership

Legal Updates for Special Education Law

Legal Update for Special Education Law – Case Law Update

July 1, 2025

U.S. Supreme Court Clarifies Standard for Disability Discrimination Claims in Education Under Section 504 and ADA A.J.T., by and through her parents, A.T., et al. v. Osseo Area Schools, Independent School District No. 279, et al., 605 U.S. --- , --- S. Ct. ---, 2025 WL 1657415 (June 12, 2025) In a ruling clarifying the rights of students with disabilities, the Supreme Court of the United States unanimously held that schoolchildren bringing claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act are not required to show “bad faith or gross misjudgment” to recover damages related to educational services.  This case alleged that a school district refused to provide supplemental instruction during the early evening to a special education student with a rare form of epilepsy that prevented her from attending school until midday. The District Court concluded that the child was entitled to the instruction and compensatory education. In addressing the parents’ suit for money damages under Section 504 and the ADA, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed that claim because the parents had not established that the school district’s refusal amounted to bad faith or gross misjudgment.  The petitioner, A.J.T., a teenager with a rare form of epilepsy that severely limits her physical and cognitive functioning, suffers from seizures that are so frequent in the mornings that she cannot attend school before noon but is alert and able to learn between noon and 6 p.m. For the first few years of her schooling, A.J.T.’s school district accommodated her condition by providing her with afternoon and evening instruction and allowed her to avoid morning activities. In 2015, A.J.T.’s family moved, and her new school district, Osseo Area Public Schools, denied her parents’ request to provide evening instruction in A.J.T.’s IEP. This denial resulted in A.J.T. only receiving 4.25 hours of instruction per day as compared to the standard 6.5 hours of schooling received by nondisabled students in the district. A.J.T.’s parents filed an IDEA complaint with the Minnesota Department of Education, claiming a denial of FAPE. The administrative law judge ruled that the school district had violated the IDEA and ordered the school district to provide compensatory education and evening instruction. Federal courts affirmed the ruling, upholding the award of compensatory education under the IDEA. A.J.T. and her parents then sued the school district in the Federal District Court under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, requesting a permanent injunction, reimbursement of certain costs and compensatory damages. The District Court granted summary judgment to the school district. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the judgment, holding that a school district’s failure to provide a reasonable accommodation was not enough to state a prima facie case of discrimination as established by prior case law. In addition, the Eighth Circuit upheld a requirement that a plaintiff prove that school officials’ conduct rose to the level of bad faith or gross misjudgment in order to recover damages under either the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act. Certain other courts of appeal have also applied the same heightened standard as the Eighth Circuit, but not all. In reaching its decision resolving the split, the Supreme Court recognized that, outside of the educational services context, courts only require a “deliberate indifference” standard to obtain compensatory damages under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act for intentional discrimination. However, the Court noted that the statutory remedial or substantive protections of Title II of the ADA or Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act suggest that claims based on educational services should be subject to a more demanding standard. The Court further referenced the specific statutory language of the IDEA, which provides that nothing in the IDEA “shall be construed to restrict or limit the rights, procedures, and remedies available under” the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, or other federal laws protecting disabling children’s rights, noting that a heightened standard of “bad faith or gross misjudgment” is irreconcilable with the unambiguous directive of this section of the IDEA. By imposing a heightened standard, the appeals court limited the ability of disabled schoolchildren to assert their independent rights under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, thereby making it more difficult to obtain remedies provided by Congress when it enacted this newer provision of the IDEA. Going forward, claims based on educational services brought pursuant to the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act should be subject to the same standards applied in other disability discrimination contexts.    Legal Update for Special Education Law – July 2025 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2025 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Legal Updates for Special Education Law

Legal Update for Special Education Law – Updates from the U.S. Department of Education

February 1, 2025

In Tennessee v. Cardona, 2025 WL 63795, a Kentucky federal judge issued an opinion vacating the new Title IX regulations.  In April of 2024, new Title IX regulations expanded the concept of discrimination “on the basis of sex” under Title IX to include “discrimination on the basis of sex stereotypes, sex characteristics, pregnancy or related conditions, sexual orientation, and gender identity.” The new regulations redefined expanded “sexual harassment” to encompass both “sexual harassment and other harassment on the basis of sex.” It also expanded protections for students against sexual harassment.  The Kentucky District Court held that the Department of Education exceeded its statutory authority when it expanded the definition of “on the basis of sex” to include “gender identity.”  The District Court also found the new regulations violated the First Amendment by requiring the use of names and pronouns associated with a student’s asserted gender and these names and pronouns were vague and overbroad.  Additionally, the District Court found the new regulations violated the Spending Clause by conditioning receipt of federal funding on the prohibition of discrimination based upon gender identity.  While not binding on other district courts, we will continue to monitor this case as it proceeds on appeal.    Legal Update for Special Education Law – February 2025 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2025 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.

Thought Leadership

Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.