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Vlada Tasich

Co-Chair, Product Liability Practice

Chair, Class Action Litigation Practice

Portrait of Vlada Tasich

Vlada Tasich is a litigation and trial attorney who has been defending the interests of companies and individuals in complex civil litigation matters throughout the state and federal courts of Pennsylvania for over twenty years. As co-chair of the firm’s Product Liability Practice, Vlada was recently recognized by Chambers USA with a Band Two ranking in the area of product liability defense in Pennsylvania. His experience encompasses all aspects of motor vehicle design and manufacture, appliances, consumer electronics, residential and industrial fires, durable medical equipment, industrial equipment, exercise equipment, perishable items, and many other consumer goods. He also represents clients in matters involving pharmacy malpractice, premises liability, transportation litigation, construction accidents, and consumer class actions. Vlada’s clients have retained him to coordinate litigation nationally and to serve as regional counsel.

Having previously been recognized as a “Rising Star” by Pennsylvania Super Lawyers from 2010 to 2012, Vlada has been selected to the Pennsylvania Super Lawyer list for product liability defense each year since 2015. He is also frequently asked by clients and industry organizations to lecture on various issues in product liability, premises liability, and motor vehicle law.

Born and raised in Philadelphia, Vlada received his B.A. from George Washington University in 1997 and his J.D. from the Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law in 2001.

    • The Catholic University of America Columbus School of Law (J.D., 2001)
    • The George Washington University (B.A., 1997)
    • Pennsylvania, 2002
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 2002
    • U.S. District Court Western District of Pennsylvania, 2011
    • U.S. District Court Middle District of Pennsylvania, 2013
    • Chambers USA, Pennsylvania: Litigation: Product Liability, Band 2 (2025-2026)
    • Pennsylvania Super Lawyers (2015-2027)
    • Pennsylvania Super Lawyers Rising Star (2010-2012)
    • Defense Research Institute (DRI)
    • Pennsylvania Bar Association
    • Product Liability Advisory Council (PLAC)
    • "Tincher – One Year Later," Defense Digest, Vol. 21, No. 4, December 2015
    • "Owners of Registered but Uninsured Vehicles Beware Pennsylvania Superior Court Ruling Makes First Party Benefits Unrecoverable," Defense Digest, Vol. 9, No. 4, December 2003
    • Successfully obtained dismissal of a wrongful death action against a product manufacturer and distributor for lack of personal jurisdiction. The case involved allegations of a defective windshield installed in Pennsylvania, but the defense team demonstrated that the clients—located in Ohio and South Carolina—lacked sufficient contacts with the forum state, overcoming the plaintiff’s stream-of-commerce jurisdiction theory.
    • Prevailed on a Motion to Dismiss in a data breach class action in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Sixteen named plaintiffs brought claims alleging that a hacker had accessed the personal information of over 1,000,000 individuals nationwide. We defended the debt collection company whose computer servers were compromised. Plaintiffs asserted broad and novel legal theories, including negligent failure to protect data, breach of implied contract, invasion of privacy, negligence per se, and violations of various state consumer protection laws. We successfully contested these claims, resulting in the dismissal of eight plaintiffs for lack of standing and 15 of the 17 asserted causes of action being dismissed.
    • Successfully defended dealer of an asphalt compactor in a two-week product liability trial in Philadelphia County. Plaintiff sustained a severe crush injury to the leg, and the jury returned a verdict against defendants dealer and manufacturer for over $900,000. On motion for judgment as a matter of law, the Court granted the client's cross-claim for indemnity against the co-defendant manufacturer on a pass through liability theory based on absence of evidence of substantial change to the product by dealer.
    • Obtained a dismissal with prejudice of a products liability case filed against an alcohol beverage manufacturer. The Plaintiffs are individuals who were seriously injured or killed when the alleged minor drunk driver of the vehicle in which they were passengers was involved in a single car accident. The Plaintiffs claimed that the manufacturer was liable to them because the product had more alcohol than other alcohol beverages, was improperly marketed to minors, like their driver, and did not warn of the dangers associated with the beverage. Our team argued several points including that Pennsylvania does not recognize such a products liability cause of action because the dangers of drinking alcohol and driving are obvious, and the manufacturer has no duty to warn potential users of such dangers.  Additionally, alcohol is not an unreasonably dangerous product.
    • Defense verdict in week-long product liability trial in Philadelphia County for global electronics manufacturer involving a fire loss allegedly due to one of its microwave ovens. There was no direct evidence of the alleged defective condition, and the plaintiff proceeded on malfunction theory. Unanimous jury found the plaintiff failed to eliminate all other possible causes of the fire.
    • Obtained dismissal of major vehicle manufacturer by non suit after week-long product liability trial in Philadelphia County involving industrial equipment after plaintiffs failed to present evidence of negligence and causation.
    • Denial of class certification in action against insurance carrier for alleged breach of fiduciary duties and violations of insurance regulations.
    • Denial of class certification in action against insurance company for alleged violations of the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law.
    • Successful defense and resolution of numerous class actions involving claims under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, Fair Debt Collections Practices Act, Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, and other state consumer protection laws.
    • Successful defense of national retail chain during four day trial in Philadelphia County premises liability action.  Plaintiff fell on defendant’s premises allegedly due to insufficient safety precautions taken by store employees, and sustained a traumatic brain injury.  Pretrial settlement demand was $500,000.  Liability was contested, and competing adverse inference instructions were given by the Court for alleged evidence spoliation.  Plaintiff contended defendant failed to preserve security camera footage.  The defense offered expert testimony that a key scene photograph taken by plaintiff had been altered.  Upon deliberation, the jury found 50% liability against plaintiff and returned a four-figure nuisance verdict.

Results

Summary Judgment Won in a Pennsylvania Premises Liability Case

We secured summary judgment in a premises liability case in Northampton County, Pennsylvania, dismissing all claims against a national sporting goods retailer. The plaintiff claimed he slipped and fell on a slippery substance inside a the store while testing out bicycles. The plaintiff and his wife admitted that after he fell, they did not inspect the floor and quickly left the store. Months later, and after filing suit, the plaintiff and an engineer visited the store and claimed that there was an open can of bicycle grease in the area where the fall had occurred. Based on this evidence alone, the plaintiff theorized, through an expert report, that he must have fallen on bicycle grease negligently left on the floor by the store staff. Summary judgment was sought on the grounds that no witnesses to the fall ever actually identified any substance on the floor, and that the expert’s opinion was based on pure speculation. The court agreed and dismissed all claims against our client.

Dismissal with Prejudice Obtained in Case Targeting Alcoholic Beverage Manufacturer

We secured a dismissal with prejudice in a product liability case in Pennsylvania. The plaintiffs, who were involved, but not responsible, for a drunk driving accident, claimed that the beverage manufacturer was liable to them because the product had more alcohol than other alcoholic beverages and was improperly marketed to minors. Our team successfully argued several points, including that Pennsylvania does not recognize such a product liability cause of action because the dangers of drinking alcohol and driving are obvious, and the manufacturer has no duty to warn potential users of such dangers.

Thought Leadership

Defense Digest

On the Pulse…Our Product Liability Practice Group

December 1, 2021

For almost five decades, Marshall Dennehey has maintained an experienced and sophisticated group of trial attorneys involved in product liability litigation. The product liability landscape has evolved continually since first arriving on the scene in the 1970s. In the intervening forty-plus years, we have successfully represented numerous product defendants, as our defense attorneys have kept abreast of ever-changing legal theories, judicial viewpoints and, of course, evolving technology.  The co-chairs of the Product Liability Practice Group, Bradley Remick and Vlada Tasich, have over 50 years of combined experience in handling product liability cases for a myriad of domestic and international product manufacturers, involving virtually every conceivable type of consumer or industrial product. Brad has authored six treatises on Pennsylvania product liability. The demands of a defense product liability practice are such that attorneys must make certain that they are up-to-date on the latest case law. Federal and state appellate and trial court decisions directly impact the defense of product liability defendants. In that respect, we have been at the forefront, providing guidance to clients and collaborating with peers to coordinate broader defense strategies as legal landscapes have shifted in this area of law.  For example, in 2014 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court issued a landmark decision in Tincher v. Omega Flex, Inc., 104 A.3d 328 (Pa. 2014), upending nearly 40 years of prior strict liability precedent. Under earlier case law, a product was defective if it lacked any element necessary to make it safe for its intended use. Jurors were told that a manufacturer was a guarantor of its product’s safety. Tincher expressly rejected these standards, acknowledged that it was for the jury to decide if a product was unreasonably dangerous, and adopted two alternative standards for demonstrating defect: the consumer expectations test and the risk-utility test. While the core legal framework for analyzing if a product is defective changed, many other longstanding product issues were left unresolved; the Tincher court leaving it to future cases where the common law could develop “within the proper factual contexts against the background of targeted advocacy.” The plaintiffs’ bar generally rejected the sweeping nature of the court’s decision, which was a positive development for product defendants. They also influenced efforts by the Pennsylvania Bar Institute to fashion plaintiff-friendly suggested standard jury instructions that, by and large, held on to the principles rejected by Tincher. Marshall Dennehey attorneys were at the forefront of concerted efforts by the defense bar to draft alternative suggested jury instructions that more fairly follow the law. Our trailblazing lawyers, on behalf of our clients, also targeted cases for trial where a number of these alternative instructions were adopted by Pennsylvania courts as more accurate statements of the applicable legal standards post Tincher.  Our practice group makes certain that our attorneys are keenly aware of legal changes involving product liability. We employ every avenue of defense available to our clients in order to successfully and fairly defend their products before a jury. Our experienced and sophisticated trial attorneys prepare and handle a variety of complex product liability litigation, including the representation of major product manufacturers, distributors and other manufacturers through insurance carriers. The wide variety of cases and clients we represent evidences the level of experience and sophistication that our clients have come to expect in their defense. Over the years, our attorneys have handled thousands of product liability matters, in all of the jurisdictions to which our regional practice extends. The practice includes defense of accidents and alleged failures of all types, including, for example: A broad variety of vehicle products including automobiles, motorcycles, recreational vehicles and trucks, as well as the component manufacturers and suppliers for those products. Consumer goods and appliances. Drug and dietary supplements. Combining its resources with its legal and medical malpractice groups, the Product Liability Practice Group defends cases involving pharmaceuticals, biologics, compounding pharmacies and medical devices. Recreational equipment, including helmets and exercise equipment. Industrial and manufacturing equipment of all sorts and all sizes, ranging from small generators to large electrical components that provide electric service to municipalities.  Building equipment and structures, including all the components involved therein. Elevators and escalators. Fire suppression equipment and systems. Mold and contamination issues.  Asbestos and toxic tort claims.  Consumer products of all varieties. Marshall Dennehey’s product liability practice also includes multi-district litigation, class actions, and commercial claims arising from allegedly poorly performing and/or defective products and/or their components. The attorneys in this practice group are recognized leaders in this area of the law. They frequently speak at national, regional and local seminars, and they are published in their field. Several have been elected as Fellows of the American College of Trial Lawyers. Their memberships include: Product Liability Advisory Council, Product Liability Committee of the Defense Research Institute, International Association of Defense Counsel, Federation of Defense and Corporate Counsel, the Pennsylvania Bar Association and the Trial Lawyers of America. Marshall Dennehey recognizes the advantage available to defense counsel by employing the resources of its clients, who have the best expertise pertaining to their product, and then supplementing that expertise with our extensive expert bank to select the appropriate forensic and/or technical expert. Our entire focus is directed at presenting the product to a jury in a persuasive and understandable manner so as to achieve a defense verdict. The next decade will surely see further change, as emerging technologies continue to reshape our world and product liability law continues to evolve. Marshall Dennehey remains at the forefront of the current generation of practitioners, and we are poised and prepared to enhance the defense of product manufacturers into the future. *Brad, chair of the Product Liability Practice Group, and Vlad, co-chair of this group, are shareholders and work in our Philadelphia, Pennsylvania office. They can be reached respectively at 215.575.2762 or bdremick@mdwcg.com and 215.575.2659 or vxtasich@mdwcg.com.   Defense Digest, Vol. 27, No. 5, December 2021 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2021 Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.

Thought Leadership

Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.