.

Thomas J. Slogar

Portrait of Thomas J. Slogar

Tom has practiced in Orlando since 1999 and has litigated in state and federal courts throughout Florida. He has extensive litigation experience in insurance defense, including personal injury claims involving premises liability, automobile collisions, trucking accidents and also employment practices liability and product liability.

Tom received his undergraduate degree from the University of Central Florida. Tom worked extensively in litigation as a legal assistant for ten years and earned the University of Central Florida Legal Assistant Award of Distinction in 1991. Tom attended law school at the University of Akron where he worked with the trial team, interned with the City of Stow Law Department and Prosecutor’s office, and was selected to Who’s Who Among American Law School Students. Tom received his juris doctor from the University of Akron School of Law in 1999.

Tom is a member of Most Precious Blood Catholic Church of Oviedo. He has worked with the American Heart Association (Heart Walk Team Captain, 2008-2012, Heart Walk Logistics Committee, 2008-2009, and Advocacy Team, 2012), the Pancreatic Cancer Action Network (PanCan 5k volunteer, 2009-2011), and the University of Akron School of Law (Admission Ambassador, 2007-Present). Tom is also an adjunct professor for the University of Central Florida's College of Health and Public Affairs (Legal Studies program).

Tom is licensed to practice in all Florida state courts and in the United State District Court for the Middle District of Florida.

    • University of Akron School of Law (J.D., 1999)
    • University of Central Florida (B.A., 1986)
    • Florida, 1999
    • U.S. District Court Middle District of Florida
    • Legal Issues in NY CT FL & DE, Marshall Dennehey Client Presentation, February 16, 2023

Thought Leadership

Defense Digest

Overcoming the Daubert Challenge With Your Billing and Coding Expert

September 1, 2024

Key Points: The Florida Standard Jury Instructions pertaining to plaintiff’s medical expenses instruct the jury to consider and award damages for the reasonable value or expense of medical care and treatment necessarily or reasonably obtained by plaintiff in the past or future.  It is plaintiff’s burden at trial to prove the reasonableness of his or her medical expenses. Once he or she testifies to the amount of the medical bills and introduces them into evidence, it is a jury question whether the bills and charges represent reasonable and necessary medical expenses.  If scientific technical or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact in understanding the evidence or in determining a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify about it in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if: the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case. In a recent slip and fall case we handled in Broward County, Florida, the plaintiff moved to strike a retail store’s billing and coding expert under Daubert from testifying at trial as to the usual, customary, and reasonable charges of the plaintiff’s medical-related expenses. Among other things, the plaintiff alleged the billing and coding expert relied on incomplete, unverifiable information, including her own opinion testimony, which the plaintiff averred would only confuse the jury. In opposition, we argued the billing and coding expert had sufficient specialized knowledge, experience, and training and was adequately qualified to express her expert opinions regarding the plaintiff’s medical bills and how those bills compare to the prevailing and customary rates charged in the medical community and specific geographical location where the services were performed and that such testimony would assist the trier of fact in understanding the evidence related to those reasonable charges for the alleged treatment provided to the plaintiff.  The plaintiff’s position would make it impossible for a defendant to contest whether the charges claimed are usual, customary, and reasonable. It would also be contrary to Florida law, which acknowledges a defendant’s right in personal injury litigation to argue to a jury that a plaintiff’s medical bills are unreasonable. See e.g., Katzman v. Rediron Fabrication, Inc., 76 So. 3d 1060, 1065 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011) (sufficiently explained below why certain hospital billing information was necessary as part of determining whether a treating doctor billed non-litigation patients at a lower rate for the same medical services is “admissible evidence regarding the reasonableness of medical expenses”); Giacalone v. Helen Ellis Mem'l Hosp. Found., Inc., 8 So. 3d 1232, 1235 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (stating that reasonableness of bills can be determined by looking at: (1) the relevant market for services, including the rates charged by other similarly situated providers for similar services; (2) the usual and customary rate the provider charges and receives for its services; and (3) the provider's internal cost structure).  The plaintiff in our case also argued that the medical and billing coding expert did not employ a sufficiently reliable scientific methodology in forming the basis for her expert opinion. In pertinent part, the plaintiff cited testimony from the expert that, as part of her methodology, she would input data from the medical billing charges (CPT coding) into a nationally recognized data base in order to obtain what the usual, customary, and reasonable charges were, in her expert opinion, for the plaintiff’s medical treatment. This method, according to the plaintiff, was not sufficiently reliable under Daubert and was, therefore, inadmissible. Simply inputting data into a database, according to the plaintiff, does not survive Daubert. In response, we cited Cordero v. Target Corporation, 2019 WL 13080580 (2019), where the federal court had already spoken on the same legal challenge under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence as it relates to the admissibility of expert opinion testimony from a medical and billing coding expert.  The Cordero court held that the medical billing and coding expert who specifically utilized the Context 4 Healthcare UCR database—the exact same database used by the billing and coding expert in our case—was qualified to render expert opinions on the reasonableness of the medical charges based on, among other things, the expert’s nine years of experience in reviewing the reasonableness of medical charges and nearly thirteen years of experience in establishing and reviewing “fee schedules using standards such as UCR databases and negotiating out-of-network reimbursement amounts (based on UCR data and commercial insurance allowable fees.” Id. at 23-24. In applying Cordero and Daubert to our case, we referred the court to the testimony of our billing and coding expert, who testified at length as to the methodology utilized to determine the reasonable value of past medical bills uniformly employed by medical billing professionals based on proper CPT coding for the medical services performed, together with the sources and data obtained, which, in her expert opinion, were not arbitrary. It was further argued that our expert utilized the same methodology throughout her 30 years in the medical billing and coding industry.  Our expert relied on nationally recognized medical billing and coding standards, federal regulations, and geographically specific modifiers based on the particular categories of medical care. The expert’s methodology was “based on billing rules and coding standards that dictate how medical services are billing in the United States, which are federally regulated, and the application of pricing databases specific to the category of care, community and year in which the service was provided.” As part of her methodology, as indicated above, the billing and coding expert utilized the nationally recognized and generally accepted UCR database (Context 4 Health Care) to review, analyze, and determine what the UCR charges should have been for the medical treatment and services provided to the plaintiff.   Additionally, our expert testified that she reviewed the plaintiff’s medical records and billing, including a review and verification of the CPT codes inputted by the providers, to determine if the providers listed and billed the services under the correct CPT codes. In essence, the methodology employed in our case was the same methodology utilized by thousands of medical providers throughout the United States inasmuch as those same or similar databases were used to establish and implement their fee schedules.  Overall, we were able to successfully establish that our medical and billing coding expert relied on sufficient and reliable data, the testimony was based on reliable and verifiable methods, and the expert applied those nationally recognized scientific methods to the facts of our case.  As a consequence, the Circuit Court denied the plaintiff’s motion in its entirety and ruled that our medical and billing coding expert was permitted to testify at trial and to provide expert opinion testimony on what the usual, reasonable, and customary charges should be for the plaintiff’s medical treatment and related expenses. The court’s decision led to a favorable settlement of the litigation shortly thereafter.  Frank and Tom are both members of our Casualty Department and work in our Orlando, Florida, office.     Defense Digest, Vol. 30, No. 3, September 2024, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2024 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Defense Digest

Limiting the Opinions of Plaintiff’s Non-Retained Expert Witnesses Regarding Injury Causation and Permanency

March 1, 2024

Key Points: Plaintiff’s non-retained experts are treating physicians, and their testimony at trial should be limited to their scope of treatment, diagnosis, and prognosis with respect to the injuries alleged.  Plaintiff’s treating physicians lack the proper foundation to provide expert opinion testimony on medical causation and permanency unless they take the plaintiff’s history relating to an incident and review the records of the plaintiff’s other physicians. When a plaintiff discloses a treating physician as a non-retained medical expert, this non-retained expert’s testimony should be limited to exclude testimony regarding medical causation and permanency unless there is a proper predicate for such testimony. To lay the proper predicate, the physician must have reviewed the plaintiff’s medical records from other treating physicians, and the physician should obtain a history from the plaintiff that describes the manner in which the plaintiff was allegedly injured.  For instance, in a slip and fall case, the history should include the manner in which the plaintiff allegedly slipped and fell. Where the treating physician fails to review the medical records from the plaintiff’s other medical providers and fails to obtain a history of how the plaintiff allegedly came to be injured, there is an argument that the non-retained expert/treating physician should be precluded from testifying about injury causation and permanency. Pursuant to § 90.702, Fla. Stat., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), and other applicable Florida law, a trial court must make two preliminary factual determinations prior to permitting expert testimony: (1) whether the expert testimony will assist the trier of fact in understanding the evidence or in determining a fact in issue; and (2) whether the witness is qualified by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education to express an opinion on the matter. Under Daubert, the trial court is specifically assigned a gatekeeper task of ensuring that an expert’s testimony, whether scientific or non-scientific, rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant to the task at hand. Id. See also Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141, 148-49 (1999); Corwin v. Walt Disney World Co., 475 F.3d 1239, 1250 (11th Cir. 2007).  In Cooper v. Marten Transp., Ltd., 539 Fed. Appx. 963, 967 (11th Cir. 2013), the Eleventh Circuit explained that causation “could not be determined through a physical examination and the chronology of events alone.” The court further noted in that case that neither physician explained the basis for their opinions. Id.  Courts frequently exclude causation opinion testimony of expert witnesses who base their opinions on a plaintiff’s account of the facts without consideration of other possible causes of injury. See Carmody v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2015 WL 5542534, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Sep. 18, 2015). Moreover, even if an expert is qualified, the expert must have a sufficient factual predicate underlying those opinions. Florida Statute § 90.705(2), explicitly states: “[i]f the [opposing] party establishes prima facie evidence that the expert does not have a sufficient basis for the opinion, the opinions and inferences of the expert are inadmissible unless the party offering the testimony establishes the underlying facts or data.”  The legislative history of the rule emphasizes that this subsection intends to provide protection for opposing counsel so that expert opinions that are completely unqualified will not be admitted and risk prejudicing the jury. See Florida Statute § 90.705, Law Revision Counsel Note (1976). “In this instance, the protection of using cross-examination to expose the flaws in the opinion is not sufficient in all cases.” Id. In a recent slip and fall case in Broward County, Florida, the plaintiff disclosed a non-retained expert/treating physician who was a pain management specialist. This doctor had not been provided and had not otherwise reviewed any medical records regarding the plaintiff’s post-incident treatment, other than his own records. He had not obtained a history from the plaintiff of how the plaintiff had allegedly slipped and fallen or how the plaintiff was allegedly injured. In this particular case, the physician admitted in deposition that he was not retained to provide any opinion testimony regarding any permanent injury.  The opinions of the physician regarding the plaintiff’s medical condition were based solely on subjective statements made by the plaintiff, that the alleged injuries occurred as a result of the incident (without any history of the incident itself or how the plaintiff came to be injured as a result of the incident), together with the medical treatment related to the physician’s care of the plaintiff (in a vacuum, without any medical treatment history related to the care and treatment provided by the plaintiff’s other treating physicians).   There was no record evidence of any attempt by the non-retained expert/treating physician to eliminate other possible causes of the plaintiff’s conditions. Additionally, there was no record evidence that this physician conducted a review of the plaintiff’s pre- or post-incident medical history. Accordingly, it was reasonable to conclude that the doctor intended to identify the condition for treatment purposes rather than to determine its exact source. See generally, Turner v. Iowa Fire Equipment, Co., 229 F.3d 1202, 1205 (8th Cir. 2000). Furthermore, none of the plaintiff’s medical records revealed information to demonstrate that the doctor made any “attempt to consider all the possible causes, or to exclude each potential cause until only one remained, or to consider which of two or more non-excludable causes was more likely to have caused the condition.” Id. at 1208 (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding treating physician causation opinion, based exclusively upon the medical history obtained from the plaintiff, which indicated no respiratory problems, and the temporal relationship between the incident and the onset of symptoms); see also, e.g., State, Div. of Risk Mgmt. v. Martin, 690 So.2d 651 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997) (holding that a doctor’s testimony did not constitute competent substantial evidence as to causation because it was based on speculation, made without knowledge of claimant’s relevant medical history, and based “virtually entirely” upon claimant’s false report of causal connection between the accident and a subsequent surgery); In re Paoli R. R. Yard PC’B Litigation, 35 F.3d 717 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding that for purposes of determining admissibility of expert medical testimony, part of differential diagnosis is using standard techniques to rule out alternative causes and, thus, where defendant points to a plausible alternative cause and the doctor offers no explanation for why he or she has concluded that was not the sole cause, the doctor’s methodology is unreliable); Berry v. CSX Transp. Inc., 709 So.2d 552, 571 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) (holding that expert witness’ testimony regarding causation of a railroad employee’s malady was admissible in toxic tort litigation, as the expert employed a scientifically acceptable differential diagnosis method in an attempt to eliminate other possible causes of symptoms and his opinion was not based upon the employee’s personal history, medical records, physical examinations, and medical tests, but upon sufficient epidemiological data, facts, and personal observations); David v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 801 So. 2d 223, 227 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001). On the other hand, in the recent Broward County case, we argued that the defendants’ experts could opine regarding issues of causation because they actually applied standard techniques of differential diagnosis through the review of prior medical records, examinations, diagnostic films, discovery, depositions, investigation, statements, and photographs. The Circuit Court in Broward County granted the defendants’ motion in limine to preclude causation opinions from the plaintiff’s treating non-retained physician. In our case, we had the perfect storm of the physician not having taken a history as to how the incident occurred or how the alleged injuries were caused by the incident, coupled with the plaintiff’s attorney not having provided any other treatment records to the physician, as well as the physician’s concession that he was not retained to provide an opinion on permanency. However, based on the case law, the argument to preclude opinion testimony by a treating physician as to causation and permanency should not hinge on whether the latter concession is made by the physician during deposition.  *Tom is special counsel in our Orlando, Florida, office. He can be reached at (407) 420-4418 or tjslogar@mdwcg.com. Frank Madia is an associate in our Orlando office who can be reached at (407) 420-4410 or flmadia@mdwcg.com. Heather, also in our Orlando office, is an associate who can be reached at (407) 505-4680 or HCTruitt@mdwcg.com.    Defense Digest, Vol. 30, No. 1, March 2024, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2024 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

U.S. Department of Education Reports to Congress on Disciplinary Removals of Children with Disabilities

In June 2026, the United States Department of Education, through the Office of Special Education and Rehabilitative Services (OSERS), published its “47th Annual Report to Congress on the Implementation of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 2025.” In its report, OSERS provided detailed data and information on the discipline and removal of students from their educational placements, specifically for the school year 2022-2023. To obtain this data, all 50 states, the District of Columbia, the Bureau of Indian Education, Puerto Rico, and other U.S. territories, were asked to report on pre-school and school-aged students, ages 3-21, who were served under IDEA, Part B, and removed from their educational placements for disciplinary reasons during the school year in question. Not all jurisdictions had data available; OSERS’ reporting to Congress was based on the information supplied by the jurisdictions that responded.  First, OSERS examined the total number of served students who were removed to an interim alternative educational setting. From the reporting data, this number totaled 7,204,199 students. Of this total, 11,364 students were removed unilaterally by school personnel for drugs, weapons, or serious bodily injury to themselves or others. These figures reflected the unilateral removal of served students at a rate of 16 per 10,000 students. Of this total, 545 students were removed by a due process hearing officer for likely serious bodily injury, a rate of one per 10,000 students.  Next, OSERS examined data for students who were suspended (in school and out of school) or expelled for more than 10 school days. The total number of students in this category was 7,623,095. Of this total, 65,104 students received out of school suspensions or expulsions, a rate of 85 per 10,000 students. A total of 21,878 students received in school suspensions, a rate of 29 students per 10,000.  OSERS evaluated this particular data and drilled down further, examining the rate of interim removal, expulsion, and suspension per 10,000 students based specifically upon each IDEA disability category. Perhaps not surprisingly, children primarily identified with emotional disturbance were the most affected.    For every 10,000 students who were identified under the category of emotional disturbance, 65 were unilaterally removed to an interim alternative educational setting by school personnel (not the IEP team) for drugs, weapons, or serious bodily injury, and four out of every 10,000 students were removed following a hearing officer finding that there was a substantial likelihood of serious bodily injury to the student or others. By contrast, the ratio of students under each of the other disability categories who were unilaterally removed by school personnel was 25 or less per 10,000 students in each category. No more than two students per 10,000 in each of the other categories were removed by a hearing officer. Other Health Impairment was the second leading category.  For every 10,000 students identified primarily with emotional disturbance, 411 students received out of school suspensions or expulsions of more than 10 days, and 107 of every 10,000 students in this category received in-school suspensions. In comparison, the ratio of students under each of the other disability categories who received out of school suspensions or expulsions of more than 10 days was no more than 172 per 10,000. Students identified in all other disability categories received in-school suspensions at a rate of no more than 57 per 10,000 students. Again, Other Health Impairment was the second leading category. OSERS then examined discipline data with a state-by-state comparison, once more at a ratio of 10,000 students served. The overall data of students who were unilaterally removed to an interim alternative educational setting by school personnel for drugs, weapons, or serious bodily injury showed that removal occurred most frequently in Texas (92 per 10,000 students), Montana (62 per 10,000 students), and Tennessee (42 per 10,000 students). The mean was 12.1.  In Pennsylvania, the rate of removal was 12 out of every 10,000 students, just below the mean.  OSERS also considered, on a state-by-state basis, the number of students who received out-of-school suspensions or expulsions of greater than 10 days. The most significant rate of discipline here occurred in North Carolina (256 per 10,000 students), Missouri (250 per 10,000 students), and South Carolina (250 per 10,000 students).  The mean was 85.83. In Pennsylvania, the rate of discipline was 57 per 10,000 students, well below the mean.  Finally, OSERS evaluated, on a state-by-state comparison, the ratio of students per 10,000 who were identified under the category of emotional disturbance and who received out of school suspensions or expulsions for greater than 10 days. The suspension or expulsion of students with emotional disturbance occurred most often in North Carolina (1,723 per 10,000 students), Missouri (1,127 per 10,000 students), and South Carolina (1,098 per 10,000). The mean was 485.81. In Pennsylvania, the suspension or expulsion of students identified with emotional disturbance occurred at a rate of 260 per 10,000, again well below the mean. Although OSERS did not draw any specific conclusions about the disciplinary data it collected, it is nonetheless evident that students primarily identified with emotional disturbance were removed from their educational placements for disciplinary reasons at a rate much higher than students in any other disability category. Relatively speaking, however, Pennsylvania acquitted itself well in the state-by-state disciplinary data collection.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania HB 2307: Special Education Contingency Fund Reform

Pennsylvania school districts and school law attorneys are aware of the increasing cost of special education services. In an effort to address this growing squeeze on school district budgets, a bi-partisan group of Pennsylvania House Representatives introduced House Bill 2307. The bill is a special education funding measure intended to reform Pennsylvania's reimbursement system for extraordinarily high-cost special education students. As written, HB 2307 would increase funding dedicated to Pennsylvania's Extraordinary Special Education Program Expenses reimbursement program. Beginning with the 2026-27 school year, the bill would increase the set-aside from 1% to 2% of the annual Special Education appropriation. The increased funding is aimed at assisting school districts and charter schools address the costs of serving students whose needs generate exceptionally high special education expenses. The proposal specifically targets situations involving students whose annual special education costs exceed the state's highest cost threshold and represent a significant burden on a district's special education budget. HB 2307 includes key eligibility requirements such as: 1) extraordinary special education expenses approved by the Secretary of Education; 2) student costs exceeding the state's highest Category 3A threshold; 3) costs representing at least 1% of the district's total special education expenditures; 4) student enrolled in the district for no more than two consecutive school years for the proposed reimbursement category; and 5) application and documentation requirements for districts and charter schools. HB 2307 successfully passed the Pennsylvania House of Representatives on June 16, 2026, by a unanimous vote of 202-0. It was subsequently transmitted to the Senate and was referred to the Senate Education Committee on June 22, 2026, where it currently remains pending. While there is currently no scheduled Senate committee or floor vote publicly listed for HB 2307, the next step would be for the Senate Education Committee to consider the bill and determine whether to report it to the full Senate for consideration. If approved by the committee, the bill would proceed through the Senate's three-consideration process before a final vote. Because the General Assembly is still within the 2025-26 legislative session, the bill remains eligible for action during the remainder of the session. However, absent committee action, it will not become law before the start of the 2026-27 school year. If enacted, HB 2307 could have several important effects: Greater financial stability for districts serving students with exceptionally expensive educational and related-service needs. Increased reimbursement opportunities for high-cost placements, specialized transportation, intensive behavioral supports, and other extraordinary services. Reduced pressure on local special education budgets, particularly in smaller districts where one or two high-cost students can significantly affect annual expenditures. Potential reduction in litigation and placement disputes driven by financial constraints, although the bill does not alter substantive IDEA rights or district obligations to provide FAPE.