.

Sunny Marie Sparano

Assistant Director, Professional Liability Department

Chair, Architectural, Engineering and Construction Defect Litigation Practice Group

SMSparano@mdwcg.com

Portrait of Sunny Marie Sparano

Sunny is the Assistant Director of the firm’s Professional Liability Department and serves on the firm's Board of Directors. Along with the Director of the Professional Liability Department, she is responsible for the administrative oversight and leadership of more than 140 lawyers across 19 offices.  As a member of the firm’s Board of Directors, Sunny oversees the firm’s daily operations spanning four departments and 50 practice areas.

Sunny also serves as Chair of the firm's Architectural, Engineering and Construction Defect Litigation Practice Group. She focuses her practice on the defense of design and construction professionals, both independently and through their insurance carriers, in complex construction defect suits asserting a variety of claims, such as building and design-related deficiencies.

These large and complex construction defect suits often involve multiple parties in which issues of code violations, negligence, breach of contract and fraud are at issue, as well as insurance coverage claims under GL policies.  Similarly, Sunny defends contractors and design professionals in claims involving construction site accidents. She also defends manufacturers in product liability actions.

In addition to the above, Sunny regularly handles environmental claims and serves as counsel in litigation involving leaking underground storage tanks, groundwater contamination, and claims pursuant to the New Jersey Spill Compensation Act.

Sunny has brought a significant amount of litigation experience with her when she joined the firm in 2005.  Prior to joining the firm, Sunny was a construction litigation attorney who represented builders and contractors in complex construction defect suits.  Prior to gaining experience in the construction litigation arena, Sunny briefly focused her practice in ERISA litigation handling health, life and disability benefit claims and the defense of insurance companies in connection with said claims. 

In 1997 Sunny received her B.A. in Political Science from Seton Hall University. She then entered Widener University School of Law and received her juris doctor in 2000.  Following law school, she served as judicial secretary to the Honorable Sallyanne Floria, J.S.C. in the Chancery Division, Family Part, Essex County, New Jersey. Sunny is a member of the New Jersey State, New York State and Essex County Bar Associations.

    • Widener University Delaware Law School (J.D., 2000)
    • Seton Hall University (B.A., 1997)
    • New Jersey, 2000
    • U.S. District Court District of New Jersey, 2000
    • New York, 2001
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of New York, 2001
    • U.S. District Court Southern District of New York, 2001
    • AV® Preeminent™ by Martindale-Hubbell®
      The Martindale-Hubbell rated attorney list is issued by Internet Brands, Inc. A description of the selection methodology can be found here. No aspect of this advertisement has been approved by the Supreme Court of New Jersey.
    • The Best Lawyers in America®, Litigation - Construction (2023-2027)
      The Best Lawyers list is issued by Woodward & White. A description of the selection methodology can be found here. No aspect of this advertisement has been approved by the Supreme Court of New Jersey.
    • New Jersey Super Lawyer Rising Star (2010-2013)
      The Super Lawyers list is issued by Thomson Reuters. A description of the selection methodology can be found here. No aspect of this advertisement has been approved by the Supreme Court of New Jersey.
    • Essex County Bar Association
    • New Jersey State Bar Association
    • New York State Bar Association
    • Women's Construction Litigation Alliance, Regional Associate, Northeast Region
    • Women's Law Caucus, 1997-2000, President (2000)
    • Navigating Liability for Design: Key Considerations for Contractors, Professionals, and Insurers, ILG Webinar, July 10, 2024
    • Coordinating the Design Defense, NJICLE 2023 Construction Law Forum, June 21, 2023
    • Building a Stronger Industry: The Impact of the Building Safety Legislation on Construction and Insurance, ILG 360º London Annual Conference 2023, March 15, 2023
    • Survival and Revival - How the Construction Industry is Embracing Change to Overcome Recent Challenges, ILG Virtual Conference, March 24, 2021
    • Construction Defect Litigation in New York and New Jersey, Client Webinar, December 2020
    • Leveling the Playing Field To Avoid Problems Down the Road on Construction Projects, West Coast Casualty Construction Defect Seminar, May 2017
    • If It Ain’t Broke, Don’t Sue: Why Products Claims in Construction Defect Cases Are Not Easy Money, West Coast Casualty Construction Defect Seminar, May 2016
    • Statute of Repose and PREDFDA in New Jersey Construction Defect Law, Construction Defect Claims Manager Association, March 2013
    • Construction Defect in the State of New Jersey, Construction Defect Claims Managers Association, March 2013
    • Case Law Alerts, contributor, 2011-2012
    • "If You Build It, They Will Sue," New Jersey Law Journal, March 27, 2006, co-author
    • "If You Build It, They Will Sue: Construction Defect Litigation In The Garden State And The Trend Of Alternative Dispute Resolution," Defense Digest, Vol. 11, No. 4, December 2005, co-author
    • Successfully represented a general contractor in a multimillion dollar construction defect litigation in New York alleging deficient construction of a mid-rise luxury building and resolved the case through mediation. Achieved a global resolution of the case for less than ten percent of the total damages complained of by plaintiff. Significantly limited our clients contribution, by taking the lead role in mediation and working with the subcontractor defendants to come up with a global settlement package.
    • Successfully represented general contractors in construction site injury cases whereby the defense of our client was tendered to the subcontractor defendants and the defense of our client was assumed.
    • Successfully represented a window manufacturer in a multi-party litigation whereby the matter was resolved through mediation with no payment by our client.
    • Summary judgment granted for defendant in case against an oil tank testing and removal company alleging negligence in connection with the testing of the underground oil tank. 
    • Summary judgment granted for defendant in case by homeowner against contractor whose alleged work caused and/or contributed to the alleged structural deficiencies of the home. Successfully established that plaintiff's expert failed to establish a causal connection between the alleged deficiencies and the work performed by defendant contractor. 

Results

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Defense Prevails in Multi-Party Construction Defect Action

The decision was later affirmed by the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, and we successfully argued both the summary judgment motion and the appeal. The plaintiff, a condominium association, filed suit against the sponsor of a newly constructed mixed-use residential and commercial building in Hoboken, New Jersey. The plaintiff also sued the property management company, the general contractor and various subcontractors involved in the construction. A temporary certificate of occupancy was issued in March 2004 and the plaintiff did not commence litigation until June 2014—more than ten years after substantial completion. Therefore, the claims were barred by the ten-year Statute of Repose, N.J.S.A. § 2A14-1.1. The former property manager for the building and the sponsor entity had common ownership. The plaintiff argued the sponsor maintained control of the property by virtue of its continued involvement through the property management entity, and that the Statute of Repose did not apply to a party in actual possession and control of the property at the time that the defective and unsafe condition caused the injury or damage at issue. The Appellate Division held that the plain language of the Statute of Repose precludes any “action, whether in contract, in tort, or otherwise, to recover damages for any deficiency in the design, planning, surveying, supervision or construction of an improvement to real property, [and] any action for contribution or indemnity for damages sustained on account of such injury . . . more than [ten] years after the performance or furnishing of such services and construction.” N.J.S.A. 2A14-1.1(a). The court found that the claims were also barred by the six-year statute of limitations as the plaintiff alleged that the first repairs at the building were undertaken in 2004, and the complaint was not filed until 2014.

News

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Firm Highlights

Marshall Dennehey Announces 2027 Pennsylvania Super Lawyers and Rising Stars Honorees

News

Marshall Dennehey Announces 2027 Pennsylvania Super Lawyers and Rising Stars Honorees

business meeting photo

Result

Summary Judgment Obtained in Insurance Coverage Case

Complete Victory Obtained in a Workers’ Compensation Matter

Result

Complete Victory Obtained in a Workers’ Compensation Matter

Event

CLM 2026 Focus Conference

Allison joins three insurance industry leaders to discuss how cyber coverage disputes, the growing impact of social inflation on bodily injury claim valuation, and the use of artificial intelligence are reshaping the bad faith landscape. The panel will examine emerging sources of extra-contractual exposure, including evolving cyber insurance coverage issues and the challenges of accurately valuing bodily injury claims. Practical approaches to claim evaluation using AI, along with defense strategies designed to help prevent or successfully defend against bad faith litigation, will also be addressed. 

Marshall Dennehey Welcomes Special Counsel David Farkouh and Michele P. Rannie to New York City Office

News

Marshall Dennehey Welcomes Special Counsel David Farkouh and Michele P. Rannie to New York City Office

Thought Leadership

The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.

Thought Leadership

Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.

Four Marshall Dennehey Attorneys Selected 2026 “Top Lawyers” by Delaware Today Magazine

News

Four Marshall Dennehey Attorneys Selected 2026 “Top Lawyers” by Delaware Today Magazine

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.

Defense Victory Obtained in Workers’ Compensation Case

Result

Defense Victory Obtained in Workers’ Compensation Case