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Sophia E. D. Philor

Portrait of Sophia E. D. Philor

Sophia is a member of the Professional Liability Department where she focuses her practice on representing businesses, directors and officers, design professionals, contractors and homeowners' associations in commercial, professional liability, construct defect, architectural, engineering, and employment disputes

Prior to joining Marshall Dennehey, Sophia practiced first-party property defense. In 2024, she was selected to the Super Lawyers© Rising Stars list for her exceptional work in civil litigation defense and was named a Top Lawyer by Palm Beach Illustrated.

Sophia received her juris doctor from Nova Southeastern University Shepard Broad College of Law. During law school, Sophia participated in several student organizations. She served as the Social Media and Marketing Director for the Black Law Student Association. She also gained valuable experience and knowledge as an intern with Legal-Aid Coast to Coast Family law division, where she provided legal information and guidance to Pro Se litigants and a law clerk at an Immigration firm. Further, Sophia also participated in legal clinics including the Dispute Resolution Clinic, where she co-mediated and arbitrated cases and eventually became a Florida Supreme Court County Mediator and a Qualified Arbitrator, as well as the Sharon and Mitchell W. Berger Entrepreneur Law Clinic, where she offered transactional representation and legal advice to entry level entrepreneurs, innovators and start-up businesses under the supervision of the clinic director.

Sophia currently lives in Broward and enjoys spending her spare time at the beach, with family, and working with her non-profit providing support to Haiti.
 

    • Nova Southeastern University Shepard Broad College of Law (J.D., 2021)
    • Nova Southeastern University (MBA, 2014)
    • Florida Atlantic University (B.A., 2013)
    • Florida, 2021
    • U.S. District Court Southern District of Florida, 2025
    • U.S. District Court Middle District of Florida, 2025
    • English (fluent)
    • French (fluent)
    • Haitian Creole (fluent)
    • Florida Super Lawyers, Rising Stars (2024-2025)
    • Palm Beach Illustrated, Top Lawyer (2024)
    • Florida Supreme Court Certified Mediator
    • Florida Supreme Court Qualified Arbitrator

Thought Leadership

Case Law Alerts

Appellate Court Applies Business Judgment Rule and Reverses Summary Judgment in Condominium Assessment Dispute

April 1, 2026

An appeals court ruled that the trial court erred in judgement for condo owners in a dispute over association fees. While the court agreed that the association must turn over its financial audits, it was determined that the rest of the case should be reconsidered because courts should generally not interfere in board decisions without clear wrongdoing. The case involved a master condo association that provides shared services (like maintenance and cable) to several smaller associations. The board’s budget included about $248,000 for cable costs, although it had settled a dispute with the cable company for $100,000. One of the smaller associations, Fifth Horizons, argued this was unfair and that they overpaid their share. The trial court ruled in their favor, saying the board acted outside its authority and awarded damages. The appeals court disagreed, explaining that under the Business Judgment Rule, courts usually defer to decisions made by boards as long as they act in good faith. The court also clarified that in Florida, the business judgment rule has been codified by statute for corporations, limited liability companies, and not-for-profit corporations, See § 607.0831(1), Fla. Stat. (2021). This protection applies automatically, even if not specifically raised as a defense. Importantly, the appeals court stated that it was within the board’s authority to create budgets and charge assessments, so although this was a disputed act, it wasn’t illegal.

Defense Digest

Court Affirms Strong Liability Protections for Rideshare Companies Under Florida Law

March 1, 2026

Key Points: Florida law treats rideshare drivers as independent contractors when statutory conditions are met. The law in effect on the date of the accident controls liability analysis.  Isolated complaints and traffic citations are generally insufficient to prove negligent hiring.  A Florida appellate court recently affirmed summary judgment in favor of Lyft, highlighting the liability protections available to rideshare companies under Florida’s Transportation Network Company statute. In Abner v. Lyft Florida, Inc., 422 So.3d 1226 (Fla. 3d DCA 2025), the District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District, held that Lyft could not be held liable for injuries caused by one of its drivers, rejecting claims for both vicarious liability and negligent hiring and retention. The case arose from an accident on July 5, 2017, where a Lyft driver collided with a motorcyclist, causing serious injuries. At the time, the driver was providing a prearranged ride through Lyft’s digital platform. The injured motorcyclist’s guardian sued both the driver and Lyft. While claims against the driver were settled, the claims against Lyft continued. The plaintiff argued Lyft was responsible in two ways: the driver was acting as Lyft’s employee or agent at the time of the accident, and that it was negligent in hiring and retaining the driver. Lyft moved for summary judgment, relying on Florida’s Transportation Network Company statute, section 627.748, Florida Statutes (2017), which had taken effect just days before the crash. The plaintiff argued the statute should not apply because the driver had been approved to drive for Lyft before it went into effect. The court rejected that argument, explaining that Florida law applies the statute in effect when the cause of action accrues. In negligence cases, that is the date of the accident. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Sheffield, 266 So. 3d 1230, 1233 (Fla. 5th DCA 2019). Since the accident occurred after the statute became effective, the statute governed the claims against Lyft. Under section 627.748(9), a rideshare driver is considered an independent contractor, not an employee, if certain conditions are met. These conditions include allowing drivers to set their own hours, permitting work on competing rideshare platforms, not restricting other business or employment, and confirming independent contractor status in writing. Lyft presented evidence that these conditions were satisfied, including the driver agreement and testimony from its corporate representative. The plaintiff argued that the driver did not qualify as an independent contractor because the agreement allegedly limited other work. The court disagreed, finding that the agreement only limited the driver’s activities while actively providing rides through the Lyft platform. Outside of those times, the driver remained free to pursue other employment or business activities. The agreement explicitly confirmed the driver’s discretion to work or not work. The court noted this is consistent with prior Florida cases recognizing rideshare drivers as independent contractors. McGillis v. Department of Economic Opportunity, 210 So. 3d 220, 225-226 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017). Since the driver qualified as an independent contractor, Lyft could not be held vicariously liable for the driver’s alleged negligence. Florida law generally holds that companies are not responsible for the negligent acts of independent contractors when they do not control how the work is performed. Stander v. Dispoz-O-Prods., Inc., 973 So. 2d 603, 604 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008). The plaintiff also claimed Lyft was directly liable for negligent hiring and retention, citing a speeding citation, a reckless driving citation, and two negative passenger complaints. The court found this evidence insufficient. Under the statute, disqualification is triggered by certain criminal convictions, and not merely by citations. The driver’s reckless driving incident was only a citation, and a single moving violation did not meet the statutory threshold for disqualification. The passenger complaints were similarly inadequate: one was a vague two-star review with no explanation, and the other involved a single passenger reporting unsafe driving. Given the hundreds of rides the driver had safely completed, the court considered this evidence isolated and minimal. The limited evidence led the court declining to broadly define negligent hiring claims against transportation network companies. Instead, it resolved the case narrowly, emphasizing judicial restraint. The court explained that if evidence is insufficient to survive a directed verdict at trial, it cannot survive summary judgment. CG Tides LLC v. SHEDDF3 VNB, LLC, 388 So. 3d 1081, 1084 (Fla. 3d DCA 2024); In re Amendments to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.510, 317 So. 3d 72, 75 (Fla. 2021). For insurance professionals, Abner v. Lyft Florida, Inc. reinforces the protections Florida law provides to transportation network companies. It highlights the importance of applying the law in effect on the date of loss, confirming independent contractor status, and assessing the sufficiency of evidence for negligent hiring claims. It also demonstrates how Florida’s summary judgment standard can resolve weak claims early, reducing exposure and defense costs. The appellate court ultimately affirmed summary judgment in Lyft’s favor. Sophia works in our Fort Lauderdale, FL office. She can be reached at (954) 233-3026 or SEPhilor@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Appeals Court Reverses Trial Court Order Striking Complaint as Sanction for Violating Discovery Order

All Dry USA v. Savell, 2026 WL 816093 (Fla. 1st DCA 2026) The First District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s order denying All Dry USA’s complaint as a sanction for violating a discovery order. The appellate court found that All Dry USA’s failure to comply with the trial court’s case management order did not give the trial court the authority to strike All Dry USA’s pleadings. All Dry USA provided water mitigation, mold remediation, and a restorative tarp at the property owned by the Savells. The property had been damaged by Hurricane Sally. All Dry USA provided invoices for the three services it performed in the amount of $90,130.61. The Savells refused to pay the invoices, stating that while they had retained All Dry USA, there was no agreement reached regarding the cost of the services. All Dry USA proceeded to file a lawsuit against the Savells, alleging breach of contract and unjust enrichment. The Savells answered the lawsuit and served discovery upon All Dry USA. All Dry USA failed to respond to the discovery requests and the Savells moved for an order compelling discovery. The trial court issued an order compelling All Dry USA to respond to Savells discovery requests and comply with all outstanding discovery deadlines per the case management order. On the day its responses were due, All Dry USA filed a motion to extend the deadline to comply with the court’s order. Before the motion was ruled upon, the Savells filed a motion to have All Dry USA’s complaint stricken for violating the trial court’s order compelling All Dry USA’s responses. The trial court granted the motion to strike, and then granted the Savell’s request for entry of default final judgment, based upon there no longer being an operative complaint. The First District Court of Appeal reversed, ruling that an order striking pleadings is justified if it is found that a party has violated numerous discovery orders, or has shown a “deliberate and contumacious disregard of the court's authority.” Mercer v. Raine, 443 So. 2d 944, 946 (Fla. 1983). The appellate court stated that a trial court’s authority to strike pleadings is not unbridled and that the situation before the court did not justify the striking of All Dry USA’s pleadings. In reaching its decision, the First District focused on the fact that the trial court only addressed the potential prejudice to Savell by All Dry USA failing to respond to discovery and seeking an extension of the deadline. The appellate court stated that prejudice is not the only factor to be considered and that the trial court needed to address if All Dry USA’s behavior in failing to comply with the discovery order was willful and deliberate.  The First District also stated that nothing in rule 1.200 or 1.380 grants a trial court the authority to strike a pleading because certain case management deadlines are not met. The appellate court held that the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure allow trial courts to bring the parties in, order them to comply with the case management discovery deadlines, and then strike pleadings if the subsequent discovery orders are disobeyed. This ruling shows the importance of understanding the authority that is binding on the trial court a party is appearing in front of. The First District’s view on a trial court’s ability to strike pleadings is in contrast with other appellate court’s throughout Florida.

Thought Leadership

Perlmutter Provides Predictability for Punitive Damages Claims in Florida

In a much anticipated decision, the Florida Supreme Court provided clarity for the standards of proof for punitive damages claims in Perlmutter v. Federal Insurance Company, SC2024-0058 (Fla. June 11, 2026). Litigants and trial judges must be mindful of the standards laid out by the Court. And, defense practitioners must be prepared to alter their strategies to defend against such claims. Perlmutter came to the Court from the Fourth District, based on conflict jurisdiction with decisions from the Second and Fifth District and on certification of a question of great public importance as to the standard of proof for punitive damages claims at the pleading stage. Fed. Ins. Co. v. Perlmutter, 376 So. 3d 24, 29 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023). In the underlying case, the Fourth District made two conclusions. First, it held that a “trial court must consider the evidentiary showing by all parties at the hearing on the motion to amend, that is, evidence ‘in the record’ and evidence ‘proffered by the claimant.’”  376 So. 3d at 33. Second, the Fourth held that it “interpreted section 768.72(1) and (2) to require the trial court to make a preliminary determination of whether a reasonable jury, viewing the totality of proffered evidence in the light most favorable to the movant, could find by clear and convincing evidence that punitive damages are warranted.  Id. at 34 (underscoring in the original). In making these conclusions, the court cautioned trial courts that the “preliminary determination” analysis did not entitle the trial court to decide whether the evidence is clear and convincing and noted that the trial court should not weigh evidence and should not determine witness credibility. Id. The Florida Supreme Court accepted jurisdiction and answered the certified question in the negative. It quashed the decision below and remanded the case for application of the following standards: The trial court should consider only the evidence identified or proffered by the claimant; it should not entertain an evidentiary counter-submission from the opponent. The trial court should consider whether a reasonable person could conclude based on the claimant’s evidence, that the defendant committed “intentional misconduct” or “gross negligence” as defined in section 768.72(2) or section 768.72(3). The trial court must review the request for punitive damages in the context of the underlying claims. The trial court should not apply the clear and convincing standard of proof in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence at the pleading stage. The trial court does not act as a fact-finder; the trial court must not weigh the claimant’s evidence—it cannot decide the truth of the matter. The trial court must consider the record evidence and the proffered evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, but the allegations in the proposed amended complaint are not themselves evidence. Perlmutter, SC2024-0058 at 13-15 (emphasis added). In explaining these standards, the Court interpreted the text of the statute and compared it to a related statute which governs punitive damages in the nursing home context. The nursing home statute expressly calls for evidentiary submissions by “the parties” and expressly tells the trial court to determine whether there is a reasonable basis to believe the claimant could satisfy the “clear and convincing evidence” standard at trial. Id. at 17-18 (comparing the text of section 768.72(1), Florida Statutes, with section 400.0237, Florida Statutes). Without that express language in section 768.72, the statute could not be applied in the same manner. With these standards specially delineated for the trial courts, the Court is “confident that its interpretation of section 768.72(1) will not frustrate the effectiveness of the statute in accomplishing the Legislature’s textually evident purposes.” Id.  at 22 (cleaned up). This remains to be seen. While Perlmutter provides predictability and clarity for trial courts when reviewing the evidentiary submissions in support of a punitive damages claim, the decision will not likely impact the numbers of punitive damages motions filed. Rather, these new parameters will change the way claims are defended, reminiscent of a time when rulings on punitive damages were only subject to certiorari review and appellate courts were limited in reviewing procedural errors. This decision will likely deflate the level-playing field that Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(3)(G) addressed by allowing appeals of orders granting and denying punitive damages amendments. Further, Perlmutter may have impliedly created a call to action for the Legislature to amend section 768.72(1) in the same manner it amended section 400.0237 to allow the courts to analyze “admissible evidence submitted by the parties” and determine at a hearing whether there is a reasonable basis to believe the claimant at trial would be able to demonstrate by “clear and convincing evidence” that the recovery of punitive damages is warranted. Until then, defendants must adjust their strategies. To adapt to these new standards, defense practitioners will need to tailor their strategy for defending punitive damages claims since they can no longer submit a counter-proffer or urge a court to apply the clear and convincing standard at the pleading phase. Instead, defendants will need to attack the deficiencies in the claimant’s pleadings and proffer. If the trial court fails to serve as a gatekeeper, and does not apply the above standards, then defendants can pursue an interlocutory appeal under Rule 9.130(a)(3)(G). If a nonfinal appeal is taken, then defendants should move to stay any intrusive financial discovery while the appellate court analyzes the issues on appeal. Finally, defendants should utilize Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.510 to serve as a screening device to allow the trial court to analyze all evidence and prevent nonmeritorious punitive damages claims from proceeding to a jury.

News

Marshall Dennehey’s John J. Hare Brings Home Attorney of the Year Honors; Firm Named Litigation Department of the Year in Two Categories

Marshall Dennehey took home top honors in three categories at the The Legal Intelligencer’s 2026 Pennsylvania Legal Awards, held June 11 in Philadelphia. The first place awards include: Attorney of the Year: John J. Hare, Chair of the firm’s Appellate Advocacy & Post-Trial Practice Group and Executive Committee member, together with Charles “Chip” Becker of Kline & Specter Litigation Department of the Year, Appellate – Third Win in a Row! Litigation Department of the Year, Product Liability/Mass Torts “There is no one more deserving of Attorney of the Year honors than John. This award is a testament to his exceptional skill, dedication, and leadership—qualities that truly exemplify the very best of our firm,” said G. Mark Thompson, Marshall Dennehey’s President & CEO. “These honors also reflect the strength and depth of our product liability, mass torts, and appellate practices across Pennsylvania and beyond, underscoring our ongoing commitment to delivering outstanding results for our clients.” Attorney of the Year – John J. Hare, Marshall Dennehey, together with Charles “Chip” Becker, Kline & Specter Over the past year, John and Charles were opposing counsel in many of the highest-profile civil appeals in Pennsylvania. John is renowned as a preeminent appellate lawyer on the defense side, and Chip on the plaintiff's side. They have opposed each other repeatedly, exhibiting peerless professionalism and exceptional civility, while zealously litigating under the unremitting pressure of high-profile litigation and record-setting verdicts totaling more than $3.5 billion. They have also collaborated, outside of litigation, on many commissions, committees, and projects of importance to the Pennsylvania judiciary and legal community. Litigation Department of the Year – Appellate Law, Winner (previous winner, 2025 and 2024) 2025 was another standout year for the firm’s Appellate Advocacy & Post‑Trial Practice Group, led by John J. Hare, which was retained to challenge many of Pennsylvania’s “nuclear” verdicts—awards exceeding $10 million. Notably, the department persuaded the Pennsylvania Superior Court to reverse a Philadelphia judgment of $1.09 billion, the largest judgment ever overturned by a Pennsylvania appellate court. The group’s 11 full‑time Pennsylvania‑based appellate lawyers are at the center of Pennsylvania’s most high-profile matters, bringing more than 150 years of combined appellate experience. They routinely handle post‑trial and appellate matters and are frequently engaged to participate in and monitor trials in high‑exposure cases to ensure that critical legal issues are properly raised and preserved for appeal. Litigation Department of the Year – Product Liability/Mass Torts, Winner This marks the first win for the firm’s Pennsylvania Product Liability and Mass Torts practices, which operate within our Casualty Department, managed by Matthew Schorr and Jeff Rapattoni. For almost five decades, Fortune 500 product manufacturers/distributors and their insurers have turned to these groups to defend their litigation. Led by Bradley D. Remick and Vlada Tasich, our Product Liability group’s success can be attributed to its commitment to keeping abreast of ever-changing legal theories, judicial viewpoints, and evolving technology impacting the product liability landscape. Our attorneys have successfully handled thousands of product liability matters in all jurisdictions across the state. Likewise, our mass tort litigation practice – divided into Asbestos & Mass Tort, and Environmental & Toxic Tort Litigation –  has defended manufacturers, distributors, contractors, and premises owners in thousands of personal injury and other claims. Led by Kevin E. Hexstall and Patrick T. Reilly, most attorneys in these groups have more than 20 years of experience, and our seasoned trial team has tried hundreds of cases to verdict, consistently achieving strong results through both trials and settlements. In addition to these awards, Marshall Dennehey was a Litigation Department of the Year finalist for Professional Liability.

Thought Leadership

Unanimous New Jersey Supreme Court Holds That Personal Emails of Public Employees and Officials are Subject to OPRA

In Rosetti v. Ramapo-Indian Hills Regional High School Board of Education, the New Jersey Supreme Court unanimously held that government-related emails, which are contained within personal email accounts, are government records under the Open Public Records Act (OPRA), and a log of those emails must be produced when requested. In reaching this decision, the court conducted an analysis of the OPRA and cited previous cases that held that emails do in fact fall within OPRA’s definition of a record and must be produced when requested pursuant to the Act. The court in Rosetti then had to answer the question as to whether public officials’ personal email accounts that are used for government purposes are subject to OPRA, and found that they are. Rosetti made an OPRA request to the Board of Education seeking email logs from Board members’ personal email accounts. The Board refused to produce the logs and indicated that it was not under any obligation to produce personal email account logs, only from government-related email accounts. The issue was whether a log had to be produced for Board members’ personal email accounts, which they used to conduct Board business. The Board argued that while it was possible to create a log for government-related email accounts through its IT Department, it was not possible to do so for personal email accounts. The court rejected this argument and ruled that Board members are required to search their personal email accounts and create a log of government-related emails housed in those accounts. Once completed, each Board member then must submit a certification detailing the searches that were conducted. The court went one step further with a suggestion to government employees and officials, stating, “[g]overnment agencies should strongly advise their employees, elected officials, and others engaged in government-related business to refrain from using their personal email accounts when conducting government-related business.”  Please do not hesitate to contact me with any questions regarding this case and others pertaining to the OPRA. 

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict.