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Seth is a member of the Professional Liability Department where he focuses his practice on representing and defending clients in insurance coverage, and first party property claims and suits made against them. Prior to joining Marshall Dennehey, Seth served as in-house counsel for two separate insurance companies litigating first party property cases, and most recently, he also served as a member of the assignment of benefits and catastrophe (Hurricane) divisions. In addition to defending cases, Seth is also experienced in investigation, where he counseled and instructed his former claims departments in pre-suit matters.

In 2005 Seth received his juris doctor from Albany Law School, where he was an active participant in the Family Court Domestic Violence Clinic and Senior Prize Trials. After graduating from law school, Seth worked as an Assistant District Attorney in the Office of the Orange County, NY District Attorney for nearly a decade. During this time, Seth held positions in the Misdemeanor, General Crimes and Special Victims Units where he tried cases ranging from DWIs to Grand Larcenies to Sexual Assaults. 

Seth moved to Florida in 2015 where he began a new chapter in his legal career, working in the insurance industry, initially representing his insurance carrier employers in coverage disputes and first-party-property-related claims and suits.

    • Albany Law School (J.D., 2005)
    • University of Florida (B.S., 2000)
    • New York, 2006
    • Florida, 2015
    • U.S. District Court Southern District of Florida
    • U.S. District Court Middle District of Florida
    • U.S. District Court Northern District of Florida
    • On a Hurricane Irma case, Seth obtained a favorable award in a Court-ordered non-binding arbitration where the arbitrator found Defendant insurer was not liable and awarded the Plaintiff $0 in damages. This helped Defendant obtain a favorable resolution before trial.
    • Seth successfully defended a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment brought by Plaintiff where Plaintiff tried to argue that the necessary cost of tearing out and replacing non-damaged property in order to access plumbing was outside of Defendant's $10,000 Limited Water Damage Coverage Endorsement and Plaintiff should be able to recover in excess of the $10,000 limit.  Defendant had tendered the policy limit prior to commencement of the lawsuit. The court ruled against Plaintiff and in favor of Defendant finding that the cost of tear out and replacement was within the policy's endorsement and Defendant's total claim for damages was limited to $10,000. This ruling enabled Defendant to later obtain Summary Judgment against Plaintiff for having tendered the limits prior to commencement of action. Thus, Plaintiff had no cause of action for breach of contract.  
    • Defendant tendered payment for the full amount of invoices with the 90 day statutory period. Unbeknownst to Defendant, Plaintiff prematurely filed a lawsuit prior to Defendant's payment. Plaintiff tried to argue Defendant confessed judgment and Plaintiff's counsel was entitled to attorney's fees. Seth filed a Motion for Sanctions and Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff dismissed the case with prejudice prior to the hearings.

Results

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Summary Judgment Secured in a Contentious Coverage Matter

We were granted summary judgment in a coverage matter. The plaintiff was seeking UM benefits for a policy he had on a car he owned for an accident that occurred when he was operating a motorcycle he owned, but did not insure. The court confirmed that the policy excluded underinsured motorist coverage for the plaintiff’s motorcycle. The issue was that the definition of “motor vehicle” for the other owned motor vehicle exclusion was not specifically provided in the policy. In the PIP coverage, the policy contained an exclusion for motorcycles because the definition said motor vehicles must have four wheels. The plaintiff argued that the same policy said a motorcycle was not a motor vehicle for PIP coverage, but was a motor vehicle for the other owned vehicle exclusion. This was an ambiguity in the policy that should be interpreted against the carrier. The plaintiff had significant injuries that far exceeded the value of the policy. The court upheld both exclusions and followed our argument that the PIP and UM portions of the policy are separate and distinct and that any definition in the PIP coverage did not necessarily apply to the UM coverage. 

Thought Leadership

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Legal Updates for Florida Coverage and Property Litigation

Third DCA Rules Insurer’s Nominal Settlement Made in Good Faith

October 5, 2026

Citizens Property Insurance Corporation appealed a Miami-Dade trial court’s order denying its motion for attorney’s fees. The motion was filed pursuant to Fla. Stat. 768.79 (2025). Maria and Christopher Suarez (collectively, “Suarez”) sued for breach of contract arising out of a Hurricane Irma claim which allegedly caused damage to their home. Citizens denied the allegations and raised several affirmative defenses including failure to provide prompt notice and failure to provide requested documents.  Citizens served a proposal for settlement (PFS) in the amount of $100 to each plaintiff. Suarez did not accept the proposal. Citizens later filed a motion for summary judgment which the court granted. After judgment was entered in its favor, Citizens filed its motion for entitlement to attorney’s fees. Suarez opposed the motion arguing the offer was not made in good faith. The trial court agreed with Suarez. On appeal, the Third DCA found “the trial court abused its discretion in determining that Citizens' nominal offer was made in bad faith when Suarez's failure to comply with the insurance policy was a reasonable basis for Citizens to offer a nominal settlement amount” Citizens v Suarez, 51 Fla. L. Weekly D1687a (2026) (citing § 768.79, Fla. Stat. (2025)); Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla. v. Lewis Tein P.L., 277 So. 3d 299, 302 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019) "The obligation of good faith merely insists that the offeror have some reasonable foundation on which to base an offer." In its ruling, the DCA rejected the trial court’s reasons for finding a lack of good faith. The first reason the trial court gave was that Citizens did not request any discovery prior to filing its PFS. The DCA found this was irrelevant because the basis for the nominal amount (Suarez’s failure to comply with the policy) was apparent prior to filing suit. “The standard as to whether an offer is made in good faith is whether the insurance company has a reasonable basis for a nominal offer, at the time the offer is made. The focus of the analysis is the substance of the reason given for the nominal offer and not on the timing of the offer itself” (Citizens v Suarez, supra.). The second reason the trial court gave was that the public adjuster’s estimate demonstrated that Citizens had substantial exposure in the case and, therefore, the offer was made in bad faith. The DCA pointed to State Farm Florida Insurance Company v. Laughlin-Alfonso, 118 So. 3d 314, 315 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013), a case with analogous facts, in rejecting this rationale. There, the DCA did not afford any weight to the adjuster’s report. Instead, it found that the insured’s failure to comply was a reasonable basis for State Farm to believe its exposure was nominal. Based on the above, the Third DCA reversed the trial court’s order denying Citizens’ motion, finding it was made in good faith and remanded with instructions to grant the motion and set the amount of fees in favor of Citizens.

Daily Business Review

A Unified, Single Claim for Damages Requires Apportionment in a Joint Proposal: What the Decision in 'Trace Elements' Means for Property Insurance Claims

August 6, 2026

Kimberly and Seth, shareholders in the Insurance Services Practice in our Fort Lauderdale office, break down the Florida Supreme Court's decision in 'Trace Elements v. MacKensen' and what it means for property insurance claims in the state. Read the article here.

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Firm Highlights

Marshall Dennehey Named a Standout in Litigation by BTI Consulting Group

News

Marshall Dennehey Named a Standout in Litigation by BTI Consulting Group

Event

CLM 2026 Focus Conference

Allison joins three insurance industry leaders to discuss how cyber coverage disputes, the growing impact of social inflation on bodily injury claim valuation, and the use of artificial intelligence are reshaping the bad faith landscape. The panel will examine emerging sources of extra-contractual exposure, including evolving cyber insurance coverage issues and the challenges of accurately valuing bodily injury claims. Practical approaches to claim evaluation using AI, along with defense strategies designed to help prevent or successfully defend against bad faith litigation, will also be addressed. 

graphic announcing our 6 2027 Super Lawyers & Rising Stars

News

Marshall Dennehey Announces 2027 New Jersey Super Lawyers And Rising Stars

Result

$19 Million Medical Malpractice Verdict Overturned

In this medical malpractice case, the trial court vacated $10 million of a $19 million verdict in post-trial motions and the Superior Court of Pennsylvania vacated the remaining $9 million on appeal.

Result

Statutory Employer Immunity Upheld

In this construction accident case that resulted in a $5 million verdict, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania upheld the Statutory Employer Doctrine, which immunizes general contractors and other contractors on construction sites when certain elements are satisfied.

Bret E. Dubbert Joins Marshall Dennehey’s Orlando Office as Special Counsel in the Casualty Department

News

Bret E. Dubbert Joins Marshall Dennehey’s Orlando Office as Special Counsel in the Casualty Department

Result

$1.09 Billion Products Liability Verdict Overturned

In this products liability crashworthiness case, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania reversed a Philadelphia jury verdict of $1.09 billion, the largest verdict ever overturned by a PA appellate court.  The court ordered a new trial based on deficient jury instructions, clarified important aspects of crashworthiness law, and confirmed that so-called standard jury instructions may be incompatible with Pennsylvania law. 

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Act 111's IRE Provisions

In this case, the claimant sustained a work injury of January 6, 1994, which was acknowledged by Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP). After the claimant’s receipt of 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, the employer filed a Request for an Impairment Rating Examination (IRE). The IRE was performed in May 2023 and the IRE physician found that the claimant had a 5% whole person impairment, under the AMA Guides. The employer filed a Petition based on the IRE results, and the Petition was granted by the WCJ. During litigation, the claimant argued that the IRE provisions of Act 111 (Section 306(a.3) of the Act) were not applicable to her injury, since it predated June 24, 1996, the date Act 57 went into effect, and that the IRE provisions were unconstitutional. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ)) granted the Petition and the Board affirmed. On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the claimant argued that Act 111 violated the nondelegation doctrine and that its retroactive application to the claimant’s injury was unconstitutional. The court rejected the arguments on the basis that they had already found the same arguments without merit in multiple, prior cases. The court also addressed an argument made by the claimant that Act 111 was procedurally defective under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it was only considered on two days in each House after having undergone amendments and reassignments. The court noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires every bill to be considered on three different days in each House. The claimant maintained that, according to the legislative history, the bill did not receive three separate days of consideration from each House when it was assigned a new bill number. The court pointed out, however, that the bill number, H.B. 1840 remained constant and was considered on three occasions by the House. Further, the court concluded that minor amendments to the bill were germane to its original subject, which was to modify the Act’s IRE process, in accordance with Protz II.

Thought Leadership

Appellate Division Reversed Trial Judge's Orders Granting a Plaintiff's Section 40 Summary Judgement Motion

In Haskins v. Casey, et al., the plaintiff Dane Haskins worked for defendant Ekornes, Inc. (Ekornes) as a material handler. In June 2021, he filed a workers’ compensation claim petition for benefits due to a left shoulder injury in December 2020. He then resolved his workers’ compensation claim in November 2022 under an Order Approving Settlement. In January 2023, he filed a lawsuit against Ekornes and later amended to add additional claims and name other defendants, including the Ekornes president, chief financial officer, and director of human resources. In May 2025, a second amended complaint alleged that after he filed the workers compensation claim, Ekornes placed him on leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), denied his request for a work accommodation, and ultimately terminated him from employment in December 2021. He pleaded several causes of action asserting violations of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD) as well as fraudulent concealment and wrongful discharge. The plaintiff then moved for partial summary judgment, seeking an order enforcing Section 40 of the Workers’ Compensation Act (WCA) as well as summary judgment on his FMLA claims. The defendants opposed the motions and cross-moved for summary judgment on the FMLA claims. After arguments, the court entered an order in December 2025, denying the FMLA motion and cross motion and granting the plaintiff’s Section 40 motion. In the order, the court permitted the plaintiff to pursue compensatory damages at trial in connection with the bodily injury claim. The court also allowed the plaintiff to present evidence of any workers’ compensation benefits to support his claim. The court then denied the defendant's subsequent reconsideration motion in February 2026. The defendants that appealed the Section 40 aspect of the orders. In reviewing the appeal de novo, the Appellate Division rejected the plaintiff's argument that the work-related injury arose out of his discrimination claims under the LAD. The plaintiff argued that he should be able to pursue a personal injury claim as a part of his LAD claim, noting that the employer’s compensation carrier would be able to assert a lien against any recovery against his LAD claims. In distinguishing between the Richter vs. Oakland Board of Education, 246 N.J. 507 (2021) case, in which the Court found that any recovery would be subject to a Section 40 lien as the allegation was that the defendants failed to accommodate her pre-existing diabetic condition, which resulted in bodily injury. In this case, the Appellate Division indicated that there was no bodily injury caused by Ekornes’ failure to accommodate a pre-existing disability. Rather, the shoulder injury was a result of a workers compensation claim, for which he received appropriate benefits previously. The Appellate Division noted that if the plaintiff was successful in proving his LAD claims, he would be entitled to damages caused by the discriminatory discriminatory conduct such as lost wages and emotional distress damages and that there will be no Section 40 lien. In addition, the Appellate Division disagreed that the petitioner could present evidence about and seek damages for his shoulder injury at trial. Although the petitioner argued that a defendant who retaliated against an employee for filing a workers’ compensation claim should not benefit from the exclusivity provision of the WCA, the Appellate Division noted that the Legislature did not include this type of scenario in the statue nor did any of the case law recognize this type of claim as a remedy. As such, the Appellate Division reversed the December 2025 order granting the the plaintiff’s Section 40 summary judgment motion as well as the February 2026 reconsideration motion order. The Appellate Division noted that they did not intend to limit the plaintiff in his pursuit of his other claims on under the LAD, FMLA, and workers’ compensation retaliation causes of action.

Thought Leadership

WCJ Improperly Refused to Conduct C&R Hearing and Erroneously Required Settlement of All Pending Petitions

In this case, the claimant sustained injuries in the course and scope of her employment as a registered nurse. The employer acknowledged the injury by a Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP).  Subsequently, a Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ) expanded the description of injury. The employer then filed a Termination Petition, alleging the claimant was fully recovered from the injuries. Providers filed Utilization Review (UR) Petitions, challenging UR determinations finding their chiropractic treatment to be not reasonable and necessary. A settlement of the claim was eventually reached, and the employer filed a Petition to Seek Approval of a Compromise and Release (C&R) Agreement. The C&R outlined that the agreement fully resolved all future workers’ compensation claims except for the termination and UR Petitions. Briefs were filed and one day later, the WCJ issued an Interlocutory Order which stated if instructions were not followed regarding filing of a C&R, a settlement hearing date would not be given. The employer complied with the order, and filed the C&R. Subsequently, the WCJ notified the parties that the C&R must resolve all issues in the petitions, or would not be entertained. A settlement hearing was never held, and the WCJ then issued a decision, granting the Termination Petition and dismissing the UR Petitions. The WCJ also said that the Petition for Approval of a C&R was dismissed without prejudice, as the issues in the Termination and UR Petitions went to a decision. The claimant appealed to the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Board). The Board granted the claimant’s appeal, finding that the WCJ violated the requirement of Section 449 that an expedited hearing be held when a Petition for Approval of a C&R is filed.  The Board further held that it was legally incorrect for the WCJ to insist that the C&R resolve all issues raised by the pending Petitions. The Board remanded the case to a new WCJ, and Employer appealed to the Commonwealth Court. The court affirmed the Board and held that the WCJ erred, as a matter of law, by refusing to hold an expedited hearing within 30 days, once the Petition for Approval of a C&R was filed.  The court noted that the language of Section 449(b) is mandatory, and a settlement hearing is not discretionary or dependent on a party’s separate request for a stay, or whether the record has been closed. The court further rejected Employer’s argument that the case should not be remanded to a new WCJ for a new decision on the termination and and UR Petitions, as the Board passed no judgment on whether the C&R Agreement resolved the termination and UR Petitions, and left it for the WCJ to decide in connection with the Petition for Approval of a C&R.