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Sean P. Greenwalt

Portrait of Sean P. Greenwalt

Sean is a shareholder in the firm’s Casualty Department where he focuses his practice on amusement, sports, and recreation matters as well as fraud and personal injury protection disputes. Sean litigates a variety of complex matters on behalf of corporations involving premises liability, commercial auto liability, catastrophic loss, wrongful death and commercial contract disputes. He also has experience defending first-party auto coverage suits and conducting examinations under oath.

Sean is a member of the Florida Defense Lawyers Association and Claims Litigation Management Alliance. He routinely writes articles and presents on legal developments in the insurance industry, and has also been published in Insurance Journal. Sean also volunteers as a Guardian ad Litem child advocate in Hillsborough County.

Prior to joining Marshall Dennehey, Sean worked as outside counsel for a national automobile insurance company and previously worked as in-house counsel for a national automobile insurance company. Before working in civil litigation, Sean was an attorney for Florida's Department of Children and Families, where he successfully litigated countless legal issues and obtained numerous successful bench trial verdicts that protected the vulnerable and allowed children to become adopted.

Sean earned his juris doctor and graduated magna cum laude from Ave Maria School of Law in Naples, Florida. During law school, Sean served as an Associate Editor on Law Review and a member of the Moot Court Board. He also was a Judicial Intern for the Honorable Judge Douglas Frazier of the US District Court, Middle District of Florida. Sean obtained his Bachelor of Arts degree from Old Dominion University where he was inducted into the honor society for Communication majors, Lambda Pi Eta.

    • Ave Maria School of Law (J.D., magna cum laude, 2016)
    • Old Dominion University (B.A., 2012)
    • Florida, 2016
    • U.S. District Court Middle District of Florida, 2023
    • Florida Bar Association
    • Florida Defense Lawyers Association
    • Claims & Litigation Management Alliance (CLM) Western Florida Chapter
    • Asian Pacific American Bar Association of Tampa Bay (APABA-TB)
    • A Proposal for Settlement for All Seasons: Effective Use of the PFS in Florida’s New Legal Landscape, Florida Liability Claims Conference, Lake Buena Visit, FL, June 18, 2025
    • First Party Auto (PIP) and Property Year in Review Preview, The Institutes CPCU Society - Central Florida Chapter, November 14, 2024
    • Guardian ad Litem, Hillsborough County

Results

Thought Leadership

SIU Spotlight

Florida Appellate Court Sets Record Straight on Longtime Misconception of Examinations Under Oath as Admissible Evidence

May 15, 2026

The Florida Third District Court of Appeal recently overturned a long standing assumption regarding the admissibility of examinations under oaths (“EUOs”) as trial evidence in Universal X Rays, Corp. v. United Auto. Ins. Co., 422 So. 3d 1203 (Fla. 3d DCA 2025), reh'g denied (Nov. 3, 2025). For years, a longstanding mythos existed around EUOs in Florida that they could not be used in litigation because of a multitude of reasoning: hearsay, trustworthiness, due process, creation in anticipation of litigation, among other common critiques. Such was the situation that great evidence could be potentially unearthed in an EUO, but if it could not be independently verified by other means, certain evidence as to fraudulent or denied coverage claims would never see the light of day. In Universal X Rays, the assignee and insured, Miguel LaRosa-Ferrer sat for an examination under oath per his insurance policy following a car accident. The EUO was conducted via videoconference with a court reporter and the insured had an attorney present. During the required examination, the insured admitted that he had moved to a new address shortly before applying for the insurance policy but continued to list his old address on the application. This resulted in a lower premium for the insured. Two months later, United Auto sent a letter to the insured rescinding the policy, citing material misrepresentation of the garaging address, and returned the premium. Several months later, the appellant, Universal, sued United Auto for breach of contract after it denied a medical billing reimbursement request for no-fault personal injury protection benefits. United Auto eventually moved for summary judgment on the issue of material misrepresentation with its key piece of evidence being the EUO transcript. Universal argued that the EUO transcript was inadmissible as improper hearsay, an out of court statement by a declarant offered for its truth, and that it violated section 92.33, Florida Statutes (2025) because the insurer did not provide a copy of the transcript to the insured. However, Universal offered no actual evidence disputing that the insured committed a material misrepresentation. The lower trial court disagreed with Universal’s legal arguments and because no evidence disputing the material misrepresentation was presented, entered final judgment for United Auto. Unsurprisingly, Universal promptly appealed, as there is a history of trial courts in Florida finding EUOs to be inadmissible for numerous reasons leading to a long fabled belief in the industry as to the same. For example, in JJZ Medical Center, Inc., v. United Auto. Ins. Co., 32 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 432a, (Fla. 11th Jud. Cir. Cty. 2024), a Miami-Dade trial court declined to review an examination under oath demonstrating material misrepresentation after an insured signed an affidavit to the contrary and it was submitted as evidence. The court held that the EUO could not be admissible because there was no cross-examination of the witness making it “inherently untrustworthy.” The court went on to state that an EUO transcript met no exception to hearsay exclusions under Florida law either such as former testimony or a business records exception. Another County Court in Miami-Dade excluded an EUO transcript involving a material misrepresentation summary judgment because it was not provided to the declarant nor adopted by the declarant per § 92.33 Fla. Stat, and would be considered hearsay. Manuel V. Feijoo, M.D., aao Andisleydis Sordo Perez v. United Auto. Ins. Co., 31 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 382a (Fla. 11th Jud. Cir. Cty. 2023). In this case, the court honed in on the argument that an examination under oath, while sworn, lacks personal knowledge of the declarant because it is not provided to them, nor do they adopt it after it is transcribed. § 92.33 Fla. Stat requires a written statement by an injured party to be provided to that individual or it may not be used in a later civil action. The court held this statute to applicable and, thus, excluded the EUO transcript. Both of these common lower court arguments were then brought up on appeal by Universal. They argued to the Third District Court of Appeal that the EUO was inadmissible hearsay, violating Florida Statute § 92.33, which requires a copy of a written statement to be provided to the declarant. However, Third District Court of Appeal rejected both arguments and for a reason that seemed to catch the appellant off-guard. First, the court cited Florida’s revised summary judgment standard, which in 2021, aligned Florida’s Rule 1.510 with the federal summary judgment standard Rule 56. Using the full benefit of federal case law, the court held that hearsay is permissible “as long as it can” be presented in admissible form at trial—such as through live testimony. In such instances, the proper response from an opposing party is to present conflicting evidence of the statement. However, in this case, Universal put forth no evidence that the insured’s garage address was not materially misrepresented, and, thus, they lost this issue. The Third District rejected the argument that the insurer violated § 92.33 Fla. Stat., noting that the statute only requires “written statements” to be provide to an injured person. The court held that an EUO, which is a sworn transcribed statement, would not even be covered by § 92.33, and the appellant failed to provide any authority to the contrary. Given that appellant’s statutory argument did not apply and it presented no evidence to contradict the examination under oath, which could be reduced to admissible form at trial, the Third District affirmed the admissibility of the EUO in favor of the insurer. The significance of the Universal X Rays opinion now means EUOs are an even stronger fraud deterrent in Florida. They can be taken with confidence and utilized to stem frivolous litigation and claims at much earlier phases than before. Rather than ignore the EUO transcript, opposing parties now must affirmatively disprove that fraud has occurred once it is admitted.

Arbitration Near and Far: Fla.’s Fifth District Court of Appeal Issues Guidance for Arbitration Scope Disputes

December 3, 2025

In Urban Air Jacksonville v. Hinton, Florida’s Fifth District Court of Appeal clarified the standard for determining the scope of an arbitration agreement in a dispute over whether activity was related or unrelated to an overall contractual agreement.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

PA Middle District Dismisses Claims Against School District and its Superintendent, Principal, Special Education Director, and Classroom Teacher

A five-year-old special education student was enrolled in the Wyoming Valley West School District and attended the State Street Elementary School during the 2024-2025 school year. The student refused to clean up classroom toys at dismissal. When his teacher allegedly grabbed him by the wrist to walk him back to his seat, the student dropped to the floor and began crying. The teacher then allegedly grabbed the student by the ankle and dragged him across the floor. Following an investigation, criminal charges were not advanced by the county DA, and the school permitted the teacher to return to the classroom. The student’s parents sued, lodging thirteen legal counts under both state and federal law, which sought monetary damages from the teacher, the school district, the superintendent, the principal, and the director of special education. The plaintiff’s 42 USC 1983 claims were dismissed as to the school district for failure to allege a policy or custom violation, and the failure to alleged deliberate indifference in the failure-to-train context. As to the superintendent, building principal, and special education director, the Section 1983 claims were also dismissed for failure to allege personal involvement on the part of the individuals. Regarding an equal protection claim asserted against all defendants, the motion to dismiss was also granted for a failure to advance a plausible equal protection claim, holding that “plaintiffs' single-act allegations do not include a factual basis to even infer that the act was motivated by discriminatory animus rather than some other non-discriminatory impulse.” The court further dismissed the plaintiff’s negligence-based claims including negligence against the teacher and district administrators, NIED, and vicarious liability under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (PSTCA). The federal claims under the IDEA, Section 504, and the ADA were also dismissed in various respects. The IDEA claim was dismissed against all defendants with prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Section 504 claims against the individual defendants were also dismissed with prejudice, as districts, not individuals, are the recipients of federal funds under Section 504. However, the Section 504 and ADA claims were dismissed without prejudice as to defendant Wyoming Valley West, and the plaintiff was permitted leave to amend.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

U.S. Supreme Court Decides Key Issue Regarding Interstate Freight Broker Liability

Freight brokers are intermediaries.  They connect shippers of goods with trucking companies that transport those goods.  Freight brokers match a load of freight with a trucking company and oversee the logistics of the transportation. For a number of years there has been a division among the Federal Circuits regarding the potential liability of freight brokers when the trucking companies that they retain for interstate loads are involved in accidents.  At the center of this division was the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAAA).  Some Federal Circuit Courts have held that state law negligent hiring claims against freight brokers were preempted by the FAAAA .  Other Federal Circuits Courts have held that even if preemption applied, the “safety exception” in the FAAAA saved state law negligent hiring claims from federal preemption.  On May 14, 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the conflict in Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC, et al, No24-1238. In that case freight broker C.H. Robinson selected Caribe Transport to haul an interstate load. The commercial truck driver employed by Caribe Transport allegedly caused an accident and the plaintiff, Montgomery, was seriously injured. Montgomery brought an action against the driver, Caribe Transport and C.H. Robinson. The allegation against C.H. Robinson was that it negligently retained Caribe Transport when it knew, or should have known, that it was an unsafe company. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that Montgomery’s claims against C.H. Robinson were preempted by the FAAAA. The plaintiff appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.  The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision focused primarily on the safety exception in the FAAAA.  That provision provides that the FAAAA preemption “…shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles.” C.H. Robinson argued, as freight brokers historically have, that their function was not “with respect to motor vehicles” because they do not own trucks or employ drivers. They are merely intermediaries, connecting entities who need freight moved with entities who can do that job. Therefore, C.H. Robinson argued that preemption applied, not the safety exception. The U.S. Supreme Court did not accept that argument. The Court focused on the meaning of the phrase “with respect to” in the safety exception. The Court held that it means “referring to”, “concerning” or “regarding”. Therefore, writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Barrett concluded that “[r]equiring C.H. Robinson to exercise ordinary care in selecting a carrier therefore “concerns” motor vehicles—most obviously, the trucks that will transport the goods. So, Montgomery’s negligent-hiring claim falls within the FAAAA’s safety exception, which saves it from preemption.” Justice Kavanaugh, in his concurring opinion, noted the effect this ruling may have on freight brokers and their insurers throughout the country: Importantly, the Court's decision today should not be read to mean that brokers will routinely be subject to state tort liability in the wake of truck accidents. As even plaintiff's counsel stressed, brokers should be able to successfully defend against state tort suits if the brokers have acted reasonably and arranged transportation with reputable trucking companies. Tr. of Oral Arg. 27-29. In plaintiff's counsel's words, the brokers "just have to hire carriers that actually have a reasonable policy," and "the broker is not going to have a problem if it's asking the hard questions of the carrier." Id., at 42, 45. In addition, the proximate-cause requirement in typical state tort law should help protect brokers from excessive liability. Id., at 25. That said, the brokers rightly caution against naivete. In the real world, as the brokers forcefully respond, state tort law can be unpredictable, and the costs to brokers of litigation and insurance may be significant even when brokers prevail in lawsuits. Moreover, the costs of litigation and insurance, as well as the costs of brokers' conducting more substantial inquiries into trucking companies, will cascade through the economy and be paid in part by American consumers in the form of higher prices. The concerns expressed by the brokers are legitimate and weighty. The key point here is that freight brokers can no longer claim they are protected from negligent retention claims by the FAAAA (in cases involving interstate transportation). The challenge will be to determine what is considered ”reasonable efforts” used by brokers when retaining transportation companies.