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Robert P. Schenk

Portrait of Robert P. Schenk

Robert is the Managing Attorney for the Workers' Compensation Department in the firm's Philadelphia office. He has developed his practice exclusively in the area of workers' compensation litigation and has represented large, self-insured entities and third-party administrators in all manner of workers' compensation matters. While doing so, Robert has been awarded an AV® Preeminent™ rating by Martindale-Hubbell. He has also lectured before various organizations on topics related to workers' compensation.

Robert's interest in politics has overlapped with his work in the field of workers' compensation. He was appointed to the Administration's Committee promulgating the proposed rules to administer Act 57. On that committee, he helped draft the regulations which ultimately implemented the Act 57 amendments. Robert was also elected to the South Harrison Township (New Jersey) Committee in 2011 and continues to serve in this capacity. From 2007-2011, he served on the township's Planning and Zoning Board.

Prior to beginning his legal career, Robert served in the United States Marine Corps. He was decorated five times during his service and was honorably discharged in 1987. Following his military service, Robert graduated from Western Connecticut State University and went on to receive his juris doctor from Villanova School of Law.

An avid photographer, Robert is also a licensed commercial drone pilot. 

    • Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law (J.D., 1994)
    • Western Connecticut State University (B.A., 1991)
    • Pennsylvania, 1994
    • AV® Preeminent™ by Martindale-Hubbell®
    • The Best Lawyers in America©, Workers' Compensation Law - Employers (2026-2027)
    • Philadelphia Bar Association, Workers' Compensation Section
    • PA Workers’ Compensation Law: How to Produce the Best IME Reports, webinar, November 6, 2025
    • PA Workers' Comp Case Law Update, webinar, October 23, 2020 
    • The Meat and Potatoes of Affirmative Defenses, Marshall Dennehey Workers' Compensation Seminar, October 19, 2017
    • Course and Scope, Marshall Dennehey Workers' Compensation Seminar, October 27, 2016
    • Settlements and Subrogation, Marshall Dennehey Workers' Compensation Seminar, October 30, 2014
    • Dial "I" For IRE – An Overview of Impairment Rating Evaluations in Pennsylvania, Marshall Dennehey Workers' Compensation Seminar, Philadelphia, PA, November 30, 2012
    • Workers' Compensation Case Law Update, Marshall Dennehey, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, May 2008 
    • W.C. Claims Handling Strategies, Providence Property and Casualty Co., Dallas, Texas, April 2008
    • Workers' Compensation Case Law Update, Marshall Dennehey, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, September 2007
    • Basic PA Case Handling for Adjusters, Providence Property and Casualty Co., Dallas, Texas, November 2006
    • Litigating W.C. Construction Cases in PA, KHS&S Contractors, Cherry Hill, New Jersey, September 2006 
    • Current Issues in PA Workers' Compensation, Old Republic Ins. Co., Greensburg, Pennsylvania, September 2005
    • Effective Marketing Techniques for Partner and Associates, Marshall Dennehey, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, August 2005
    • Workers' Compensation Case Law Update, Morris., CLE, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, August 2005
    • Basic Claims Handling -PA Workers' Compensation Cases, CNA, Reading, Pennsylvania, October 2003
    • Handling Claims in PA, ACE/USA, ESIS, Wilmington, Delaware, July 2003 
    • Workers' Compensation Case Law Update, McLaughlin., CLE, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, October 2002 
    • Current Case Law Update, PAWCCA, Bala Cynwyd, Pennsylvania, May 2002
    • Status of Vocational Rehabilitation in Light of Current Case Law, Concentra, King of Prussia, Pennsylvania, March 2002 
    • Successful File Management and Billing Guidelines, Marshall Dennehey, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, April 2001
    • Avoiding Pitfalls Inherent to the Use of Bureau Forms, RSKCO, Bala Cynwyd, Pennsylvania, August 2000 
    • Proving Fraudulent Claims Under Act 57, Sumitomo Marine Management (USA), Inc., Warren, New Jersey, February 1998 
    • Practical Management of Cases under Act 57, PMA Insurance Company, King of Prussia, Pennsylvania, June 1997 
    • Large Firm v. Small Firm, Advantages for the New Associate's Consideration, PA Bar Association's Law School Practicum, Widener School of Law, Wilmington, Delaware, April 1995
    • "Attorney’s Fees for a Frivolous Appeal: An Old Cloak Gets a New Owner," Defense Digest, Vol. 21, No. 2, June 2015
    • "Killing Constituents: The Current Status of the Utilization Review Process," Defense Digest, Volume 18, No. 1, March 2012
    • "Losing Sight of Act 44 -Judicial Rollback of Legislative Medical Savings," Defense Digest, March 2008 

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.

Thought Leadership

Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.