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Robert Ely Williams

Portrait of Robert Ely Williams

Rob is a member of the Casualty Department. He has experience litigating a wide range of general liability matters representing insureds and self insureds, individuals and national corporations in cases involving motor vehicle liability, premises liability, first party and third party property insurance, product liability, and personal injury.

Prior to joining the firm, Rob worked as Staff Counsel for AIG, defending AIG, its subsidiaries and its insured customers related to general liability litigation which included bodily injury, trucking, property damage, uninsured/underinsured coverage, and subrogation disputes. He has assisted in various insurance defense matters, including mass tort (asbestos) litigation. Rob also has prior experience in workers' compensation matters, defending several of these matters through bench trials to final order by the judges of compensation throughout the state of Florida, and in some instances through appeal.

Before attending law school, Rob worked for several years in the mortgage banking industry. He is admitted to practice in the state of Florida.

    • University of Florida Levin College of Law (J.D., 2005)
    • Washington and Lee University (B.A., 1995)
    • Florida, 2006
    • U.S. District Court Middle District of Florida, 2015
    • E. Robert Williams Inn of Court (Barrister, 2008 - present)
    • Adjuster Law & Policy, State of Florida, Department of Financial Services, Bureau of Licensing
    • Adjuster Ethics, State of Florida, Department of Financial Services, Bureau of Licensing
    • “A Recent and Thorough Discussion of Negligence and Premises Liability in Florida by the Second District of Florida,” Defense Digest, Vol. 28, No. 12, December 2022
    • After discovery and evidentiary depositions involving multiple defendants, obtained nuisance value settlement on behalf of defendant elevator company arising out of plaintiff's second floor fall down an elevator shaft with serious injuries.
    • Successfully argued defendant's summary judgment motion and opposition to plaintiff's motion to abate on dispositive issue of plaintiff's failure to appear for examination under oath, resulting in dismissal with prejudice of plaintiff's first party property case.
    • Obtained favorable settlement for less than medical costs of plaintiff's neck and shoulder surgeries in a motor vehicle accident case where plaintiff alleged the defendant's vehicle rear-ended plaintiff's vehicle. Through deposition testimony and expert discovery, the defense was developed that the incident was a side-swipe which could not have occurred in the manner described by the plaintiff, and through medical records discovery, the plaintiff's neck and shoulder surgeries were not causally related to the accident.
    • Obtained dismissal, with zero payment, of premises liability case through use of aggressive motion and discovery practice, to include defense of failure to timely substitute personal respresentative on behalf of later deceased plaintiff.
    • Obtained nuisance value settlement for trip and fall case by securing deposition testimony of plaintiff that was inconsistent with police officer's statement as to the location of the alleged dangerous condition and the manner of the fall.
    • Obtained workers' compensation final order in bench trial resulting in denial of entire claim based on finding there was no objective evidence of injury.
    • Obtained workers' compensation final order in bench trial resulting in denial of claimant's claim for temporary indemnity benefits based on finding of no competent substantial evidence of occupational cause of injury with resulting disability within reasonable degree of medical certainty.

Thought Leadership

Defense Digest

A Recent and Thorough Discussion of Negligence and Premises Liability in Florida by the Second District of Florida

December 1, 2022

Key Points: Property owner is not, by that status alone, responsible for injuries caused solely by a tenant or lessee’s activities on the property. Property owner’s right to enter leased premises is not sufficient to constitute control over property so as to impose duty on landlord to protect third parties, even where property owner may have been able to generally instruct people not to do certain activities. It happens all the time. A complaint comes in, there are several counts with several theories of liability seeking damages for personal injuries, seemingly based on the simple fact that the named defendant(s) own the property. In a lengthy discussion on the theories commonly (and sometimes uncommonly seen), the Second District Court of Appeal in the case of Ruiz v. Wendy’s Trucking, LLC, et al., 2022 WL 4389879 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App., Sept. 23, 2022), affirmed a summary judgment in favor of the defendant property owner faced with such theories. The plaintiff, Antonio Ruiz, was severely injured while performing maintenance on a commercial truck owned by a third party, Wendy Carbrera, in a parking lot owned by the defendants, Roberto and Jesus Garcia. The Garcias hired a third party, Eglisbel Ginarte, to find truck owners to enter into leases for parking spots on a portion of the lot. At the time of the accident, there was no written lease agreement between Carbera and the Garcias. The plaintiff’s operable complaint alleged that the Garcias, as the lot owners, had a non-delegable duty to maintain their premises in a reasonably safe condition and to prevent unreasonable and dangerous activities on the lot. After several depositions, with varied testimony regarding the repair work on the property, the Garcias filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing there was no evidence that the condition on the property caused the accident. They also argued the plaintiff was a licensee on the property (such that the duty of reasonable care did not apply). The plaintiff responded to the motion for summary judgment, arguing that there was a disputed material fact as to whether the Garcias created a foreseeable zone of risk by permitting the repairs on their lot without proper safety measures. They also argued that the Garcias owed the plaintiff a duty of reasonable care under the ordinary negligence standard because the accident, based on testimony and evidence, was a result of their active or passive negligence rather than a defective condition of the lot. The trial court ruled that there was no duty owed to the plaintiff based on the facts of the case, which involved a truck that had been permitted to be parked on the lot. The plaintiff appealed to the Second District Court of Appeal, which affirmed that the Garcias, as property owners, did not owe a duty to the plaintiff. In its discussion of the plaintiff’s ordinary negligence liability/premises liability theories, the court addressed the plaintiff’s “active” negligence theory by finding that there was no active negligence by the Garcias as property owners because the accident (the truck breaking loose from whatever was holding it in place and running over a person) could have happened anywhere. Had it happened off the Garcias’ property, then the plaintiff would have had no basis to sue the defendants. There was no evidence that this was a case where the property owner or one of his/her agents operated equipment on the property and created a dangerous condition. The court then turned to the plaintiff’s allegation that the Garcias failed to prohibit mechanical repairs on the lot or implement safeguards regarding same, which it considered to be an allegation of “passive” negligence under both the ordinary negligence theory and premises liability theory. Even if the plaintiff was considered an invitee, the same standard of reasonable care applied under both of these theories. The court distilled the plaintiff’s argument as follows: that the Garcias owed the plaintiff a duty to prevent mechanical work from being performed on the lot by its lessees or invitees without having safeguards in place. The court ruled that there was no known dangerous condition because it was undisputed the lot was being used for parking, and the Garcias did not create a dangerous condition by owning the lot and allowing trucks to park there. The court specifically indicated that, if a dangerous condition was created by the mechanical work on the lot, the Garcias had no involvement in it because the condition was created by truck owners (lessees), who had requested such work to be done on the lot or by truck mechanics (the plaintiff), who had opted to perform work on the lot themselves. The plaintiff further argued that the right to control the property by the Garcias (the right to enter the property and stop people from working on the trucks) was a factual issue to be determined by the jury, such that a genuine material issue of fact prohibited entry of summary judgment. The court found that even though the Garcias may have been able to generally instruct people to stop performing mechanical work on the lot, this did not render them in control of their lessees’ (i.e., owners of the trucks who lease parking space from the Garcias on the lot) operations and activities. Defending these type of cases necessarily involves navigating a response to all attempts by plaintiffs’ attorneys to establish a duty of care on the part of a property owner under Florida case law. The Second District Court of Appeal’s analysis and holding in Ruiz provides a roadmap for evaluation of the heavily fact-dependent question of property owner liability.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Perlmutter Provides Predictability for Punitive Damages Claims in Florida

In a much anticipated decision, the Florida Supreme Court provided clarity for the standards of proof for punitive damages claims in Perlmutter v. Federal Insurance Company, SC2024-0058 (Fla. June 11, 2026). Litigants and trial judges must be mindful of the standards laid out by the Court. And, defense practitioners must be prepared to alter their strategies to defend against such claims. Perlmutter came to the Court from the Fourth District, based on conflict jurisdiction with decisions from the Second and Fifth District and on certification of a question of great public importance as to the standard of proof for punitive damages claims at the pleading stage. Fed. Ins. Co. v. Perlmutter, 376 So. 3d 24, 29 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023). In the underlying case, the Fourth District made two conclusions. First, it held that a “trial court must consider the evidentiary showing by all parties at the hearing on the motion to amend, that is, evidence ‘in the record’ and evidence ‘proffered by the claimant.’”  376 So. 3d at 33. Second, the Fourth held that it “interpreted section 768.72(1) and (2) to require the trial court to make a preliminary determination of whether a reasonable jury, viewing the totality of proffered evidence in the light most favorable to the movant, could find by clear and convincing evidence that punitive damages are warranted.  Id. at 34 (underscoring in the original). In making these conclusions, the court cautioned trial courts that the “preliminary determination” analysis did not entitle the trial court to decide whether the evidence is clear and convincing and noted that the trial court should not weigh evidence and should not determine witness credibility. Id. The Florida Supreme Court accepted jurisdiction and answered the certified question in the negative. It quashed the decision below and remanded the case for application of the following standards: The trial court should consider only the evidence identified or proffered by the claimant; it should not entertain an evidentiary counter-submission from the opponent. The trial court should consider whether a reasonable person could conclude based on the claimant’s evidence, that the defendant committed “intentional misconduct” or “gross negligence” as defined in section 768.72(2) or section 768.72(3). The trial court must review the request for punitive damages in the context of the underlying claims. The trial court should not apply the clear and convincing standard of proof in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence at the pleading stage. The trial court does not act as a fact-finder; the trial court must not weigh the claimant’s evidence—it cannot decide the truth of the matter. The trial court must consider the record evidence and the proffered evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, but the allegations in the proposed amended complaint are not themselves evidence. Perlmutter, SC2024-0058 at 13-15 (emphasis added). In explaining these standards, the Court interpreted the text of the statute and compared it to a related statute which governs punitive damages in the nursing home context. The nursing home statute expressly calls for evidentiary submissions by “the parties” and expressly tells the trial court to determine whether there is a reasonable basis to believe the claimant could satisfy the “clear and convincing evidence” standard at trial. Id. at 17-18 (comparing the text of section 768.72(1), Florida Statutes, with section 400.0237, Florida Statutes). Without that express language in section 768.72, the statute could not be applied in the same manner. With these standards specially delineated for the trial courts, the Court is “confident that its interpretation of section 768.72(1) will not frustrate the effectiveness of the statute in accomplishing the Legislature’s textually evident purposes.” Id.  at 22 (cleaned up). This remains to be seen. While Perlmutter provides predictability and clarity for trial courts when reviewing the evidentiary submissions in support of a punitive damages claim, the decision will not likely impact the numbers of punitive damages motions filed. Rather, these new parameters will change the way claims are defended, reminiscent of a time when rulings on punitive damages were only subject to certiorari review and appellate courts were limited in reviewing procedural errors. This decision will likely deflate the level-playing field that Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(3)(G) addressed by allowing appeals of orders granting and denying punitive damages amendments. Further, Perlmutter may have impliedly created a call to action for the Legislature to amend section 768.72(1) in the same manner it amended section 400.0237 to allow the courts to analyze “admissible evidence submitted by the parties” and determine at a hearing whether there is a reasonable basis to believe the claimant at trial would be able to demonstrate by “clear and convincing evidence” that the recovery of punitive damages is warranted. Until then, defendants must adjust their strategies. To adapt to these new standards, defense practitioners will need to tailor their strategy for defending punitive damages claims since they can no longer submit a counter-proffer or urge a court to apply the clear and convincing standard at the pleading phase. Instead, defendants will need to attack the deficiencies in the claimant’s pleadings and proffer. If the trial court fails to serve as a gatekeeper, and does not apply the above standards, then defendants can pursue an interlocutory appeal under Rule 9.130(a)(3)(G). If a nonfinal appeal is taken, then defendants should move to stay any intrusive financial discovery while the appellate court analyzes the issues on appeal. Finally, defendants should utilize Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.510 to serve as a screening device to allow the trial court to analyze all evidence and prevent nonmeritorious punitive damages claims from proceeding to a jury.

Thought Leadership

Unanimous New Jersey Supreme Court Holds That Personal Emails of Public Employees and Officials are Subject to OPRA

In Rosetti v. Ramapo-Indian Hills Regional High School Board of Education, the New Jersey Supreme Court unanimously held that government-related emails, which are contained within personal email accounts, are government records under the Open Public Records Act (OPRA), and a log of those emails must be produced when requested. In reaching this decision, the court conducted an analysis of the OPRA and cited previous cases that held that emails do in fact fall within OPRA’s definition of a record and must be produced when requested pursuant to the Act. The court in Rosetti then had to answer the question as to whether public officials’ personal email accounts that are used for government purposes are subject to OPRA, and found that they are. Rosetti made an OPRA request to the Board of Education seeking email logs from Board members’ personal email accounts. The Board refused to produce the logs and indicated that it was not under any obligation to produce personal email account logs, only from government-related email accounts. The issue was whether a log had to be produced for Board members’ personal email accounts, which they used to conduct Board business. The Board argued that while it was possible to create a log for government-related email accounts through its IT Department, it was not possible to do so for personal email accounts. The court rejected this argument and ruled that Board members are required to search their personal email accounts and create a log of government-related emails housed in those accounts. Once completed, each Board member then must submit a certification detailing the searches that were conducted. The court went one step further with a suggestion to government employees and officials, stating, “[g]overnment agencies should strongly advise their employees, elected officials, and others engaged in government-related business to refrain from using their personal email accounts when conducting government-related business.”  Please do not hesitate to contact me with any questions regarding this case and others pertaining to the OPRA. 

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court Holds Self-Referral Prohibition Does Not Cover Prescriptions Written by Physicians with Ownership Interests in Dispensing Pharmacies

700 Pharmacy v. Bureau of Workers’ Compensation Fee Review Hearing Office (State Workers’ Insurance Fund); Nos. 97, 98, 99, 100, 101 MAP 2024; decided June 16, 2026; by Justice Mundy.   In this case, Drs. Miteswar Purewal and Shailen Jalali, treating physicians for workers’ compensation claimants, wrote prescriptions for various medications that were filled by 700 Pharmacy. The worker’s compensation insurer refused to pay for the prescriptions on the basis that they were illegal self-referrals under the Act. 700 Pharmacy subsequently filed fee review applications with The Bureau of Workers’ Compensation Medical Fee Review Office. At a fee review hearing, both physicians stipulated they had a financial interest in the pharmacy.  The physicians argued that the Anti-Referral Provision of the Act does not bar self-referrals on prescription drugs and pharmaceutical services, since the provision does not specifically identify prescription drugs. The Fee Review Hearing Officer rejected this argument and found that prescriptions for medications are prohibited under the “goods or services” language included in the provision. 700 Pharmacy appealed to the Commonwealth Court, and the court affirmed, agreeing with the Hearing Officer’s interpretation of “goods and services” as encompassing prescriptions. 700 Pharmacy appealed to the Supreme Court.  The Supreme Court reversed the decisions of the Hearing Officer and the Commonwealth Court, holding that the term “goods and services” in the Anti-Referral Provision of the Act did not include prescriptions. According to the Court, “goods and services” was not a catch-all, but simply explanatory as to the eight enumerated categories in the provision. The provision (Section 306(f.1)(3)(iii)) reads, in pertinent part: Notwithstanding any other provision of law, it is unlawful for a provider to refer a person for laboratory, physical therapy, rehabilitation, chiropractic, radiation oncology, psychometric, home infusion therapy  or diagnostic imaging, goods or services pursuant to this section if the provider has a financial interest with the person or in the entity that receives the referral. The Court said that if the General Assembly wanted to specifically include prescription drugs and pharmaceutical services in the Anti-Referral Provision, they would have done so. They pointed out that prescription drugs and pharmaceutical services were included by the legislature in Section 306 (f.1)(3)(vi) of the Act as to reimbursement, and claimed that their omission from the Anti-Referral Provision supports the conclusion that those services are not included in the Anti-Referral Provision’s self-referral prohibition.

News

Marshall Dennehey’s John J. Hare Brings Home Attorney of the Year Honors; Firm Named Litigation Department of the Year in Two Categories

Marshall Dennehey took home top honors in three categories at the The Legal Intelligencer’s 2026 Pennsylvania Legal Awards, held June 11 in Philadelphia. The first place awards include: Attorney of the Year: John J. Hare, Chair of the firm’s Appellate Advocacy & Post-Trial Practice Group and Executive Committee member, together with Charles “Chip” Becker of Kline & Specter Litigation Department of the Year, Appellate – Third Win in a Row! Litigation Department of the Year, Product Liability/Mass Torts “There is no one more deserving of Attorney of the Year honors than John. This award is a testament to his exceptional skill, dedication, and leadership—qualities that truly exemplify the very best of our firm,” said G. Mark Thompson, Marshall Dennehey’s President & CEO. “These honors also reflect the strength and depth of our product liability, mass torts, and appellate practices across Pennsylvania and beyond, underscoring our ongoing commitment to delivering outstanding results for our clients.” Attorney of the Year – John J. Hare, Marshall Dennehey, together with Charles “Chip” Becker, Kline & Specter Over the past year, John and Charles were opposing counsel in many of the highest-profile civil appeals in Pennsylvania. John is renowned as a preeminent appellate lawyer on the defense side, and Chip on the plaintiff's side. They have opposed each other repeatedly, exhibiting peerless professionalism and exceptional civility, while zealously litigating under the unremitting pressure of high-profile litigation and record-setting verdicts totaling more than $3.5 billion. They have also collaborated, outside of litigation, on many commissions, committees, and projects of importance to the Pennsylvania judiciary and legal community. Litigation Department of the Year – Appellate Law, Winner (previous winner, 2025 and 2024) 2025 was another standout year for the firm’s Appellate Advocacy & Post‑Trial Practice Group, led by John J. Hare, which was retained to challenge many of Pennsylvania’s “nuclear” verdicts—awards exceeding $10 million. Notably, the department persuaded the Pennsylvania Superior Court to reverse a Philadelphia judgment of $1.09 billion, the largest judgment ever overturned by a Pennsylvania appellate court. The group’s 11 full‑time Pennsylvania‑based appellate lawyers are at the center of Pennsylvania’s most high-profile matters, bringing more than 150 years of combined appellate experience. They routinely handle post‑trial and appellate matters and are frequently engaged to participate in and monitor trials in high‑exposure cases to ensure that critical legal issues are properly raised and preserved for appeal. Litigation Department of the Year – Product Liability/Mass Torts, Winner This marks the first win for the firm’s Pennsylvania Product Liability and Mass Torts practices, which operate within our Casualty Department, managed by Matthew Schorr and Jeff Rapattoni. For almost five decades, Fortune 500 product manufacturers/distributors and their insurers have turned to these groups to defend their litigation. Led by Bradley D. Remick and Vlada Tasich, our Product Liability group’s success can be attributed to its commitment to keeping abreast of ever-changing legal theories, judicial viewpoints, and evolving technology impacting the product liability landscape. Our attorneys have successfully handled thousands of product liability matters in all jurisdictions across the state. Likewise, our mass tort litigation practice – divided into Asbestos & Mass Tort, and Environmental & Toxic Tort Litigation –  has defended manufacturers, distributors, contractors, and premises owners in thousands of personal injury and other claims. Led by Kevin E. Hexstall and Patrick T. Reilly, most attorneys in these groups have more than 20 years of experience, and our seasoned trial team has tried hundreds of cases to verdict, consistently achieving strong results through both trials and settlements. In addition to these awards, Marshall Dennehey was a Litigation Department of the Year finalist for Professional Liability.