.

Paul W. Lanza

Co-Chair, Trucking & Transportation Practice

Portrait of Paul W. Lanza

As an experienced member of the Casualty Department, Paul concentrates his practice primarily on trucking/transportation liability, premises/retail liability, and construction injury litigation. Additionally, he handles cases in the fields of condominium/community association law, automobile liability,  products liability and malpractice claims against real estate professionals. Paul is frequently retained by clients to handle the pre-suit investigation of high exposure cases involving complex issues of fact and law, including fatal commercial vehicle accidents.  

Paul handles all aspects of civil litigation up to trial, including pleadings, depositions, expert discovery, dispositive motion practice, mediation and non-binding arbitration. He has obtained numerous favorable results for his clients, which range from individuals and small businesses to large-sized insurance companies. He has appeared on behalf of his clients in both New Jersey and New York state and federal courts. Paul has also argued before the New Jersey Appellate Division, where he successfully defended an appeal to affirm an order entering summary judgment on behalf of his client. Additionally, prior to joining Marshall Dennehey, Paul worked at a defense firm where he specialized as regional counsel for a Fortune 50 transportation company. 

Paul attended Seton Hall University School of Law where he was a recipient of the Chancellor's Scholarship. While in law school, he completed over 200 hours of pro bono work in the Immigrants' Rights/International Human Right Clinic.  Paul also worked as a judicial extern in the Superior Court of Essex County, Civil Division for the Hon. Paul J. Vichness, J.S.C. (Ret.) and as an intern in the Newark Public Defender's Office.

Prior to law school, Paul graduated from the University of Notre Dame, with a B.A. in Political Science and Spanish. He was a member of the Dean's List and Sigma Delta Pi (National Collegiate Hispanic Honor Society).

    • Seton Hall University School of Law (J.D., 2014)
    • University of Notre Dame (B.A., 2011)
    • New Jersey, 2014
    • New York, 2015
    • U.S. District Court District of New Jersey, 2015
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of New York, 2015
    • U.S. District Court Southern District of New York, 2015
    • The Best Lawyers: Ones to Watch®, Product Liability Litigation - Defendants; Transportation Law (2021-2024)
      The Best Lawyers list is issued by Woodward & White. A description of the selection methodology can be found here. No aspect of this advertisement has been approved by the Supreme Court of New Jersey.
    • New Jersey Super Lawyers Rising Star (2022-2024)
      The Super Lawyers list is issued by Thomson Reuters. A description of the selection methodology can be found here. No aspect of this advertisement has been approved by the Supreme Court of New Jersey. 
    • Trucking Industry Defense Association (TIDA)
    • Dude Where’s My Driver? Regulatory Concerns of the Automated Delivery Vehicle and Unmanned Aircraft Systems, Client Event, June 2017
    • Cyber Liability, Client Event, August 2016
    • "Guide to Expert Testimony in Malpractice Cases Against Real Estate Professionals,"New Jersey Law Journal, October 21, 2019
    • “The Implementation of Cyber Security Legislation: An Overview of the NYFDS and NAIC Model Laws,” Claims Litigation Management, November 2017
    • “How Secure Is Your Vendor? Protecting Yourself from Third-party Cyber Risks,” Claims Litigation Management, July 2017
    • “Preventative Cyber Defenses: Laying the Foundation to Minimize the Risk of Breach,” Claims Litigation Management, April 2017
    • “The Evolution of Cyber Insurance:  How Did We Get Here and Where Are We Headed?,” Claims Litigation Management, January 2017
    • Obtained a defense verdict in a trucking accident in New Jersey. The plaintiff claimed that our client merged into her lane at the George Washington Bridge toll plaza causing her to sustain neck and back injuries for which she underwent two spinal surgeries. Our client testified that both of their lanes ended and, because they were required to merge, he had the right-of-way since the front of his truck was ahead of the front of her vehicle. Our accident reconstruction expert confirmed that our driver had the right-of-way and opined that plaintiff was the sole cause of the accident. We also disputed the causation of plaintiff’s alleged injuries based on the very limited property damage to her vehicle, as well as the fact that she had prior, similar injuries. After a little more than an hour of deliberations, the jury returned a verdict finding that our driver was not negligent.   
    • Obtained summary judgment on behalf of our client. The plaintiff was injured when she fell from a 25-foot rock-climbing wall at our client's facility.  After reaching the summit of the wall, plaintiff, a certified climber, pushed off to begin repelling down, only to realize that she forgot to connect to the auto-belay system.  She proceeded to fall to the ground and fractured both ankles for which she underwent open reduction internal fixation surgery.  Plaintiff had previously visited the client's facility approximately 35 times and had executed a liability waiver on each occasion, including the date of the accident.  We moved for summary judgment to dismiss plaintiff's Complaint based on the fact that the liability waiver was enforceable.  Plaintiff argued that the liability waiver was only enforceable as to her claims of ordinary negligence and that the issue of whether the defendant was grossly negligent was a triable issue of fact.  However, we successfully argued that no reasonable jury could find that the client was grossly negligent based on the client's testimony of the safety procedures, protocols and equipment in place at the rock-climbing gym. Accordingly, the Court granted our motion for summary judgment dismissing plaintiff's Complaint, in its entirety, against the client.
    • Successfully defended plaintiff's appeal in the New Jersey Appellate Division of an order granting summary judgment in favor of the client by arguing that plaintiff's claims were barred pursuant to the Workers' Compensation Act because plaintiff was a "special employee" of the client. Holmes v. Zayas, No. A-0591-15T2, 2017 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2568 (App. Div. Oct. 13, 2017).
    • Obtained summary judgment in favor of the client, a non-profit charitable organization, by arguing that it was immune from liability under the New Jersey Charitable Immunity Act and there was no evidence of gross negligence against the client.
    • Obtained summary judgment in favor of our clients, a residential real estate agent and company, by arguing that expert testimony was required because a jury could not be reasonably expected to discern the nuances of the standard of care owed by the clients to the plaintiff on its own. Therefore, because plaintiff did not produce a liability expert report during discovery, he could not satisfy his burden of proof and the Court granted summary judgment in favor of our clients.
    • Obtained a defense verdict in favor of the client in a case involving plaintiff's allegations of negligent automobile repairs by proving that our client's repairs were performed in accordance with the industry's customs and standards.
    • Negotiated a stipulation of dismissal with prejudice, without any monetary contribution, in favor of a local college in a premises liability matter. Plaintiff claimed that, as a result of her fall on snow and ice on the sidewalk, she sustained severe injuries including a fractured ankle and she underwent open reduction internal fixation. However, using video surveillance, we were able to dispute the location of the accident and the condition of the sidewalk and obtain this favorable result for the client.

Results

Defense Verdict Returned After Short Jury Deliberation in High-Exposure New Jersey Trucking Case

Christopher Block and Paul Lanza (both of Roseland) successfully obtained a defense verdict in a trucking accident in New Jersey. The plaintiff claimed that our client merged into her lane at the George Washington Bridge toll plaza causing her to sustain neck and back injuries for which she underwent two spinal surgeries. Our client testified that both of their lanes ended and, because they were required to merge, he had the right-of-way since the front of his truck was ahead of the front of her vehicle. Our accident reconstruction expert confirmed that our driver had the right-of-way and opined that plaintiff was the sole cause of the accident. We also disputed the causation of plaintiff’s alleged injuries based on the very limited property damage to her vehicle, as well as the fact that she had prior, similar injuries. After a little more than an hour of deliberations, the jury returned a verdict finding that our driver was not negligent. The trial team was assisted by associate attorney Haleigh Catalano and paralegal Kelly Dermody who provided critical support with motions in limine and trial management.

Summary Judgment Obtained in Three Consolidated Cases Involving Multi-vehicle Accident

We secured summary judgment for our client, a tow truck company, in three consolidated cases venued in Essex County Superior Court arising out of a fatal motor vehicle accident caused by an illegal left-hand turn by a tow truck driver. The plaintiffs alleged that our client was liable under a theory of respondeat superior as the tow truck driver’s employer. The plaintiffs further alleged that our client negligently hired, trained, supervised and entrusted the vehicle to the driver. However, we established that our client sold the subject tow truck to a co-defendant tow truck company two weeks before the accident. The court found that the co-defendant’s deposition testimony did not suffice to create a genuine issue of material fact and granted our motion, dismissing all claims against our client.

Thought Leadership

Case Law Alerts

Florida Court Affirms Summary Judgment Based on Unrebutted Testimony of Phantom Vehicle in Rear-End Collision

July 1, 2025

This case arises out of a multi-vehicle accident in which the operator of the rearward vehicle claimed that she was rear-ended by a phantom vehicle, causing the chain of rear-end collisions.  The other parties in the lawsuit testified, in general terms, that they did not see a phantom vehicle and had no recollection of a vehicle passing them immediately after the crash.  The court held that their scant negative testimony was insufficient to overcome the unequivocal positive statement of the rearward driver, that there was a phantom vehicle, and affirmed the order for summary judgment. The court also noted that summary judgment could have been avoided by the opposing parties if there was evidence from a witness that “I looked where I should have been looking and there was nothing to see.”    Case Law Alerts, 3rd Quarter, July 2025 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. Copyright © 2025 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm.

Case Law Alerts

NY Appellate Division Reverses Trial Court, Grants Summary Judgment to Middle Vehicle in Rear-End Collision

July 1, 2025

The owner and operator of the middle vehicle in a three-vehicle accident moved for summary judgment. The moving defendant argued that it was stopped 5 to 10 feet behind the plaintiff’s vehicle for approximately 5 seconds when their vehicle was struck from behind by co-defendant and pushed into the rear of the plaintiff’s vehicle.  Their motion was denied at the trial court level. However, the Appellate Division reversed after finding that the plaintiff and the co-defendant failed to raise a triable issue of fact and because the motion was not premature, as the opposing parties failed to demonstrate why further discovery was necessary.    Case Law Alerts, 3rd Quarter, July 2025 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. Copyright © 2025 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.

Thought Leadership

The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.