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Patrick M. DeLong

Co-Chair, Rideshare Litigation Practice

Portrait of Patrick M. DeLong

As a member of the Casualty Department, Patrick represents clients and their insurers in high exposure automobile negligence, uninsured motorist, premises liability, commercial general liability and construction site accident cases involving allegations of wrongful death and catastrophic injuries in both Florida and federal courts.

Patrick focuses a portion of his practice on a recently emerging area of law–the defense of rideshare liability cases. In this capacity, he develops strategies for successfully defending rideshare drivers and their insurers in complex, catastrophic rideshare negligence and uninsured motorist cases throughout the State of Florida.

Additionally, Patrick represents clients in complex construction defect, and building design related claims and suits. He routinely represents and defends real estate developers, general contractors, subcontractors, licensed construction industry professionals, as well as municipalities, in all manner of construction related actions.

Since joining the firm in 2013, Patrick has defended creditors and debt servicers in creditors’ rights, TCPA, FDCPA and FCCPA actions.

In 1990, Patrick earned his Bachelor of Arts degree with Honors from the University of Notre Dame, and remained at the University of Notre Dame for law school where he received is juris doctor in 1993. Patrick is a member of the Bar of the state of Florida. He is admitted to practice before all Florida state circuit and federal district courts, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern and Middle District of Florida, as well as the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals

    • Notre Dame Law School (J.D., 1993)
    • University of Notre Dame (B.A., cum laude, 1990)
    • Florida, 1993
    • U.S. District Court Middle District of Florida, 1994
    • U.S. District Court Northern District of Florida, 2000
    • U.S. District Court Southern District of Florida, 2000
    • U.S. Court of Appeals 11th Circuit, 2010
    • ACA International (The Association of Credit and Collection Professionals)
    • NCBA (The National Creditors Bar Association)
    • The Complexity of Rideshare Claims, AM Best Insurance Law Podcast, June 2021
    • Preserving Evidence and Avoiding Spoliation in Florida, Marshall Dennehey Florida Claims Symposium - The Best Defense is a Good Offense, Orlando, FL, September 17, 2014
    • Won summary judgment in favor of a national real estate developer in a class action case brought in federal court, on behalf of homeowners in a large planned community. Damages in excess of $5 million were sought against the developer, who was accused of fraud, deceptive and unfair trade practices, misleading advertising, unjust enrichment, and negligence. After the summary judgment was affirmed on appeal, four related class action cases and one mass tort case were pending against the real estate developer in state court. Here, the combined alleged damages were in excess of $40 million, but were again favorably resolved.
    • Secured summary judgment in favor of a municipality in a Fair Housing Act case brought by a real estate developer who accused the municipality, its mayor, vice mayor and commissioners of racial discrimination after the commission voted against its proposed development.
    • Secured the dismissal of an FDCPA class action on behalf of a law firm whose practice focused upon mortgage foreclosures.

Thought Leadership

Defense Digest

On the Pulse…Our Rideshare Liability Practice Group

March 1, 2023

Meeting the Needs of the Rideshare Revolution In a relatively short timespan, rideshare platforms—like Uber and Lyft—and carshare platforms—like Turo—have transformed the global transportation industry. With the push of a few buttons, users can instantly hail a ride or rent a vehicle virtually anywhere in the world. Unquestionably, the advent of these technology service companies has made travel more convenient and efficient. But it has also spawned a multitude of new legal issues and claims. Legislators and judges have been striving to keep up with the technology, but every legislative or judicial action can create new and complex legal questions. Marshall Dennehey responded to the needs of the industry by forming its Rideshare Liability Practice Group—a dedicated team of experienced defense attorneys who have developed specialized knowledge of legal issues facing this revolutionary industry. Originally launched in 2021, the Rideshare Liability Practice Group is on the cutting edge of defending a wide variety of rideshare claims and peer-to-peer carshare claims. The practice group is comprised of numerous attorneys across the firm’s 19 offices—located in seven different states, including Pennsylvania, Florida, New Jersey, Ohio, New York, Connecticut, and Delaware—who have handled hundreds of claims in the field. The practice group is co-chaired by Thomas F. Brown (Orlando) and Patrick M. Delong (Fort Lauderdale), who cumulatively have over 50 years of insurance defense experience. The attorneys in this practice group have worked with multiple rideshare and carshare platforms. They appreciate the need for understanding the vocabulary of the industry as well as issues of confidentiality and brand protection. Using the wrong terminology could create exposure or liability where it would not otherwise exist. During the course of discovery, a company’s intellectual property and proprietary data might be requested. The attorneys in this group frequently oppose discovery requests that seek proprietary and trade-secret information, and they utilize confidentiality agreements and protective orders to shield confidential information from improper use and widespread disclosure. Appropriate provisions in settlement agreements are also used to protect sensitive information. The Rideshare Liability Practice Group also has extensive experience defending the insurers and users of these platforms, including drivers, vehicle owners, and vehicle renters. They have successfully defended claims involving catastrophic injuries, wrongful death, multiple-vehicle accidents, and multiple claimants. They have staved off aggressive and creative attempts by the plaintiff’s bar to expand liability through causes of action, including: Negligence Vicarious liability Negligent hiring or selection Negligent retention and supervision Product liability Negligent design of the ride-hailing application Negligent maintenance of a shared car Negligent entrustment Bad faith Uninsured and underinsured motorist Defending these cases requires the knowledge and an understanding of applicable federal and state laws and regulations. The laws and regulations of a particular state might govern the level of insurance coverage required during various aspects of the rideshare process. An independent rideshare driver might need his or her own insurance while the rideshare app is off. The rideshare platform might be required to provide a coverage when an independent rideshare driver is using the app, but a different amount of coverage might be required depending on whether the driver has accepted a ride or if the driver is actively transporting a rider. Formulating appropriate defenses to these claims also requires an understanding of the applicable law. For example, Florida trial courts have issued conflicting opinions regarding whether a transportation network application is a product subject to product liability laws or a service outside the scope of such laws. Since the Florida appellate courts have not yet weighed in with a controlling opinion on the issue, a rideshare defense practitioner must possess a cutting-edge awareness of developing discovery trends and legal arguments advanced by the plaintiff’s bar with respect to this issue and must prepare his or her client to successfully defend against them during the discovery and dispositive motion phases of litigation. Another example of evolving legal trends may be found in the carshare arena, where both state and federal law could insulate the vehicle owner from liability. The Graves Amendment is a federal law that bars vicarious liability claims where: The owner (or an affiliate of the owner) is engaged in the trade or business of renting or leasing motor vehicles; and There is no negligence or criminal wrongdoing on the part of the owner (or an affiliate of the owner). Several states have now enacted peer-to-peer carsharing statutes that expressly extend the Graves Amendment to carsharing situations. There are numerous complexities to defending a rideshare or carshare claim, and the attorneys in Marshall Dennehey’s Rideshare Liability Practice Group can be retained to assist at different stages throughout the life of a claim. Before a lawsuit is filed, our rideshare defense attorneys are often asked to assist with accident investigations, preservation of evidence, expert retention, legal research, global settlement conferences, and responding to time-limit demands. Marshall Dennehey’s lawyers have the experience and skill to take cases to trial and are also supported by an exceptional appellate group. In the Marshall Dennehey Rideshare Liability Practice Group, the aim is to always provide outstanding, efficient, and cost-conscious legal services to our clients. *Patrick DeLong is a shareholder in our Fort Lauderdale, Florida, office. He can be reached at 954.832.3953 or pmdelong@mdwcg.com. Tom Brown is a shareholder in our Orlando, Florida, office. He can be reached at 407.420.4392 or tfbrown@mdwcg.com.   Defense Digest, Vol. 29, No. 1, March 2023, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2023 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Defending Ride-Hailing and Car-Sharing Claims

January 1, 2022

The sharing economy has grown exponentially in a short period of time. Rideshare platforms like Uber and Lyft, and car-sharing platforms like Turo, control a significant part of the sharing economy space. Along with this rapid growth came insurance programs for ridesharing and car-sharing platforms, as well as a surge of claims and lawsuits against them, their users, and their insurers.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

The Enforceability of Online Arbitration Agreements Remains Unresolved in Pennsylvania, But the Pennsylvania Superior Court has Provided Substantive Guidance on the Issue

Key Points: The Pennsylvania Supreme Court confirms that an order compelling arbitration is not immediately appealable as collateral orders. The outcome of Chilutti II has generally left the substantive enforceability issues with browsewrap agreements unresolved in Pennsylvania. Until this issue is resolved by the Pennsylvania courts, companies operating in the Commonwealth should strive to ensure that their registration websites and/or application screens conspicuously present arbitration agreements in manners which ensure their users and consumers assent to the terms of the agreements by following the standards set forth in Chilutti I. Browsewrap agreements have been defined as agreements “‘in which a website offers terms that are disclosed only through a hyperlink and the user supposedly manifests assent to those terms simply by continuing to use the website,’ and typically do not require an electronic signature.” See, Cobb v. Tesla, Inc., 2026 WL 458470, at *1 n. 2 (Pa. Super. Feb. 18, 2026) (citation omitted). They are largely regarded as the “if you keep using this, you agree to everything buried in this link” terms embedded into almost every online agreement consumers and users sign before proceeding with purchases of goods and/or services. While consumers are generally aware of them, many almost never click on the link, nor read them in their entirety. This leaves many consumers and users ignorant of the terms and impact of such agreements. However, one’s ignorance of the otherwise neatly-tucked-away terms rarely renders them unenforceable. The issue of the enforceability of browsewrap agreements has been up for debate for some time in many jurisdictions, including Pennsylvania. Indeed, Pennsylvania had a brief grip on this issue for a period in time. Specifically, in 2023, an en banc Superior Court set forth heightened standards for companies to meet in order to secure assent and enforce browsewrap arbitration agreements. See Chilutti v. Uber Techs., Inc., 300 A.3d 430 (Pa.Super. 2023) (en banc) (“Chilutti I”) Chilutti I involved a husband and wife who sued Uber and its subsidiaries after the wife, a wheelchair bound passenger using Uber’s rideshare service, fell, struck her head, and lost consciousness due to her uber driver failing to provide a seatbelt and making an aggressive turn during the trip. The Chilutti’s filed a negligence lawsuit against Uber and its subsidiaries. In response, the defendants moved to compel arbitration, arguing that “the couple’s conduct on the company’s website and application — when they registered for the ridesharing service — signified that they agreed to be bound by the mandatory arbitration provision found in the hyperlinked terms and conditions.” The trial court granted the defendants’ petition and stayed the proceedings pending the results of arbitration, and the Chilutti’s appealed. On appeal, the Superior Court addressed two issues. First, it addressed the issue of whether it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal. A divided Superior Court determined that it did, with its basis for the holding being that the order from which the Chilutti’s appealed was a collateral order. Next, the Superior Court set out to address the merits of the Chilutti’s substantive claim. The Superior Court concluded that the parties lacked a valid agreement to arbitrate. Its rationale was that Uber’s website and application did not provide reasonably conspicuous notice of the terms to the Chiluttis. In reaching this decision, the en banc Superior Court held that browsewrap arbitration agreements are enforceable in Pennsylvania only if the registration website and application screens explicitly inform consumers that they are waiving the right to a jury trial, the registration process cannot be completed until the consumer is fully informed of this waiver, and, when the agreement is available via hyperlink, the waiver appears at the top of the first page of the terms in bold, capitalized text. Since the ruling, Pennsylvania courts have applied Chilutti I to determine if browsewrap agreements are enforceable.  For instance, the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas invoked Chilutti I to reject an agreement that lacked an express jury-trial waiver on the assent screen.  See Miller v. Festival Fun Parks, LLC, 92 WDA 2025 (C.P. Alleg. Cnty. Mar. 24, 2025). Similarly, the Superior Court has held that notice which failed to explicitly state the consumer was waiving a jury-trial right did not “me[e]t the strict burden set forth by our en banc Court in Chilutti I.” Pierce v. FloatMe Corp., 348 A.3d 1077, 1088 (Pa. Super. 2025). While the issue of enforceability of browsewrap agreements appeared to have been resolved by Chilutti I, Pennsylvania courts’ grip on this issue has been slackened by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s January 21, 2026, opinion in Chilutti II. See Chilutti v. Uber Techs., Inc., 349 A.3d 826 (Pa. 2026) (“Chilutti II”). Therein, the Supreme Court did not address the merits of the Chiluttis’ substantive claim, but rather the issue of whether the Superior Court had appellate jurisdiction to immediately review the orders staying litigation pending arbitration. The Court ultimately vacated the en banc opinion on jurisdictional grounds, holding that the Superior Court did not have appellate jurisdiction because the trial court’s order from which the Chiluttis appealed did not qualify as a collateral order and, thus, the Superior Court erred in holding to the contrary and lacked jurisdiction to entertain the merits” of the Chiluttis’ substantive claim. As such, Chilutti II has rendered Chilutti I nonbinding, and the issue of enforceability of online arbitration agreements remains unresolved. However, in light of the fact the Supreme Court did not address or comment on the merits of the Chiluttis’ appeal, Chilutti I is still meaningful. Specifically, it provides guidance as to the standards a company should strive to meet to ensure they have obtained users’ assent so that they are able to enforce online arbitration agreements. Additionally, it may serve as persuasive authority in judges’ evaluations of petitions and/or motions to compel browsewrap arbitration agreements until this particular issue is properly put before our appellate courts. Keanna works in our Pittsburgh, PA office. She can be reached at (412) 803-1174 or KASeabrooks@MDWCG.com.

Thought Leadership

PA Superior Court Upholds Household Vehicle Exclusion in Favor of Erie When Stacking Was Not Implicated

Key Points: A household vehicle exclusion was upheld under an Erie Policy when the estate of deceased insureds sought UIM coverage when the insureds were occupying a motorcycle owned by the insureds, but the motorcycle was not covered by Erie’s Policy. The PA Superior Court distinguished Gallagher v. GEICO, in which Gallagher, unlike the Erie insured, had recovered UM/UIM, thus rendering the "household exclusion" an impermissible waiver of stacking. Here, with no UIM recovery from any source, the issue of stacking, much less impermissible waiver of stacking, never arose. In sum, the household vehicle exclusion is a valid exclusion when stacking is not implicated. In the Pennsylvania Superior Court case of Erie Ins. Exchange v. Estate of Kennedy, 350 A.3d 219 (Pa. Super. 2025), the court upheld Erie’s denial of coverage under the household vehicle exclusion in the Erie Policy when the insureds were occupying a motorcycle not covered under the policy. Dennis and Elissa Kennedy, Erie insureds, died in a single-vehicle motorcycle accident, with Dennis driving. Dennis insured the motorcycle with Progressive, which paid its liability limits to Elissa, after which Elissa sought household stacked Erie UIM coverage. Erie denied coverage under its "household exclusion" applicable to vehicles owned by insureds, but not covered by Erie's policy. The trial court granted judgment in favor of Erie on the ground that such benefits were barred by an exclusion applicable when an insured has suffered damages while occupying a vehicle owned by a relative and not covered under the policy, i.e. the household vehicle exclusion. Finding that the exclusion was valid, the PA Superior Court affirmed. The court found the facts of the case and policy exclusion analogous to the case of Erie Ins. Exchange v. Mione, 289 A.3d 524 (Pa. 2023). In Mione, a motorcyclist was injured in an accident with another vehicle whose driver was both at fault and underinsured. The motorcyclist's insurance policy did not include UM/UIM coverage. However, the motorcyclist had two household policies covering other vehicles, including stacked UM/UIM coverage, as well a household vehicle exclusion. UM/UIM benefits were therefore denied, and the motorcyclist argued that the exclusion was invalid because it did not comport with the statutory waiver requirements of Section 1738. The PA Supreme Court rejected the argument, explaining that UM/UIM coverage could not be procured in the "first instance" under the motorcyclist's household policies as “[F]or a household vehicle exclusion to be acting as an impermissible de facto waiver of stacking, the insured must have received UM/UIM coverage under some other policy first, or else is not implicated at all.” The motorcyclist had not received any UM/UIM benefits under his own motorcycle policy, so there was nothing for the UM/UIM benefits of the household policies to "stack on" to, and as such, Section 1738 was not implicated. The court also distinguished the case from Gallagher v. Geico, 201 A.3d 131 (Pa. 2009), in which a motorcyclist was injured in an accident caused by another driver who was underinsured. The motorcyclist had purchased two policies, each of which provided stacked UM/UIM benefits. The first policy covered only the motorcycle; the second covered two automobiles, while also containing a "household exclusion," which precluded UM/UIM benefits. The PA Supreme Court held that the exclusion was invalid because the resulting waiver of UM/UIM coverage did not comport with the statutory requirements of Section 1738. The court distinguished the Kennedy’s case from Gallagher as the Kennedy’s were attempting to stack UM/UIM coverages from (a) the Progressive Motorcycle Policy under which Dennis Kennedy was the only insured, and (b) the Erie Policy under which Dennis Kennedy and Elissa J. Kennedy were the insureds. Crucially, the court found that the party from whom the right to stack UM/UIM benefits under the Erie policy was derived (Elissa J. Kennedy) was not an insured under the motorcycle policy. In other words, no one paid for Elissa J. Kennedy to receive UM/UIM benefits under the motorcycle policy, so that policy afforded her no contractual right to such coverage in the first instance. The court further reasoned that the "miscellaneous vehicle" exclusion in the Erie Policy was valid because the insured, Elissa J. Kennedy, had not first received UM/UIM coverage under Dennis Kennedy's Motorcycle Policy. In conclusion, the Court found Gallagher inapposite, and Mione compelled the affirmance of the trial court's ruling upholding Erie’s denial of coverage pursuant to the household vehicle exclusion. Christin is a Shareholder in our King of Prussia, Pennsylvania, office. She can be reached at 610-354-8279 or clkochel@mdwcg.com.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

Featured Conversations... Key Takeaways from A.M. Best’s Webinar on the Misuse Defense in Product Liability Claims, Featuring Michael Salvati

Michael Salvati, shareholder in our Philadelphia office, was a panelist for the April A.M. Best webinar, “The Misuse Defense: Strategic Approaches to Defending Product Liability Claims for Insurers.” During the program, Michael and his fellow panelists offered practical, jurisdiction‑specific guidance on how misuse and failure‑to‑warn theories intersect in modern product liability litigation. Michael emphasized the unique challenges these claims present—particularly in states like Pennsylvania, where evidentiary rules diverge sharply from those applied in many other jurisdictions. Failure to Warn as the “Flip Side” of Misuse Salvati explained that failure‑to‑warn allegations often arise as a direct counter to a misuse defense. As he noted, “If our misuse defense is that the plaintiff didn't use a product properly or safely, then the failure to warn claim is that we didn't tell them how to use it properly.” He emphasized that these claims can stem from either the absence of warnings or criticisms of existing warnings, such as insufficient specificity or lack of clarity about risks. Pennsylvania’s Unique Evidentiary Landscape One of Salvati’s most notable points was the stark difference in how Pennsylvania treats evidence of compliance with industry standards. He highlighted that Pennsylvania is “one of the only states…where that evidence is not admissible” in strict liability cases. Manufacturers cannot rely on compliance with ANSI, UL, ISO, or even federal safety standards to defend the product against a strict liability claim—because the focus is solely on the product itself, not the manufacturer’s conduct. Salvati acknowledged the challenge this creates for defense counsel and clients who expect such compliance to carry weight. Understanding the Three Defect Theories Salvati also walked through the three primary defect theories recognized in many jurisdictions: - Design defect – a flaw in the product’s intended design - Manufacturing defect – a deviation affecting a specific unit - Failure to warn – inadequate instructions or warnings He noted that warnings claims are increasingly significant and sometimes stand alone when design or manufacturing theories are weak. As he put it, plaintiffs often default to warnings claims because “the default position seems to be, ‘If I got hurt, there must be something wrong.’” Warranties and State‑by‑State Variations Salvati addressed how breach‑of‑warranty claims fit into the broader framework, explaining that implied warranties—such as merchantability—often overlap with strict liability in Pennsylvania. He emphasized the importance of understanding local nuances, as warranty law and admissibility rules vary widely across states. Looking Ahead: The Growing Importance of Warnings In his closing remarks, Salvati stressed that warnings should never be treated as an afterthought in product liability defense. He observed that warnings‑only claims are becoming more common and urged manufacturers and insurers to continually evaluate the clarity and completeness of their instructions and warnings. His takeaway: “We should always be talking about what are the instructions that come with our products…to bolster a misuse defense.” Listen to the complete webinar here: https://www3.ambest.com/conferences/events/eventregister.aspx?event_id=WEB1074.