.

Patricia M. McDonagh

Portrait of Patricia M. McDonagh

Patricia concentrates her practice primarly on insurance coverage litigation and counseling, bad faith litigation, environmental and toxic tort litigation, and appellate practice. She has represented a large number of insurance companies and insurance industry professionals in both first and third party insurance coverage and bad faith matters. Patricia provides coverage opinions and advice to insurance carriers concerning their coverage obligations under insurance policies they issued and which provided CGL, homeowners', automobile liability, UM/UIM, PIP, workers' compensation and/or employer's liability coverage. She has also represented oil delivery companies and other third parties in litigation where they have been asked to assume or share in the costs of state-mandated clean up and remediation of environmental contamination. In addition, Patricia has had a great deal of experience in the defense of general liability, professional malpractice and products liability matters.

In 1990, Patricia graduated magna cum laude from Fairfield University. She then went on to obtain her juris doctor from Villanova University School of Law in 1993, after which she was admitted to the bar in the states of New Jersey and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

After working for another defense litigation law firm in Morristown, New Jersey, Patricia joined Marshall Dennehey in 1997 and practices in the firm's Roseland, New Jersey, office, where she oversees the bad faith/coverage matters in that office.

    • Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law (J.D., 1993)
    • Fairfield University (B.A., magna cum laude, 1990)
    • New Jersey, 1993
    • The Best Lawyers in America©, Appellate Practice (2026)
    • Essex County Bar Association
    • New Jersey State Bar Association
  • Assisted in securing a unanimous 6-0 defense verdict in a New Jersey premises liability case after the jury found no negligence on the part of the defendant. The plaintiff alleged that a six-foot drill bit fell from a retail display, causing a concussion, post-concussion syndrome and permanent cognitive impairments. The defense demonstrated that the item was displaced only after an unidentified customer struck the shelving with a shopping cart and that there was no evidence store employees knew or should have known of the condition. Through surveillance video, fact witness testimony and expert evidence, the defense also established that the impact was inconsistent with the forces necessary to cause a concussion and highlighted alternative explanations for the plaintiff's claimed injuries. Following a six-day trial, the jury returned a complete defense verdict, finding the defendant was not negligent.

    Secured a unanimous defense verdict in a premises liability matter involving a national home improvement retailer. The plaintiff alleged that she developed Complex Regional Pain Syndrome (CRPS) following a fall in the retailer's parking lot in October 2022. Plaintiff claimed that the incident necessitated significant ongoing medical treatment, including the implantation of a permanent spinal cord stimulator. The plaintiff sought substantial damages, including claims for extensive future medical care. The defense team successfully challenged the credibility of the plaintiff's allegations and expert testimony through rigorous cross-examination and the presentation of defense experts in forensic engineering, human factors, and pain management. The defense also demonstrated that the plaintiff's alleged condition was attributable to pre-existing medical issues rather than the incident at issue. Following a six-day trial, the jury deliberated for just 42 minutes before returning a unanimous verdict finding no negligence on the part of the defendant.

    Secured a no-cause verdict on behalf of a national home improvement retailer in a personal injury action. The plaintiff alleged that on May 20, 2019, she was injured at one of the retailer’s stores when an associate moved a lumber cart, causing a PVC pipe to fall and strike her head and right shoulder. She claimed permanent traumatic brain injury, concussion, and spinal injuries, supported by her orthopedic and neurologic experts. Our defense orthopedic and neurologic experts testified that the plaintiff’s reported symptoms were more consistent with malingering or a somatoform disorder. After a one-week trial and approximately 45 minutes of deliberation, the jury unanimously found the defendant was not negligent. The last demand was $1.2 million, and the final offer was $100,000.

    Obtained summary judgment in favor of an automobile liability insurance carrier, wherein court upheld carrier's disclaimer of defense and indemnity coverage to its insured in response to personal injury lawsuit brought against insured arising from motor vehicle accident on the basis that insured had made material misrepresentations on his insurance policy application as to where he resided and principally garaged the insured vehicle.

    Successfully represented an insurance carrier in a declaratory judgment action, wherein carrier disclaimed coverage to insured under an automobile liability insurance policy with regard to an underlying personal injury lawsuit brought against insured arising from a motor vehicle accident because insured failed to provide the carrier with notice of either the accident or the resultant lawsuit and which, in turn, substantially prejudiced the insurer.

    Obtained summary judgment on behalf of defendant employers and having all claims against them dismissed in civil lawsuits brought against them by their own employees for injuries the employees sustained in the workplace on the basis that there was no evidence to support a finding that the "intentional wrong" exception to the workers' compensation bar applied. In one of these cases, in particular, after successfully in having the plaintiff employee's claim against his employer dismissed, the employee continued to litigate his claim against the remaining defendant, a forklift manufacturer, resulting in a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff in excess of $1 million, which was subsequently affirmed on appeal.

    Obtained summary judgment in favor of a commercial general liability carrier in a declaratory judgment action, successfully limiting the CGL carrier's potential liability exposure in a case involving serious injuries to two plaintiffs as a result of a robbery. Received a favorable ruling from the court that the $100,000 aggregate policy limit, set forth in the CGL policy's Assault & Battery Endorsement, was the applicable liability coverage limit potentially available to the injured plaintiffs under the CGL policy and not the $1 million per occurrence coverage limit, set forth in the policy's Declarations, as was argued by the plaintiffs.

    Successfully defended a CGL insurance carrier in a claim brought against it by the landlord/owner of a warehouse for defense and indemnity coverage as an Additional Insured under a CGL insurance policy issued by the carrier to one of the tenants at the warehouse in a high-exposure property damage loss case arising from a fire on the basis that the landlord did not qualify as an additional insured on the policy pursuant to the Additional Insured Endorsement and the landlord's claim should be a claim against its insurance broker for professional negligence in not procuring the proper insurance coverage requested by the landlord.

    Obtained summary judgment in favor of a subcontractor on an indemnity cross-claim, where the contract at issue, between the subcontractor and the general contractor, did not include the required express language that the general contractor would be indemnified for own negligence.

    • "New Jersey Supreme Court Holds that Evidence of an Insured’s Uncompensated Medical Expenses Falling Between the Insured’s Selected PIP Coverage and the Statutory Maximum PIP Coverage of $250,000 Is Inadmissible," Legal Updates for Coverage and Bad Faith, March 28, 2019
    • "New Jersey Environmental Insurance Law: The Battle Over Coverage Between Insurers and Policyholders, Arising from "Owned Property Exclusion" Clauses in CGL Policies," Defense Digest, Fall 2004
    • "Are E-Mails Privileged?," For The Defense, November 2000

Results

Summary Judgment for Insurer in Complex Coverage Case

We successfully persuaded the court to grant summary judgement on behalf of a major insurer on a complex coverage issue. This coverage case concerned two Virginia personal automobile policies in regard to an automobile accident in New Jersey. The son of a divorced couple sought coverage for an accident he was involved in on a major thoroughfare in New Jersey. At the time of the accident, the son was operating a motor vehicle owned by another Virginia resident, and he had the reasonable expectation that he had permission to operate the vehicle. The accident was very serious, and he sought coverage under both of his parents’ policies. As to the mother’s policy, we convinced the court that the son was not an insured under her policy because he was not so designated on the policy’s declaration page, which was a specific condition of the policy pursuant to Virginia law. As to the father’s policy, once again, we convinced the court that the son was not an insured under this policy given the fact that the mother had sole and exclusive custody under the divorce agreement; thus, the son was not a resident relative of the father’s household. Therefore, neither policy provided coverage for the son, and the insurer was totally dismissed from the case.

Court Agrees Mode of Operations Does Not Apply in Retail Liability Case

We were successful on a motion for summary judgment, thereby barring the application of the mode of operations in a slip and fall case where an alleged partially eaten sandwich was found in the aisle of the retailer. ​The facts indicated that the sandwich came from a fast-food sandwich shop within the premises and was dropped by an unidentified customer, who took the item to go and dropped it in the aisle before the plaintiff fell. The court ruled that the mode of operations did not apply because the aisle, which contained greeting cards and the like, and did not create an extension of the cafeteria within the retailer’s premises. Further, the court ruled there was no nexus to any self-serve component of the fast food restaurant’s business to the area in the retailer’s store proper where the accident occurred.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

Delaware Superior Court Clarifies Pleading Standard for Legal Malpractice Claims

In the matter of Edelstein v. Kirschner, No. N25C-09-018 FJJ, 2026 Del. Super. LEXIS 45, at *1 (Super. Ct. Jan. 29, 2026), the plaintiff law firm sued its former client for unpaid legal fees in the amount of $4,399.35. The former client asserted a counterclaim alleging legal malpractice. More, specifically, the former client claimed that his lawyer committed malpractice be recommending that he settle an underlying lawsuit by entering into a stipulated judgment for an excessive amount with interest that was accruing at “an outlandish” interest rate. The law firm moved to dismiss the counterclaim on the basis that its former client had not alleged facts reflecting that he could prove the case within the case. That is, facts reflecting that his attorneys caused him to lose the underlying case. The Superior Court held that while a legal malpractice plaintiff in cases arising from underlying litigation must prove the case within the case to survive a summary judgment motion, he does not need to plead facts reflecting as much in order to survive a motion to dismiss. While this case addresses the pleading requirements of a legal malpractice case in Delaware, it also serves as reminder that chasing unpaid legal fees from a former client can often give rise to a legal malpractice counterclaim. Attorneys seeking to collect unpaid legal fees should ensure that the fees they seek are for a significant amount, which would be recoverable if a judgment is obtained. Otherwise, the effort could backfire.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court Takes Up the Gist of the Action Doctrine

The gist of the action doctrine has been a hot topic in legal malpractice cases in Pennsylvania over the last several years.  Beginning in 2014, the Pennsylvania courts applied the gist of the action doctrine to professional liability actions, following the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s opinion in Bruno v. Erie Ins. Co., 106 A.3d 48 (Pa. 2014).  In Bruno, the court applied the gist of the action doctrine to a professional negligence claim, and found that a negligence claim was not barred simply because the parties were in a contractual relationship where the gist of the claim sounded in negligence. Thereafter, courts in Pennsylvania applied the gist of the action doctrine to breach of contract claims as well, finding that where the allegations sounded in negligence, a plaintiff could not recast a negligence claim as one for breach of contract. This was important because of the distinction between statutes of limitations: negligence claims must be brought within two (2) years, while breach of contract claims can be brought within four (4) years.  Then, last year, the Pennsylvania Superior Court held that the gist of the action doctrine does not apply to breach of contract claims as seen through two opinions. These opinions were Swatt v. Nottingham Village, 342 A.3d 23 (Pa. Super. 2025) and Poteat v. Asteak, et al., 350 A.3d 198 (Pa. Super. 2025). That is, the gist of the action doctrine can bar a negligence claim but it cannot bar a breach of contract claim.  This month, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted the petition for allowance of appeal in Poteat.  The Supreme Court phrased the issue for consideration as follows: Whether the Superior Court majority’s holding conflicts with this Court’s holding in Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co., 160 A.3d 48 (Pa. 2014), as well as Superior Court opinions that applied Bruno, and departs from almost 200 years of controlling precedent that distinguishes between causes of action in contract and tort based upon the nature of the duty that was allegedly breached? Attorneys on both sides of legal malpractice matters no doubt look forward to clarification on these issues from our Supreme Court.