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Noah E. Blake

Portrait of Noah E. Blake

Noah Blake is an associate in our Casualty Department where he represents defendants in third-party insurance defense matters concerning negligence, automobile liability, and premises liability. He also defends insurance carriers in matters involving personal injury protection (PIP) litigation, bodily injury, and general liability.

Prior to joining Marshall Dennehey, Noah served as the Assistant Public Defender in Hillsborough County. During his time in this office, he litigated over 2,000 cases that included several trials and motions to suppress and dismiss. Notably he received a 'not guilty' verdict at trial after the jury had only deliberated for eight minutes on a case where the client was facing up to 10 years prison. 

Noah earned his Bachelor of Science degree in Law Enforcement and Justice Administration from Western Illinois University. He received his juris doctor from University of Florida Levin College of Law graduating magna cum laude. While in law school, he served as Volunteer Coordinator for the Ask a Lawyer Project which helped provide free legal consultation to the homeless community in Gainesville, Florida. 

When he is not working, he enjoys spending time with his family. Noah is admitted to practice in Florida. 

    • University of Florida Levin College of Law (J.D., magna cum laude, 2020)
    • Western Illinois University (B.S., summa cum laude, 2017)
    • Florida, 2020

Thought Leadership

Defense Digest

Is Your Independent Contractor Actually a “Secret” Agent?

September 30, 2026

Key Points: • A principal is vicariously liable for the negligence of an agent, but not that of an independent contractor. • If an employer’s right to control extends to the manner in which a task is completed, then an employee is an agent rather than an independent contractor. • Even though agency is generally a question for a jury to resolve, where the record is devoid of evidence to support a finding of agency, then summary judgment is appropriate. In many cases involving the alleged negligence of an independent contractor we may think the liability analysis is simple: there is no vicarious liability for an independent contractor’s negligent actions. However, this analysis does not consider whether that “independent contractor” could be considered an agent. Under Florida law, “[A] principal is vicariously liable for the negligence of an agent, but not of an independent contractor.” Del Pilar v. DHL Glob. Customer Sols. (USA), Inc., 993 So. 2d 142, 145 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008). The First District Court of Appeals’ recent ruling in the case of James v. Hernandez et al, 2026 Fla. App. LEXIS 3878 (Fla. 1st DCA May 20, 2026) provides clear guidance on the determinative test used to evaluate whether a person/entity is an independent contractor or an agent. In James, the plaintiff, Jeffrey James, was on a bicycle when he was struck by a vehicle operated by Abraham Hernandez, Jr. Hernandez owned Premier Waterproofing & Painting (“PWP”), which was a painting subcontractor for Premier Construction-Residential, LLC (“Premier”). Hernandez was traveling between Premier job sites at the time of the accident. Premier moved for summary judgment on the basis that Hernandez was an independent contractor. The plaintiff opposed the motion and asserted that Hernandez was Premier’s agent and, thus, Premier was vicariously liable for Hernandez’s negligence. At the trial court level, Premier’s motion for summary judgment was granted, but the plaintiff appealed, leading to this opinion from the 1st DCA. The 1st DCA began their analysis by considering Premier’s right to control Hernandez, and not the actual control exercised over Hernandez. They cited to Del Pilar v. DHL Glob. Customer Sols. (USA), Inc., 993 So. 2d 142, 146 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) for the proposition that, “If the employer’s right to control the activities of an employee extends to the manner in which a task is to be performed, then the employee is not an independent contractor, but rather is an agent … .” For the purpose of analyzing Premier’s right to control, they looked at the written agreement between Premier and Hernandez. The agreement governing the relationship among Premier, Hernandez, and PWP expressly provided that Hernandez was an independent contractor. The 1st DCA specifically highlighted provisions that were consistent with Hernandez being an independent contractor such as requirements that Hernandez have his own general liability, workers’ compensation, and auto liability insurance and that Hernandez be paid in one lump sum rather than a salary or hourly wage. In addition to the agreement, the court also looked to the actual practice among the parties to determine if the relationship was one of principal or agent. The Court noted that Hernandez drove his own truck, purchased his own paint and equipment, hired and paid his own workers, and he controlled how he got to and from Premier jobsites. Despite these facts, the plaintiff tried to argue that Hernandez was Premier’s agent because Hernandez worked almost exclusively for Premier. They also argued that Premier exercised control over Hernandez’s painting methods by indicating the order in which he should paint homes in the Fletcher Oaks subdivision and which paint colors to use. Counter to these assertions, the Court recognized that Hernandez and PWP contracted with and were compensated by other companies and individuals besides Premier. Likewise, Premier contracted with other painters to paint houses in the Fletcher Oaks subdivision as well. As to the direction given to Hernandez by Premier, the court indicated that the instructions to Hernandez were essential to the work generally assigned by a build contractor to a specialty subcontractor. Considering that there were other subcontractors working within the Fletcher Oaks subdivision, Premier needed to provide instruction as to the sequence of homes to be painted and which paints to use on those homes. The court stated that these actions by Premier did not point to control over Hernandez’s methods of painting but rather control over outcomes of the job assigned. Typically, the question of whether there is an agency relationship is a question for a jury to resolve, but, in this instance, the court ultimately ruled that the plaintiff failed to present any significantly probative evidence pointing to Premier’s control over Hernandez’s painting methods to show that there was an agency relationship. As such, the 1st DCA affirmed the trial court’s ruling that Premier had no vicarious liability since Hernandez was an independent contractor. This ruling serves as a reminder not only of the agency exception to the general independent contractor rule but also the standards for ruling on a motion for summary judgment. Even though the question of agency is generally considered a question of fact for a jury, the test on summary judgment is whether there is evidence such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. As this case demonstrates, when there is not sufficient evidence on a question of fact, then summary judgment is appropriate. Noah is an Associate in our Tampa, FL office. He can be reached at (813) 898-1817 or NEBlake@mdwcg.com.

Defense Digest

Take a Closer Look: The Precise Language of an Out-of-State Coverage Provision Leads To Varying Results

March 1, 2024

Key Points: Where the language in an insurance contract is plain and unambiguous, the courts must interpret the terms of the contract according to their plain meaning as written. Florida Statute §627.733 only requires a nonresident owner of a vehicle to maintain PIP coverage after they have been within Florida for more than 90 days of the preceding 365 days.  Due to Florida’s presence requirement under Fla. Stat. §627.733 for nonresidents, an out-of-state coverage provision that only applies to unconditional out-of-state compulsory insurance laws will not provide PIP benefits in Florida. The recent ruling by the Fourth District Court of Appeal in T.I.O. Medical Intervention LLC a/a/o Mary Faison v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company, 373 So. 3d 341 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023) serves as a reminder to pay very close attention to the exact wording in insurance policy provisions. This case involved an insured that maintained a Georgia-based insurance policy but was involved in an accident in Florida. The insured was treated in Florida, and the plaintiff, a medical provider, submitted medical bills to the defendant insurer for reimbursement under Florida Personal Injury Protection (PIP) benefits.  The insurer argued that the Georgia policy did not provide for Florida PIP benefits per the policy language. At the county court level, the insurer was granted summary judgment because the court found that the “clear and unambiguous” language of the Georgia policy did not provide for Florida PIP benefits. The plaintiff appealed. On appeal, the Fourth District analyzed the specific out-of-state coverage provision. Specifically, the court noted, “Where the language in an insurance contract is plain and unambiguous, a court must interpret the policy in accordance with the plain meaning so as to give effect to the policy as written.” Wash. Nat’l Ins. Corp. v. Ruderman, 117 So.3d 943, 948 (Fla. 2013). Looking first to the subject out-of-state coverage provision, the Georgia policy stated:  If an auto accident to which this policy applies occurs in any state or province other than the one in which ‘your covered auto’ is principally garaged, we will interpret your policy for that accident as follows: If the state or province has: … A compulsory insurance or similar law requiring a nonresident to maintain insurance whenever the nonresident uses a vehicle in that state or province, your policy will provide at least the required minimum amounts and types of coverage.  The Fourth District then looked to the presence requirement under Fla. Stat. §627.733(2) which governs PIP coverage for nonresidents: Every nonresident owner or registrant of a motor vehicle which, whether operated or not, has been physically present within this state for more than 90 days during the preceding 365 days shall thereafter maintain security as defined by subsection (3)… Fla. Stat. §627.733(2). In comparing the policy provision and the relevant Florida statute, the Fourth District concluded that the Georgia policy did not provide for Florida PIP benefits. Specifically, the court noted that the Georgia policy would only provide out-of-state coverage if the state’s compulsory insurance laws require a nonresident to have insurance “whenever” they use a vehicle. Florida law does not require a nonresident owner of a vehicle to maintain PIP coverage every time they drive, only when they have been in Florida for 90 out of the last 365 days.   The plaintiffs did not present any evidence that the insured met the nonresident presence requirement under Fla. Stat. §627.733(2), but the Fourth District stated that it would make no difference to the court’s conclusion since Florida law does not “unconditionally require” nonresidents to have PIP coverage when they drive in Florida as considered by the policy. The Fourth District contrasted the Georgia policy language with out-of-state coverage provisions interpreted by the Fifth and Second District Court of Appeals. In Meyer v. Hutchinson, 861 So.2d 1185, 1186-87 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003) and Jiminez v. Faccone, 98 So.3d 621 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012), the Fifth and Second Districts analyzed an out-of-state coverage provision of an insurance policy which stated: If an insured is in another state or Canada and, as a nonresident, becomes subject to its motor vehicle compulsory insurance, financial responsibility, or similar law: This policy will be interpreted to give the coverage required by the law…  The Fourth District distinguished the policy provisions interpreted by the Fifth and Second Districts from the Georgia policy provision on the basis that the former policy provision would allow coverage for nonresidents who “became subject” to Florida’s PIP statute by virtue of maintaining presence in Florida for 90 days. In comparison, the Georgia policy provision does not include the same language that would afford coverage to nonresidents who maintain presence in Florida for 90 days pursuant to Fla. Stat. §627.733(2). Therefore, the Fourth District held that the Georgia policy did not provide for Florida PIP benefits, and the lower court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of the insurer was affirmed. In light of this case, it is recommended that insurance companies review the out-of-state coverage provisions in their respective policies. As shown by this case, these provisions need to be carefully constructed so as not to afford coverage when it is not intended. They are easy to overlook, but every word is vital since courts interpret these policy provisions by their plain meaning. That is why it is important to look closely at each provision and make sure the clear meaning of the provision is what is intended.  *Noah is an associate in our Tampa, Florida, office. He can be reached at (813) 898-1817 or NEBlake@mdwcg.com.    Defense Digest, Vol. 30, No. 1, March 2024, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2024 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

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Thought Leadership

U.S. Department of Education Reports to Congress on Disciplinary Removals of Children with Disabilities

In June 2026, the United States Department of Education, through the Office of Special Education and Rehabilitative Services (OSERS), published its “47th Annual Report to Congress on the Implementation of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 2025.” In its report, OSERS provided detailed data and information on the discipline and removal of students from their educational placements, specifically for the school year 2022-2023. To obtain this data, all 50 states, the District of Columbia, the Bureau of Indian Education, Puerto Rico, and other U.S. territories, were asked to report on pre-school and school-aged students, ages 3-21, who were served under IDEA, Part B, and removed from their educational placements for disciplinary reasons during the school year in question. Not all jurisdictions had data available; OSERS’ reporting to Congress was based on the information supplied by the jurisdictions that responded.  First, OSERS examined the total number of served students who were removed to an interim alternative educational setting. From the reporting data, this number totaled 7,204,199 students. Of this total, 11,364 students were removed unilaterally by school personnel for drugs, weapons, or serious bodily injury to themselves or others. These figures reflected the unilateral removal of served students at a rate of 16 per 10,000 students. Of this total, 545 students were removed by a due process hearing officer for likely serious bodily injury, a rate of one per 10,000 students.  Next, OSERS examined data for students who were suspended (in school and out of school) or expelled for more than 10 school days. The total number of students in this category was 7,623,095. Of this total, 65,104 students received out of school suspensions or expulsions, a rate of 85 per 10,000 students. A total of 21,878 students received in school suspensions, a rate of 29 students per 10,000.  OSERS evaluated this particular data and drilled down further, examining the rate of interim removal, expulsion, and suspension per 10,000 students based specifically upon each IDEA disability category. Perhaps not surprisingly, children primarily identified with emotional disturbance were the most affected.    For every 10,000 students who were identified under the category of emotional disturbance, 65 were unilaterally removed to an interim alternative educational setting by school personnel (not the IEP team) for drugs, weapons, or serious bodily injury, and four out of every 10,000 students were removed following a hearing officer finding that there was a substantial likelihood of serious bodily injury to the student or others. By contrast, the ratio of students under each of the other disability categories who were unilaterally removed by school personnel was 25 or less per 10,000 students in each category. No more than two students per 10,000 in each of the other categories were removed by a hearing officer. Other Health Impairment was the second leading category.  For every 10,000 students identified primarily with emotional disturbance, 411 students received out of school suspensions or expulsions of more than 10 days, and 107 of every 10,000 students in this category received in-school suspensions. In comparison, the ratio of students under each of the other disability categories who received out of school suspensions or expulsions of more than 10 days was no more than 172 per 10,000. Students identified in all other disability categories received in-school suspensions at a rate of no more than 57 per 10,000 students. Again, Other Health Impairment was the second leading category. OSERS then examined discipline data with a state-by-state comparison, once more at a ratio of 10,000 students served. The overall data of students who were unilaterally removed to an interim alternative educational setting by school personnel for drugs, weapons, or serious bodily injury showed that removal occurred most frequently in Texas (92 per 10,000 students), Montana (62 per 10,000 students), and Tennessee (42 per 10,000 students). The mean was 12.1.  In Pennsylvania, the rate of removal was 12 out of every 10,000 students, just below the mean.  OSERS also considered, on a state-by-state basis, the number of students who received out-of-school suspensions or expulsions of greater than 10 days. The most significant rate of discipline here occurred in North Carolina (256 per 10,000 students), Missouri (250 per 10,000 students), and South Carolina (250 per 10,000 students).  The mean was 85.83. In Pennsylvania, the rate of discipline was 57 per 10,000 students, well below the mean.  Finally, OSERS evaluated, on a state-by-state comparison, the ratio of students per 10,000 who were identified under the category of emotional disturbance and who received out of school suspensions or expulsions for greater than 10 days. The suspension or expulsion of students with emotional disturbance occurred most often in North Carolina (1,723 per 10,000 students), Missouri (1,127 per 10,000 students), and South Carolina (1,098 per 10,000). The mean was 485.81. In Pennsylvania, the suspension or expulsion of students identified with emotional disturbance occurred at a rate of 260 per 10,000, again well below the mean. Although OSERS did not draw any specific conclusions about the disciplinary data it collected, it is nonetheless evident that students primarily identified with emotional disturbance were removed from their educational placements for disciplinary reasons at a rate much higher than students in any other disability category. Relatively speaking, however, Pennsylvania acquitted itself well in the state-by-state disciplinary data collection.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania HB 2307: Special Education Contingency Fund Reform

Pennsylvania school districts and school law attorneys are aware of the increasing cost of special education services. In an effort to address this growing squeeze on school district budgets, a bi-partisan group of Pennsylvania House Representatives introduced House Bill 2307. The bill is a special education funding measure intended to reform Pennsylvania's reimbursement system for extraordinarily high-cost special education students. As written, HB 2307 would increase funding dedicated to Pennsylvania's Extraordinary Special Education Program Expenses reimbursement program. Beginning with the 2026-27 school year, the bill would increase the set-aside from 1% to 2% of the annual Special Education appropriation. The increased funding is aimed at assisting school districts and charter schools address the costs of serving students whose needs generate exceptionally high special education expenses. The proposal specifically targets situations involving students whose annual special education costs exceed the state's highest cost threshold and represent a significant burden on a district's special education budget. HB 2307 includes key eligibility requirements such as: 1) extraordinary special education expenses approved by the Secretary of Education; 2) student costs exceeding the state's highest Category 3A threshold; 3) costs representing at least 1% of the district's total special education expenditures; 4) student enrolled in the district for no more than two consecutive school years for the proposed reimbursement category; and 5) application and documentation requirements for districts and charter schools. HB 2307 successfully passed the Pennsylvania House of Representatives on June 16, 2026, by a unanimous vote of 202-0. It was subsequently transmitted to the Senate and was referred to the Senate Education Committee on June 22, 2026, where it currently remains pending. While there is currently no scheduled Senate committee or floor vote publicly listed for HB 2307, the next step would be for the Senate Education Committee to consider the bill and determine whether to report it to the full Senate for consideration. If approved by the committee, the bill would proceed through the Senate's three-consideration process before a final vote. Because the General Assembly is still within the 2025-26 legislative session, the bill remains eligible for action during the remainder of the session. However, absent committee action, it will not become law before the start of the 2026-27 school year. If enacted, HB 2307 could have several important effects: Greater financial stability for districts serving students with exceptionally expensive educational and related-service needs. Increased reimbursement opportunities for high-cost placements, specialized transportation, intensive behavioral supports, and other extraordinary services. Reduced pressure on local special education budgets, particularly in smaller districts where one or two high-cost students can significantly affect annual expenditures. Potential reduction in litigation and placement disputes driven by financial constraints, although the bill does not alter substantive IDEA rights or district obligations to provide FAPE.