.

Nicholas D. Bowers

Portrait of Nicholas D. Bowers

As a seasoned litigator, Nick has represented companies, schools and professionals across a range of disciplines in relation to civil and commercial disputes. His representative experience includes construction injury, auto and trucking accident cases as well as products and premises liability matters. Nick represents construction firms, industrial clients and others in relation to catastrophic injury claims, both pre-suit and during litigation, as well as pursuant to OSHA investigations and similar governmental inquiries. Additionally, he represents property management companies in personal injury claims by tenants due to mold exposure.

Nick’s practice also encompasses litigation stemming from construction defect and other property loss. In this regard, he regularly handles cases involving claims for alleged defect(s) and damage arising from negligence as well as the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices Act and Consumer Protection Law. Nick’s experience extends to shipping loss matters, including actions involving the Carmack Amendment.  

Nick’s practice has grown to include the defense of school districts, municipalities and private schools in relation to allegations of abuse. He is cognizant of the complex and sensitive nature of these cases and well-versed in the applicable statutory framework.  

During the course of his career, he has tried cases in a broad range of claims in both Federal and State Courts, obtaining favorable outcomes for clients at trial, arbitration and by way of summary judgment. Since 2017, Nick has been selected by Super Lawyers as a Rising Star in the field of Civil Litigation Defense, a recognition awarded to no more than 2.5 percent of attorneys under the age of 40 in the region.  

Nick also has experience in the area of insurance fraud (“SIU”) litigation. In this role, he handles a wide variety of auto litigation (including BI, UM/UIM and PIP) as well as premises liability matters flagged for suspected fraudulent activity.  

Nick graduated from Loyola University Maryland in 2005. While at Loyola, he was a four-year starter on the NCAA Division One Men’s Tennis Team, serving as captain during his senior year. After Loyola, he was employed on Capitol Hill in Washington, DC at the United States House of Representatives.  In this role, he served as staff for the Committee on Ways and Means, which is the House Committee responsible for formulating bills related to taxation and international trade.

Outside of his practice, Nick enjoys spending time with his family, experiencing the outdoors and riding the highs and lows of Philadelphia sports.

    • Temple University Beasley School of Law (J.D., 2009)
    • Loyola University Maryland (B.A., 2005)
    • New Jersey, 2009
    • U.S. District Court District of New Jersey, 2009
    • Pennsylvania, 2013
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 2014
    • Pennsylvania Super Lawyers Rising Star (2017-2022)
    • Pennsylvania Bar Association
    • Philadelphia Bar Association
    • Loyola University, Philadelphia Alumni Chapter, Board of Directors
    • Pennsylvania First Party Medical Benefits (PIP): An Overview And Strategies For Effective Claims Handling, Marshall Dennehey Virtual Client Presentation, March 5, 2021
    • An Overview of Pennsylvania Law for Auto & Premises Claims, Marshall Dennehey Virtual Client Presentation, February, 2021
    • Accident Prevention and Investigation: Strategies for Risk Mitigation, Client Presentation, April 2017
    • Pennsylvania First-Party Benefits: An Overview.  Client seminar.  Presented August, 2015.
    • SIU and the Third-Party Liability Case: An Overview and Tactics.  CLE Course.  Presented July, 2015.
    • "Bankruptcy Fraud—Tactics for the Effective Use of a Plaintiff’s Bankruptcy Filing in Defending Civil Claims," Defense Digest, Vol. 19, No. 4, December 2013
    • "Acupuncture Billing Has PIP Carriers on Pins and Needles," SIU Perspectives, Vol. 1, No. 1, October 2013
    • "Winning Legal Strategies for Combating A Prickly Problem 'Sticking' New Jersey Carriers," Defense Digest, Vol. 19, No. 2, June 2013
    • Case Law Alerts, regular contributor, 2012-present
    • Obtained dismissal of clients by Summary Judgment in a Philadelphia premises liability case in which we represented both the landowner and tenant. The plaintiff originally demanded $2 million, later reduced to $800,000. Although our clients were responsible for sidewalk maintenance, the plaintiff’s deposition testimony confirmed she tripped on a smaller portion of an alleged defect which was larger in other areas of the sidewalk. We successfully argued that this portion was de minimis and not actionable under Pennsylvania law. Despite a comprehensive opposition and a Motion for Reconsideration, the Court agreed with our arguments, dismissing all claims against our clients with prejudice.
    • Secured dismissal with prejudice of clients (bar owners) in high value dram shop case involving the unfortunate death of an automobile occupant. Court granted defense motion and found that Plaintiff’s claims were barred as a matter of law.
    • First chair trial counsel in two-week trial at Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas in case involving a catastrophically injured Plaintiff and settlement demand of $25 million. The case and trial involved complex issues pertaining to post-Tincher product liability in Pennsylvania as well as successor liability and statutory employer considerations. Resolved on terms favorable to client prior to verdict.
    • Secured dismissal with prejudice in significant property loss/theft case.  Plaintiff alleged that his landlord stole several artifacts and other materials from him while Plaintiff was out of the country.  Plaintiff testified that he filed for bankruptcy and obtained a discharge after the alleged theft.  Plaintiff did not list his claim against my client on his bankruptcy petition and thus Plaintiff forfeited his post-discharge right to this “asset” (claim) per the United State Bankruptcy Code.  Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed case with prejudice when confronted with bankruptcy evidence and legal argument.
    • Secured summary judgment in favor of large oil refinery based on argument that refinery was the owner out of possession and thus had no control over the premises and therefore had no duty of care with respect to the Plaintiff.
    • Obtained defense verdict in Philadelphia premises liability matter.  Plaintiff alleged she slipped and fell on “dirty water” which accumulated in the lobby of Defendant’s premises.  Defense verdict secured based on Plaintiff’s failure to establish that Defendant had actual or constructive notice of alleged dangerous condition.

Results

Thought Leadership

Defense Digest

Change Is in the Air: A Shift in Pennsylvania Judge’s Role in Jury Selection Effective April 1, 2025

March 1, 2025

Key Points: Effective April 1, 2025, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has amended Pa.R.C.P. 220.3, pertaining to voir dire of jurors.  Amended Rule 220.3(a) now provides: “Judge’s Presence Required. Voir dire of prospective jurors shall be conducted, and the jurors shall be selected, in the presence of a judge, unless the judge’s presence is waived by all parties with the consent of the court.” The right to a trial by jury is a hallmark of the justice system in the United States. Juries consist of eight or twelve individuals from a given geographic area, generally lacking legal training, who are asked to decide facts and render verdicts, often of great consequence to the litigants. While jurors must follow the directions of the court, each juror has broad discretion in deciding, among other things, whether or not to believe a witness, how heavily to weigh competing evidence, and in determining whether they are or are not persuaded by arguments of counsel. In light of this, it is perhaps rightly said that many cases are won or lost during jury selection.  In Pennsylvania, attorney control of jury composition is generally limited to voir dire and peremptory challenges. Traditionally, voir dire procedures in Pennsylvania have varied from county to county—with some counties involving judges in the process more than others. In particular, Allegheny and Philadelphia Counties, for example, generally utilized court officers who controlled the voir dire process in the absence of the judge or court reporter.  Recently, however, a significant change in these procedures was adopted, with an effective date of April 1, 2025. Specifically, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania amended Pa.R.C.P. 220.3, pertaining to voir dire of jurors, to include amended Rule 220.3(a), which now provides the following: “Judge’s Presence Required. Voir dire of prospective jurors shall be conducted, and the jurors shall be selected, in the presence of a judge, unless the judge’s presence is waived by all parties with the consent of the court.” (Emphasis added.) The adoption of amended Pa.R.C.P. 220.3 was preceded by the case of Trigg v. Children’s Hospital of Pittsburgh of UPMC, 187 A.3d 1013 (Pa. Super 2018), which involved an Allegheny County trial where jury selection occurred in the presence of a court clerk as opposed to the trial judge. The plaintiff appealed the jury verdict on, among others, the basis that three jurors should have been stricken for cause due to bias, as evidenced in voir dire, which occurred outside of the presence of the trial judge. The appellant argued the court’s decision not to strike was reversible error, while the appellees took the position that the trial court was entitled to the palpable error deference standard announced in McHugh v. Proctor & Gamble, 776 A.2d 266 (Pa. Super. 2001). Thus, no error warranting overturning the verdict occurred. The Trigg court took note of the fact that jury selection took place outside of the presence of the judge thus, depriving the trial court of the opportunity to assess the credibility of the proposed jurors to any extent beyond reading a transcript. Accordingly, per Trigg, the trial judge had no greater insight into the credibility of the proposed jurors—having not viewed the questioning live and, thus, lacked insight into the reactions of the proposed jurors to the questioning, including hesitation, eye movement or other physical manifestations impacting credibility—than the appellate court. Therefore, McHugh deference was not warranted.  The Superior Court overturned the verdict accordingly.  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court took up the case on appeal from the Superior Court in Trigg v. Children’s Hospital of Pittsburgh of UPMC, 229 A.3d 269 (Pa. 2020). While the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that the issue in question had been waived due to counsel’s failure to object to the jury selection proceeding in the absence of the judge, the Supreme Court still found the procedure problematic, leading to adoption of amended Pa.R.C.P. 220.3. Amended Rule 220.3 will likely lead to greater uniformity in the jury selection process across counties in Pennsylvania. Unless waived by the parties, voir dire must now occur in the presence of a judge. It is important for practitioners to understand that each party is entitled to have the judge present for voir dire, and this right should not be waived absent an affirmative decision to do so approved by a client.  The Amended Rule may also assist litigants in the preservation of appellate issues, including those relative to a trial court’s decision to strike or decline to strike a juror for cause. The judge will be present along with a court reporter.  *Nick is a member of our Casualty Department. He works in our Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, office.    Defense Digest, Vol. 31, No. 1, March 2025, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2025 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania Holds That Public Policy Does Not Prevent Insurance Coverage for Sex Trafficking Claims

On July 21, 2026, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania issued an opinion emphasizing the limited circumstances in which courts may invoke public policy to bar insurance coverage, holding in Samsung Fire & Marine Insurance Co., Ltd. (U.S. Branch) v. RI Settlement Trust that Pennsylvania public policy does not preclude coverage for claims alleging that insureds enabled or profited from human sex trafficking. The decision rejects a line of federal district court decisions predicting otherwise and reinforces that Pennsylvania courts will invoke the public policy doctrine only in the clearest of circumstances. RI Settlement is particularly significant because it arose on certified questions from the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, giving the Supreme Court the opportunity to resolve an issue on which federal courts had predicted Pennsylvania law differently. RI Settlement arose out of four separate civil complaints in which the underlying plaintiffs alleged that, as minors, they were the victims of human sex trafficking at various hotels in Philadelphia. The plaintiffs claimed that the hotel owners were negligent in failing to stop the sex trafficking from happening at their hotels. After the filing of the lawsuits, the hotel owners sought coverage under their Commercial General Liability policies. The insurers initially defended the hotels under Reservation of Rights letters, though the carriers later filed Declaratory Judgment actions seeking declarations that they did not owe a duty to defend or indemnify. In short, the insurers argued in the alternative that they did not owe any obligation to provide coverage based upon Pennsylvania public policy (because the claims violated the Human Trafficking Law – 18 Pa.C.S. § 3011) and the terms and conditions of the policy. On motions for judgment on the pleadings, the District Court found for the insurers on the basis of public policy: There is no duty to defend or indemnify against actions arising out of an insured's criminal conduct related to the sex trafficking of minors. The Court appreciates that it may make public policy the basis of a judicial decision only in “the clearest of cases.” See Minnesota Fire & Cas. Co. v. Greenfield, 589 A.2d 854, 868 (Pa. 2004) (quoting Hall v. Amica Mut. Ins. Co., 648 A.2d 755, 760 (Pa. 1994)). Yet, the Court strains to imagine a clearer case than the one presented here in which the facts alleged indicate that Policyholders engaged in criminal conduct in violation of Pennsylvania's Human Trafficking Law. The hotel owners appealed the matter to the Third Circuit, which petitioned the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania to grant review of two certified questions of law: (1) whether Pennsylvania law had an “overriding public policy” against sex trafficking, such that an insurer’s duty to defend and/or indemnify is abrogated when an insured is alleged to have enabled or profited from such trafficking; and (2) if yes, is that duty abrogated whenever the insured’s alleged conduct would constitute a violation of the Pennsylvania Human Trafficking statute. Importantly, the certified questions did not ask the Supreme Court to determine whether the policies afforded coverage under their terms. Rather, the court was asked only whether Pennsylvania public policy independently barred coverage. As a result, the court assumed for purposes of answering the certified questions that the insurers otherwise owed a duty to defend and addressed only the public policy issue, leaving all policy-based coverage defenses for further proceedings. Because the court concluded that the answer to the first certified question was “no”, it did not reach the second issue. In reaching its determination that Pennsylvania public policy does not prohibit insurance coverage for sex trafficking claims, the court limited the impact of its decision in Minnesota Fire & Cas. Co. v. Greenfield, 855 A. 2d 854, 855 (Pa. 2004), which the RI Settlement opinion emphasized as having been an “Opinion Announcing Judgment of the Court” – or a plurality opinion. In Greenfield, the insured homeowner was sued by the estate of his houseguest who overdosed from heroin that he sold to her. The matter wound its way to the Supreme Court, which determined that the insurer did not owe a duty to defend or indemnify based upon Pennsylvania public policy, which criminalized the sale and use of heroin as a Schedule I narcotic. In RI Settlement, the court “decline[d] the invitation” to extend the rationale of the three-justice plurality in Greenfield beyond cases involving Schedule I controlled substances. In so holding, the justices in RI Settlement refused to “divine an overriding public policy pronouncement by the General Assembly by virtue of its enactment of the Human Trafficking Law.” The opinion further states that it is not “within the purview of this Court to rank the magnitude of the public policy underlying the various crimes defined in the Crimes Code. It is sufficient for the work of the courts to know that the General Assembly has identified conduct it deems harmful and dangerous to the maintenance of an orderly society and criminalized it.” While the court declined to declare that Pennsylvania public policy prohibits coverage for sex trafficking claims, the opinion in RI Settlement expressly states that insurers are free to include appropriate exclusionary language for such causes of actions in their policies if they desire to do so. It will certainly be interesting to see whether the insurance industry accepts the court’s invitation, or perhaps whether the Pennsylvania legislature steps in to clarify that sex trafficking claims are indeed of the type or magnitude that they should not be covered by insurance. In any event, we will, of course, continue to monitor this and other insurance coverage issues that arise before courts in Pennsylvania, New Jersey and throughout our firm’s geographic footprint and around the country.

Thought Leadership

Court Allows Recklessness and Punitive Damages Claims to Proceed After Work‑Zone Crash

In a case where a defendant filed preliminary objections against allegations of recklessness and punitive damages, the Susquehanna County Court of Common Pleas denied these preliminary objections. This case stems from a motor vehicle accident, where the defendants car struck the plaintiffs car after the defendant allegedly fell asleep at the wheel, going at a high rate of speed, through a construction work zone. Defendant first objected to the general allegations throughout the plaintiff’s complaint pertaining to “reckless” conduct contending that there were insufficient factual allegations to support the claim of reckless conduct. Defendant next objected to the plaintiffs claim for punitive damages, as punitive damages may only be assessed against a motorist for falling asleep while driving if there is further evidence to prove driver was aware of their drowsiness and risk of falling asleep. Lastly, defendant objected to plaintiffs complaint, claiming it lacked specificity. The court here found that the plaintiff had included in the complaint specific allegations related to the defendant’s alleged recklessness, including allegations regarding speeding in a work zone, almost striking the flagger, falling asleep at the wheel, and striking the plaintiffs vehicle which was stopped. Additionally, the court noted that falling asleep does not come without warning. The court found that these allegations were sufficient to support an allegation of recklessness at the pleadings stage.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

New Jersey Appellate Division Affirms Exclusion of Legal Malpractice Expert as Impermissible Net Opinion

Jack Slimm and Jeremy Zacharias obtained a favorable decision on behalf of their client in a case centering on the admissibility of expert testimony in legal malpractice actions. In Martin v. Loury, the New Jersey Appellate Division affirmed the exclusion of a plaintiff's legal malpractice expert, holding that the expert's opinions on causation and damages were too speculative to support the malpractice claim. The legal malpractice action arose from an underlying employment dispute involving claims for damages stemming from the breach of an employment agreement. The plaintiff alleged that defense counsel committed malpractice during a second trial by failing to recall the plaintiff as a rebuttal witness after the employer's CEO testified. According to the plaintiff's expert, additional rebuttal testimony would have bolstered the plaintiff's damages claims and led to a more favorable result. Both the trial court and the Appellate Division rejected that theory. The courts found that the expert could not explain how the proposed rebuttal testimony would have altered the outcome of the underlying case or resulted in any additional recoverable damages. Notably, the trial judge in the underlying employment matter had already rejected the CEO's testimony as not credible and had accepted the damages analysis advanced by the plaintiff. The court had also determined that the amount of damages was not genuinely disputed. As a result, the expert's opinion that additional rebuttal testimony would have produced a better outcome was unsupported by the record and based on speculation rather than evidence. The Appellate Division agreed that neither the plaintiff nor the expert could identify any actual damages attributable to the alleged malpractice or demonstrate the required element of proximate causation. The court further upheld the trial court's application of New Jersey's net opinion doctrine, finding that the expert failed to provide the necessary "why and wherefore" supporting his conclusion that the attorney's conduct caused a compensable loss. Because the opinions rested on unquantified possibilities rather than demonstrable facts, they were inadmissible. Key Takeaway for Legal Malpractice Defendants For attorneys and firms defending legal malpractice claims, Martin v. Loury underscores the importance of closely scrutinizing an opponent's expert report on the critical elements of proximate causation and damages. The decision demonstrates that a malpractice claim cannot survive where an expert merely speculates that different litigation tactics might have produced a better result. Instead, the plaintiff must present admissible expert testimony grounded in the record that explains how the alleged attorney error probably changed the outcome of the underlying matter and resulted in measurable damages.