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Michael J. Connolly

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MJConnolly@mdwcg.com

Portrait of Michael J. Connolly

A member of the firm’s Casualty Department, Mike primarily handles matters involving premises liability, automobile, and general liability. Mike regularly defends commercial motor vehicle and trucking cases including transportation fleets engaged in interstate trucking, waste hauling, shuttle and bus operators, and rental vehicle fleets. In addition to commercial motor vehicle cases, he also defends commercial businesses and properties on their liability claims, including hotels, resorts and others within the hospitality industry. Mike also represents various public utility organizations within the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.  

Mike has handled wrongful death and catastrophic injury cases, surface mining accidents, motor vehicle, product liability and underinsured/uninsured (UIM/UM) motorists claims. He routinely serves as monitoring counsel for insurance carriers on excess casualty claims and has presented seminars on the subject of risk management and best practices associated with safety.

An honors graduate of the University of Scranton, Mike then received his juris doctor from Drexel University with distinction in the field of Insurance Law. Mike worked for the Honorable Chester T. Harhut, former President Judge of Lackawanna County and the Lackawanna County District Attorney. Admitted to practice in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, Mike is also a member of the American Bar Association, Pennsylvania Bar Association and Lackawanna County Bar Association. Mike previously worked with the Law School Admission Council as an administrator of the Law School Admission Test for prospective law students, as well as with the Pennsylvania Board of Law Examiners on the Multi-state Professional Responsibility Exam.

Within the firm, Mike serves as a member of the Executive Committee Advisory Council, whose purpose is to enhance the communication between the Executive Committee and younger members of the firm's professional ranks, including associates, special counsel and junior shareholders.    

Mike was selected as a Pennsylvania Super Lawyer Rising Star for six consecutive years between 2015 and 2020, and since 2024 has been recognized by the Best Lawyers in America© for Personal Injury Litigation – Defendants.

    • Drexel University Thomas R. Kline School of Law (J.D., 2010)
    • University of Scranton
      • B.A., B.S., cum laude, 2007
    • Pennsylvania, 2010
    • U.S. District Court Middle District of Pennsylvania, 2010
    • The Best Lawyers in America©, Personal Injury Litigation – Defendants (2024-2027)
    • The Best Lawyers in America®, Professional Malpractice Law - Defendants (2025-2027)
    • Pennsylvania Super Lawyers Rising Star (2015-2020)
    • American Bar Association
    • Lackawanna County Bar Association
    • Pennsylvania Bar Association
    • "Expert Medical Evidence Mandatory on Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Claims," Defense Digest, Vol. 22, No. 4, December 2016
    • Obtained a compulsory nonsuit at the close of the plaintiff’s case during a jury trial in Luzerne County.  The case stemmed from a fall that occurred in a grocery store.  It was undisputed that the plaintiff experienced a hard fall after stepping on a bottle containing an energy drink while shopping.  Plaintiff suffered several injuries including serious nerve damage to both legs as a result of the fall. Although the plaintiff had alleged both actual and constructive notice of the allegedly dangerous condition created by the bottle on the floor, she failed to introduce any evidence beyond mere speculation of that notice, and the court granted the nonsuit.
    • Successfully obtained summary judgment on behalf of commercial property owners under the immunity available to owners who hire independent contractors to perform work on the owners’ property.  Plaintiff was operating an electric saw as part of a building demolition project when he lost his footing and fell from a roof sustaining serious injuries. We demonstrated why none of the available exceptions to the immunity rule applied to the subject property owners.  Summary judgment was granted under Pennsylvania’s recognition of immunity for property owners who hire competent independent contractors to complete a project, when the owners retain no control over project details, supervision, or safety.
    • Successfully obtained summary judgment on behalf of a real estate company in a property destruction case in which a moving company was hired to enter, clean, and winterize a property prior to the real estate company’s listing the property for sale.  Instead, the moving company went to the wrong house and emptied and destroyed all of the Plaintiff’s belongings and contents.  Plaintiff sued various defendants, including the real estate company which had no role in hiring the moving company, nor any knowledge of the wrongfully destroyed property.  Plaintiff attempted to connect all of the defendants involved through various theories of agency, conspiracy and identity theft.  Summary judgment was granted in favor of the real estate company after it was shown that Plaintiff failed to establish the requisite burden of proof for the claims under Pennsylvania’s agency laws, as well as the laws on identity theft and conspiracy. 

Results

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Summary Judgment Won in NASCAR Slip and Fall Case

We secured summary judgment in a case where the plaintiff fell down a flight of stairs at a NASCAR race in Monroe County, Pennsylvania, sustaining multiple fractures. The plaintiff alleged that she fell on water that had accumulated from patrons’ coolers dripping through the bleachers onto the staircase below. The court dismissed the plaintiff’s claims in their entirety due to her failure to adequately establish actual or constructive notice of a dangerous condition.

Defense Prevails in Construction Defect Case

We obtained summary judgment on a construction defect claim in Susquehanna County, Pennsylvania. The court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims against the defendant, a homebuilder, in their entirety for the plaintiffs’ failure to adequately prove breach of contract, breach of express and implied warranties, fraud in the inducement, wrongful conversion and various alleged violations of the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices Act.

News

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Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.

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Result

Summary Judgment Obtained in Insurance Coverage Case

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.

Event

CLM 2026 Focus Conference

Allison joins three insurance industry leaders to discuss how cyber coverage disputes, the growing impact of social inflation on bodily injury claim valuation, and the use of artificial intelligence are reshaping the bad faith landscape. The panel will examine emerging sources of extra-contractual exposure, including evolving cyber insurance coverage issues and the challenges of accurately valuing bodily injury claims. Practical approaches to claim evaluation using AI, along with defense strategies designed to help prevent or successfully defend against bad faith litigation, will also be addressed. 

Four Marshall Dennehey Attorneys Selected 2026 “Top Lawyers” by Delaware Today Magazine

News

Four Marshall Dennehey Attorneys Selected 2026 “Top Lawyers” by Delaware Today Magazine

Defense Victory Obtained in Workers’ Compensation Case

Result

Defense Victory Obtained in Workers’ Compensation Case

Marshall Dennehey Announces 2027 Pennsylvania Super Lawyers and Rising Stars Honorees

News

Marshall Dennehey Announces 2027 Pennsylvania Super Lawyers and Rising Stars Honorees

Marshall Dennehey Welcomes Special Counsel David Farkouh and Michele P. Rannie to New York City Office

News

Marshall Dennehey Welcomes Special Counsel David Farkouh and Michele P. Rannie to New York City Office

Complete Victory Obtained in a Workers’ Compensation Matter

Result

Complete Victory Obtained in a Workers’ Compensation Matter

Thought Leadership

Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.