.

Matthew S. Schorr

Chairman, Board of Directors

Director, Casualty Department

Portrait of Matthew S. Schorr

Matthew serves as the Director of the Casualty Department, Chairman of the firm’s Board of Directors, and a member of Marshall Dennehey’s three-person Executive Committee. This governing body oversees the firm's daily operations and drives the implementation of strategic initiatives for the Am Law 200 firm. As Director of the Casualty Department, the largest of the firm’s four legal divisions, Matthew manages the administrative functions and provides strategic leadership for over 250 attorneys across 19 offices.

An experienced litigator with a broad legal background gained from working at specialized firms in New York and New Jersey, Matthew brings the perspective of having defended individuals, insurance companies, and major corporations in complex litigations within a variety of practice areas.

Matthew joined Marshall Dennehey as a shareholder and co-chair of the maritime litigation practice group in June of 2008. He and his litigation team routinely handle high-exposure cases in the fields of premises liability, product liability, restaurant/bar liability, marine, inland marine, construction accidents, automobile, insurance coverage, condominium/community association law, medical malpractice and subrogation.

Based upon his experience, skill, and effectiveness at trial, Matthew has been certified by the Supreme Court of New Jersey as a Civil Trial Attorney, an achievement attained by less than two percent of lawyers in New Jersey. He has 10 published opinions and has argued before the Supreme Court of New Jersey on multiple occasions. Matthew was also one of the first trial attorneys to participate in the pilot program that permitted jurors to question witnesses and was asked to lecture at the ATLA Boardwalk Seminar as the defense speaker on this topic.

In 1991, Matthew began his career at Donovan, Parry, Walsh & Repetto, a New York firm that pioneered maritime and insurance law, where he handled a variety of challenging matters involving Jones Act seaman claims, insurance coverage disputes, hull and cargo liability actions, consumer fraud, premises liability, subrogation, product liability, and various commercial cases. He also achieved the status as a Proctor in Admiralty. In 1996, Matthew joined the well-known medical malpractice defense firm of McDonough, Korn & Eichhorn, which went on to become McDonough, Korn, Eichhorn & Schorr subsequent to his ascension to partnership in 1999. During his 12 years with the firm, he managed and helped the firm develop maritime, insurance, community association law, and casualty practices. He also became a seasoned trial lawyer taking dozens of malpractice and casualty cases to trial with a success rate of approximately 95 percent.

Matthew graduated cum laude from the State University of New York at Albany in 1988 and received his juris doctor from Fordham Law School in 1991, where he was named a Leonard F. Manning Scholar. Matthew is admitted to the bars of New York and New Jersey. 

    • Fordham University School of Law (J.D., 1991)
    • State University of New York at Albany (B.A., cum laude, 1988)
    • New Jersey, 1991
    • New York, 1992
    • U.S. District Court District of New Jersey
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of New York
    • U.S. District Court Northern District of New York
    • U.S. District Court Southern District of New York
    • U.S. Court of Appeals 3rd Circuit
    • Pennsylvania, 2021
    • Litigation Management Institute, Graduate 2013 (CLMP)
    • New Jersey Super Lawyer (2011)
      The Super Lawyers list is issued by Thomson Reuters. A description of the selection methodology can be found here. No aspect of this advertisement has been approved by the Supreme Court of New Jersey.
    • Association of Trial Lawyers of America
    • Claims and Litigation Management Alliance (CLM)
    • New Jersey Bar Association
    • New York Bar Association
    • The Maritime Law Association of the United States
    • Trial Attorneys of New Jersey
    • The Lawyers Club of Philadelphia
    • Autonomous Vehicles: The Rise of the Machines - Moderator, ILG Virtual Conference, March 25, 2021
    • Negligent Security: Foreseeable Crime - Believable Risk - Moderator, ILG Virtual Conference, March 22, 2021
    • Impact of Long Shore and New York Labor Law, the Jones Act and McBride Decision on Punitive Damages Under Maritime Law, Navigators Insurance Marine Department, April 2015
    • New Jersey Contractual Indemnity and Additional Insured Issues, Zurich Insurance, April 2015
    • Advanced Trial Strategies, National Business Institute, Newark, NJ, December 2014
    • Know Before You Go, CLM Claims College -  Property School, Faculty, Philadelphia, PA, September 2014
    • Transportation Claims and Recovery, Travelers Insurance, April 2013
    • CLE Seminar: Settlements and Releases, June 5, 2009 
    • Obtained a defense verdict following a two-week trial in Camden County.  Our insured, a stevedore company (responsible for discharging cargo ships), had offloaded telephone pole-sized pillars of solid steel, known as "blooms" from a ship at a marine terminal port and stacked them on the pier.  The plaintiff was a supervisor for the port owner, whose company was responsible for subsequently loading the blooms by forklift onto trucks for delivery to the end-user. 
    • During the truck loading process , the forklift operator and our insured's “checker” (responsible for insuring that the correct inventory was being loaded and shipped) experienced difficulty loading the last of 3 blooms onto a truck.  The plaintiff, as supervisor of the forklift operator, stopped to assist.  While attempting a routine repositioning procedure, the bloom, which weighed approximately 7 tons, inadvertently rolled off the forklift blades, crushing the plaintiff's right leg and necessitating an above-the-knee amputation.
    • The plaintiff alleged that the accident and injury resulted from our client’s negligence with improperly stacking the blooms after discharge, as well as the checker’s involvement during the repositioning procedure. The plaintiff’s demand was $3.5 million. Following a two week trial, and into a second day of deliberations, the jury ultimately concluded that any negligence of our client did not proximately cause the accident, but rather the accident was caused by the conduct of the forklift operator and the plaintiff himself. A defense verdict was returned.
    • Obtained a defense verdict following a 1 month trial where the plaintiff, a 47 year old female periodontist, alleged that she sustained a career-ending injury, resulting in total disability, when she was struck by a deteriorated section of a wood privacy fence at the insured's condominium complex where she lived. The plaintiff underwent anterior & posterior lumbar spinal fusion surgery 3 months after the accident and then sold her practice 3 months later. She had been earning approximately $200,000 annually. The plaintiff rejected a $2 million settlement offer (which had been extended to protect an excess layer) on the last day of trial, holding firm on a $7 million demand. 
    • Obtained a defense verdict following a jury trial in Federal District Court on a Maritime Jones Act Seaman claim.  The plaintiff, a commercial fisherman, suffered a crushed hand injury while lowering clam cages. The defense successfully maintained that the vessel was seaworthy and that the accident was caused by the claimant's own negligence.  
    • Obtained a defense verdict following a jury trial on behalf of two surgeons in a medical malpractice case alleging negligence during a laparoscopic gall bladder removal surgery in which the common bile duct was inadvertently transected. The plaintiff required additional surgery and suffered a difficult post-operative course as well as alleged permanent liver damage. The jury accepted the defense argument that aberrant anatomy led to this accepted complication. 
    • Obtained a defense verdict following a jury trial on behalf of NY Waterway. The plaintiff fell on a ramp while entering a ferry boat, suffering a fractured knee that required surgical repair. The plaintiff alleged that the ramp on which she fell was negligently designed. The defense used as its liability expert Tom Blomquist, US Coast Guard (Ret.). Capt. Blomquist had served as the Commanding Officer of the US Coast Guard Marine Inspection Office, Philadelphia, Pa., and convincingly testified that the ramp was in compliance with all applicable Coast Guard and maritime related regulations. The jury apparently liked or sympathized with the plaintiff as it returned a question during deliberations, asking if it could award monetary damages in the absence of any adverse finding against the defendant. After the judge instructed the jury that it could not, the jury returned its verdict in favor of the defense. 
    • Obtained a defense verdict following a jury trial on behalf of a surgeon in a medical malpractice case. The plaintiff suffered a puncture of the aorta during a laparoscopic gall bladder surgery. The plaintiff was pregnant at the time and the fetus died. The jury accepted the defense argument that inadvertent vascular injury was a rare but recognized complication of the procedure. 
    • Obtained a defense verdict following a jury trial in a premises liability action against a condominium complex.   The plaintiff claimed that she fell on ice on a sidewalk following a snow storm. She suffered a fractured shoulder that required surgical repair.  Matthew was successful not only in obtaining a defense verdict on behalf of the condominium Association as to the plaintiff, but was also successful in pursuing a cross claim for defense and indemnity against the co­defendant snow contractor. The client was awarded all legal costs incurred in having defended the suit, plus interest and fees. 
    • Certified by the Supreme Court of New Jersey as a Civil Trial Attorney, 2005 
    • Certified Proctor in Admiralty, 1996 

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.

Thought Leadership

Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.

Thought Leadership

The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.