.

Matthew J. Burdalski

Portrait of Matthew J. Burdalski

Matt is a shareholder in the firm's Fraud/Special Investigation Practice Group where he focuses primarily on large loss fraud and medical provider fraud. His practice in the area of fraud investigation involves the assessment and evaluation of both medical provider fraud and fraudulent claims on the part of his clients' insureds. Matt also has experience dealing with insurance coverage disputes, representing numerous insurance carriers across multiple states for the purposes of SIU investigation, bad faith litigation and general defense litigation. In doing so, Matt has represented a significant number of insurance carriers on these issues and has assisted in high-dollar and high-profile medical provider fraud, property loss and insurance fraud matters.

During his time with the firm, Matt has taken numerous Examinations Under Oath, drafted various complex coverage opinions and litigated topics of insurance fraud including, but not limited to, medical provider fraud, large loss property investigations and bad faith. In particular, he has assisted in multiple high-profile matters regarding carrier recovery of monies paid to fraudulent medical providers and as a result of fraudulent motor vehicle accidents. He has also successfully represented his clients in matters involving policy coverage and eligibility for benefits. Matt also has experience handling Personal Injury Protection (PIP) litigation, including matters involving coverage, benefits, and related disputes.

Matt earned his undergraduate degree from West Chester University and went on to receive his juris doctor from Widener University, in Wilmington, Delaware, graduating cum laude and with pro bono distinction. As a law student, he took part in Widener's Environmental Law Clinic, working with clients in all aspects of complex environmental litigation, and was the recipient of the Greenwatch Award for excellence in environmental law.

Prior to joining the firm, Matt represented insurance carriers and employers in the field of workers' compensation defense litigation where he handled matters in both Pennsylvania and New Jersey.  

    • Widener University Delaware Law School (J.D., cum laude, 2010)
    • West Chester University (B.S., cum laude, 2006)
    • New Jersey, 2010
    • Pennsylvania, 2010
    • Ping! Utilizing Modern Technology to Answer the Who, Where and When of First-Party Claims, NJSIA General Membership Meeting, December 9th, 2022
    • Ping! Utilizing Modern Technology to Answer the Who, Where and When of First-Party Claims, Marshall Dennehey Insurance Fraud 360 Seminar, Lafayette Hill, PA, June 2022
    • Medical Investigator's Guide to the Modern SIU Claim, Speaker, New Jersey Special Investigators Association (NJSIA) Annual Conference, Atlantic City, NJ, October 2019
    • NJ PIP: Building Better Medical Reviews, Marshall Dennehey Insurance Fraud 360 Seminar, Lafayette Hill, PA, June, 2018

Thought Leadership

SIU Spotlight

Changes to NJ’s Open Public Records Act and Implications for SIU

March 1, 2025

In June 2024, New Jersey Governor Phil Murphy signed into law Senate Bill 2930, enacting significant amendments to New Jersey’s Open Public Records Act (OPRA). These changes, effective September 3, 2024, were made with the stated intent to modernize public records access, enhance transparency, and protect personal information. As access to public records is often a tool for SIU in investigating insurance claims, it will be important to understand the changes and how they may impact your investigation.  The New Jersey Open Public Records Act, N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1 et. seq., was passed in 2002. It replaced New Jersey’s former Right to Know Law and also expanded the definition of a public record. The amendments passed late last year enacted changes to everything from the method to obtaining public records to which records can be provided and how. Some of the most relevant and important changes which should be noted by SIU follow. Attorney Fees Previously, requestors who were successful in court with respect to denied records requests were entitled to recover attorney’s fees. The new law limits the right to recover fees only upon a showing that the public agency “unreasonably denied access, acted in bad faith, or knowingly and willfully violated” OPRA. Further, if the records are provided within seven days of a lawsuit, attorney’s fees may be awarded only if the agency “knew or should have known” that the denial violated OPRA.  Protective Orders Against Disruptive Requests Public agencies can now seek protective orders against individuals or entities whose records requests are intended to “substantially interrupt the performance of government function.” This was previously unavailable to public agencies. This potentially allows courts to issue orders to limit the scope or number of records requested.  Public Records on Websites Agencies are now required to make records available on publicly accessible websites “to the extent feasible.” These websites must include a search function, and custodians must assist requestors in locating records online. This has the benefit of potentially streamlining the process of accessing public records, assuming the records are properly and fully placed online. Further, agencies may now be in compliance of specific records requests by directing the requestor to the online source provided they offer assistance in locating the records.  Model Request Form There will now be a model request form that must be utilized by each public agency and used when requesting public records. The new model request form will include additional questions regarding commercial purpose, whether the records are being sought in connection with litigation, and the addition of new exemptions in the Exemptions Checklist section.  Definition of “Commercial Purpose” The amendments introduce a new category of requestor—those seeking records for a “commercial purpose.” In addition to commercial entities, this category covers individuals who intend to use the records for the sale, solicitation, rent or lease or a service, or any use by which the user expects to profit either through commission, salary, or fee. Importantly for SIU, those requestors must certify that the records are for a commercial purpose and must provide the intended use of the records. The failure to do so can result in fines. Exemptions apply to journalists, educational institutions, and certain non-profits. The commercial purpose definition is not currently well defined and will likely be the subject of future litigation for clarification.  Limitations on Use During Legal Proceedings The amendments to the OPRA law restricts parties to a legal proceeding from requesting records that are the subject of a court order, including pending discovery requests. Requestors must now certify whether their request is connected to a legal proceeding. In short, once litigation has been commenced, requestors will be foreclosed from seeking public records through the OPRA process. Notably, legal proceeding is not specifically defined in the statute, and this provision will apply regardless of whether the agency is a party to the proceeding or not. This is especially important for SIU. Requests for needed records or information important to your investigation must be made as early as possible and prior to any litigation being filed.  Expanded Definition of Personal Identifying Information This definition now includes birth dates, personal email addresses, debit card and bank account information, home addresses, personal telephone numbers, personal information of juveniles under 18 (excepting MVC and elections information), HIPPA data, and indecent graphic images, all with the stated intent of enhancing the protection of personal data.  Responses and Response Time Agencies must respond to proper requests, in writing, “as soon as possible but not later than seven (7) days after receipt of the request.” The response must address each item requested by either: granting access; denying access; seeking clarification of the request; or requesting an extension of time. Other Relevant Changes Identical Request: Agencies are no longer required to respond to identical requests for the same information from the same requestor if no information has changed. Appeal Timeframe: Requestors must appeal the denial of their request within 45 days. Records Kept by Others: Agencies are not obligated to respond to requests for records kept by separate public agencies.  Vague Requests: Agencies are not required to respond to a request if it does not identify with specificity the information/documentation sought.  Security Footage: Footage of public buildings is exempt unless the request identifies a specific incident that occurred, or a specified date and limited time period at a particular building. These amendments were enacted with the stated purpose of balancing the public’s right to access information with the need to protect personal privacy and prevent the misuse and abuse of the records request process. However, from a SIU perspective, the changes may have the effect of limiting access and transparency on the part of the agencies.  It is crucial for the SIU community to familiarize itself with the new provisions to ensure compliance and maintain the ability to access public records necessary for effective and efficient claims investigations and determinations. SIU should take care to familiarize itself with the OPRA process and the new potential limitations and roadblocks to accessing public records. Additional care should be taken to ensure compliance with the updated processes and regulations when making records requests as well as the remedies available when encountered with failures to full comply or respond.  *Matthew is a shareholder in our Mount Laurel, NJ office and a member of the Insurance Fraud/SIU Practice Group. (856) 414-6035 | MJBurdalski@mdwcg.com    SIU Spotlight, Issue 2, Vol. 1, March 2025 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2025 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

SIU Spotlight

Class Action Out of Minnesota with Potential Impacts on Litigating and Negotiating Major Case

July 1, 2024

A class action suit is brewing in Minnesota which has the potential for major implications in the way major case investigations are litigated and negotiated. In Taqueria El Primo LLC et al. v. Illinois Farmers Ins. Co. et al., Civil No. 19-3071, the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota has certified a class action against Illinois Farms Insurance. The plaintiffs allege that so called “no-bill” or billing moratorium agreements between Farmers and certain medical providers are in violation of the Minnesota Deceptive Trade Practices Act, the Minnesota Consumer Fraud Act and the terms of the policy of insurance. the plaintiffs further allege that the billing limitations impacted have the potential to affect the ability of insureds to use PIP benefits under their policies to seek treatment with health care providers of their choice. Following SIU investigations revealing what Farmers believed to be fraudulent billing practices on the part of certain health care providers treating its insureds, Farmers entered into confidential settlement agreements with those health care providers in the state of Minnesota in which the providers agreed, in exchange for a settlement of Farmers’ claims, to not bill Farmers for treatment to its insureds. There were various such agreements with differing terms and conditions. The agreements, again with some exceptions, were also confidential per the terms and the settlements. Often, the confidentiality of the agreements was requested by the health care providers. The plaintiffs filed suit, alleging those non-disclosed agreements constituted unfair and illegal practices on the part of Farmers, resulting in the class members not receiving the value guaranteed by the policies of insurance purchased as they would not be able to use their No-Fault Benefits with any health care provider covered by such agreements. The plaintiffs are seeking monetary damages and injunctive relief voiding any such existing agreements.  Farmers contends that the agreements were at all times legally permissible and has denied any and all violations of Minnesota law. Farmers argued that there was no proof at all from any class representative that medical treatment was sought and denied as a result of any no-bill agreement and that such agreements touched so small a percentage of available providers in the State there was no likelihood of any actual damage to any class member.  The court ultimately approved the class action for monetary and injunctive relief on the Minnesota Consumer Fraud Act (MCFA) claim only. Regarding the breach of contract claim, the court agreed there had been no actual breach applicable to the class since there would need to be individualized evidence of a claim denied based on the at-issue agreements for the members of the Class. The Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act claim was similarly dismissed as there could be no theory of damages applicable to the class as a whole.  Regarding the MCFA claim, the court allowed the same to go forward. The MCFA prohibits the “act, use or employment by any person of any fraud, false pretense, false promise, misrepresentation, misleading statement or deceptive practice, with the intent that others rely thereon in connection with the sale of any merchandise, whether or not any person has in fact been misled, deceived, or damaged thereby…” Minn. Stat. § 325F.69, subd. 1. In short, the court found that the MCFA claim could proceed since it is not necessary to show any individual consumer’s reliance on the purported wrongful conduct. All that is required is a causal nexus between the conduct and the damages of the plaintiffs established through direct or circumstantial evidence. The court found the case raises several common questions applicable to all class members:  Whether the billing limitations violate the No-Fault Act; Whether the billing limitations violated the policies;  Whether Farmers would have been able to sell the policies with the limitations at all; Whether Farmers would have been able to sell the policies only if it disclosed the limitations’ and  Whether under Minnesota law it is inherently material and harmful to all purchasers as a matter of law, irrespective of individual consumer differences, if a company was only able to sell a product by fraudulently omitting a fact that if disclosed the company would have been barred from selling. The court likewise found that resolution of those questions posed several common questions of law which predominated over any differences between the class members. Finally, the court found that, if the plaintiffs’ theories were correct, damages could be measured on a class-wide basis, thus meeting the final elements necessary for class certification.  The court did not engage in any discussion of the merits of the claims, but the very fact that the classes were certified and the legality of the no-bill agreements will now be litigated is a substantial development for the insurance community and SIU specifically. The failure to disclose the no-bill agreements to current and prospective insureds seems to have been the sticking point with the court. However, as previously noted, that confidentiality was bargained for by, in most cases, the health providers and their attorneys. No-bill agreements have been an important tool utilized by insures and SIU to effectively prevent further fraudulent billing by bad actor health care providers taking advantage of No-Fault benefits across the country. Such agreements arguably work to the benefit of insureds by preventing improper treatment and billing and keeping fraudulent actors at bay, resulting in reduced premiums. However, this current legal landscape puts those agreements directly at risk and should be followed closely.  Matt is a shareholder in the firm’s Fraud/Special Investigation Practice Group where he focuses primarily on large loss fraud and medical provider fraud. His practice in the area of fraud investigation involves the assessment and evaluation of both medical provider fraud and fraudulent claims on the part of his clients’ insureds.    SIU Spotlight, Issue 1, Vol. 1, July 2024 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2024 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

New Jersey Appellate Division Affirms Recreational Immunity for County Under Landowners' Liability Act

In a recent unpublished decision in Matthew Kuzma, etc. v. Middlesex County Parks Department, et al., the New Jersey Appellate Division affirmed summary judgment in favor of Middlesex County Parks Department, holding that the county was immune from liability under New Jersey's Landowners' Liability Act (LLA), notwithstanding its failure to plead the immunity as an affirmative defense in its answer to the Complaint. The case arose from injuries sustained by fourteen-year-old plaintiff, Matthew Kuzma, while playing basketball at Spring Lake Park in South Plainfield on August 23, 2019. The plaintiff observed a crack in the basketball court before beginning to play but did not consider it dangerous. During the game, his foot became caught in the crack, causing him to fall and suffer a significant ankle injury. The plaintiff alleged that the injury resulted in ongoing physical limitations and deprived him of the opportunity to play collegiate basketball. The plaintiff filed suit alleging that the defendants negligently maintained the basketball court. Although the county did not assert LLA immunity as an affirmative defense in its answers, it later moved for summary judgment on that basis. The plaintiff opposed the motion, arguing that the county had waived the defense by failing to plead it. The county maintained that the plaintiff had received sufficient notice of its intent to rely on the LLA through discovery and therefore suffered no unfair surprise or prejudice. The trial court agreed and granted summary judgment, concluding that the county should be permitted to invoke statutory immunity notwithstanding its failure to formally plead the defense. Relying heavily on the New Jersey Supreme Court's guidance in Arias v. Cnty. of Bergen, holding a county park was subject to the immunity of the LLA, the Appellate Division affirmed, holding that the county's failure to plead LLA immunity did not preclude reliance on the defense under the circumstances presented. The court determined that the plaintiff had received adequate notice of the immunity claim through discovery and that permitting the defense furthered the public-policy objectives embodied in the LLA. In affirming dismissal, the Appellate Division acknowledged the seriousness of the plaintiff's injury and the general societal interest in maintaining parks and recreational facilities in a safe condition. However, the court emphasized that both the legislature and the New Jersey Supreme Court have expressed a clear policy choice to limit liability for public and private landowners who make recreational property available for public use. The decision reinforces the courts' continuing adherence to the Landowners' Liability Act and the principle that recreational lands and facilities should be broadly protected from liability exposure, even in cases involving significant personal injuries.

Thought Leadership

Florida Supreme Court Rules Florida Statute §627.70152 Does not Apply Retroactively

In a decision that resolves years of appellate uncertainty and confirms that insurers and insureds alike can rely on the legal framework in place when a policy is issued, the Supreme Court of Florida last week found that Florida Statute §627.70152, which involves an insured’s requirement to provide an insurer with pre-suit notice before filing a suit, cannot be applied retroactively. In Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company v. Hughes, the Court was presented with the issue of whether the statutory pre-suit notice requirement applied retroactively and whether it would apply to a breach of contract of an insurance policy that was issued before the statute went into effect. Before the Court was an appeal from a homeowner, Ms. Hughes, who sued her insurance carrier, Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company (Universal) for breach of contract under an insurance policy that was in effect from April 24, 2019 through April 24, 2020. During the policy period, Ms. Hughes suffered a loss and, on May 29, 2019, made a claim for water damage. The carrier investigated the loss and issued payment; Ms. Hughes disputed the payment, finding the amount insufficient for repairs. On July 1, 2021, Florida Statute §627.70152 went into effect, which required insureds to provide notice of intent to initiate litigation against the carrier prior to filing a lawsuit; if an insured filed the lawsuit without complying with §627.70152, a court must dismiss the case without prejudice. On August 4, 2021, Ms. Hughes filed her lawsuit against Universal for breach of contract. Universal moved to dismiss based on her failure to comply with §627.70152. Ms. Hughes contended the notice requirement could not be applied retroactively. The trial court disagreed and dismissed the lawsuit without prejudice, and Ms. Hughes appealed. During the appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, in Cole v. Universal Property & Casualty, 363 So. 3d 1089 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023), ruled that Florida Statute §627.70152 did apply retroactively to policies issued before the effective date of §627.70152. However, the Sixth District Court agreed with Ms. Hughes and overturned the trial court’s ruling, finding the statute could not retroactively apply to policies issued prior to the statute effective date. Thereafter, the other district courts weighed in, with the Third District Court agreeing with the Fourth District Court, and the First, Second and Fifth District Courts agreeing with the Sixth District Court. In resolving the conflict amongst the district courts, the Supreme Court advised “as a general rule, ‘the statute in effect at the time an insurance contract is executed governs substantive issues arising in connection with that contract.’ Hassen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 674 So. 2d 106, 108 (Fla. 1996). The Court applied the two-step test when deciding whether a statute has retroactive application: “First, the Court must ascertain whether the Legislature intended for the statute to apply retroactively. Second, if such an intent is clearly expressed, the Court must determine whether retroactive application would violate any constitutional principles.” Menendez v. Progressive Exp. Ins. Co., 35 So. 3d 873, 877 (Fla. 2010). In analyzing the Legislature’s intent, the Court must determine whether the Legislature has manifested a clear command for retroactivity in the statutory text.  In review of the statutory text, the Court found nothing in the language of the statute to indicate that the phrase “all suits” was serving another purpose of expanding its reach to suits based on policies that both predate and postdate the enactment of the statute. Buis v. Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 394 So. 3d 738, 741 (Fla. 2d DCA 2024). Further, the Court noted the statute has an effective date, which has long been considered to be evidence against retroactive application of a statute. The Court concluded that, on its face, no provision of §627.70152 speaks to application of the statute to insurance policies issued before the statute’s effective date and therefore, the Legislature did not clearly command retroactivity of the statute to include insurance policies issued prior to the enactment of the statute. The Court briefly reviewed Universal’s argument that the presuit notice requirement was procedural, not substantive, and therefore should be applied retroactively; however, the Court agreed with the Sixth District Court’s finding that, in its entirety, §627.70152 transformed an insured’s ability to sue an insurance company under a property insurance policy and an insurer’s obligations to respond to and pay insurance claims, thus making the requirement a substantive change. The Court thereby upheld the decision of the Sixth District and disapproved the decision of the Fourth District in Cole.

Thought Leadership

The Tolling Trap: Filing Alone Will Not Toll the Statute Without Good-Faith Service

The Eastern District of Pennsylvania recently reinforced a critical limitation on bad faith claims, holding that a timely filing alone will not preserve a cause of action absent a good-faith effort to serve the original process. The plaintiff had presented a claim for underinsured motorist benefits to his auto insurer. The insurer evaluated the claim and determined that the plaintiff’s accident-related damages did not exceed the bodily injury liability insurance limits of the at-fault driver and denied his claim. Among other claims, the plaintiff sought to present a claim for insurance bad faith under 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8371, to which a two year statute of limitation applies. He first filed a praecipe for writ of summons before the expiration of the statute of limitation. However, the plaintiff did not attempt to serve the praecipe or writ until after the statute of limitations had expired. Additionally, the service failed as the plaintiff had mailed the original process to an incorrect address. Despite receipt of the Postal Service’s failure to deliver the original process, the plaintiff did not attempt to re-serve the writ. Two months later, the plaintiff filed a complaint and then successfully served that complaint. The insurer sought to dismiss the plaintiff’s bad faith claim as time-barred by the statute of limitations. The district court agreed. Though the plaintiff had filed a praecipe for a writ of summons prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations, the statute is only tolled if there is a good faith effort to serve that original process. In this case, the court determined that the plaintiff had failed to perform a “good faith effort to serve the original process”. Additionally, though the filing and service of a complaint can serve as alternative original process when the lawsuit is commenced by the filing of a praecipe for a writ of summons, the plaintiff filed his complaint after the statute of limitations had expired. The plaintiff’s bad faith claim was therefore determined to be barred by the statute of limitations and dismissed by the court, with prejudice. A key takeaway for the defense is not to assume that the statute of limitations has been successfully tolled by a plaintiff merely because a praecipe for a writ of summons or complaint has been filed prior to the expiration of the statute. A filed complaint or writ is only part of the equation. The defense should carefully review the docket and filings to confirm that the plaintiff also performed the requisite good faith effort to serve that original process. A thorough review of the docket may reveal that the plaintiff failed to make the good-faith service efforts necessary to toll the statute of limitations.