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Lisa M. Grubb

Portrait of Lisa M. Grubb

Lisa focuses her practice on the defense of medical malpractice cases, representing hospitals, physicians and long-term care facilities. Her experience also includes defending physicians before the Delaware State Examining Board of Medicine. Lisa has defended physicians in various practices including ophthalmology, wound care, dermatology, PT/chiropractic, and dentistry. She has also represented clients in surgical cases and failure to diagnose cases. In addition, Lisa is experienced in representing veterinarians in professional liability matters from case inception through resolution, including witness preparation, working with experts, and preparing for trial.

Lisa also handles general liability matters including premises liability and motor vehicle accidents as well as defense of commercial trucking cases. Additionally, Lisa assists clients in matters involving insurance coverage, PIP/first party contractual claims and Fraud/Special Investigation. She also has significant experience in products liability and toxic tort litigation.

Lisa graduated from Elon University and received her juris doctor from Widener University School of Law.

She is admitted to practice in Delaware. 

    • Widener University Delaware Law School (J.D., 2005)
    • Elon University (B.A., 2002)
    • Delaware, 2008
    • “The New Superior Court Rule 16.1: The Revamping and Reviving of an Old ‘Favorite’,” Defense Digest, September 2018, Vol. 24, No. 3

Thought Leadership

Defense Digest

Delaware ‘Meet and Confer’ Rule Requires Human Contact??!

June 1, 2023

Key Points: The Superior Court of Delaware’s “meet and confer” requirement is mandated by the notice provision articulated in Del. R. Civ. P. Super. Ct. 37(a). The Rule has long been interpreted by counsel to require only an email or letter to opposing counsel attempting to quash a discovery dispute prior to filing motions and a request for court resolution of same. More recently, the Superior Court of Delaware is trending toward requiring actual in-person and/or telephonic communications amongst counsel in an attempt to resolve discovery disputes before agreeing to intervene to hear and decide such matters on behalf of the litigants. It is unclear whether this new trend is due to more recent docket backlogs and, therefore, temporary or if it will be adopted by other members of the Superior Court of Delaware judiciary. Delaware courts have long recognized the obligation of the parties to a civil action to engage in a meaningful “meet and confer” conference in an attempt to resolve discovery disputes prior to such issues being heard and decided upon by the bench. Historically, the “meet and confer” obligation has been vigorously enforced and adopted by the Delaware Court of Chancery, See Danenberg v. Fitracks, Inc., 58 A.3d 991, 1003 (Del. Ch. 2012) (Delaware lawyers “have a duty to meet and confer in a good faith effort to resolve differences.”), while the Superior Court of Delaware has made only passing reference to the same, without fully defining the obligations of the parties. The primary source of guidance for litigants in the Superior Court is enumerated in the language set forth in Delaware Rule of Civil Procedure for the Superior Court of Delaware, Rule 37, which states, in pertinent part: Rule 37 - Failure to make discovery: Sanctions;  (a) Motion for order compelling discovery. - A party, upon reasonable notice to other parties and all persons affected thereby, may apply for an order compelling discovery as follows…”  Del. R. Civ. P. Super. Ct. 37(a) (emphasis added). Previously, counsel for a party involved in a discovery dispute were considered to have met their “meet and confer” obligation by simply attempting communication with opposing counsel by letter, email, or other correspondence setting forth the alleged discovery deficiencies. In Mine Safety Appliances Co. v. AIU Ins. Co., 2014 WL 4724571, at *1 (Del. Super. Sept. 19, 2014), for example, the Superior Court held that a party’s mere attempt to discuss deposition dates with opposing counsel satisfied their “meet and confer” requirement. However, more recently, the Superior Court seems to be making a case for more substantial communications on the part of the litigants in an effort to resolve discovery disputes on their own as a prerequisite to being heard by the court. In Megen Cummings v. Ronald James Landry, et al., C.A. No. N18C-07-266 ALR (Del. Super. June 28, 2021), the plaintiff filed a motion to compel certain requested documents, as well as more sufficient answers to her formal written discovery demands. In conjunction with her motion, the plaintiff also filed a notice of hearing, scheduling the motion to be presented to the court via oral argument. In a letter opinion, dated June 28, 2021, the court declined to hear oral argument on the plaintiff’s motion and the defendant’s response in opposition thereto, stating: [i]t is plain from the record that the parties have not satisfied their obligation to engage in a meaningful meet and confer before resorting to motion practice. To be clear: a meet and confer does not mean sending an email or a letter. Meeting and conferring requires counsel to communicate by phone or in person. The parties’ written submissions reflect that a candid discussion between counsel may resolve most, if not all, of the outstanding issues. If, after complying with the obligation to meet and confer, there are discovery issues that remain in dispute, the Plaintiff may refile her Motion. At this time, the Motion is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE and the hearing scheduled for July 1, 2021, is CANCELLED. Id. The court’s sentiments represent the first time in the history of Superior Court of Delaware jurisprudence where the court specifically outlined that the “meet and confer” obligation requires more than just an email or letter attempt. The court required a communication by phone or in person wherein meaningful discussions must be had.  In reviewing decisions of the Superior Court of Delaware in certain discovery disputes since Cummings, it seems that the holding set forth therein is one that is gaining traction. In De Lage Landen Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Spinal Techs., LLC, 2021 WL 3520629, at *7 (Del. Super. Aug. 10, 2021) court declined to hear oral argument on a party’s motion to quash and a motion for protective order until such time as the parties had had the opportunity to “meet and confer” to discuss the scope of certain discovery demands. In Tijanna Richardson v. Stanley Access Technologies, C.A. No. N21C-10-115 AML (Del. Super. March 3, 2022), the court declined to hear oral argument on the sufficiency of a party’s answers and responses to demands for formal written discovery until after such time as the parties could “meet and confer” to discuss same. The court in Legion Partners Asset Mgmt., LLC v. Underwriters at Lloyds London, 2022 WL 289940, at *2 (Del. Super. Jan. 31, 2022) issued a similar ruling. It held that the issue as to whether or not an award of attorney’s fees was appropriate was not yet ripe because the parties had yet to engage in a meaningful “meet and confer” conference to discuss the potential award. It is evident that the Superior Court bench is trending toward interpreting Rule 37 to require more than a simple written attempt to contact opposing counsel regarding a discovery dispute prior to involving the court. What remains to be seen is whether this required “human contact” will continue as the docket (hopefully) becomes less congested and whether this interpretation will be adopted by other members of the Superior Court.   *Lisa is a shareholder in our Wilmington, Delaware, office. She can be reached at 302.552.4339 or lmgrubb@mdwcg.com.     Defense Digest, Vol. 29, No. 2, June 2023, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2023 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania Holds That Public Policy Does Not Prevent Insurance Coverage for Sex Trafficking Claims

On July 21, 2026, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania issued an opinion emphasizing the limited circumstances in which courts may invoke public policy to bar insurance coverage, holding in Samsung Fire & Marine Insurance Co., Ltd. (U.S. Branch) v. RI Settlement Trust that Pennsylvania public policy does not preclude coverage for claims alleging that insureds enabled or profited from human sex trafficking. The decision rejects a line of federal district court decisions predicting otherwise and reinforces that Pennsylvania courts will invoke the public policy doctrine only in the clearest of circumstances. RI Settlement is particularly significant because it arose on certified questions from the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, giving the Supreme Court the opportunity to resolve an issue on which federal courts had predicted Pennsylvania law differently. RI Settlement arose out of four separate civil complaints in which the underlying plaintiffs alleged that, as minors, they were the victims of human sex trafficking at various hotels in Philadelphia. The plaintiffs claimed that the hotel owners were negligent in failing to stop the sex trafficking from happening at their hotels. After the filing of the lawsuits, the hotel owners sought coverage under their Commercial General Liability policies. The insurers initially defended the hotels under Reservation of Rights letters, though the carriers later filed Declaratory Judgment actions seeking declarations that they did not owe a duty to defend or indemnify. In short, the insurers argued in the alternative that they did not owe any obligation to provide coverage based upon Pennsylvania public policy (because the claims violated the Human Trafficking Law – 18 Pa.C.S. § 3011) and the terms and conditions of the policy. On motions for judgment on the pleadings, the District Court found for the insurers on the basis of public policy: There is no duty to defend or indemnify against actions arising out of an insured's criminal conduct related to the sex trafficking of minors. The Court appreciates that it may make public policy the basis of a judicial decision only in “the clearest of cases.” See Minnesota Fire & Cas. Co. v. Greenfield, 589 A.2d 854, 868 (Pa. 2004) (quoting Hall v. Amica Mut. Ins. Co., 648 A.2d 755, 760 (Pa. 1994)). Yet, the Court strains to imagine a clearer case than the one presented here in which the facts alleged indicate that Policyholders engaged in criminal conduct in violation of Pennsylvania's Human Trafficking Law. The hotel owners appealed the matter to the Third Circuit, which petitioned the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania to grant review of two certified questions of law: (1) whether Pennsylvania law had an “overriding public policy” against sex trafficking, such that an insurer’s duty to defend and/or indemnify is abrogated when an insured is alleged to have enabled or profited from such trafficking; and (2) if yes, is that duty abrogated whenever the insured’s alleged conduct would constitute a violation of the Pennsylvania Human Trafficking statute. Importantly, the certified questions did not ask the Supreme Court to determine whether the policies afforded coverage under their terms. Rather, the court was asked only whether Pennsylvania public policy independently barred coverage. As a result, the court assumed for purposes of answering the certified questions that the insurers otherwise owed a duty to defend and addressed only the public policy issue, leaving all policy-based coverage defenses for further proceedings. Because the court concluded that the answer to the first certified question was “no”, it did not reach the second issue. In reaching its determination that Pennsylvania public policy does not prohibit insurance coverage for sex trafficking claims, the court limited the impact of its decision in Minnesota Fire & Cas. Co. v. Greenfield, 855 A. 2d 854, 855 (Pa. 2004), which the RI Settlement opinion emphasized as having been an “Opinion Announcing Judgment of the Court” – or a plurality opinion. In Greenfield, the insured homeowner was sued by the estate of his houseguest who overdosed from heroin that he sold to her. The matter wound its way to the Supreme Court, which determined that the insurer did not owe a duty to defend or indemnify based upon Pennsylvania public policy, which criminalized the sale and use of heroin as a Schedule I narcotic. In RI Settlement, the court “decline[d] the invitation” to extend the rationale of the three-justice plurality in Greenfield beyond cases involving Schedule I controlled substances. In so holding, the justices in RI Settlement refused to “divine an overriding public policy pronouncement by the General Assembly by virtue of its enactment of the Human Trafficking Law.” The opinion further states that it is not “within the purview of this Court to rank the magnitude of the public policy underlying the various crimes defined in the Crimes Code. It is sufficient for the work of the courts to know that the General Assembly has identified conduct it deems harmful and dangerous to the maintenance of an orderly society and criminalized it.” While the court declined to declare that Pennsylvania public policy prohibits coverage for sex trafficking claims, the opinion in RI Settlement expressly states that insurers are free to include appropriate exclusionary language for such causes of actions in their policies if they desire to do so. It will certainly be interesting to see whether the insurance industry accepts the court’s invitation, or perhaps whether the Pennsylvania legislature steps in to clarify that sex trafficking claims are indeed of the type or magnitude that they should not be covered by insurance. In any event, we will, of course, continue to monitor this and other insurance coverage issues that arise before courts in Pennsylvania, New Jersey and throughout our firm’s geographic footprint and around the country.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

New Jersey Appellate Division Affirms Exclusion of Legal Malpractice Expert as Impermissible Net Opinion

Jack Slimm and Jeremy Zacharias obtained a favorable decision on behalf of their client in a case centering on the admissibility of expert testimony in legal malpractice actions. In Martin v. Loury, the New Jersey Appellate Division affirmed the exclusion of a plaintiff's legal malpractice expert, holding that the expert's opinions on causation and damages were too speculative to support the malpractice claim. The legal malpractice action arose from an underlying employment dispute involving claims for damages stemming from the breach of an employment agreement. The plaintiff alleged that defense counsel committed malpractice during a second trial by failing to recall the plaintiff as a rebuttal witness after the employer's CEO testified. According to the plaintiff's expert, additional rebuttal testimony would have bolstered the plaintiff's damages claims and led to a more favorable result. Both the trial court and the Appellate Division rejected that theory. The courts found that the expert could not explain how the proposed rebuttal testimony would have altered the outcome of the underlying case or resulted in any additional recoverable damages. Notably, the trial judge in the underlying employment matter had already rejected the CEO's testimony as not credible and had accepted the damages analysis advanced by the plaintiff. The court had also determined that the amount of damages was not genuinely disputed. As a result, the expert's opinion that additional rebuttal testimony would have produced a better outcome was unsupported by the record and based on speculation rather than evidence. The Appellate Division agreed that neither the plaintiff nor the expert could identify any actual damages attributable to the alleged malpractice or demonstrate the required element of proximate causation. The court further upheld the trial court's application of New Jersey's net opinion doctrine, finding that the expert failed to provide the necessary "why and wherefore" supporting his conclusion that the attorney's conduct caused a compensable loss. Because the opinions rested on unquantified possibilities rather than demonstrable facts, they were inadmissible. Key Takeaway for Legal Malpractice Defendants For attorneys and firms defending legal malpractice claims, Martin v. Loury underscores the importance of closely scrutinizing an opponent's expert report on the critical elements of proximate causation and damages. The decision demonstrates that a malpractice claim cannot survive where an expert merely speculates that different litigation tactics might have produced a better result. Instead, the plaintiff must present admissible expert testimony grounded in the record that explains how the alleged attorney error probably changed the outcome of the underlying matter and resulted in measurable damages.

Thought Leadership

Court Allows Recklessness and Punitive Damages Claims to Proceed After Work‑Zone Crash

In a case where a defendant filed preliminary objections against allegations of recklessness and punitive damages, the Susquehanna County Court of Common Pleas denied these preliminary objections. This case stems from a motor vehicle accident, where the defendants car struck the plaintiffs car after the defendant allegedly fell asleep at the wheel, going at a high rate of speed, through a construction work zone. Defendant first objected to the general allegations throughout the plaintiff’s complaint pertaining to “reckless” conduct contending that there were insufficient factual allegations to support the claim of reckless conduct. Defendant next objected to the plaintiffs claim for punitive damages, as punitive damages may only be assessed against a motorist for falling asleep while driving if there is further evidence to prove driver was aware of their drowsiness and risk of falling asleep. Lastly, defendant objected to plaintiffs complaint, claiming it lacked specificity. The court here found that the plaintiff had included in the complaint specific allegations related to the defendant’s alleged recklessness, including allegations regarding speeding in a work zone, almost striking the flagger, falling asleep at the wheel, and striking the plaintiffs vehicle which was stopped. Additionally, the court noted that falling asleep does not come without warning. The court found that these allegations were sufficient to support an allegation of recklessness at the pleadings stage.