As a shareholder in the Workers’ Compensation Department, Linda devotes her entire practice to representing employers in workers’ compensation and unemployment matters. She also assists clients in handling matters pertaining to Medicare set-asides. Whether counseling clients, negotiating settlements or trying cases, Linda always seeks to minimize the client’s exposure/expenditures.
Linda’s extensive litigation experience began at the Delaware Department of Justice, where she prosecuted both criminal and civil matters. As a deputy attorney general, she represented various state agencies, including the Delaware Industrial Accident Board (IAB). Linda left the Department of Justice to become a workers’ compensation hearing officer. Following her appointment to that position by the Delaware Secretary of Labor, Linda provided legal counsel to the IAB, wrote its decisions and, upon stipulation of the parties, sat in place of the IAB, hearing and deciding matters. That experience gave Linda the invaluable perspective of the tribunal, which is helpful in her current practice.
Today, Linda actively appears before the IAB on behalf of employers in a variety of matters. Her experience extends to practice before the Delaware Superior and Supreme courts with regard to workers compensation appeals. Linda also appears before Delaware Unemployment Insurance Referees and the Delaware Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board.
Linda received her B.S. in Economics from the University of Delaware and her juris doctor from Widener University School of Law, where she was a member of the Phi Delta Phi Honor Society. In her free time, Linda enjoys watching lacrosse and gardening.
Thought Leadership
What's Hot in Workers' Comp
Delaware Supreme Court Again Reverses Judge, Litigants Still Pay
May 1, 2026
In 2022, the Delaware Supreme Court, en banc, reversed a decision of Superior Court Judge Karsnitz in a pro hac vice matter, writing that “[b]oth the tone and the explicit language of the Superior Court’s memorandum opinion and order suggest that the courts’ interest extended beyond the mere propriety and advisability of Wood’s continued involvement in the case before it.” Page v. Oath Inc., 270 A.3d 833 (Del. 2022), 2022 WL 162965 at *3. Two of the justices that decided Page recently heard and decided Red House Motors v. Bayly, No. 234, 2025, 2026 WL 568964 (Del. Mar. 2, 2026), again reversing a decision of Judge Karsnitz. The law is clear that, in workers’ compensation matters, the board is the finder of fact. If a board decision is appealed, the reviewing court is required to defer to the factual findings of the board, so long as they are supported by substantial evidence. Unfortunately, some judges seek to substitute their factual findings for those of the board, often resulting in significant litigation expenses for the parties. Such was the case of Red House Motors v. Bayly. This case initially came before the board as a coverage matter. Robert Bayly was a sole proprietor of several businesses. The employees of the businesses were covered by workers’ compensation insurance. After being injured at work, Bayly sought workers’ compensation benefits, which were denied by the carrier because Bayly was not considered an employee and had not paid for additional coverage for sole proprietors. The board, agreeing with the carrier, found that, as a factual matter, Bayly never elected additional sole proprietor coverage. Bayly appealed the board decision. Contrary to the factual findings of the board, Judge Karsnitz concluded that they should have found that Bayly “orally” elected sole proprietor coverage. He then reversed and entered judgment for Bayly. The carrier appealed. The Delaware Supreme Court reversed the decision because the Superior Court is not free to make its own factual findings contrary to those of the board when there is substantial evidence to support the board’s conclusions. Here, the board explained why, based on the record, it concluded as a factual matter that Bayly did not elect sole proprietor coverage and that those findings are entitled to deference. Unfortunately, while the board decision was eventually upheld, the litigants still had to bear the expense of extra litigation.
What's Hot in Workers' Comp
Has the Board Misread Gilliard‑Belfast for 25 Years?
April 1, 2026
In the August 2025 What’s Hot publication, I wrote about a decision in UPS v. Smith. Smith was injured at work on February 3, 2022, and, as a result, began receiving total disability benefits. After a period of treatment, including surgery, the employer filed a petition for review, seeking to terminate the claimant’s ongoing total disability benefits. At the April 18, 2024, hearing on that petition, the employer’s expert testified that the claimant was able to return to full duty work as of December 1, 2023. Although the treating doctor testified that claimant was still totally disabled, the board granted employer’s petition for review, holding that the claimant was no longer totally disabled as of December 31, 2023. Following receipt of the board’s decision on the petition for review, the claimant filed a motion for clarification on two issues: (1) how the board determined that the claimant's disability period ended on December 31, 2023; and (2) how the employer met its burden of proof to show total disability benefits had terminated without producing a labor market survey. In response to the motion, the board issued a clarification order on September 27, 2024. In its clarification order, the board acknowledged that, in deciding that the claimant was no longer totally disabled as of December 31, 2023, it relied more on the medical witness presented by the employer than the physician who treated the claimant. Next, the board emphasized that, as of the date of the hearing, the claimant had been instructed by her treating physician not to return to work. The board then held that, under Delaware law, specifically the Supreme Court’s decision in Gilliard-Belfast v. Wendy’s Inc., the claimant could remain totally disabled until her doctor stated otherwise. After the employer appealed, the Superior Court affirmed the board, holding that its interpretation of Gilliard-Belfast was free from legal error. Since 2000, when the Delaware Supreme Court issued its decision in Gilliard-Belfast, the board had interpreted that decision to mean that claimants could rely on their treating doctor’s total disability order until the board heard and determined the matter. The clarification order by the board and the Superior Court decision affirming that order appear to be quite a departure from how Gilliard-Belfast has been interpreted. UPS appealed to the Delaware Supreme Court, arguing the interpretation followed by the board for 25 years: a claimant is entitled to rely on a treating doctor’s prohibition on working until the board decides the issue of disability. The Supreme Court declined to adopt the employer’s interpretation and affirmed the Superior Court decision. This appears to mean that, as long as a treating doctor has a claimant on total disability status, an employer will no longer be able to obtain an order from the board terminating the claimant’s ongoing total disability benefits. It will be interesting to see what will result from future litigation in this area.
