.

Lee C. Durivage

Chair, Employment Law

Chair, School Leaders' Liability

LCDurivage@mdwcg.com

Portrait of Lee C. Durivage

Lee is a shareholder and the Chair of the Employment Law Practice Group, where he represents employers in the full spectrum of discrimination, harassment and retaliation claims, including claims pursuant to Title VII, the ADA public accommodation, the ADEA, the FMLA, whistleblower, housing discrimination and related tort claims. He is experienced in handling wage and hour lawsuits, including class and collective actions, pursuant to the FLSA, the Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act and the Pennsylvania Wage Payment and Collection Law. Additionally, Lee serves as the Vice Chair of the firm's School Leaders' Liability Practice Group. He routinely defends school districts, charter schools and other academic institutions in civil rights litigation, as well as in special education due process matters alleging violations of the IDEA and related federal and state statutes.

Lee serves as lead counsel for clients from a wide range of industries, including construction, manufacturing, restaurant and hospitality, education, real estate development, health care and non-profit organizations. He has served as lead counsel in a number of employment litigation matters in federal court and state court, as well as before the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission, the Philadelphia Commission on Human Relations. Additionally, Lee advises clients on how to avoid employment disputes altogether by counseling them on compliance with federal, state and local laws with respect to hiring, discipline, medical leave and terminations, as well as conducting workplace investigations and creating and updating employment policies and procedures to proactively manage employee relations.

In 2004, Lee graduated from Syracuse University with a double major in Communications & Rhetorical Studies and Political Science. Following graduation, he attended Widener University School of Law, receiving his juris doctor, cum laude, in 2007 and was awarded a Business Organization Law Certificate, with honors. During his time in law school, Lee served as an administrative board member of the Delaware Journal of Corporate Law and as a member of the Moe Levine Trial Advocacy Honor Society. He joined Marshall Dennehey as a summer associate in May 2006 and continued to work with the firm during his final year of law school. Following graduation, Lee returned to the firm as an associate in August 2007.

In addition to his employment practice, Lee has experience litigating environmental, toxic tort and professional liability matters. He has been recognized as a Pennsylvania Super Lawyer: Rising Star by Philadelphia Magazine in the area of Employment Litigation: Defense in from 2012 through 2021. Rising Stars are chosen by their peers as being among the top-up-and-coming lawyers in Pennsylvania. Only 2.5 percent of Pennsylvania attorneys receive this honor each year.

    • Widener University Delaware Law School (J.D., cum laude, 2007)
    • Syracuse University (B.S., 2004)
    • Pennsylvania, 2007
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 2007
    • U.S. District Court Middle District of Pennsylvania, 2014
    • Pennsylvania Super Lawyers Rising Star (2012-2022)
    • American Bar Association
    • Pennsylvania Bar Association
    • Philadelphia Bar Association
    • Hot Topics in Employment Law, PBA Law Firm Administrators Conference, April 30, 2025
    • EPL – You Have Headaches, We Have Solutions, Public Risk Management Association Conference, Long Beach, CA, June 2023
    • Best Practices in Handling Employment Issues, Motor Carrier Insurance Education Foundation, November 2015
    • EPL Training, Berkley Mid-Atlantic Group, co-presenter, June 26, 2014
    • Social Media & Cyber Breaches: the Internet's Impact on Your Business, The Graham Company, co-presenter, May 2014
    • "The EEOC's Litigation Under the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act,"The Legal Intelligencer, November 8, 2024
    • "EEOC's Expansion of Accommodations Under the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act,"Pennsylvania Law Weekly, December 13, 2023
    • "The State of Class Action Waivers in Arbitration Agreements," Pennsylvania Law Weekly, November 22, 2016
    • "EEOC’s Proposed Guidance Expands the Scope of Retaliation," Legal Updates for Employment Law, February 2016
    • "Avoiding Penalties When Classifying Independent Contractors,"The Legal Intelligencer, Employment Law Supplement, June 30, 2015
    • "Pennsylvania Employment Law Update," Counterpoint, newsletter of the Pennsylvania Defense Institute, 2008-present
    • "Avoiding Age Discrimination Claims in Succession Planning," The Legal Intelligencer, June 11, 2013
    • "When Does Striving for a Health Workforce Violate the Law?," The Legal Intelligencer, June 12, 2012
    • "The Continued Expansion of the ADA: The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's Updated Regulations In Light of the Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act," Counterpoint, newsletter of the Pennsylvania Defense Institute, Oct. 2011
    • "Undue Hardship: the Employer's Burden Under the ADAAA," The Legal Intelligencer, June 15, 2011
    • Case Law Alerts, regular contributor, 2008-2018

Results

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Defense Verdict Obtained in Two Consolidated Matters Following a Five-Day Trial

We obtained a defense verdict in two consolidated matters in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania following a five-day trial before Judge Gallagher. The first plaintiff alleged he was terminated in retaliation for filing a lawsuit and that he was subjected to racial discrimination during his employment. The second plaintiff alleged he was terminated in retaliation for supporting the wage and hour claims of the first plaintiff. After deliberating for approximately two hours, the jury answered “no” on the five theories asserted by the plaintiffs.

Unanimous Defense Verdict Secured in Fourth Amendment Civil Rights Trial

We obtained a defense verdict in a Fourth Amendment civil rights trial before Judge Michael Baylson in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The plaintiff alleged that a public agency violated his Fourth Amendment rights by searching and seizing his personal property after his vehicle was impounded. The defense witnesses each testified that the vehicle was never searched by the public agency and that the public agency does not have a policy or custom of searching vehicles once they are impounded, which was an essential element of plaintiff’s constitutional violation claim. After less than 15 minutes of deliberation, the jury unanimously found that plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the public agency violated his constitutional rights, granting judgment in favor of the public agency defendant.  

Thought Leadership

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The EEOC's Litigation Under the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act

November 8, 2024

Since the law went into effect, the EEOC has reported that it has received more than 2,000 charges alleging violation of the PWFA. In addition, the EEOC has recently filed several lawsuits against employers who have allegedly violated the PWFA, which provides accommodations for pregnant, and postpartum, applicants and employees.

EEOC's Expansion of Accommodations Under the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act

December 14, 2023

The law requires covered employers to provide reasonable accommodations to a worker's known limitations related to pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions, unless the accommodation will cause the employer an undue hardship.

Firm Highlights

Complete Victory Obtained in a Workers’ Compensation Matter

Result

Complete Victory Obtained in a Workers’ Compensation Matter

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Act 111's IRE Provisions

In this case, the claimant sustained a work injury of January 6, 1994, which was acknowledged by Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP). After the claimant’s receipt of 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, the employer filed a Request for an Impairment Rating Examination (IRE). The IRE was performed in May 2023 and the IRE physician found that the claimant had a 5% whole person impairment, under the AMA Guides. The employer filed a Petition based on the IRE results, and the Petition was granted by the WCJ. During litigation, the claimant argued that the IRE provisions of Act 111 (Section 306(a.3) of the Act) were not applicable to her injury, since it predated June 24, 1996, the date Act 57 went into effect, and that the IRE provisions were unconstitutional. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ)) granted the Petition and the Board affirmed. On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the claimant argued that Act 111 violated the nondelegation doctrine and that its retroactive application to the claimant’s injury was unconstitutional. The court rejected the arguments on the basis that they had already found the same arguments without merit in multiple, prior cases. The court also addressed an argument made by the claimant that Act 111 was procedurally defective under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it was only considered on two days in each House after having undergone amendments and reassignments. The court noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires every bill to be considered on three different days in each House. The claimant maintained that, according to the legislative history, the bill did not receive three separate days of consideration from each House when it was assigned a new bill number. The court pointed out, however, that the bill number, H.B. 1840 remained constant and was considered on three occasions by the House. Further, the court concluded that minor amendments to the bill were germane to its original subject, which was to modify the Act’s IRE process, in accordance with Protz II.

Thought Leadership

The Tolling Trap: Filing Alone Will Not Toll the Statute Without Good-Faith Service

The Eastern District of Pennsylvania recently reinforced a critical limitation on bad faith claims, holding that a timely filing alone will not preserve a cause of action absent a good-faith effort to serve the original process. The plaintiff had presented a claim for underinsured motorist benefits to his auto insurer. The insurer evaluated the claim and determined that the plaintiff’s accident-related damages did not exceed the bodily injury liability insurance limits of the at-fault driver and denied his claim. Among other claims, the plaintiff sought to present a claim for insurance bad faith under 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8371, to which a two year statute of limitation applies. He first filed a praecipe for writ of summons before the expiration of the statute of limitation. However, the plaintiff did not attempt to serve the praecipe or writ until after the statute of limitations had expired. Additionally, the service failed as the plaintiff had mailed the original process to an incorrect address. Despite receipt of the Postal Service’s failure to deliver the original process, the plaintiff did not attempt to re-serve the writ. Two months later, the plaintiff filed a complaint and then successfully served that complaint. The insurer sought to dismiss the plaintiff’s bad faith claim as time-barred by the statute of limitations. The district court agreed. Though the plaintiff had filed a praecipe for a writ of summons prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations, the statute is only tolled if there is a good faith effort to serve that original process. In this case, the court determined that the plaintiff had failed to perform a “good faith effort to serve the original process”. Additionally, though the filing and service of a complaint can serve as alternative original process when the lawsuit is commenced by the filing of a praecipe for a writ of summons, the plaintiff filed his complaint after the statute of limitations had expired. The plaintiff’s bad faith claim was therefore determined to be barred by the statute of limitations and dismissed by the court, with prejudice. A key takeaway for the defense is not to assume that the statute of limitations has been successfully tolled by a plaintiff merely because a praecipe for a writ of summons or complaint has been filed prior to the expiration of the statute. A filed complaint or writ is only part of the equation. The defense should carefully review the docket and filings to confirm that the plaintiff also performed the requisite good faith effort to serve that original process. A thorough review of the docket may reveal that the plaintiff failed to make the good-faith service efforts necessary to toll the statute of limitations.

Marshall Dennehey Named a Standout in Litigation by BTI Consulting Group

News

Marshall Dennehey Named a Standout in Litigation by BTI Consulting Group

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Result

Summary Judgment Obtained in Insurance Coverage Case

Bret E. Dubbert Joins Marshall Dennehey’s Orlando Office as Special Counsel in the Casualty Department

News

Bret E. Dubbert Joins Marshall Dennehey’s Orlando Office as Special Counsel in the Casualty Department

Defense Victory Obtained in Workers’ Compensation Case

Result

Defense Victory Obtained in Workers’ Compensation Case

graphic announcing our 6 2027 Super Lawyers & Rising Stars

News

Marshall Dennehey Announces 2027 New Jersey Super Lawyers And Rising Stars

Event

CLM 2026 Focus Conference

Allison joins three insurance industry leaders to discuss how cyber coverage disputes, the growing impact of social inflation on bodily injury claim valuation, and the use of artificial intelligence are reshaping the bad faith landscape. The panel will examine emerging sources of extra-contractual exposure, including evolving cyber insurance coverage issues and the challenges of accurately valuing bodily injury claims. Practical approaches to claim evaluation using AI, along with defense strategies designed to help prevent or successfully defend against bad faith litigation, will also be addressed. 

Thought Leadership

Florida Supreme Court Rules Florida Statute §627.70152 Does not Apply Retroactively

In a decision that resolves years of appellate uncertainty and confirms that insurers and insureds alike can rely on the legal framework in place when a policy is issued, the Supreme Court of Florida last week found that Florida Statute §627.70152, which involves an insured’s requirement to provide an insurer with pre-suit notice before filing a suit, cannot be applied retroactively. In Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company v. Hughes, the Court was presented with the issue of whether the statutory pre-suit notice requirement applied retroactively and whether it would apply to a breach of contract of an insurance policy that was issued before the statute went into effect. Before the Court was an appeal from a homeowner, Ms. Hughes, who sued her insurance carrier, Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company (Universal) for breach of contract under an insurance policy that was in effect from April 24, 2019 through April 24, 2020. During the policy period, Ms. Hughes suffered a loss and, on May 29, 2019, made a claim for water damage. The carrier investigated the loss and issued payment; Ms. Hughes disputed the payment, finding the amount insufficient for repairs. On July 1, 2021, Florida Statute §627.70152 went into effect, which required insureds to provide notice of intent to initiate litigation against the carrier prior to filing a lawsuit; if an insured filed the lawsuit without complying with §627.70152, a court must dismiss the case without prejudice. On August 4, 2021, Ms. Hughes filed her lawsuit against Universal for breach of contract. Universal moved to dismiss based on her failure to comply with §627.70152. Ms. Hughes contended the notice requirement could not be applied retroactively. The trial court disagreed and dismissed the lawsuit without prejudice, and Ms. Hughes appealed. During the appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, in Cole v. Universal Property & Casualty, 363 So. 3d 1089 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023), ruled that Florida Statute §627.70152 did apply retroactively to policies issued before the effective date of §627.70152. However, the Sixth District Court agreed with Ms. Hughes and overturned the trial court’s ruling, finding the statute could not retroactively apply to policies issued prior to the statute effective date. Thereafter, the other district courts weighed in, with the Third District Court agreeing with the Fourth District Court, and the First, Second and Fifth District Courts agreeing with the Sixth District Court. In resolving the conflict amongst the district courts, the Supreme Court advised “as a general rule, ‘the statute in effect at the time an insurance contract is executed governs substantive issues arising in connection with that contract.’ Hassen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 674 So. 2d 106, 108 (Fla. 1996). The Court applied the two-step test when deciding whether a statute has retroactive application: “First, the Court must ascertain whether the Legislature intended for the statute to apply retroactively. Second, if such an intent is clearly expressed, the Court must determine whether retroactive application would violate any constitutional principles.” Menendez v. Progressive Exp. Ins. Co., 35 So. 3d 873, 877 (Fla. 2010). In analyzing the Legislature’s intent, the Court must determine whether the Legislature has manifested a clear command for retroactivity in the statutory text.  In review of the statutory text, the Court found nothing in the language of the statute to indicate that the phrase “all suits” was serving another purpose of expanding its reach to suits based on policies that both predate and postdate the enactment of the statute. Buis v. Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 394 So. 3d 738, 741 (Fla. 2d DCA 2024). Further, the Court noted the statute has an effective date, which has long been considered to be evidence against retroactive application of a statute. The Court concluded that, on its face, no provision of §627.70152 speaks to application of the statute to insurance policies issued before the statute’s effective date and therefore, the Legislature did not clearly command retroactivity of the statute to include insurance policies issued prior to the enactment of the statute. The Court briefly reviewed Universal’s argument that the presuit notice requirement was procedural, not substantive, and therefore should be applied retroactively; however, the Court agreed with the Sixth District Court’s finding that, in its entirety, §627.70152 transformed an insured’s ability to sue an insurance company under a property insurance policy and an insurer’s obligations to respond to and pay insurance claims, thus making the requirement a substantive change. The Court thereby upheld the decision of the Sixth District and disapproved the decision of the Fourth District in Cole.