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Kristen L. Worley

Co-Chair, Catastrophic Claims Litigation

Co-Chair, Cannabis Law Practice

Portrait of Kristen L. Worley

Kristen Worley brings more than 22 years of litigation and trial experience to Marshall Dennehey’s Casualty Department. Throughout her career, she has represented a variety of clients in New Jersey and Pennsylvania in the areas of product liability, premises liability, commercial motor vehicle and, specifically, companies specializing in paratransit and non-emergency medical transport lines of business. Additionally, she has handled product defect cases and negligent maintenance cases for elevators and escalators throughout PA and NJ.  Kristen routinely defends elevator mechanics in their depositions to defend modernization cases, door strikes, mislevelings, improper passenger extractions by third parties, etc. Kristen has also been admitted on a pro hac basis at the request of her clients to litigate matters with significant exposure in Delaware and New York.  

Kristen is driven by results; whether that be identifying those matters that are ripe for early resolution or engaging in targeted discovery for those cases that must be tried. Litigation with a purpose is the key to her success both behind the scenes and in the courtroom. This case management methodology and approach to litigation has proven successful over the years, assisting Kristen in securing the 3rd largest negligent entrustment verdict in New Jersey in 2017.   

Kristen is an honors graduate of Trenton State College and earned her law degree at Rutgers School of Law in Camden, New Jersey. In addition to the state courts of Pennsylvania and New Jersey, Kristen is admitted in the District Court of New Jersey, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and the United States Third Circuit Court of Appeals.  Active in the legal community, she is a member of the International Association of Defense Counsel and the prestigious Federation of Defense and Corporate Counsel. 

Kristen resides in Southern New Jersey with her family where she enjoys spending her time involved in the local youth soccer community.

    • Rutgers Law School (J.D., 1999)
    • The College of New Jersey (B.S., magna cum laude, 1996)
    • New Jersey, 1999
    • Pennsylvania, 1999
    • U.S. District Court District of New Jersey
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania
    • U.S. Court of Appeals 3rd Circuit
    • Pennsylvania Bar Association
    • Strategically defended and obtained the dismissal of a Laidlow claim asserted by the plaintiff who was acting within the course and scope of his employment with the defendant when he sustained a significant workplace injury. In a 37-page written opinion granting the defendant’s motion for summary judgment and addressing several other applications, the court ruled the plaintiff failed to establish that his employer committed an intentional and malicious act sufficient to circumvent the workers’ compensation exclusivity provision. In reaching this conclusion, the court applied the Millison “conduct” and “context” prongs, reasoning that the absence of prior accidents or evidence suggesting the plaintiff’s employer intentionally disabled a safety device, the lack of pre-incident OSHA violations or post-accident efforts by the employer to deceive OSHA, and the undeniable determination that the plaintiff’s incident was “part and parcel” of industrial life, all warranted the entry of summary judgment in favor of the defendant employer and the dismissal of the plaintiff’s claim. You can read the opinion here.  

Results

Summary Judgment Obtained in Significant Workplace Injury Case

We secured a motion for summary judgment in a significant workplace injury case involving a Laidlow claim. The court ruled that the plaintiff had failed to establish that his employer had committed an intentional and malicious act sufficient to circumvent the workers’ compensation exclusivity provision.

Jury Defense in High-Stakes Catastrophic Litigation Case

We obtained a defense verdict in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in a case where the plaintiff sought $24.1M for alleged property damages and lost revenue.     In 2014, our client defendant, a marine construction company, was retained by the U.S. Navy to conduct pile driving activities at the Philadelphia Navy Yard. The plaintiff, a neighboring commercial property owner, alleged that our client's pile driving and related activities damaged its property and caused it to lose revenue. All other defendants settled before trial. The plaintiff claimed $20 million in damages against our client. A bifurcated trial began on January 17, 2023. The plaintiff’s demand dropped throughout the nine-day liability phase, which involved numerous scientific and engineering experts and other witnesses. On January 27, 2023, the jury returned its unanimous verdict, attributing 60% of the fault to plaintiff itself and 25% to the Navy, which resulted in a defense verdict for our client. As a result of the defense verdict on liability, there will be no damages phase.  

Thought Leadership

Defense Digest

On the Pulse…Navigating the Complexities of Cannabis Litigation: Marshall Dennehey’s Multidisciplinary Approach to a Rapidly Evolving Industry

December 1, 2025

Cannabis litigation is on the rise and impacts multiple facets of law. Marshall Dennehey’s Cannabis Law Practice Group is adept at helping clients navigate this evolving legal landscape, offering a full suite of legal services, no matter what type of claim a cannabis business or its insurers may be facing. Our services include analysis of insurance coverage and the defense of commercial general liability (CGL), professional liability, cybersecurity, employment, workers’ compensation, and health care claims. Coverage Our team defends insurers and managing general agents (MGAs) against cannabis-related coverage and bad faith claims, including those related to equipment breakdown, application of protective safeguard endorsements, business interruption, and crop losses. We are familiar with the industry’s underwriting goals and policies that reflect the unique risks of this segment.  CGL Claims  Commercial general liability claims encompass a wide range of casualty matters relevant to cannabis operations and recreational product usage. These claims may include auto liability matters, product liability claims, “Gram-Shop,” and other retail accessory risks, such as landlord liability and delivery service claims. We defend typical retail claims at cannabis dispensaries, such as falls and even assault claims involving altercations between patrons and, occasionally, employees. In doing so, we utilize varied technology assets of clients, such as surveillance and body cam footage and, where appropriate, pursue loss-transfer claims against third parties. Additionally, we defend clients in cannabis product liability matters, including claims of tainted product, and have identified a team of experts in the various fields of toxicology, analytical chemistry, food safety, and forensic science to assist in defending these claims.  Professional Liability Claims Our vast history and focus on defending professional liability claims across a broad range of industries affords our attorneys a unique advantage in defending claims brought against cannabis professionals, such as growers, cultivators, consultants, accountants, lawyers, MGAs, adjusters, and others who work within this space.  Cybersecurity Claims  Ransomware attacks and data breaches threaten cannabis operators and their obligation to safeguard their customers’ sensitive medical and personal data. Likewise, security breaches with track-and-trace software designed to track cannabis from “seed-to-sale” can interrupt an operator’s regulatory compliance. In the event of a data compromise, our cyber team is available to quickly mobilize and mitigate the damage caused by a ransomware attack. Employment and Workers’ Compensation Claims With the growing approval of recreational cannabis usage and the increasing number of cultivators and dispensaries popping up to meet consumer demand, it is not surprising that employment and workers’ compensation lawsuits in these fields are trending upwards. Our attorneys defend facility owners and operators when wage-and-hour disputes, discrimination and harassment, and retaliation claims arise. We also represent insurers and employers in workplace injury and occupational hazard claims. Our approach extends to cannabis industry-specific risks that include cultivation and manufacturing operations, as well as retail sales and distribution environments. Health Care Claims While many states have legalized the medical use of cannabis, it remains illegal under federal law. This dichotomy creates significant legal challenges for health care providers. Our attorneys leverage their experience in helping clients navigate health care regulations, such as HIPAA laws and patient privacy protections, and apply it to the uniquely complex environment surrounding the cannabis industry. We defend clients against civil claims, including medical malpractice matters, and can assist health care providers—including physicians, dispensaries and clinics—in understanding the evolving standards of care for cannabis as a therapeutic option, which can differ significantly from conventional treatments. Such claims may involve appropriate patient evaluations, dosage recommendations, and documentation requirements within the framework of state medical cannabis programs. We are also well-equipped to address challenges related to informed consent.  As the legal and regulatory frameworks surrounding cannabis continue to evolve, so too do the risks and complexities faced by businesses operating within this area. Our Cannabis Law Practice Group stands at the forefront of this rapidly developing field, providing clients with informed, strategic, and results-oriented counsel. Our multidisciplinary approach—spanning coverage, liability, cybersecurity, employment, workers’ compensation, and health care—ensures that clients receive comprehensive support tailored to the unique challenges of the cannabis industry. Whether addressing emerging claims or guiding proactive risk management, our team is committed to protecting our clients’ interests and positioning them for continued success in this dynamic legal landscape. Kristen works in our Philadelphia, PA office and can be reached at 215-575-2849 or KLWorley@mdwcg.com. Todd works in both our Philadelphia, PA and Mount Laurel, NJ offices. He can be reached at 215-575-2605, 856-414-6029 or TJLeon@mdwcg.com.  Defense Digest, Vol. 31, No. 4, December 2025, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2025 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Defense Digest

Including Settled Defendants on a Verdict Sheet: A Reminder that No Assumptions Are Allowed

December 1, 2023

Key Points: Pennsylvania’s Fair Share Act permits the inclusion of a defendant or other non-party who has entered into a release with a plaintiff to be included on the verdict sheet and, thus, subject to apportionment of liability “… upon appropriate requests and proofs by any party.”  Employers who are granted immunity from liability and suit under Pennsylvania’s Workers’ Compensation Act are not subject to inclusion on a verdict sheet.  Trial of any case necessarily comes at the conclusion of months, and, in many instances, years, of discovery. Practitioners carefully weigh their strategy when propounding and answering written discovery, asserting objections during depositions, and serving expert reports. During this phase, it is easy to push the notion of trial and all of its practical considerations to the side, acknowledging the oft-cited statistic that only 1% of cases will reach the trial stage. Nevertheless, when those few cases we encounter in our practice reach the trial stage, we find ourselves preparing in earnest for testimony, crafting arguments for the admission or exclusion of evidence, as the case may be, and finally, preparing a litany of pretrial submissions. It is this latter subset of considerations, and specifically the verdict sheet, that are ultimately submitted to a jury which is the focus herein. A jury verdict sheet is the sum of every case expressed in its simplest form and, quite arguably, the most important document in any trial. The verdict sheet outlines for a jury the decisions that must be rendered once all the evidence has been placed before it. The form can take any number of versions, but in the traditional case, it directs a jury to determine liability, causation, and damages. But who goes on the verdict sheet? We expect that parties to a lawsuit will be placed on a verdict sheet, but what about settled defendants and non-parties? A defendant has a significant interest in providing a jury with the opportunity to apportion fault to as many entities as possible, thereby reducing its overall exposure.  Pennsylvania’s Fair Share Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 7102, directs practitioners as to those instances in which settled defendants and non-parties may be included on a verdict sheet for purposes of apportionment of liability. 42 Pa.C.S. § 7102(a)(2) provides as follows: Apportionment of responsibility among certain nonparties and effect.--For purposes of apportioning liability only, the question of liability of any defendant or other person who has entered into a release with the plaintiff with respect to the action and who is not a party shall be transmitted to the trier of fact upon appropriate requests and proofs by any party. A person whose liability may be determined pursuant to this section does not include an employer to the extent that the employer is granted immunity from liability or suit pursuant to the act of June 2, 1915 (P.L.736, No.338), known as the Workers’ Compensation Act.  Note the key phrase in the foregoing citation, “…any defendant or other person who has entered into a release with the plaintiff with respect to the action and who is not a party shall be transmitted to the trier of fact upon appropriate requests and proofs by any party.” (Emphasis added.) Significantly, Pennsylvania courts have determined that there is no absolute right to the inclusion of a settled defendant on a verdict sheet. Hyrcza v. West Penn Allegheny Health System, Inc,. 978 A.2d 961, 969-970 (Pa. Super. 2009). Rather, a jury must be presented with proofs sufficient to find the settled defendant or other person liable, and the trial court functions as the gate keeper to determine whether that evidential burden has been satisfied. Ultimately, a trial court’s determination of whether sufficient evidence has been adduced that supports a prima facie case against a settled defendant and, thus, its inclusion on a verdict sheet is a decision that is subject to review for an abuse of discretion or error of law. See Rose v. Annabi, 934 A.2d 743, 745 (Pa. Super. 2007). An abuse of discretion occurs when the decision of the trial court represents “not merely an error of judgment, but where the judgment is manifestly unreasonable or where the law is not applied or where the record shows that the action is a result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will.” Id. In discussing this standard of review, practitioners must take note that the decision of the trial court concerning the inclusion of a settled defendant or other person on a verdict sheet will be, for better or worse, a difficult ruling to challenge on appeal, and one should prepare their trial proofs accordingly.  In converse to settled defendants that may be placed on a verdict sheet following the submission of sufficient evidence of fault, employers who are granted immunity under the Pennsylvania’s Workers’ Compensation Act are not subject to inclusion on a verdict sheet. The exclusivity provision of the Pennsylvania Workers’ Compensation Act, set forth at 77 P.S. § 481, provides that the “liability of an employer under this Act shall be exclusive and in place of any and all other liability to such employees … entitled to damages in any action at law or otherwise on account of any injury or death … .” Acknowledging the Act’s limitation of suit, or exclusivity provision, the Pennsylvania Fair Share Act similarly bars the apportionment of any liability to an employer immunized from liability or suit under the Act. In sum, practitioners should not presume that defendants or non-parties who have entered into a release with the plaintiff will automatically be included on the verdict sheet. Rather, they should prepare their cases for trial with special attention paid to expert discovery and advance theories of liability against a settled entity. In this manner, practitioners can ensure that they are capable of presenting sufficient proofs from which the trial court can conclude that a prima facie case of liability has been advanced against a settled entity and, thereby, order the inclusion of said entity on the verdict sheet for purposes of liability apportionment.  *Kristen, a shareholder in our Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, office, is Co-Chair of our firm’s Catastrophic Claims Litigation Practice Group. She can be reached at 215.575.2849 or KLWorley@mdwcg.com.   Defense Digest, Vol. 29, No. 4, December 2023, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2023 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

News

Marshall Dennehey’s John J. Hare Brings Home Attorney of the Year Honors; Firm Named Litigation Department of the Year in Two Categories

Marshall Dennehey took home top honors in three categories at the The Legal Intelligencer’s 2026 Pennsylvania Legal Awards, held June 11 in Philadelphia. The first place awards include: Attorney of the Year: John J. Hare, Chair of the firm’s Appellate Advocacy & Post-Trial Practice Group and Executive Committee member, together with Charles “Chip” Becker of Kline & Specter Litigation Department of the Year, Appellate – Third Win in a Row! Litigation Department of the Year, Product Liability/Mass Torts “There is no one more deserving of Attorney of the Year honors than John. This award is a testament to his exceptional skill, dedication, and leadership—qualities that truly exemplify the very best of our firm,” said G. Mark Thompson, Marshall Dennehey’s President & CEO. “These honors also reflect the strength and depth of our product liability, mass torts, and appellate practices across Pennsylvania and beyond, underscoring our ongoing commitment to delivering outstanding results for our clients.” Attorney of the Year – John J. Hare, Marshall Dennehey, together with Charles “Chip” Becker, Kline & Specter Over the past year, John and Charles were opposing counsel in many of the highest-profile civil appeals in Pennsylvania. John is renowned as a preeminent appellate lawyer on the defense side, and Chip on the plaintiff's side. They have opposed each other repeatedly, exhibiting peerless professionalism and exceptional civility, while zealously litigating under the unremitting pressure of high-profile litigation and record-setting verdicts totaling more than $3.5 billion. They have also collaborated, outside of litigation, on many commissions, committees, and projects of importance to the Pennsylvania judiciary and legal community. Litigation Department of the Year – Appellate Law, Winner (previous winner, 2025 and 2024) 2025 was another standout year for the firm’s Appellate Advocacy & Post‑Trial Practice Group, led by John J. Hare, which was retained to challenge many of Pennsylvania’s “nuclear” verdicts—awards exceeding $10 million. Notably, the department persuaded the Pennsylvania Superior Court to reverse a Philadelphia judgment of $1.09 billion, the largest judgment ever overturned by a Pennsylvania appellate court. The group’s 11 full‑time Pennsylvania‑based appellate lawyers are at the center of Pennsylvania’s most high-profile matters, bringing more than 150 years of combined appellate experience. They routinely handle post‑trial and appellate matters and are frequently engaged to participate in and monitor trials in high‑exposure cases to ensure that critical legal issues are properly raised and preserved for appeal. Litigation Department of the Year – Product Liability/Mass Torts, Winner This marks the first win for the firm’s Pennsylvania Product Liability and Mass Torts practices, which operate within our Casualty Department, managed by Matthew Schorr and Jeff Rapattoni. For almost five decades, Fortune 500 product manufacturers/distributors and their insurers have turned to these groups to defend their litigation. Led by Bradley D. Remick and Vlada Tasich, our Product Liability group’s success can be attributed to its commitment to keeping abreast of ever-changing legal theories, judicial viewpoints, and evolving technology impacting the product liability landscape. Our attorneys have successfully handled thousands of product liability matters in all jurisdictions across the state. Likewise, our mass tort litigation practice – divided into Asbestos & Mass Tort, and Environmental & Toxic Tort Litigation –  has defended manufacturers, distributors, contractors, and premises owners in thousands of personal injury and other claims. Led by Kevin E. Hexstall and Patrick T. Reilly, most attorneys in these groups have more than 20 years of experience, and our seasoned trial team has tried hundreds of cases to verdict, consistently achieving strong results through both trials and settlements. In addition to these awards, Marshall Dennehey was a Litigation Department of the Year finalist for Professional Liability.

Thought Leadership

Unanimous New Jersey Supreme Court Holds That Personal Emails of Public Employees and Officials are Subject to OPRA

In Rosetti v. Ramapo-Indian Hills Regional High School Board of Education, the New Jersey Supreme Court unanimously held that government-related emails, which are contained within personal email accounts, are government records under the Open Public Records Act (OPRA), and a log of those emails must be produced when requested. In reaching this decision, the court conducted an analysis of the OPRA and cited previous cases that held that emails do in fact fall within OPRA’s definition of a record and must be produced when requested pursuant to the Act. The court in Rosetti then had to answer the question as to whether public officials’ personal email accounts that are used for government purposes are subject to OPRA, and found that they are. Rosetti made an OPRA request to the Board of Education seeking email logs from Board members’ personal email accounts. The Board refused to produce the logs and indicated that it was not under any obligation to produce personal email account logs, only from government-related email accounts. The issue was whether a log had to be produced for Board members’ personal email accounts, which they used to conduct Board business. The Board argued that while it was possible to create a log for government-related email accounts through its IT Department, it was not possible to do so for personal email accounts. The court rejected this argument and ruled that Board members are required to search their personal email accounts and create a log of government-related emails housed in those accounts. Once completed, each Board member then must submit a certification detailing the searches that were conducted. The court went one step further with a suggestion to government employees and officials, stating, “[g]overnment agencies should strongly advise their employees, elected officials, and others engaged in government-related business to refrain from using their personal email accounts when conducting government-related business.”  Please do not hesitate to contact me with any questions regarding this case and others pertaining to the OPRA. 

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court Holds Self-Referral Prohibition Does Not Cover Prescriptions Written by Physicians with Ownership Interests in Dispensing Pharmacies

700 Pharmacy v. Bureau of Workers’ Compensation Fee Review Hearing Office (State Workers’ Insurance Fund); Nos. 97, 98, 99, 100, 101 MAP 2024; decided June 16, 2026; by Justice Mundy.   In this case, Drs. Miteswar Purewal and Shailen Jalali, treating physicians for workers’ compensation claimants, wrote prescriptions for various medications that were filled by 700 Pharmacy. The worker’s compensation insurer refused to pay for the prescriptions on the basis that they were illegal self-referrals under the Act. 700 Pharmacy subsequently filed fee review applications with The Bureau of Workers’ Compensation Medical Fee Review Office. At a fee review hearing, both physicians stipulated they had a financial interest in the pharmacy.  The physicians argued that the Anti-Referral Provision of the Act does not bar self-referrals on prescription drugs and pharmaceutical services, since the provision does not specifically identify prescription drugs. The Fee Review Hearing Officer rejected this argument and found that prescriptions for medications are prohibited under the “goods or services” language included in the provision. 700 Pharmacy appealed to the Commonwealth Court, and the court affirmed, agreeing with the Hearing Officer’s interpretation of “goods and services” as encompassing prescriptions. 700 Pharmacy appealed to the Supreme Court.  The Supreme Court reversed the decisions of the Hearing Officer and the Commonwealth Court, holding that the term “goods and services” in the Anti-Referral Provision of the Act did not include prescriptions. According to the Court, “goods and services” was not a catch-all, but simply explanatory as to the eight enumerated categories in the provision. The provision (Section 306(f.1)(3)(iii)) reads, in pertinent part: Notwithstanding any other provision of law, it is unlawful for a provider to refer a person for laboratory, physical therapy, rehabilitation, chiropractic, radiation oncology, psychometric, home infusion therapy  or diagnostic imaging, goods or services pursuant to this section if the provider has a financial interest with the person or in the entity that receives the referral. The Court said that if the General Assembly wanted to specifically include prescription drugs and pharmaceutical services in the Anti-Referral Provision, they would have done so. They pointed out that prescription drugs and pharmaceutical services were included by the legislature in Section 306 (f.1)(3)(vi) of the Act as to reimbursement, and claimed that their omission from the Anti-Referral Provision supports the conclusion that those services are not included in the Anti-Referral Provision’s self-referral prohibition.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

Perlmutter Provides Predictability for Punitive Damages Claims in Florida

In a much anticipated decision, the Florida Supreme Court provided clarity for the standards of proof for punitive damages claims in Perlmutter v. Federal Insurance Company, SC2024-0058 (Fla. June 11, 2026). Litigants and trial judges must be mindful of the standards laid out by the Court. And, defense practitioners must be prepared to alter their strategies to defend against such claims. Perlmutter came to the Court from the Fourth District, based on conflict jurisdiction with decisions from the Second and Fifth District and on certification of a question of great public importance as to the standard of proof for punitive damages claims at the pleading stage. Fed. Ins. Co. v. Perlmutter, 376 So. 3d 24, 29 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023). In the underlying case, the Fourth District made two conclusions. First, it held that a “trial court must consider the evidentiary showing by all parties at the hearing on the motion to amend, that is, evidence ‘in the record’ and evidence ‘proffered by the claimant.’”  376 So. 3d at 33. Second, the Fourth held that it “interpreted section 768.72(1) and (2) to require the trial court to make a preliminary determination of whether a reasonable jury, viewing the totality of proffered evidence in the light most favorable to the movant, could find by clear and convincing evidence that punitive damages are warranted.  Id. at 34 (underscoring in the original). In making these conclusions, the court cautioned trial courts that the “preliminary determination” analysis did not entitle the trial court to decide whether the evidence is clear and convincing and noted that the trial court should not weigh evidence and should not determine witness credibility. Id. The Florida Supreme Court accepted jurisdiction and answered the certified question in the negative. It quashed the decision below and remanded the case for application of the following standards: The trial court should consider only the evidence identified or proffered by the claimant; it should not entertain an evidentiary counter-submission from the opponent. The trial court should consider whether a reasonable person could conclude based on the claimant’s evidence, that the defendant committed “intentional misconduct” or “gross negligence” as defined in section 768.72(2) or section 768.72(3). The trial court must review the request for punitive damages in the context of the underlying claims. The trial court should not apply the clear and convincing standard of proof in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence at the pleading stage. The trial court does not act as a fact-finder; the trial court must not weigh the claimant’s evidence—it cannot decide the truth of the matter. The trial court must consider the record evidence and the proffered evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, but the allegations in the proposed amended complaint are not themselves evidence. Perlmutter, SC2024-0058 at 13-15 (emphasis added). In explaining these standards, the Court interpreted the text of the statute and compared it to a related statute which governs punitive damages in the nursing home context. The nursing home statute expressly calls for evidentiary submissions by “the parties” and expressly tells the trial court to determine whether there is a reasonable basis to believe the claimant could satisfy the “clear and convincing evidence” standard at trial. Id. at 17-18 (comparing the text of section 768.72(1), Florida Statutes, with section 400.0237, Florida Statutes). Without that express language in section 768.72, the statute could not be applied in the same manner. With these standards specially delineated for the trial courts, the Court is “confident that its interpretation of section 768.72(1) will not frustrate the effectiveness of the statute in accomplishing the Legislature’s textually evident purposes.” Id.  at 22 (cleaned up). This remains to be seen. While Perlmutter provides predictability and clarity for trial courts when reviewing the evidentiary submissions in support of a punitive damages claim, the decision will not likely impact the numbers of punitive damages motions filed. Rather, these new parameters will change the way claims are defended, reminiscent of a time when rulings on punitive damages were only subject to certiorari review and appellate courts were limited in reviewing procedural errors. This decision will likely deflate the level-playing field that Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(3)(G) addressed by allowing appeals of orders granting and denying punitive damages amendments. Further, Perlmutter may have impliedly created a call to action for the Legislature to amend section 768.72(1) in the same manner it amended section 400.0237 to allow the courts to analyze “admissible evidence submitted by the parties” and determine at a hearing whether there is a reasonable basis to believe the claimant at trial would be able to demonstrate by “clear and convincing evidence” that the recovery of punitive damages is warranted. Until then, defendants must adjust their strategies. To adapt to these new standards, defense practitioners will need to tailor their strategy for defending punitive damages claims since they can no longer submit a counter-proffer or urge a court to apply the clear and convincing standard at the pleading phase. Instead, defendants will need to attack the deficiencies in the claimant’s pleadings and proffer. If the trial court fails to serve as a gatekeeper, and does not apply the above standards, then defendants can pursue an interlocutory appeal under Rule 9.130(a)(3)(G). If a nonfinal appeal is taken, then defendants should move to stay any intrusive financial discovery while the appellate court analyzes the issues on appeal. Finally, defendants should utilize Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.510 to serve as a screening device to allow the trial court to analyze all evidence and prevent nonmeritorious punitive damages claims from proceeding to a jury.