Kimberly is a shareholder in the firm's Appellate Advocacy and Post-Trial Practice Group in the Professional Liability Department and is Board-certified in Appellate Practice by the Florida Bar. She has litigated numerous appeals in Florida state and federal appellate courts across a wide variety of subject matters in cases including but not limited to cases involving, medical malpractice, construction defect, condominium and homeowner association matters, insurance coverage, bad faith, maritime, aviation and premises liability. Kimberly handles the brief writing, motion practice and oral arguments. In addition to her extensive appellate practice, Kimberly provides litigation support in insurance coverage, construction defect, premises liability, casualty, professional malpractice and bad faith cases.
Kimberly has an AV Preeminent rating by Martindale-Hubbell, the highest rating for professional competence. From 2015-2020, Kimberly was recognized as a Super Lawyers Rising Star, a designation given each year to only 2.5 percent of lawyers in the state of Florida. She has also been recognized as a Top Lawyer for Appellate Law by the South Florida Legal Guide. Kimberly was selected to Florida Trend Legal Elite Notable Women Leaders in Law.
Kimberly is actively involved in bar association and related legal societies. She is a member of the Board of Trustees of the Florida Supreme Court Historical Society and currently serves as Treasurer and Communications Chair. An active member of the Florida Bar, she is Vice Chair (Live Programs) of the Appellate Practice Section's CLE Committee and past chair of the Pro Bono and Programs Committees. She has been a member of the Broward County Bar Association, the Dade County Bar Association, the Defense Research Institute, the Florida Defense Lawyers' Association, the Third District Court of Appeal Historical Society and the Rosemary Barkett American Appellate Inn of Court. She has served as the president of the Third District Court of Appeal Historical Society and as co-chair of the Dade County Bar Association's Appellate Practice Section.
She has spoken on appellate and litigation support topics and written multiple articles on important issues impacting appellate and trial lawyers. Kimberly has also served as adjunct faculty at three law schools: Nova Southeastern Shepard Broad College of Law in Davie, Florida; Ave Maria School of Law in Naples, Florida; and St. Thomas University Benjamin L. Crump College of Law in Miami Gardens, Florida.
Prior to joining the firm, Kimberly was the head of the appellate division at a local defense firm. Before entering private practice, Kimberly served as a Career Research Attorney for the Honorable David M. Gersten of the Third District Court of Appeal in Miami, Florida. She also interned at the Third District and at the Florida Supreme Court in Tallahassee, Florida, while in law school.
Kimberly graduated from the University of Florida, Gainesville, with a Bachelor of Science in Public Relations with high honors. She subsequently attended the University of Miami School of Law in Coral Gables, Florida, where she obtained her juris doctor.
Results
Summary Judgment Secured in a Foodborne Illness Wrongful Death Matter
We won summary judgment in a foodborne illness wrongful death case. The plaintiff filed a wrongful death action against multiple parties, including the seafood supplier, distributors, transporters and the restaurant that served the decedent. The plaintiff alleged the decedent died as a result of eating raw oysters that contained vibrio vulnificus. We represented the supplier and argued there was no evidence the oysters were defective when they left the supplier’s hands. An expert was retained to support our motion for summary judgment. The expert prepared an affidavit citing the applicable duties pertaining to the harvesting, processing, and transportation of the oysters and stated the supplier did not breach any of the applicable duties. Utilizing calculated pressure tactics in a long-term strategy execution, plaintiff’s counsel eventually conceded that the record evidence did not support a finding that the supplier breached its duties, resulting in the court granting summary judgment. The case remains ongoing with multimillion dollar demands against the remaining defendants.
Obtained Reversal of Non-Final Order in a Wrongful Death Case
We obtained reversal of a non-final order in a wrongful death case against a dive captain, dive master and the corporate entity dive companies. A woman drowned while scuba diving on a chartered tour. Following her death, the toxicology report revealed high levels of illicit drugs and alcohol. During the course of litigation, her estate moved for leave to amend their complaint to add a claim for gross negligence and punitive damages, claiming the defendants were grossly negligent for failing to use the buddy system and for allowing the decedent to dive when they knew or should have known she was intoxicated. The estate also claimed gross negligence against the dive master for allowing the decedent out of his eyesight for four to ten minutes during the dive, despite having identified the decedent as requiring “special assistance.” In support of their motion, the estate relied on the police statements, deposition testimony and an expert report. The defendants argued the evidence was insufficient to support the amendment and contended that none of the witnesses knew that the decedent was intoxicated before she dove. In granting the motion, the trial court did not make an affirmative finding that the estate had made a reasonable showing by evidence, which would provide a reasonable evidentiary basis to recover punitive damages. On appeal, the Fourth District agreed with our arguments and reversed on several grounds. First, the Fourth District concluded the trial court applied the wrong legal standard. Second, the court found the estate failed to present sufficient evidence to establish a reasonable basis for recovery of punitive damages against the dive captain and dive master. Third, the estate’s proposed amended complaint did not properly allege a claim against the corporate entity defendants.
Thought Leadership
Perlmutter Provides Predictability for Punitive Damages Claims in Florida
June 15, 2026
In a much anticipated decision, the Florida Supreme Court provided clarity for the standards of proof for punitive damages claims in Perlmutter v. Federal Insurance Company, SC2024-0058 (Fla. June 11, 2026). Litigants and trial judges must be mindful of the standards laid out by the Court. And, defense practitioners must be prepared to alter their strategies to defend against such claims. Perlmutter came to the Court from the Fourth District, based on conflict jurisdiction with decisions from the Second and Fifth District and on certification of a question of great public importance as to the standard of proof for punitive damages claims at the pleading stage. Fed. Ins. Co. v. Perlmutter, 376 So. 3d 24, 29 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023). In the underlying case, the Fourth District made two conclusions. First, it held that a “trial court must consider the evidentiary showing by all parties at the hearing on the motion to amend, that is, evidence ‘in the record’ and evidence ‘proffered by the claimant.’” 376 So. 3d at 33. Second, the Fourth held that it “interpreted section 768.72(1) and (2) to require the trial court to make a preliminary determination of whether a reasonable jury, viewing the totality of proffered evidence in the light most favorable to the movant, could find by clear and convincing evidence that punitive damages are warranted. Id. at 34 (underscoring in the original). In making these conclusions, the court cautioned trial courts that the “preliminary determination” analysis did not entitle the trial court to decide whether the evidence is clear and convincing and noted that the trial court should not weigh evidence and should not determine witness credibility. Id. The Florida Supreme Court accepted jurisdiction and answered the certified question in the negative. It quashed the decision below and remanded the case for application of the following standards: The trial court should consider only the evidence identified or proffered by the claimant; it should not entertain an evidentiary counter-submission from the opponent. The trial court should consider whether a reasonable person could conclude based on the claimant’s evidence, that the defendant committed “intentional misconduct” or “gross negligence” as defined in section 768.72(2) or section 768.72(3). The trial court must review the request for punitive damages in the context of the underlying claims. The trial court should not apply the clear and convincing standard of proof in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence at the pleading stage. The trial court does not act as a fact-finder; the trial court must not weigh the claimant’s evidence—it cannot decide the truth of the matter. The trial court must consider the record evidence and the proffered evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, but the allegations in the proposed amended complaint are not themselves evidence. Perlmutter, SC2024-0058 at 13-15 (emphasis added). In explaining these standards, the Court interpreted the text of the statute and compared it to a related statute which governs punitive damages in the nursing home context. The nursing home statute expressly calls for evidentiary submissions by “the parties” and expressly tells the trial court to determine whether there is a reasonable basis to believe the claimant could satisfy the “clear and convincing evidence” standard at trial. Id. at 17-18 (comparing the text of section 768.72(1), Florida Statutes, with section 400.0237, Florida Statutes). Without that express language in section 768.72, the statute could not be applied in the same manner. With these standards specially delineated for the trial courts, the Court is “confident that its interpretation of section 768.72(1) will not frustrate the effectiveness of the statute in accomplishing the Legislature’s textually evident purposes.” Id. at 22 (cleaned up). This remains to be seen. While Perlmutter provides predictability and clarity for trial courts when reviewing the evidentiary submissions in support of a punitive damages claim, the decision will not likely impact the numbers of punitive damages motions filed. Rather, these new parameters will change the way claims are defended, reminiscent of a time when rulings on punitive damages were only subject to certiorari review and appellate courts were limited in reviewing procedural errors. This decision will likely deflate the level-playing field that Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(3)(G) addressed by allowing appeals of orders granting and denying punitive damages amendments. Further, Perlmutter may have impliedly created a call to action for the Legislature to amend section 768.72(1) in the same manner it amended section 400.0237 to allow the courts to analyze “admissible evidence submitted by the parties” and determine at a hearing whether there is a reasonable basis to believe the claimant at trial would be able to demonstrate by “clear and convincing evidence” that the recovery of punitive damages is warranted. Until then, defendants must adjust their strategies. To adapt to these new standards, defense practitioners will need to tailor their strategy for defending punitive damages claims since they can no longer submit a counter-proffer or urge a court to apply the clear and convincing standard at the pleading phase. Instead, defendants will need to attack the deficiencies in the claimant’s pleadings and proffer. If the trial court fails to serve as a gatekeeper, and does not apply the above standards, then defendants can pursue an interlocutory appeal under Rule 9.130(a)(3)(G). If a nonfinal appeal is taken, then defendants should move to stay any intrusive financial discovery while the appellate court analyzes the issues on appeal. Finally, defendants should utilize Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.510 to serve as a screening device to allow the trial court to analyze all evidence and prevent nonmeritorious punitive damages claims from proceeding to a jury.
Florida Appellate Court Affords Lyft Broad Immunity Under Section 627.748(18), Florida Statutes (2022), for the Actions of One of its Drivers
May 15, 2026
Florida’s Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the dismissal of negligent and fraudulent misrepresentation claims against transportation network company (TNC), Lyft Florida, Inc., concluding such claims are barred by the plain text of section 627.748(18), Florida Statutes (2022). In Haddad v. Lyft Florida, Inc., 4D2025-017 (Fla. 4th DCA May 13, 2026), a rideshare passenger alleged she was assaulted by her Lyft driver. She sued for negligent and fraudulent misrepresentation, alleging statements on Lyft’s website led her to believe that her ride would be safe and that she would not suffer personal injuries at the hands of a Lyft driver. Lyft moved to dismiss, contending that section 627.748(18) provided it with immunity against such claims. Subsection 18 provides that “[a] TNC is not liable under general law by reason of owning, operating, or maintaining the digital network accessed by a TNC driver or rider…for harm to persons or property which results or arises out of the use, operation, or possession of a motor vehicle operating as a TNC vehicle while the driver is logged on to the digital network” under three circumstances if: (1) there is no negligence under this section or criminal wrongdoing under the federal or Florida criminal code on the part of the TNC; (2) the TNC has fulfilled all of its obligations under this section with respect to the TNC driver; and (3) the TNC is not the owner or bailee of the motor vehicle that caused harm to persons or property. The trial court agreed that subsection 18 provided Lyft with immunity and dismissed the complaint. With the benefit of oral argument, the Fourth District affirmed the dismissal. In doing so, the court concluded that subsection 18’s plain text makes clear that the immunity conferred under section 627.748(18) is much broader than traditional vicarious liability. Thus, the passenger’s claims for negligent and fraudulent misrepresentations, which arose out of the use, operation, or possession of the vehicle operating as a TNC vehicle while the driver was logged on to the network, were barred. It did not matter that the complaint purported to plead negligence by Lyft rather than a traditional vicarious liability theory. The negligent act asserted against the TNC had to relate to a negligent failure to meet the statute’s requirements for rideshare companies. This is a favorable decision for TNC companies. Plaintiffs will need to carefully tailor their allegations to overcome the broad immunity set forth in the statute. Otherwise, their claims will be subject to dismissal out of the gate. TNC companies should look to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaints from the outset. The immunity is not a traditional affirmative defense. Thus, trial courts can rule on the immunity at the motion to dismiss stage.
