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As an associate in the Health Care Department, Kevin's practice is devoted to representing physicians, physician assistants, hospitals, dentists and other health care providers in liability matters.

Kevin earned his B.A. in Psychology from the University of Kentucky and J.D. from Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law. During law school, Kevin completed a judicial externship for the Honorable Judge Steven C. Tolliver Sr. in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas. He also participated in Villanova's Clinic for Law and Entrepreneurship as a student attorney providing pro bono legal assistance to local under-resourced businesses.

After law school graduation, Kevin returned to the chambers of the Honorable Judge Steven C. Tolliver Sr., serving as his law clerk. During this time, Kevin developed a strong understanding of litigation by writing opinions and memoranda, assisting in ruling on motions, and aiding in the disposition of multiple trials.

Outside of work, Kevin enjoys watching football and cycling.

    • Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law (J.D., 2021)
    • University of Kentucky (B.A., cum laude, 2018)
    • Pennsylvania, 2021
    • Montgomery County Bar Association
    • Part of the team that obtained a defense verdict in Montgomery County on behalf of a podiatrist. The plaintiff filed a medical malpractice action alleging that the podiatrist improperly placed a first metatarsophalangeal joint hemi implant, improperly placed bilateral sinus tarsi implants, and improperly utilized bilateral sinus tarsi implants all of which led to continuing foot pain after the removal of the bilateral sinus tarsi implants. The evidence presented to the jury demonstrated the proper placement of the first metatarsophalangeal joint hemi implant and the sinus tarsi implants, as supported by the subsequent treating physician, and the proper utilization of the bilateral sinus tarsi implants in order to treat plaintiff’s congenital flat feet resulting in degenerative changes in plaintiff’s bilateral first metatarsophalangeal joint. The trial lasted four days and the jury returned a verdict in approximately three hours. (2023)

Results

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Defense Verdict Secured in Medical Malpractice Case

We received a defense verdict for an emergency room physician in a medical malpractice case after a six-day trial. The plaintiffs alleged the physician failed to diagnose and treat a transient ischemic attack in the emergency department and that this failure caused the plaintiff’s ischemic stroke 48 hours later. Following an hour and a half of deliberations, the jury found the emergency room physician did not violate the standard of care.   

Received a Defense Verdict for an Emergency Room Physician in a Medical Malpractice Case

We received a defense verdict for an emergency room physician in a medical malpractice case after a six-day trial. The plaintiffs alleged that the physician failed to diagnose and treat a transient ischemic attack in the emergency department and that this failure caused the plaintiff’s ischemic stroke 48 hours later. The plaintiff at the time was 44 years old. Following an hour and a half of deliberations, the jury found that the emergency room physician did not violate the standard of care.

Thought Leadership

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The Quarterly Dose

LEGAL ROUNDUP – Pennsylvania

November 1, 2024

PA Superior Court Reaffirms Need for Expert Testimony in Support of Claim for Corporate Negligence and Provides Further Clarity as to ‘Obvious Negligence Wandell v. Robert Packer Hosp., 1532 MDA 2023, 2024 WL 3697497 (Pa. Super. Ct. Aug. 7, 2024) The Superior Court of Pennsylvania found that expert testimony was still required in a matter involving an alleged defective toilet provided to a patient post surgery that broke and resulted in a fall and injuries to the patient.  The court specifically stated that this was not a case in which negligence was so obvious that expert testimony was not required and, in turn, granted summary judgment for failure to produce expert reports supporting the claims. The court was not compelled by the patient’s argument—a claim for corporate negligence based on the provision of a defective toilet to a post-surgical patient which broke and resulted in a fall—does not require expert testimony.  The court outlined that questions which required expert testimony regarding adequate and appropriate supervision, reasonable care to maintain facilities and equipment, and adequate training, among others, still existed. As such, summary judgment was proper for failing to produce experts in support of the patient’s claim.    PA Superior Court Reverses Grant of Summary Judgment Based on Gross Negligence Where Expert Opinions Are Sufficiently Supported by the Record Azaravich v. Wilkes-Barre Hosp. Co., LLC, 2024 PA Super 116, 318 A.3d 876 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2024), reargument denied (Aug. 12, 2024) The Superior Court of Pennsylvania found that a grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant-hospital was improper where the medical records, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, created genuine issues of material fact regarding whether there was a gross deviation from the standard of care.  In vacating the trial court’s order, the Superior Court disagreed with the trail court insofar that the plaintiff’s experts failed to provide sufficient evidence to support their conclusions regarding gross negligence.  Further, in determining there was sufficient evidence for the opinions of the plaintiff’s experts, the Superior Court restated that where an expert’s conclusions are supported by the record, a trial court may not sua sponte criticize the expert’s opinions in an order or on summary judgment as that is a question of fact and credibility for the fact finder to determine.    The Quarterly Dose – November 2024, has been prepared for our readers by Marshall Dennehey. It is solely intended to provide information on recent legal developments and is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We welcome the opportunity to provide such legal assistance as you require on this and other subjects. If you receive the alerts in error, please send a note to tamontemuro@mdwcg.com. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2024 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved.

Case Law Alerts

PA Superior Court Reverses Grant of Summary Judgment Based on Gross Negligence Where Expert Opinions Are Sufficiently Supported by the Record.

October 1, 2024

The Superior Court of Pennsylvania found that a grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant-hospital was improper where the medical records, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, created genuine issues of material fact regarding whether there was a gross deviation from the standard of care.  In vacating the trial court’s order, the Superior Court disagreed with the trail court insofar that the plaintiff’s experts failed to provide sufficient evidence to support their conclusions regarding gross negligence.  Further, in determining there was sufficient evidence for the opinions of the plaintiff’s experts, the Superior Court restated that where an expert’s conclusions are supported by the record, a trial court may not sua sponte criticize the expert’s opinions in an order or on summary judgment as that is a question of fact and credibility for the fact finder to determine.    Case Law Alerts, 4th Quarter, October 2024 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. Copyright © 2024 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm.

Firm Highlights

Result

$19 Million Medical Malpractice Verdict Overturned

In this medical malpractice case, the trial court vacated $10 million of a $19 million verdict in post-trial motions and the Superior Court of Pennsylvania vacated the remaining $9 million on appeal.

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Act 111's IRE Provisions

In this case, the claimant sustained a work injury of January 6, 1994, which was acknowledged by Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP). After the claimant’s receipt of 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, the employer filed a Request for an Impairment Rating Examination (IRE). The IRE was performed in May 2023 and the IRE physician found that the claimant had a 5% whole person impairment, under the AMA Guides. The employer filed a Petition based on the IRE results, and the Petition was granted by the WCJ. During litigation, the claimant argued that the IRE provisions of Act 111 (Section 306(a.3) of the Act) were not applicable to her injury, since it predated June 24, 1996, the date Act 57 went into effect, and that the IRE provisions were unconstitutional. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ)) granted the Petition and the Board affirmed. On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the claimant argued that Act 111 violated the nondelegation doctrine and that its retroactive application to the claimant’s injury was unconstitutional. The court rejected the arguments on the basis that they had already found the same arguments without merit in multiple, prior cases. The court also addressed an argument made by the claimant that Act 111 was procedurally defective under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it was only considered on two days in each House after having undergone amendments and reassignments. The court noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires every bill to be considered on three different days in each House. The claimant maintained that, according to the legislative history, the bill did not receive three separate days of consideration from each House when it was assigned a new bill number. The court pointed out, however, that the bill number, H.B. 1840 remained constant and was considered on three occasions by the House. Further, the court concluded that minor amendments to the bill were germane to its original subject, which was to modify the Act’s IRE process, in accordance with Protz II.

Result

$1.09 Billion Products Liability Verdict Overturned

In this products liability crashworthiness case, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania reversed a Philadelphia jury verdict of $1.09 billion, the largest verdict ever overturned by a PA appellate court.  The court ordered a new trial based on deficient jury instructions, clarified important aspects of crashworthiness law, and confirmed that so-called standard jury instructions may be incompatible with Pennsylvania law. 

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Marshall Dennehey Announces 2027 New Jersey Super Lawyers And Rising Stars

Thought Leadership

Appellate Division Reversed Trial Judge's Orders Granting a Plaintiff's Section 40 Summary Judgement Motion

In Haskins v. Casey, et al., the plaintiff Dane Haskins worked for defendant Ekornes, Inc. (Ekornes) as a material handler. In June 2021, he filed a workers’ compensation claim petition for benefits due to a left shoulder injury in December 2020. He then resolved his workers’ compensation claim in November 2022 under an Order Approving Settlement. In January 2023, he filed a lawsuit against Ekornes and later amended to add additional claims and name other defendants, including the Ekornes president, chief financial officer, and director of human resources. In May 2025, a second amended complaint alleged that after he filed the workers compensation claim, Ekornes placed him on leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), denied his request for a work accommodation, and ultimately terminated him from employment in December 2021. He pleaded several causes of action asserting violations of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD) as well as fraudulent concealment and wrongful discharge. The plaintiff then moved for partial summary judgment, seeking an order enforcing Section 40 of the Workers’ Compensation Act (WCA) as well as summary judgment on his FMLA claims. The defendants opposed the motions and cross-moved for summary judgment on the FMLA claims. After arguments, the court entered an order in December 2025, denying the FMLA motion and cross motion and granting the plaintiff’s Section 40 motion. In the order, the court permitted the plaintiff to pursue compensatory damages at trial in connection with the bodily injury claim. The court also allowed the plaintiff to present evidence of any workers’ compensation benefits to support his claim. The court then denied the defendant's subsequent reconsideration motion in February 2026. The defendants that appealed the Section 40 aspect of the orders. In reviewing the appeal de novo, the Appellate Division rejected the plaintiff's argument that the work-related injury arose out of his discrimination claims under the LAD. The plaintiff argued that he should be able to pursue a personal injury claim as a part of his LAD claim, noting that the employer’s compensation carrier would be able to assert a lien against any recovery against his LAD claims. In distinguishing between the Richter vs. Oakland Board of Education, 246 N.J. 507 (2021) case, in which the Court found that any recovery would be subject to a Section 40 lien as the allegation was that the defendants failed to accommodate her pre-existing diabetic condition, which resulted in bodily injury. In this case, the Appellate Division indicated that there was no bodily injury caused by Ekornes’ failure to accommodate a pre-existing disability. Rather, the shoulder injury was a result of a workers compensation claim, for which he received appropriate benefits previously. The Appellate Division noted that if the plaintiff was successful in proving his LAD claims, he would be entitled to damages caused by the discriminatory discriminatory conduct such as lost wages and emotional distress damages and that there will be no Section 40 lien. In addition, the Appellate Division disagreed that the petitioner could present evidence about and seek damages for his shoulder injury at trial. Although the petitioner argued that a defendant who retaliated against an employee for filing a workers’ compensation claim should not benefit from the exclusivity provision of the WCA, the Appellate Division noted that the Legislature did not include this type of scenario in the statue nor did any of the case law recognize this type of claim as a remedy. As such, the Appellate Division reversed the December 2025 order granting the the plaintiff’s Section 40 summary judgment motion as well as the February 2026 reconsideration motion order. The Appellate Division noted that they did not intend to limit the plaintiff in his pursuit of his other claims on under the LAD, FMLA, and workers’ compensation retaliation causes of action.

Result

Statutory Employer Immunity Upheld

In this construction accident case that resulted in a $5 million verdict, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania upheld the Statutory Employer Doctrine, which immunizes general contractors and other contractors on construction sites when certain elements are satisfied.

Event

CLM 2026 Focus Conference

Allison joins three insurance industry leaders to discuss how cyber coverage disputes, the growing impact of social inflation on bodily injury claim valuation, and the use of artificial intelligence are reshaping the bad faith landscape. The panel will examine emerging sources of extra-contractual exposure, including evolving cyber insurance coverage issues and the challenges of accurately valuing bodily injury claims. Practical approaches to claim evaluation using AI, along with defense strategies designed to help prevent or successfully defend against bad faith litigation, will also be addressed. 

Bret E. Dubbert Joins Marshall Dennehey’s Orlando Office as Special Counsel in the Casualty Department

News

Bret E. Dubbert Joins Marshall Dennehey’s Orlando Office as Special Counsel in the Casualty Department

Thought Leadership

WCJ Improperly Refused to Conduct C&R Hearing and Erroneously Required Settlement of All Pending Petitions

In this case, the claimant sustained injuries in the course and scope of her employment as a registered nurse. The employer acknowledged the injury by a Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP).  Subsequently, a Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ) expanded the description of injury. The employer then filed a Termination Petition, alleging the claimant was fully recovered from the injuries. Providers filed Utilization Review (UR) Petitions, challenging UR determinations finding their chiropractic treatment to be not reasonable and necessary. A settlement of the claim was eventually reached, and the employer filed a Petition to Seek Approval of a Compromise and Release (C&R) Agreement. The C&R outlined that the agreement fully resolved all future workers’ compensation claims except for the termination and UR Petitions. Briefs were filed and one day later, the WCJ issued an Interlocutory Order which stated if instructions were not followed regarding filing of a C&R, a settlement hearing date would not be given. The employer complied with the order, and filed the C&R. Subsequently, the WCJ notified the parties that the C&R must resolve all issues in the petitions, or would not be entertained. A settlement hearing was never held, and the WCJ then issued a decision, granting the Termination Petition and dismissing the UR Petitions. The WCJ also said that the Petition for Approval of a C&R was dismissed without prejudice, as the issues in the Termination and UR Petitions went to a decision. The claimant appealed to the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Board). The Board granted the claimant’s appeal, finding that the WCJ violated the requirement of Section 449 that an expedited hearing be held when a Petition for Approval of a C&R is filed.  The Board further held that it was legally incorrect for the WCJ to insist that the C&R resolve all issues raised by the pending Petitions. The Board remanded the case to a new WCJ, and Employer appealed to the Commonwealth Court. The court affirmed the Board and held that the WCJ erred, as a matter of law, by refusing to hold an expedited hearing within 30 days, once the Petition for Approval of a C&R was filed.  The court noted that the language of Section 449(b) is mandatory, and a settlement hearing is not discretionary or dependent on a party’s separate request for a stay, or whether the record has been closed. The court further rejected Employer’s argument that the case should not be remanded to a new WCJ for a new decision on the termination and and UR Petitions, as the Board passed no judgment on whether the C&R Agreement resolved the termination and UR Petitions, and left it for the WCJ to decide in connection with the Petition for Approval of a C&R.

Marshall Dennehey Named a Standout in Litigation by BTI Consulting Group

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Marshall Dennehey Named a Standout in Litigation by BTI Consulting Group