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Kathleen A. Carlson

Portrait of Kathleen A. Carlson

Kathleen is a member of the Casualty Department. She has experience litigating automobile liability, uninsured/underinsured motorist and general liability matters.

Prior to joining the firm, Kathleen was an associate with a state wide insurance defense firm in Jacksonville, where she focused her practice on the areas of automobile liability, uninsured/underinsured motorist, coverage matters, and bad faith litigation. Kathleen also served two years as judicial law clerk for the Honorable James A. Edwards of the Florida Fifth District Court of Appeal in Daytona Beach, Florida

A double Gator, Kathleen completed both her undergraduate and legal studies at the University of Florida, where she proudly served as an executive editor of the Florida Law Review.

Before attending law school, she worked as a freelance sports photographer for many of the major collegiate athletic programs in and around the state of Florida.

    • University of Florida Levin College of Law (J.D., cum laude, 2014)
    • University of Florida (B.A., cum laude, 2007)
    • Florida, 2014
    • U.S. District Court Middle District of Florida, 2018
    • U.S. District Court Northern District of Florida, 2018
    • The Best Lawyers: Ones to Watch©, Insurance Law (2024-2025)
    • The Best Lawyers: Ones to Watch®, Personal Injury Litigation (2025)
    • New FL Pilot Program for Remote Trials, Marshall Dennehey Special Alert, May, 2020
    • Note, Social Media and the Workplace: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Privacy Settings and the NLRB, 66 Fla. L. Rev. 479 (2014)
    • Comment, Ryan v. Gonzales and the Potential Elimination of the Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Post Conviction Failsafe, 65 Fla. L. Rev. 1435 (2013)

Thought Leadership

Defense Digest

Splitting the Road: Navigating Uninsured Motorist Coverage of Divorced Spouses

June 1, 2024

Key Points: In Florida, a divorced or separated spouse of an auto insurance policyholder may be entitled to uninsured or underinsured motorist (UM) benefits under their former spouse’s auto policy.  The issue arises when the spouses divorce (or separate) and establish separate residences but do not remove the divorced or separated person from the policy.  Result will be heavily dependent on the facts and terms of the policy. Is the divorced or separated spouse of an auto insurance policyholder entitled to uninsured or underinsured motorist (UM) benefits under their former spouse’s auto policy? Surprisingly, maybe. Often an insurance policy issued to married spouses will list a single individual as the named insured and the other spouse as another insured or operator. An issue arises when the spouses divorce (or separate) and establish separate residences but that person is not removed from the policy. Certainly, the carrier did not intend for one personal auto policy to apply to multiple households. The policyholder is likely not even aware of the potential consequence. When separation or divorce is not reported to the carrier, the carrier has no way of independently knowing. As a result, insurers may continue affording UM coverage to the divorced spouse, believing they are still a member of the policyholder’s household. The carrier’s first notice of the divorce/separation may not even occur until the case is in suit and discovery is underway. Availability of UM coverage for the divorced or separated spouse is heavily dependent on facts and the terms of the policy. So, it is important to determine if the individuals and autos are covered. Outside of the named insured policyholder, for example, UM coverage may be afforded to a permissive user, resident relative, or household member. This policy language is important, as it is possible for a divorced or separated spouse to be considered a household member of the policyholder. This is because exclusory policy terms, such as “resident relative” or “household member,” must be construed as liberally as could reasonably be permitted under common use to give effect to the intentions of the parties and the purposes of insurance. Row v. United Services Auto. Ass’n, 474 So. 2d 348, 349 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985).  The test to determine if an individual is a member of the household is physical absence with no intent to return to the household. Sanders v. Wausau Underwriters Ins. Co., 392 So. 2d 343, 344 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981). Most of the Florida case law applying this residency/intent test is in the context of adult children and children of divorced parents, but is it easy to see the parallels if applied to a separated spouse? In American Security Insurance Co. v. Van Hoose, 416 So. 2d 1273 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982), the court held that a father and daughter were not members of the same household, even though the father provided a substantial amount of financial support to the daughter, but she lived in a different home. Importantly, the court recognized that a joint-household is not established just because one household is dependent on the other for support.  Outside of Florida, the same residency/intent standard has been applied to separated and divorced spouses. Although other state law is not binding on Florida, the out-of-state courts’ analyses demonstrate that the common theme throughout the case law concerning divorced spouses turns on residency and the parties' intent to return to the relationship/household. In some states, it is well-established law that a divorced spouse who does not reside with the policyholder is not a member of the policyholding spouse’s household. See, e.g., Crews v. Allstate Ins. Co., 373 S.E.2d 782 (Ga. App. 1998); Johnson v. Payne, 549 N.E. 2d 48 (Ind. App. 1 Dist. 1990). Similarly, in cases where the spouses are separated and not yet legally divorced, courts in many states consider the physical residency and the status of the relationship. See, e.g., Ledet v. Leighton, 736 So.2d 854 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1999); United Services Auto. Ass’n v. Akers, 729 P.2d 495 (Nev. 1986); Wall v. Heritage Mut. Ins. Co., 446 N.W.2d 75 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989); GEICO Casualty Company v. Collins, 371 P.3d 729 (Colo. App. 2016).  However, even if the former spouse is not a household member, there is still the potential for coverage under the policy depending on the vehicle occupied when the loss occurred. If the vehicle is listed on the policy, coverage may extend to the divorced spouse as a permissive user of the vehicle. In this instance, it is important for the carrier to determine if the vehicle garaging and residential information is accurate.  If a divorced spouse who resides outside of the policyholder’s home owns the vehicle and that vehicle is not listed on the policy, there may not be coverage to the divorced spouse. Similarly, if a divorced/separated spouse is traveling in a ride-share vehicle, like Uber or Lyft, it may be excluded by a covered or owned auto provision.  These situations are heavily dependent on specific facts and policy language. This issue can be easily overlooked. Once the carrier learns the former spouse is divorced from the policyholder, the carrier should gather the facts to evaluate the situation and potentially seek judicial clarification on the matter through a declaratory action or other appropriate filing. *Kathleen works in our Jacksonville, Florida, office.    Defense Digest, Vol. 30, No. 2, June 2024, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2024 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Ohio Supreme Court Holds That a Binding Appraisal Award May Not Be Set Aside Absent Specific Evidence of Manifest Mistake or Fraud

On July 23, 2026, the Ohio Supreme Court issued a rare opinion on the binding effect of an appraisal award in a property insurance policy.  The Court in One Church held: A binding appraisal award will not be set aside unless an error is so palpably wrong that it undermines the intent of the agreement, such as corruption or gross mistake, not a mere error of judgment—To plead a claim of mistake with particularity as required by Civ.R. 9(B), facts alleged in a complaint must constitute the elements of mistake—Allegation that additional, hidden damage was discovered after appraisal award failed to state a claim of mistake that could justify setting aside binding appraisal.  The case arose out of a claim brought by One Church against its insurer, Brotherhood Mutual Insurance Company for roof damage from a storm. Pursuant to the terms of the insurance policy, the parties agreed to submit the matter to appraisal. The two appraisers inspected the building, and both appraisers agreed that the damages were $313,271.98. The insurer paid the agreed appraised amount.  Thereafter, the insured submitted a claim for an additional $206,663.09 in damages. The insured argued that these additional damages were not discovered until after the repairs began, and that they should be permitted to submit an additional claim, even though there had already been a binding appraisal of damages. The insurer refused to pay the additional damages, and the insured sued for breach of contract and bad faith.  In the trial court, the insurer moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim, arguing that the binding appraisal award barred any further claims. The insured took the position that additional hidden damages could not be discovered until after the repairs began, and therefore there was a mutual mistake. The trial court dismissed the case on the insurer’s motion, because there was no “evidence of fraud, misfeasance, or mistake”. The Court of Appeals agreed that appraisal awards are generally binding, but noted that an appraisal award can be set aside for fraud or manifest mistake. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case to the trial court, finding that the insured had pled mistake with sufficient particularity. The insurer appealed to the Ohio Supreme Court. On appeal, the Ohio Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, and reinstated the trial court decision dismissing the case for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Supreme Court found that since the insured had already demanded appraisal, and the appraisal award was binding, “something more than error of judgement, such as corruption in the arbitrator, or gross mistake” must be pled with particularity, and proven for the insured to override the appraisal award. Since the complaint did not allege fraud or manifest mistake with sufficient particularity, something more than a mere error of judgment, the complaint was insufficient to state a claim.  The complaint in this case did not challenge the appraisal award. It pled that additional damages were discovered that were not apparent when the appraisal was done. It did not specify “who discovered the damages, how they were discovered, where they were found, why they were previously hidden, or why they rise to the level of a manifest mistake that the “appraiser would have corrected...had it been called to his attention”. Id at ¶22 citing Lakewood Mfg. Co. v. Home Ins. Co. of New York, 422 F.2d 796, 798 (6th Cir. 1970). Cases deciding the effect of appraisal awards are unusual. The Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in One Church relies primarily on 19th century case law for its conclusion. This emphasizes the fact that there is minimal case law deciding the effect of binding appraisal clauses in property insurance policies, and makes this case all the more significant. A lengthy dissent was written by Justice Fisher, who would have affirmed the Court of Appeals decision reversing and remanding the case for a decision on the merits. Of course, the decision works both ways, and an insurer dissatisfied with a binding appraisal award will likewise be without further recourse absent evidence of corruption, fraud, misfeasance, or manifest mistake, which must be pled with particularity. To constitute manifest mistake, “the mistake must be of such character that the arbitrator or appraiser would have corrected it had it been called to his attention.”  Lakewood Mfg. Co. v. Home Ins. Co. of New York, 422 F.2d 796, 798 (6th Cir. 1970).  The majority opinion does not specifically identify what would have been sufficient to plead mistake with particularity, or if the insured could have amended the complaint to overcome the deficiencies. The dissent argues that this was not really a case alleging mistake, but rather a question of contract interpretation. The insured did not challenge the appraisal, but argued that the hidden damage was not part of the appraisal, and the appraisal only covered the known damages.  However, this argument did not carry the day with the majority. 

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

New Jersey Appellate Division Affirms Exclusion of Legal Malpractice Expert as Impermissible Net Opinion

Jack Slimm and Jeremy Zacharias obtained a favorable decision on behalf of their client in a case centering on the admissibility of expert testimony in legal malpractice actions. In Martin v. Loury, the New Jersey Appellate Division affirmed the exclusion of a plaintiff's legal malpractice expert, holding that the expert's opinions on causation and damages were too speculative to support the malpractice claim. The legal malpractice action arose from an underlying employment dispute involving claims for damages stemming from the breach of an employment agreement. The plaintiff alleged that defense counsel committed malpractice during a second trial by failing to recall the plaintiff as a rebuttal witness after the employer's CEO testified. According to the plaintiff's expert, additional rebuttal testimony would have bolstered the plaintiff's damages claims and led to a more favorable result. Both the trial court and the Appellate Division rejected that theory. The courts found that the expert could not explain how the proposed rebuttal testimony would have altered the outcome of the underlying case or resulted in any additional recoverable damages. Notably, the trial judge in the underlying employment matter had already rejected the CEO's testimony as not credible and had accepted the damages analysis advanced by the plaintiff. The court had also determined that the amount of damages was not genuinely disputed. As a result, the expert's opinion that additional rebuttal testimony would have produced a better outcome was unsupported by the record and based on speculation rather than evidence. The Appellate Division agreed that neither the plaintiff nor the expert could identify any actual damages attributable to the alleged malpractice or demonstrate the required element of proximate causation. The court further upheld the trial court's application of New Jersey's net opinion doctrine, finding that the expert failed to provide the necessary "why and wherefore" supporting his conclusion that the attorney's conduct caused a compensable loss. Because the opinions rested on unquantified possibilities rather than demonstrable facts, they were inadmissible. Key Takeaway for Legal Malpractice Defendants For attorneys and firms defending legal malpractice claims, Martin v. Loury underscores the importance of closely scrutinizing an opponent's expert report on the critical elements of proximate causation and damages. The decision demonstrates that a malpractice claim cannot survive where an expert merely speculates that different litigation tactics might have produced a better result. Instead, the plaintiff must present admissible expert testimony grounded in the record that explains how the alleged attorney error probably changed the outcome of the underlying matter and resulted in measurable damages.