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Julianna is a member of the Health Care Department, concentrating her practice on the defense of health care practitioners and medical providers against all manner of medical malpractice suits. Her clients include physicians and other health care providers, as well as physicians’ offices, nursing homes, outpatient centers, hospitals and health systems.

Born and raised in Seattle, WA, Julianna graduated from Western Washington University with a bachelor’s degree in Sociology. She went on to earn her Masters in Criminology and Criminal Justice from Arizona State University, and her law degree with a Health Law Concentration from Villanova University’s Charles Widger School of Law. While at Villanova, Julianna served as president of the Health Law Society and was a staff writer for the Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal.

Outside of work, Julianna enjoys Pilates, reading all genres of fiction (although murder mystery is her favorite), and spending time with her husband and their two dogs, Stanley and Ollie.

    • Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law (J.D., 2024)
    • Arizona State University (M.S., 2019)
    • Western Washington University (B.A., 2017)
    • Pennsylvania, 2024

Thought Leadership

Case Law Alerts

Pennsylvania Superior Court Reaffirms Liberal Pleading Standard in Medical Malpractice Actions

July 21, 2026

The Pennsylvania Superior Court has reinforced a broader fact-pleading approach that may make it more difficult for healthcare defendants to obtain dismissal at the preliminary objection stage. In DaSilva v. Abington Memorial Hospital, the court held that the plaintiffs’ second amended complaint satisfied Pennsylvania’s fact‑pleading requirements despite the absence of individually named negligent actors. In DaSilva, the plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint alleging that Abington Memorial Hospital was directly and vicariously negligent after the patient, who was experiencing a mental health crisis, was left unattended by hospital staff, exited the emergency department, and was struck by a vehicle, suffering serious injuries. The trial court sustained the hospital’s preliminary objections and dismissed the complaint with prejudice, stating plaintiffs “failed to plead any material factual allegations in support of their claims of negligence [and] set forth vague allegations of negligence and unidentified agency.” Id. at *5. The plaintiffs appealed. On appeal, the Superior Court reversed, holding that the complaint sufficiently pled negligence and vicarious liability claims under Pa.R.C.P. 1019(a). The court concluded that allegations describing the patient’s condition, the hospital’s awareness of that condition, and the alleged failure to monitor or prevent elopement were adequate to satisfy Pennsylvania’s pleading requirements. Significantly, the court rejected the hospital’s argument that the complaint failed because it did not identify the specific employees responsible for the alleged negligence. Instead, the court found that generalized references to “emergency room staff” were sufficient to place the hospital on notice of the claims because “the names of those who performed services for the plaintiff are known to the defendant or can be ascertained during discovery.” Id. at *12 (citing Est. of Denmark ex rel. Hurst v. Williams, 117 A.3d 300, 307 (Pa. Super. 2015)). The effect of DaSilva is that plaintiffs may proceed past the pleading stage with relatively generalized allegations, particularly in cases involving institutional defendants where relevant details are uniquely within the defendant’s control. As a result, healthcare defendants should anticipate that challenges to claim sufficiency may be resolved in the later stages of litigation, including discovery and summary judgment.

The Quarterly Dose

LEGAL ROUNDUP – Pennsylvania

February 25, 2026

Pennsylvania Supreme Court Broadens MHPA Immunity to Include Ordinary Negligence in Physical Care During Involuntary Commitment Wunderly v. Saint Luke’s Hospital of Bethlehem, 345 A.3d 692 (Pa. 2025) The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has recently expanded the scope of provider immunity under the Mental Health Procedures Act (MHPA), holding that the statute can shield providers from ordinary negligence claims arising from medical care for physical ailments provided during involuntary commitment. The case arose from a wrongful death and survival action following the death of a patient involuntarily committed for dementia-related aggression who developed severe pressure ulcers. Under 50 P.S. § 7114(a), facilities and practitioners participating in decisions to examine or treat individuals under the MHPA are immune from civil and criminal liability, absent a showing of willful misconduct or gross negligence. As § 114 does not define “treat,” the court looked to Section 104 of the MHPA, interpreting “treatment” to include medical care necessary to maintain “decent, safe, and healthful living conditions.” The court concluded that care for physical conditions is covered when it is coincident to the patient’s mental health treatment, even if the condition did not result from psychiatric care or advance psychiatric recovery. This decision significantly broadens the precedent established in Allen v. Montgomery Hospital, 696 A.2d 1175 (Pa. 1997). While Allen provided immunity for physical conditions caused by psychiatric care (such as medication side effects), Wunderly extends that protection to general medical care that simply occurs during the same timeframe as the commitment (such as treatment for pressure ulcers). The dissent warned that the majority’s interpretation risks lowering the standard of care for involuntarily-committed patients by immunizing ordinary medical malpractice based solely on commitment status. The dissent argued that the patient’s pressure ulcers arose independently of his mental health condition and should not fall within MHPA immunity.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.