.

With more than 25 years of legal experience, Judd has secured successful results for clients in Northampton, Lehigh, Berks, Schuylkill, Monroe and Carbon counties including school districts, intermediate units, nursing homes, assisted living facilities, large retailers, manufacturers, construction companies, and various other employers. He has also defended coal mine operations throughout the eastern part of Pennsylvania in Federal Black Lung claims. A native of Allentown, Judd has spent his legal career defending clients in the Lehigh Valley region against workers' compensation claims.

Judd has significant experience litigating cases before Workers’ Compensation Judges throughout the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and before the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board. He has successfully defeated numerous claim petitions by presenting medical and factual evidence showing that the claimants did not sustain work-related injuries and/or corresponding disabilities. Judd utilizes innovative legal strategies and develops unique solutions to help clients achieve their litigation goals. He places a high value on communication and works closely with each client from case inception to completion.

Judd is also skilled in counseling clients on effective management of workers' compensation plans and development and implementation of innovative return-to-work programs. He also provides risk management services, which can help reduce litigation costs.

In 2026, Judd was inducted into the College of Workers' Compensation Lawyers, joining a select group of attorneys from across the country who have distinguished themselves in the practice of workers' compensation law.

Judd is a graduate of Ursinus College in Collegeville, Pennsylvania. He received his juris doctor in from Widener University School of Law in Wilmington, Delaware, graduating cum laude. He is admitted to practice in Pennsylvania and before the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.

    • Widener University Delaware Law School (J.D., cum laude, 1995)
    • Ursinus College (B.A., 1992)
    • Pennsylvania, 1995
    • U.S. Court of Appeals 3rd Circuit
    • The Best Lawyers in America®, Workers’ Compensation Law - Employers (2025-2026)
    • Top Lawyers of the Lehigh Valley, Workers' Compensation (2025)
    • Bar Association of Lehigh County, Workers' Compensation Committee
    • Claims & Litigation Management Alliance
    • College of Workers' Compensation Lawyers
    • Pennsylvania Bar Association
    • We See You: How Employee Engagement Enhances Work Comp Outcomes, CLM Work Comp Conference, Nashville, TN, May 20, 2026
    • A State-By-State Guide to Avoiding Attorneys' Fees and Sanctions, Marshall Dennehey Workers' Compensation Seminar, October 27, 2022
    • Civil Litigation Updates in COVID-19 Litigation – Where Do We Stand One Year Later?, Marshall Dennehey Webinar, May 2021
    • IREs and WC Case Law Update, client webinar, May 19, 2021
    • Are You Coming or Going – Do You Know Your Course and Scope?, Marshall Dennehey webinar, October 26, 2020
    • Mitigating the Risk of Workplace Bullying, Marshall Dennehey Workers' Compensation Seminar, October 24, 2019
    • Return to Work: Perfecting Job Offers and the Revival of the Labor Market Survey, Marshall Dennehey Workers' Compensation Seminar, October 18 and 25, 2018
    • Ingredients for Successfully Defending Claims for Work Injuries at Home, Marshall Dennehey Workers' Compensation Seminar, October 19, 2017
    • Course and Scope, Marshall Dennehey Workers' Compensation Seminars, October 19 and 27, 2016
    • Cover Your Bases: A WCAIS Update, Marshall Dennehey Workers' Compensation Seminar, October 22, 2015
    • The Basics of WCAIS, client seminar, Parsippany, New Jersey, November 21, 2014
    • Social Media Update, Marshall Dennehey Workers' Compensation Seminar, November 6, 2014
    • Workers' Compensation: What's the Best Case, The Seltzer Group Workers' Compensation Seminar, Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, December 6, 2012
    • How To Control Your Claim, The Seltzer Group Workers' Compensation Seminar, Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, December 7, 2011
    • Workers' Compensation Hearings: Techniques & Strategies for Success, National Business Institute, Allentown, Pennsylvania, October 22, 2008 
    • Advanced Workers' Compensation in Pennsylvania, National Business Institute, Allentown, Pennsylvania, 2003, 2004 (speaker and course planner) 
    • Pennsylvania Workers' Compensation Law Seminar, Top 20 Cases of 2001 & 2002, Professional Education Systems Institute, Pittsburgh, 2002 
    • Workers' Compensation Update Lecture, Institute of Management Accountants, Lehigh Valley Chapter, Holiday Inn Bethlehem, 1998 
    • "Goodbye 'Yellow Freight' Road?," The Legal Intelligencer, November 15, 2024
    • “Protz – One Year Later,” Defense Digest, Vol. 24, No. 2, June 2018
    • "It "Payes" to Be Abnormal - Is The Law Really Changing for Mental/Mental Claims in PA Workers’ Comp?," Defense Digest, Vol. 20, No. 3, September 2014
    • "That 70's Show: Obamacare Takes Federal Black Lung Claims Back in Time," Carrier Management, December 2013 and Defense Digest, Vol. 20, No. 1, March 2014
    • Successfully defended against a Petition for Joinder of Additional Defendant that sought to place liability on our client as a statutory employer under the Act.  The judge found that the original defendants had failed to join the proper party, had failed to prove that our client was a statutory employer, and had failed to prove facts sufficient to pierce the corporate veil. Our client was dismissed from the claim.
    • Defeated a claim where the claimant was alleging that his degenerative disc disease in his cervical and lumbar spine was caused by his years of employment as a lineman for a cable services company. 
    • Prevailed in several cases for a meat packing company by proving that the claimants' alleged repetitive stress injuries to the upper extremities (shoulder injuries, carpal tunnel, etc.) were not caused by their employment. 
    • Successfully defended numerous federal black lung claims filed by miners, even when the miner was able to prove an extensive coal mine employment history and significant exposure to coal dust, and widows' claims when the miners had been awarded lifetime benefits, but the widows were unable to prove that coal workers' pneumoconiosis caused or significantly contributed to the miners' death.
    • Successfully defended a claim in which claimant was seriously injured in an automobile accident on her way to work by convincing the judge and Appeal Board that the facts of the case did not meet the criteria for exclusion from the coming and going rule. 
    • Successfully defended multiple claims where claimant was working under restrictions but was fired by the employer. Successfully argued to several Workers' Compensation Judges that the claimant was fired for cause and for reasons unrelated to the work injury and that benefits should not be awarded or reinstated.

Results

Successfully Represented an Insurance Company in a Workers’ Compensation Appellate Matter

We successfully represented an insurance company before the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania. The court agreed with our argument that the claimant needed to provide notice of his work-related injury to the defendant insurance company within 120 days of the occurrence of the injury due to his combined status as sole proprietor/owner and also the employee in this matter. The judges distinguished the facts of the case due to the fact that the claimant was a sole proprietor, owner and the only employee of his own business. The court agreed that allowing the claimant to pursue a claim, by claiming that he provided notice to himself immediately when the accident occurred, but did not bother to report the injury to the insurance company for over a year thereafter, would result in an absurdity and put the insurance company at a disadvantage in the investigation of the claim. The court also noted that the definition of “employer” in certain portions of the Act includes not only the actual employer as a business itself, but also the employer’s duly authorized agent or its insurer, if such insurer has assumed the employer’s liability. Since the claimant failed to provide notice to the insurance company within 120 days of his injury, the court held that the Claim Petition was barred. The Claim Petition was dismissed, and the claimant was not entitled to any benefits at all.

Establishing Failure to Well-Plead Secures a Win for the Defense

In our successful appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the workers’ compensation judge had awarded a closed period of benefits and then terminated all benefits, despite the employer’s late answer. The judge found that the description of injury was not well-pled and, therefore, not deemed admitted. The Appeal Board reversed the judge on the full termination of benefits, saying that, since our IME physician did not acknowledge a work-related psychiatric injury, his testimony was in conflict with the admitted injury due to the late answer. They reversed the judge and ordered reinstatement of temporary total disability benefits. The Commonwealth Court found in our favor and reversed. The court held that the judge was correct that the injury was not well-pled and that we were not deemed to have admitted a psychiatric injury. Therefore, they reinstated the judge’s decision which terminated benefits.

Thought Leadership

What's Hot in Workers' Comp

Pennsylvania Bureau of Workers' Compensation Payment Authorization Form

January 14, 2025

On October 29, 2024, Pennsylvania Governor Josh Shapiro signed into law Senate Bill 1232, which amended the Pennsylvania Workers’ Compensation Act to require that employers and insurers offer claimants the option to receive their workers’ compensation wage loss payments by direct deposit. The Direct Deposit law took effect December 28, 2024. Pursuant to the law, direct deposit must be offered to all claimants as an option for payment of indemnity benefits on or before December 28, 2025.  Employers and carriers can start offering direct deposit immediately. The Bureau recently issued a form (LIBC-215) that employers and carriers can send to claimants to authorize direct deposit. A copy of the form can be found at this link:  Payment Authorization Form LIBC-215  Please note that claimants are not required to use direct deposit, but the law requires that it be offered as an option. Please contact any of our Pennsylvania Workers’ Compensation attorneys if you have any questions regarding this new requirement.    What’s Hot in Workers’ Comp – Special PA Alert – January 14, 2025, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2025 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Goodbye ‘Yellow Freight’ Road?

November 15, 2024

Pursuant to Yellow Freight System v. Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board (Madara), 423 A.2d 1125 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1981), an employer’s answer to a claim petition that is filed more than 20 days after the assignment of the claim petition to a workers’ compensation judge (WCJ) is deemed to be a “late answer” and the employer is deemed to have admitted all well pleaded facts alleged in the claim petition. While not a complete default judgment, the granting of a Yellow Freight motion by a WCJ will often mean that a claim is found compensable and benefits are payable with the burden of proof shifting to the employer to prove that benefits should be modified, suspended or terminated.

Events

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Perlmutter Provides Predictability for Punitive Damages Claims in Florida

In a much anticipated decision, the Florida Supreme Court provided clarity for the standards of proof for punitive damages claims in Perlmutter v. Federal Insurance Company, SC2024-0058 (Fla. June 11, 2026). Litigants and trial judges must be mindful of the standards laid out by the Court. And, defense practitioners must be prepared to alter their strategies to defend against such claims. Perlmutter came to the Court from the Fourth District, based on conflict jurisdiction with decisions from the Second and Fifth District and on certification of a question of great public importance as to the standard of proof for punitive damages claims at the pleading stage. Fed. Ins. Co. v. Perlmutter, 376 So. 3d 24, 29 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023). In the underlying case, the Fourth District made two conclusions. First, it held that a “trial court must consider the evidentiary showing by all parties at the hearing on the motion to amend, that is, evidence ‘in the record’ and evidence ‘proffered by the claimant.’”  376 So. 3d at 33. Second, the Fourth held that it “interpreted section 768.72(1) and (2) to require the trial court to make a preliminary determination of whether a reasonable jury, viewing the totality of proffered evidence in the light most favorable to the movant, could find by clear and convincing evidence that punitive damages are warranted.  Id. at 34 (underscoring in the original). In making these conclusions, the court cautioned trial courts that the “preliminary determination” analysis did not entitle the trial court to decide whether the evidence is clear and convincing and noted that the trial court should not weigh evidence and should not determine witness credibility. Id. The Florida Supreme Court accepted jurisdiction and answered the certified question in the negative. It quashed the decision below and remanded the case for application of the following standards: The trial court should consider only the evidence identified or proffered by the claimant; it should not entertain an evidentiary counter-submission from the opponent. The trial court should consider whether a reasonable person could conclude based on the claimant’s evidence, that the defendant committed “intentional misconduct” or “gross negligence” as defined in section 768.72(2) or section 768.72(3). The trial court must review the request for punitive damages in the context of the underlying claims. The trial court should not apply the clear and convincing standard of proof in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence at the pleading stage. The trial court does not act as a fact-finder; the trial court must not weigh the claimant’s evidence—it cannot decide the truth of the matter. The trial court must consider the record evidence and the proffered evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, but the allegations in the proposed amended complaint are not themselves evidence. Perlmutter, SC2024-0058 at 13-15 (emphasis added). In explaining these standards, the Court interpreted the text of the statute and compared it to a related statute which governs punitive damages in the nursing home context. The nursing home statute expressly calls for evidentiary submissions by “the parties” and expressly tells the trial court to determine whether there is a reasonable basis to believe the claimant could satisfy the “clear and convincing evidence” standard at trial. Id. at 17-18 (comparing the text of section 768.72(1), Florida Statutes, with section 400.0237, Florida Statutes). Without that express language in section 768.72, the statute could not be applied in the same manner. With these standards specially delineated for the trial courts, the Court is “confident that its interpretation of section 768.72(1) will not frustrate the effectiveness of the statute in accomplishing the Legislature’s textually evident purposes.” Id.  at 22 (cleaned up). This remains to be seen. While Perlmutter provides predictability and clarity for trial courts when reviewing the evidentiary submissions in support of a punitive damages claim, the decision will not likely impact the numbers of punitive damages motions filed. Rather, these new parameters will change the way claims are defended, reminiscent of a time when rulings on punitive damages were only subject to certiorari review and appellate courts were limited in reviewing procedural errors. This decision will likely deflate the level-playing field that Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(3)(G) addressed by allowing appeals of orders granting and denying punitive damages amendments. Further, Perlmutter may have impliedly created a call to action for the Legislature to amend section 768.72(1) in the same manner it amended section 400.0237 to allow the courts to analyze “admissible evidence submitted by the parties” and determine at a hearing whether there is a reasonable basis to believe the claimant at trial would be able to demonstrate by “clear and convincing evidence” that the recovery of punitive damages is warranted. Until then, defendants must adjust their strategies. To adapt to these new standards, defense practitioners will need to tailor their strategy for defending punitive damages claims since they can no longer submit a counter-proffer or urge a court to apply the clear and convincing standard at the pleading phase. Instead, defendants will need to attack the deficiencies in the claimant’s pleadings and proffer. If the trial court fails to serve as a gatekeeper, and does not apply the above standards, then defendants can pursue an interlocutory appeal under Rule 9.130(a)(3)(G). If a nonfinal appeal is taken, then defendants should move to stay any intrusive financial discovery while the appellate court analyzes the issues on appeal. Finally, defendants should utilize Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.510 to serve as a screening device to allow the trial court to analyze all evidence and prevent nonmeritorious punitive damages claims from proceeding to a jury.

News

Marshall Dennehey’s John J. Hare Brings Home Attorney of the Year Honors; Firm Named Litigation Department of the Year in Two Categories

Marshall Dennehey took home top honors in three categories at the The Legal Intelligencer’s 2026 Pennsylvania Legal Awards, held June 11 in Philadelphia. The first place awards include: Attorney of the Year: John J. Hare, Chair of the firm’s Appellate Advocacy & Post-Trial Practice Group and Executive Committee member, together with Charles “Chip” Becker of Kline & Specter Litigation Department of the Year, Appellate – Third Win in a Row! Litigation Department of the Year, Product Liability/Mass Torts “There is no one more deserving of Attorney of the Year honors than John. This award is a testament to his exceptional skill, dedication, and leadership—qualities that truly exemplify the very best of our firm,” said G. Mark Thompson, Marshall Dennehey’s President & CEO. “These honors also reflect the strength and depth of our product liability, mass torts, and appellate practices across Pennsylvania and beyond, underscoring our ongoing commitment to delivering outstanding results for our clients.” Attorney of the Year – John J. Hare, Marshall Dennehey, together with Charles “Chip” Becker, Kline & Specter Over the past year, John and Charles were opposing counsel in many of the highest-profile civil appeals in Pennsylvania. John is renowned as a preeminent appellate lawyer on the defense side, and Chip on the plaintiff's side. They have opposed each other repeatedly, exhibiting peerless professionalism and exceptional civility, while zealously litigating under the unremitting pressure of high-profile litigation and record-setting verdicts totaling more than $3.5 billion. They have also collaborated, outside of litigation, on many commissions, committees, and projects of importance to the Pennsylvania judiciary and legal community. Litigation Department of the Year – Appellate Law, Winner (previous winner, 2025 and 2024) 2025 was another standout year for the firm’s Appellate Advocacy & Post‑Trial Practice Group, led by John J. Hare, which was retained to challenge many of Pennsylvania’s “nuclear” verdicts—awards exceeding $10 million. Notably, the department persuaded the Pennsylvania Superior Court to reverse a Philadelphia judgment of $1.09 billion, the largest judgment ever overturned by a Pennsylvania appellate court. The group’s 11 full‑time Pennsylvania‑based appellate lawyers are at the center of Pennsylvania’s most high-profile matters, bringing more than 150 years of combined appellate experience. They routinely handle post‑trial and appellate matters and are frequently engaged to participate in and monitor trials in high‑exposure cases to ensure that critical legal issues are properly raised and preserved for appeal. Litigation Department of the Year – Product Liability/Mass Torts, Winner This marks the first win for the firm’s Pennsylvania Product Liability and Mass Torts practices, which operate within our Casualty Department, managed by Matthew Schorr and Jeff Rapattoni. For almost five decades, Fortune 500 product manufacturers/distributors and their insurers have turned to these groups to defend their litigation. Led by Bradley D. Remick and Vlada Tasich, our Product Liability group’s success can be attributed to its commitment to keeping abreast of ever-changing legal theories, judicial viewpoints, and evolving technology impacting the product liability landscape. Our attorneys have successfully handled thousands of product liability matters in all jurisdictions across the state. Likewise, our mass tort litigation practice – divided into Asbestos & Mass Tort, and Environmental & Toxic Tort Litigation –  has defended manufacturers, distributors, contractors, and premises owners in thousands of personal injury and other claims. Led by Kevin E. Hexstall and Patrick T. Reilly, most attorneys in these groups have more than 20 years of experience, and our seasoned trial team has tried hundreds of cases to verdict, consistently achieving strong results through both trials and settlements. In addition to these awards, Marshall Dennehey was a Litigation Department of the Year finalist for Professional Liability.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

Unanimous New Jersey Supreme Court Holds That Personal Emails of Public Employees and Officials are Subject to OPRA

In Rosetti v. Ramapo-Indian Hills Regional High School Board of Education, the New Jersey Supreme Court unanimously held that government-related emails, which are contained within personal email accounts, are government records under the Open Public Records Act (OPRA), and a log of those emails must be produced when requested. In reaching this decision, the court conducted an analysis of the OPRA and cited previous cases that held that emails do in fact fall within OPRA’s definition of a record and must be produced when requested pursuant to the Act. The court in Rosetti then had to answer the question as to whether public officials’ personal email accounts that are used for government purposes are subject to OPRA, and found that they are. Rosetti made an OPRA request to the Board of Education seeking email logs from Board members’ personal email accounts. The Board refused to produce the logs and indicated that it was not under any obligation to produce personal email account logs, only from government-related email accounts. The issue was whether a log had to be produced for Board members’ personal email accounts, which they used to conduct Board business. The Board argued that while it was possible to create a log for government-related email accounts through its IT Department, it was not possible to do so for personal email accounts. The court rejected this argument and ruled that Board members are required to search their personal email accounts and create a log of government-related emails housed in those accounts. Once completed, each Board member then must submit a certification detailing the searches that were conducted. The court went one step further with a suggestion to government employees and officials, stating, “[g]overnment agencies should strongly advise their employees, elected officials, and others engaged in government-related business to refrain from using their personal email accounts when conducting government-related business.”  Please do not hesitate to contact me with any questions regarding this case and others pertaining to the OPRA. 

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court Holds Self-Referral Prohibition Does Not Cover Prescriptions Written by Physicians with Ownership Interests in Dispensing Pharmacies

700 Pharmacy v. Bureau of Workers’ Compensation Fee Review Hearing Office (State Workers’ Insurance Fund); Nos. 97, 98, 99, 100, 101 MAP 2024; decided June 16, 2026; by Justice Mundy.   In this case, Drs. Miteswar Purewal and Shailen Jalali, treating physicians for workers’ compensation claimants, wrote prescriptions for various medications that were filled by 700 Pharmacy. The worker’s compensation insurer refused to pay for the prescriptions on the basis that they were illegal self-referrals under the Act. 700 Pharmacy subsequently filed fee review applications with The Bureau of Workers’ Compensation Medical Fee Review Office. At a fee review hearing, both physicians stipulated they had a financial interest in the pharmacy.  The physicians argued that the Anti-Referral Provision of the Act does not bar self-referrals on prescription drugs and pharmaceutical services, since the provision does not specifically identify prescription drugs. The Fee Review Hearing Officer rejected this argument and found that prescriptions for medications are prohibited under the “goods or services” language included in the provision. 700 Pharmacy appealed to the Commonwealth Court, and the court affirmed, agreeing with the Hearing Officer’s interpretation of “goods and services” as encompassing prescriptions. 700 Pharmacy appealed to the Supreme Court.  The Supreme Court reversed the decisions of the Hearing Officer and the Commonwealth Court, holding that the term “goods and services” in the Anti-Referral Provision of the Act did not include prescriptions. According to the Court, “goods and services” was not a catch-all, but simply explanatory as to the eight enumerated categories in the provision. The provision (Section 306(f.1)(3)(iii)) reads, in pertinent part: Notwithstanding any other provision of law, it is unlawful for a provider to refer a person for laboratory, physical therapy, rehabilitation, chiropractic, radiation oncology, psychometric, home infusion therapy  or diagnostic imaging, goods or services pursuant to this section if the provider has a financial interest with the person or in the entity that receives the referral. The Court said that if the General Assembly wanted to specifically include prescription drugs and pharmaceutical services in the Anti-Referral Provision, they would have done so. They pointed out that prescription drugs and pharmaceutical services were included by the legislature in Section 306 (f.1)(3)(vi) of the Act as to reimbursement, and claimed that their omission from the Anti-Referral Provision supports the conclusion that those services are not included in the Anti-Referral Provision’s self-referral prohibition.