Joshua is a member of the Professional Liability Department and focuses his practice on appellate advocacy, post-trial motions, and appeals. His practice extends to civil rights and public entity litigation, employment law, school leaders’ liability, and healthcare matters. Before joining Marshall Dennehey, Joshua clerked for Pennsylvania Supreme Court Justice Daniel D. McCaffery during his tenure on the Superior Court of Pennsylvania. There, Joshua engaged in the resolution of complex civil and criminal matters at the appellate level. Prior to serving in chambers, Joshua participated in Marshall Dennehey’s Summer Associate Program and interned for Rodney A. Smolla, former Dean of Widener University School of Law. As an intern, Joshua was responsible for revising and analyzing common law jurisdictional developments in First Amendment jurisprudence for the legal treatise, "Smolla & Nimmer on Freedom of Speech."
In 2021, Joshua earned his Juris Doctor, cum laude, from Widener University School of Law. During law school, Joshua was regularly recognized on the Dean’s List and held senior positions on various honor societies, such as the Widener Law Review, the Transactional Law Honor Society, and the Moot Court Honor Society. During his tenure on the executive committee of the Moot Court Honor Society, Joshua earned top marks in many interscholastic, appellate moot court competitions, including top oralist in the 2021 Touro Law Center’s National Moot Court Competition on Law and Religion. Joshua’s interscholastic achievements led to his induction into the Order of the Barristers, an honorary organization for law students and practicing lawyers who demonstrate exceptional skill in trial advocacy, oral advocacy, and brief writing.
Joshua is deeply committed to fostering legal skills and advancing the professional development of future attorneys. He is an adjunct professor of Legal Methods at Widener University School of Law and volunteers his time as a coach for Widener’s Moot Court Honor Society.
Results
Summary Judgment Secured in a Section 1983 Substantive Due Process Case
We obtained summary judgment in a Section 1983 substantive due process claim involving a Philadelphia police officer. The officer had taken a photo of the plaintiff’s son after he attempted suicide by jumping off a bridge, and the photo was later circulated on social media. The plaintiff alleged that circulation of the photo violated her substantive due process privacy rights, and she also asserted a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. One week before trial began, the Honorable Mark Kearney, U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, held, although the plaintiff possessed a viable privacy right, that right was not clearly established at the time of the incident; therefore, the court granted qualified immunity to the officer. Additionally, the court held the plaintiff failed to present competent expert opinion evidence establishing her emotional distress and, therefore, dismissed the state tort claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Defense Verdict Secured in Section 1983 Malicious Prosecution Trial
We secured a defense verdict in a Section 1983 malicious prosecution trial in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The plaintiff alleged that our client’s law enforcement officers falsified evidence and testimony in order to maliciously prosecute him for conspiracy for engaging in the illegal sale of narcotics. We successfully contended that the former narcotics detective, who corroborated the plaintiff’s complaint, was lying, and called various members of our client’s narcotics unit to testify about the facts of the investigation.
Thought Leadership
Case Law Alerts
The en banc Third Circuit concludes citizens with prior felony convictions for welfare fraud are among ‘the people’ protected by the Second Amendment.
July 1, 2023
In 1995, Bryan David Range pleaded guilty to one count of making a false statement to obtain food stamps in violation of Pennsylvania law and faced up to five years’ imprisonment. Following the conviction, Mr. Range attempted to purchase a firearm but was rejected by Pennsylvania’s instant background check system. He then learned the 1995 conviction prohibited him from possessing a firearm under 18 U.S.C § 922(g)(1), which criminalizes the possession of a firearm or ammunition by a person who has been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year. Mr. Range filed for equitable relief in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, seeking among other remedies a declaration that Section 922(g)(1), as applied to him, violates the Second Amendment. The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the Government, so Mr. Range appealed. Applying New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 142 S. Ct. 2111 (2022), a panel of the Third Circuit affirmed. Mr. Range was then granted rehearing, the panel decision was vacated, and the en banc court reversed. In Range, Judge Hardiman explains that Bruen abrogated the Third Circuit’s “two-step” Second Amendment jurisprudence such that future Second Amendment challenges must be analyzed under Bruen’s three-part test, which requires determination of: (1) whether the challenger is “of the people” who have Second Amendment rights; (2) whether the plain text of the Second Amendment covers the challenger’s conduct; and (3) if so, whether the government has proven that the firearms regulation is part of the historical tradition that delimits the outer bounds of the right to keep and bear arms. Under this analysis the en banc majority reversed the district court, concluding: (1) Mr. Range was among “the people” protected by the Second Amendment, despite his non-violent felony conviction, because the rights conferred by the Second Amendment presumptively belong to all Americans; (2) by prohibiting Mr. Range from possessing a rile to hunt and a shotgun to defend himself at home, Section 922(g)(1) regulates conduct protected by the plain text of the Second Amendment; and (3) since Section 922(g)(1) is not a “longstanding” regulation as contemplated by D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), and it could not otherwise identify an older analogous regulation, the Government failed to demonstrate Section 922(g)(1) was consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearms regulations. Accordingly, the en banc majority held that Section 922(g)(1), as applied to citizens with prior felony convictions for welfare fraud, violates the Second Amendment. Case Law Alerts, 3rd Quarter, July 2023 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. Copyright © 2023 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm.
Case Law Alerts
Following Commonwealth v. Alexander, Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution continues to permit warrantless “inventory searches” of impounded automobiles.
April 1, 2023
In Commonwealth v. Alexander, 243 A.3d 177 (Pa. 2020), the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution affords greater privacy interests than the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and, thus, requires both probable cause and exigent circumstances before a vehicle may be subject to a warrantless investigatory search for evidence of a crime. The Superior Court of Pennsylvania rejected, in a case of first impression, the argument that Alexander necessarily eliminated the “inventory search” exception to the warrant requirement, which allows a warrantless search of a vehicle lawfully impounded, so long as the search is undertaken for a noncriminal purpose pursuant to a routine practice of securing and inventorying the impounded vehicle’s contents. Distinguishing Alexander, the Superior Court emphasized that an inventory search proceeds from a “community caretaking” principle and, therefore, does not involve the probable cause determination required for investigatory searches. While recognizing Alexander may support placing limitations on the inventory search exception, the court declined to address the viability of any such limitations because the appellant argued only that Alexander eliminated the inventory search exception in total. Accordingly, Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution continues to permit warrantless “inventory searches” of impounded automobiles, without limitation. Case Law Alerts, 2nd Quarter, April 2023 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. Copyright © 2023 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm.
