.

Jordan L. Mazzoni

Associate

JLMazzoni@mdwcg.com

Portrait of Jordan L. Mazzoni

Jordan is a member of the firm’s Professional Liability Department, where she represents public entities, employers, self-insured businesses, insurers, and licensed professionals in a broad range of high-exposure litigation and professional liability matters. Her practice is centered on strategic risk management, efficient resolution of disputes, and delivering practical counsel tailored to each client’s operational and legal needs.

Jordan’s Public Entity and Civil Rights practice includes the defense of municipalities, police departments, school districts, zoning officials, and public agencies in complex litigation involving constitutional claims, civil rights allegations, use of force claims, premises liability, and governmental liability issues. She regularly represents public-sector clients in matters arising under Section 1983 and other state and federal statutes, while navigating the unique procedural and immunity defenses available to governmental entities and officials.

In her Employment Law practice, Jordan defends employers against claims involving discrimination, retaliation, harassment, hostile work environment allegations, whistleblower claims, wrongful termination, and sexual assault allegations. She works closely with employers to assess litigation exposure, develop defense strategies, and address sensitive workplace matters with discretion and practical business insight.

Jordan also maintains active First-Party Property, Insurance Coverage, and Liquor Liability Defense practices. She represents insurers in coverage disputes, bad faith litigation, fraud investigations, and Special Investigations Unit (SIU) matters, including the analysis of complex insurance policies and advising carriers on coverage obligations. In her Liquor Liability Defense practice, Jordan represents bars, restaurants, taverns, distributors, and hospitality businesses in dram shop and liquor liability claims involving personal injury, assault, intoxication-related incidents, and wrongful death allegations. She works closely with insureds and carriers to evaluate exposure, develop defense strategies, and navigate the unique statutory and regulatory issues impacting licensed establishments.

Prior to joining Marshall Dennehey, Jordan served as an Assistant District Attorney in the Lackawanna County District Attorney's Office, where she prosecuted criminal matters with a concentration in narcotics-related offenses as a member of the Narcotics Unit.

Jordan earned her Juris Doctor from Widener University Commonwealth Law School, where she was an active member of the Student Bar Association. She received her bachelor’s degree in Liberal Studies, with concentrations in pre-medicine and pre-law, from University of Scranton.

    • Widener University Commonwealth Law School (J.D., 2017)
    • University of Scranton (B.S., 2013)
    • Pennsylvania, 2017
    • Pennsylvania Super Lawyers Rising Star (2024-2026)
    • Lackawanna County Bar Association, Young Lawyers Division, Board Member

Results

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Successful Defense of Employer Alleged to Have Violated the Pennsylvania Medical Marijuana Act

The plaintiff sought employment as a fork lift operator in a manufacturing facility. He was extended a conditional offer of employment, contingent on passing a pre-employment drug test. His drug test showed a positive indication for the presence of marijuana, and his offer was rescinded. The plaintiff claimed that he notified the facility that he held a valid Medical Marijuana Identification Card, yet our client still rescinded its offer in violation of the Pennsylvania Medical Marijuana Act. The Act prohibits an employer from refusing to hire a person solely on the basis of that person’s status as a certified medical marijuana user. In response to the complaint, we filed preliminary objections arguing that the employment offer was expressly contingent upon passing a drug test. We also argued that fork lift operation is, by its very nature, an inherently dangerous job that, if done carelessly or under the influence of a narcotic, could result in injury or death to the plaintiff or others on the premises. The court held that the Medical Marijuana Act’s provisions do not require an employer to hire a medical marijuana user as a forklift operator and taking on a substantial risk of liability for injury to persons. Additionally, the court found that a medical marijuana user does not have a right to be hired by a prospective employer who, prior to such hiring, determines that the position for which the prospective employee would be hired would require his or her performance of tasks an employer deems life-threatening to the employee or any of its employees. The demurer was sustained, and the complaint was dismissed.

Thought Leadership

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Case Law Alerts

Third Circuit Broadens CHRIA’s Scope in Pennsylvania Employment Law

April 1, 2026

The Third Circuit clarified the scope of Pennsylvania’s Criminal History Record Information Act (CHRIA), holding that the statute applies even when an employer learns of a criminal conviction directly from the job applicant. Plaintiff Rodney Phath applied for a truck driver position with Central Transport and received an interview because he had relevant experience, appeared to be a good candidate with a commercial driver’s license, and had federal clearance to access secure ports. During the hiring process, Central Transport said it would check his criminal record, so Phath voluntarily disclosed a 15-year-old armed robbery conviction for which he spent six years in prison. The employer immediately rejected his application based on that conviction. Phath sued, alleging violations of CHRIA, which limits how employers may consider history in hiring decisions. The district court dismissed the case, reasoning that CHRIA did not apply because the employer learned of the conviction from the applicant rather than from the state. Pennsylvania's Criminal History Record Information Act limits disclosure and use of “criminal history record information.” 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 9101–9183. That includes “[i]nformation collected by criminal justice agencies” about a person's description, arrests, indictments, convictions, and the like, and prospective employers may request that information from state agencies. §§ 9102, 9113(e), 9121(b), 9125. The issue is whether the Act covered the plaintiff’s own disclosure. When an employer is in receipt of the information which is part of an employment applicant’s criminal history record information file, the employer may use the applicant’s prior convictions for the purpose of deciding whether or not to hire the applicant § 9125(a); but employers may use those convictions “only to the extent to which they relate to the applicant’s suitability” for the job. § 91125(b). If the employer rejects the applicant because of the criminal history information, it must give the applicant written notice of that decision. § 9125(c). The plaintiff alleged violations of subsections (b) and (c), but the dispute was over subsection (a), as Central Transport had not attempted to show that the plaintiff’s conviction made him unsuitable to drive their trucks, nor that they notified him of this rejection in writing. Central Transport argued the Act did not apply because it acquired the information from plaintiff, not from a state agency. The Third Circuit rejected this argument and reversed, holding that CHRIA applies whenever an employer is in receipt of criminal history information that is part of an applicant’s criminal history record, regardless of the source of that information.

Case Law Alerts

Court Dismisses Inmate’s § 1983 Civil Rights Complaint as Time-Barred and Legally Deficient

October 1, 2025

The plaintiff, Javier Gomez, an inmate at SCI-Coal Township, brought a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Gomez alleged that on July 14, 2022, a fellow inmate, Higgin, assaulted him. He also named several unidentified correctional and medical staff as defendants for failing to protect him and for deliberate indifference to his medical needs. Gomez filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis.  The court conducted a preliminary screening under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2), as well as 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c), applying the same standard as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, requiring a complaint to state a plausible claim supported by factual allegations (Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)). Gomez’s pro se complaint was liberally construed (Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007)). The court found that claims against fellow inmate Higgin were legally deficient because a § 1983 defendant must be a person acting under color of state law, and fellow inmates do not qualify as such (West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988)).  Additionally, Gomez’s claims were time-barred as the applicable statute of limitations for § 1983 claims in Pennsylvania is two years, and Gomez filed suit nearly three years after the alleged assault (42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524(2); Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384 (2007)).  Regarding the John and Jane Doe defendants, Gomez failed to allege any specific facts showing that correctional or medical staff were deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of harm or that they personally participated in any constitutional violation, as required to state a claim (Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1970); Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192 (3d Cir. 1999)). The allegation that inmate Higgin displayed “abrasive/aggressive behavior” was insufficient to establish a substantial risk of serious harm or deliberate indifference by prison officials. The court further explained that failure to protect claims require proof that officials knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to inmate safety. Gomez did not allege any prior violent history between himself and Higgin, or any facts suggesting that prison staff had actual knowledge of a specific risk, making the claim speculative and insufficient under controlling precedent. Conclusory allegations without factual support were not entitled to be accepted as true. As a result, the court granted Gomez leave to proceed in forma pauperis, but dismissed his complaint for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), 1915A(b)(1) and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1). Given the statute of limitations bar and numerous pleading deficiencies, the court found that an amendment to his compliant would be futile, and denied leave to amend.  This decision highlights the importance of timely filing, naming appropriate defendants who act under the color of state law, and providing factual allegations sufficient to state plausible constitutional claims in prisoner civil rights actions.   Case Law Alerts, 4th Quarter, October 2025 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. Copyright © 2025 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm.

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Firm Highlights

blue facade of a hospital sign against blue sky

Result

Defense Verdict in Complex Medical Malpractice Trial

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

empty courtroom photo

Result

Summary Judgment Secured for Life Insurance Agent

Marshall Dennehey Announces 2026 Ohio Super Lawyers and Rising Stars

News

Marshall Dennehey Announces 2026 Ohio Super Lawyers and Rising Stars

Thought Leadership

New Jersey Appellate Division Affirms Exclusion of Legal Malpractice Expert as Impermissible Net Opinion

Jack Slimm and Jeremy Zacharias obtained a favorable decision on behalf of their client in a case centering on the admissibility of expert testimony in legal malpractice actions. In Martin v. Loury, the New Jersey Appellate Division affirmed the exclusion of a plaintiff's legal malpractice expert, holding that the expert's opinions on causation and damages were too speculative to support the malpractice claim. The legal malpractice action arose from an underlying employment dispute involving claims for damages stemming from the breach of an employment agreement. The plaintiff alleged that defense counsel committed malpractice during a second trial by failing to recall the plaintiff as a rebuttal witness after the employer's CEO testified. According to the plaintiff's expert, additional rebuttal testimony would have bolstered the plaintiff's damages claims and led to a more favorable result. Both the trial court and the Appellate Division rejected that theory. The courts found that the expert could not explain how the proposed rebuttal testimony would have altered the outcome of the underlying case or resulted in any additional recoverable damages. Notably, the trial judge in the underlying employment matter had already rejected the CEO's testimony as not credible and had accepted the damages analysis advanced by the plaintiff. The court had also determined that the amount of damages was not genuinely disputed. As a result, the expert's opinion that additional rebuttal testimony would have produced a better outcome was unsupported by the record and based on speculation rather than evidence. The Appellate Division agreed that neither the plaintiff nor the expert could identify any actual damages attributable to the alleged malpractice or demonstrate the required element of proximate causation. The court further upheld the trial court's application of New Jersey's net opinion doctrine, finding that the expert failed to provide the necessary "why and wherefore" supporting his conclusion that the attorney's conduct caused a compensable loss. Because the opinions rested on unquantified possibilities rather than demonstrable facts, they were inadmissible. Key Takeaway for Legal Malpractice Defendants For attorneys and firms defending legal malpractice claims, Martin v. Loury underscores the importance of closely scrutinizing an opponent's expert report on the critical elements of proximate causation and damages. The decision demonstrates that a malpractice claim cannot survive where an expert merely speculates that different litigation tactics might have produced a better result. Instead, the plaintiff must present admissible expert testimony grounded in the record that explains how the alleged attorney error probably changed the outcome of the underlying matter and resulted in measurable damages.

Portrait of Carolyn Schweizer, with text below: Philadelphia Office Managing Attorney

News

Marshall Dennehey Names Carolyn Schweizer New Philadelphia Office Managing Attorney

Thought Leadership

Court Allows Recklessness and Punitive Damages Claims to Proceed After Work‑Zone Crash

In a case where a defendant filed preliminary objections against allegations of recklessness and punitive damages, the Susquehanna County Court of Common Pleas denied these preliminary objections. This case stems from a motor vehicle accident, where the defendants car struck the plaintiffs car after the defendant allegedly fell asleep at the wheel, going at a high rate of speed, through a construction work zone. Defendant first objected to the general allegations throughout the plaintiff’s complaint pertaining to “reckless” conduct contending that there were insufficient factual allegations to support the claim of reckless conduct. Defendant next objected to the plaintiffs claim for punitive damages, as punitive damages may only be assessed against a motorist for falling asleep while driving if there is further evidence to prove driver was aware of their drowsiness and risk of falling asleep. Lastly, defendant objected to plaintiffs complaint, claiming it lacked specificity. The court here found that the plaintiff had included in the complaint specific allegations related to the defendant’s alleged recklessness, including allegations regarding speeding in a work zone, almost striking the flagger, falling asleep at the wheel, and striking the plaintiffs vehicle which was stopped. Additionally, the court noted that falling asleep does not come without warning. The court found that these allegations were sufficient to support an allegation of recklessness at the pleadings stage.

Thought Leadership

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania Holds That Public Policy Does Not Prevent Insurance Coverage for Sex Trafficking Claims

On July 21, 2026, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania issued an opinion emphasizing the limited circumstances in which courts may invoke public policy to bar insurance coverage, holding in Samsung Fire & Marine Insurance Co., Ltd. (U.S. Branch) v. RI Settlement Trust that Pennsylvania public policy does not preclude coverage for claims alleging that insureds enabled or profited from human sex trafficking. The decision rejects a line of federal district court decisions predicting otherwise and reinforces that Pennsylvania courts will invoke the public policy doctrine only in the clearest of circumstances. RI Settlement is particularly significant because it arose on certified questions from the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, giving the Supreme Court the opportunity to resolve an issue on which federal courts had predicted Pennsylvania law differently. RI Settlement arose out of four separate civil complaints in which the underlying plaintiffs alleged that, as minors, they were the victims of human sex trafficking at various hotels in Philadelphia. The plaintiffs claimed that the hotel owners were negligent in failing to stop the sex trafficking from happening at their hotels. After the filing of the lawsuits, the hotel owners sought coverage under their Commercial General Liability policies. The insurers initially defended the hotels under Reservation of Rights letters, though the carriers later filed Declaratory Judgment actions seeking declarations that they did not owe a duty to defend or indemnify. In short, the insurers argued in the alternative that they did not owe any obligation to provide coverage based upon Pennsylvania public policy (because the claims violated the Human Trafficking Law – 18 Pa.C.S. § 3011) and the terms and conditions of the policy. On motions for judgment on the pleadings, the District Court found for the insurers on the basis of public policy: There is no duty to defend or indemnify against actions arising out of an insured's criminal conduct related to the sex trafficking of minors. The Court appreciates that it may make public policy the basis of a judicial decision only in “the clearest of cases.” See Minnesota Fire & Cas. Co. v. Greenfield, 589 A.2d 854, 868 (Pa. 2004) (quoting Hall v. Amica Mut. Ins. Co., 648 A.2d 755, 760 (Pa. 1994)). Yet, the Court strains to imagine a clearer case than the one presented here in which the facts alleged indicate that Policyholders engaged in criminal conduct in violation of Pennsylvania's Human Trafficking Law. The hotel owners appealed the matter to the Third Circuit, which petitioned the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania to grant review of two certified questions of law: (1) whether Pennsylvania law had an “overriding public policy” against sex trafficking, such that an insurer’s duty to defend and/or indemnify is abrogated when an insured is alleged to have enabled or profited from such trafficking; and (2) if yes, is that duty abrogated whenever the insured’s alleged conduct would constitute a violation of the Pennsylvania Human Trafficking statute. Importantly, the certified questions did not ask the Supreme Court to determine whether the policies afforded coverage under their terms. Rather, the court was asked only whether Pennsylvania public policy independently barred coverage. As a result, the court assumed for purposes of answering the certified questions that the insurers otherwise owed a duty to defend and addressed only the public policy issue, leaving all policy-based coverage defenses for further proceedings. Because the court concluded that the answer to the first certified question was “no”, it did not reach the second issue. In reaching its determination that Pennsylvania public policy does not prohibit insurance coverage for sex trafficking claims, the court limited the impact of its decision in Minnesota Fire & Cas. Co. v. Greenfield, 855 A. 2d 854, 855 (Pa. 2004), which the RI Settlement opinion emphasized as having been an “Opinion Announcing Judgment of the Court” – or a plurality opinion. In Greenfield, the insured homeowner was sued by the estate of his houseguest who overdosed from heroin that he sold to her. The matter wound its way to the Supreme Court, which determined that the insurer did not owe a duty to defend or indemnify based upon Pennsylvania public policy, which criminalized the sale and use of heroin as a Schedule I narcotic. In RI Settlement, the court “decline[d] the invitation” to extend the rationale of the three-justice plurality in Greenfield beyond cases involving Schedule I controlled substances. In so holding, the justices in RI Settlement refused to “divine an overriding public policy pronouncement by the General Assembly by virtue of its enactment of the Human Trafficking Law.” The opinion further states that it is not “within the purview of this Court to rank the magnitude of the public policy underlying the various crimes defined in the Crimes Code. It is sufficient for the work of the courts to know that the General Assembly has identified conduct it deems harmful and dangerous to the maintenance of an orderly society and criminalized it.” While the court declined to declare that Pennsylvania public policy prohibits coverage for sex trafficking claims, the opinion in RI Settlement expressly states that insurers are free to include appropriate exclusionary language for such causes of actions in their policies if they desire to do so. It will certainly be interesting to see whether the insurance industry accepts the court’s invitation, or perhaps whether the Pennsylvania legislature steps in to clarify that sex trafficking claims are indeed of the type or magnitude that they should not be covered by insurance. In any event, we will, of course, continue to monitor this and other insurance coverage issues that arise before courts in Pennsylvania, New Jersey and throughout our firm’s geographic footprint and around the country.

Casey Alan Coyle Joins Marshall Dennehey's PA Appellate Practice as a Shareholder in Harrisburg and Philadelphia

News

Marshall Dennehey Expands Leading Pennsylvania Appellate Practice With Addition of Shareholder Casey Coyle

Result

Summary Judgment Secured, Preserving $750,000 in Coverage for Insured in Major Trucking Liability Dispute

Ray Freudiger and Michael A. Roberts (both of Cincinnati) successfully obtained summary judgment on behalf of their client in a coverage dispute arising from a May 19, 2022, motor vehicle accident. A permissive driver operated a box truck for an interstate trucking company and caused severe injuries to two tort victims. Prior to the accident, the insured had procured a commercial auto policy for the trucking company with stated limits of $1,000,000. Following the accident, the insurer initiated a declaratory judgment action asserting that only reduced bodily injury limits of $25,000/$50,000 applied and later counterclaimed, alleging it would not have insured the driver had he been properly submitted for approval under the policy. After extensive discovery, briefing, and oral argument, the court rejected the insurer’s attempt to shift responsibility for the $750,000 in coverage it was legally required to provide for permissive drivers under Ohio law, granting summary judgment in favor of the insured and preserving $750,000 in liability exposure.